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ABSTRACT. 
The thesis is divided into two parts, Part I contains four 
chapters which map the pattern of legal changes relating to domestic 
violence against women from the 18th century to the 1980s. The 
history is written from the viewpoint of the legal interventions 
available to and used by women victims of domestic violence. 
Statutory enactments, case law and procedural changes in the relevant 
areas of criminal, family (ecclesiastical) and welfare law are 
described. Throughout Part I the discussion of the remedies 
available and reforms implemented is supplemented by the inclusion of 
case examples and statistical evidence showing local and national 
patterns of use. Chapter 1 describes the period from the start of 
the 18th century to the begining of the 20th; Chapter 2,1900 to the 
1960s, Chapter 3 from 1969 to 1977 and Chapter 4 the more recent 
history in the 10 years between 1977 to 1987. 
Part II contains five chapters and is based upon an analysis of 
women victim's needs in contemporary socio-legal discourse. Part II 
grew out of a concern about the part played by the law in the 
secondary assault of women. The main aim of the discussion is to 
look at how women victims' self defined needs inform the practice of 
the law and how the legal approach contributes to the creation of 
violent relations between men and women in the social institution of 
heterosexuality. Part II emphasises the use of written and spoken 
language in interactional settings to define women's needs. The 
discussion is based upon the analysis of: 
1. a survey of women involved in 54 legal cases concerning their 
partners' behaviour supplemented by interviews with legal advisors; 
2. case records obtained from solicitors' offices with the womens' 
permission; 
3. over 300 decisions traced from the published Law Reports; 
4.105 press reports of cases of domestic violence against women. 
Chapter 5 describes the method employed in the research for Part II. 
Chapter 6 contains the analysis of the women's cases; Chapter 7 the 
reported decisions and Chapter 8 the press reports. Chapter 9 
offers a summary of academic discourse and the abuse of women as 
well as a concluding discussion on some possibilities for the 
empowerment of women in law. 
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Introduction, 
In 1812 Mrs Waring applied for a court order as a result of her 
husband's cruelty (Waring v Waring (1813)). Mr Waring had given his 
wife an emetic in order to produce a miscarriage, compelled her to 
leave her bed straight after miscarrying, forbidden her contact with 
her family, dragged her from a chair and beaten her head against a 
marble chimney shelf, dragged her by the arm across the room, sworn 
at her and slapped her face. Witnesses and neighbours said they 
had often heard Mrs Waring screaming for help from the windows when 
her husband beat her. The court refused Mrs Waring's order on the 
ground that, as a result of her own behaviour, she had deserved such 
treatment. Mrs Waring had occasionally refused to cook her 
husband's dinner and resorted to her own strategies of defence (one 
day she confiscated her husband's wig and locked him in his room, 
just once she fought him back). Over 170 years later, women 
victims of domestic violence recount strikingly similar tales of legal 
non-interventions where professionals have sought legitimacy for 
their decisions on the grounds that the victims, as Edwards put it, 
'provoked their own demise' (Edwards, 1987). 
In a sense, women who experience male violence are subject to a 
double victimisation -a primary assault by the aggressor and a 
secondary assault executed by the institutional response to such 
crimes (see Dobash & Dobash, 1980; Stanko, 1985). The documented 
experiences of women victims of domestic violence show repeatedly 
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that legal, social and welfare agencies reinforce, condone and 
legitimise their victimisation with victim-blaming responses or 
refusals to intervene (Kinney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981; Homer, Leonard & 
Taylor, 1984). When individuals at the grass roots level of the 
legal profession and public services refuse a battered woman (and her 
children) housing, welfare support, an injunction or police protection 
on the grounds that the assault was 'Just a domestic', a 'trivial' 
matter, or deserved, they are reinforcing and supporting her 
victimisation. The secondary assault of women victims makes it 
harder for them to leave violent relationships by reinforcing their 
feelings of guilt and shame, making them feel even more powerless 
and certain that nobody cares or is able to help them. The part 
played by the law in the secondary assault of women forms the 
central focus of this study. 
For feminist activists, law reform presents a paradox. This has 
traditionally been at the forefront of campaigns even though it has 
been recognised that legal involvement can have the opposite effect 
of supporting- the gender inequalities which reformers wish to 
eradicate. The history of law reform and domestic violence against 
women clearly demonstrates this contradictory feature of the law. 
In Chapters Three and Four for example, the introduction of special 
legislation to remedy some of the problems of battered women is 
discussed. It will be argued that legislation introduced in the 
1970s to improve emergency and housing provisions for women victims 
of domestic violence could also be used in a perverse manner to 
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contribute to their secondary assault. By looking at the part 
played by the law in the secondary assault upon women, my intention 
was primarily to explore possibilities for change and to leave scope 
for future work on how to use the law to improve the position of 
battered women in society. The project was motivated by the 
understanding that although the law alone could not eradicate social 
inequalities, careful exploration of the law in action might 
nonetheless offer some possibilities for challenging their legal 
supports. 
Throughout history the debates on law reform and domestic violence 
against women oppose two conflicting views - what lawyers, judges, 
the police and policy makers say the law can do and what actually 
happens in practice. Although it has never been the subject of 
comprehensive policies, domestic violence against women has 
periodically been an issue of concern in debates on reform of divorce 
and matrimonial law, housing and welfare provision, police powers and 
the criminal law and the treatment of violent offenders. Other 
researchers have noted that historically domestic violence is a 
problem which 'emerges' or is 'discovered' every few years to be 
'solved' by policy reforms (Dobash & Dobash, 1980). On a cyclical 
pattern, those involved in reformist debates can put forward 
remarkably similar explanations concerning the need for legal 
intervention, the nature of the problem and the matters which hinder 
its eradication. Later discussion will show for example that time 
and again, lawyers, reformers and policy makers have argued that, in 
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its present form, the law offers 'sufficient' scope for the protection 
of battered and abused women. By divorcing the law from its social 
context and influences (such as race, class and sexual inequalities) 
and discussing its history in the politically aseptic vacuum of 'good 
intent', defenders of the legal status quo are able to map a pattern 
of policy changes which show a trend of the gradual easening of 
legal scrutiny and court control to produce fast and easy divorces, 
legal separations, 'quick' injunctions and so forth (see especially the 
discussion in Chapter Four). Whilst it may be relatively easy to 
maintain that the legal provisions for women victims of domestic 
violence are more adequate to cope with their needs than had 
previously been the case, the provisions available and their 
implementation in practice are not necessarily matched. The fact 
that domestic violence against women is or has been for 130 years or 
so illegal does little to alter women's recurring experiences of their 
victimisation as legitimate. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I and Part II offer 
discrete yet complementary surveys of the law and domestic violence 
against women. The aim of Part I is to trace the pattern of legal 
changes relating to domestic violence against women from the 
eighteenth century to the 1980s. Part I describes the 'lawyers' 
history whilst Part II aims to broaden the discussion in the 
contemporary era by analysing the law in its context as part of 
social life. Apart from the fact that the 'lawyer's history' in Part 
I is a piece of women's history yet to be documented (and, I would 
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contend, of value in its own right) it was necessary to conclude this 
prior to the discussion of material in Part II because: 
a. the survey shed light on the main preoccupations of 
lawmakers and legislators who had influence on the initiation, 
reform and implementation of the legal approach to cases of 
domestic violence against women. This was necessary for the 
later investigation of women's self-defined needs. 
b. it is not easy to understand the intricacies and pecularities 
of the present without some prior knowledge of the past. It 
would be difficult to look at the treatment of women's needs in 
contemporary legal discourse without prior discussion of the 
legal remedies available and how they developed, or without 
some knowledge of procedural matters. 
Whilst Part I discusses the provisions which were made available for 
women victims of domestic violence, Part II looks at how women 
victims' self defined needs inform the practice of the law and how 
the law contributes to the creation of violent relations between men 
and women in the social institution of heterosexuality. 
In Part I the development of statutory enactments, case law and 
procedural changes affecting the problem of domestic violence against 
women has been traced. The discussion does not document the 
origins of legal involvement in this area. An historical study with 
that objective would alone involve a considerable thesis which it was 
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felt would be best left to the historians. Readers who are 
interested in finding further information on the origins of legal 
involvement may find some already published research helpful. For 
example, as part of their 'context specific' research on domestic 
violence against women Dobash and Dobash (1980) traced legal 
involvement back to ancient Roman codes. In Part I the eighteenth 
century was selected as a 'starting point' for the historical 
discussion in order to give bearing to the massive reforms made to 
courts, legal procedure and statutory enactments during the 
nineteenth century. 
Many of the features of the present day legal system were founded in 
the nineteenth century - an hierarchical court structure, civil 
divorce procedure, police force, system of summary relief for 'family' 
cases, etc. As the nineteenth century advanced, more and more 
individuals had experience of the legal system because this expanded 
and became cheaper and more accessible. Historians, sociologists and 
lawyers have argued that prior to the twentieth century, most people 
lived 'outside' the law because marriages and divorces were informal 
rather than legally scrutinised and extra-legal mechanisms existed 
for the resolution of neighbourhood conflicts or personal disputes 
(Dobash & Dobash, 1980; Eekelaar, 1984; Menefee, 1981). It could of 
course be argued that people today seldom have personal experience 
of the legal system and also live 'outside' the law. In the 1980s 
however, most individuals have knowledge of the law, if not from 
personal experience, then from the experiences of others or through 
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ideological messages of the media and communication system. Even if 
it has only symbolic effect, the law today reaches most people's 
lives. 
Part I describes the strategic choices the law has offered battered 
women. The discussion is very much a 'lawyer's' form of history, 
with the modest refinement of 'taking women into account' (Bottomley, 
Gibson & Meteyard, 1987). Slowly, feminists are begining to unravel 
evidence of violence against women in times past (Bland, 1985; Clark, 
1987; Dowd, 1983; Edwards, 1981; Jones, 1980; Morrell, 1981; Ross, 
1983. ). Wherever possible, evidence of women's experiences of the 
legal system in dealing with situations of domestic violence has been 
included. Published research findings and statistical evidence on 
women's use of legal provisions on national and local levels have 
been collected to aid the analysis. 
Perhaps due to tradition or for reasons of convenience, orthodox 
'black letter' law teaches students on the basis of divisions between 
various fields of expertise - family, criminal, property, welfare law, 
etc. Historical discussions of violence against women in legal texts 
tend therefore to correspond to these arbitrary divisions. The 
innovative and extremely useful sourcebook written by Hoggett and 
Pearl for instance offers a brief history of the law and domestic 
violence against women solely on the basis of injunctions and divorce 
proceedings (Hoggett & Pearl, 1985). In criminal law texts, domestic 
violence against women as a specific category does not exist except 
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occasionally by reference to marital rapes (Smith & Hogan, 1983). 
Legal involvement in this problem has been piecemeal, pragmatic and 
inconsistent, falling upon several of the conflicting categories which 
form the artificial divisions of the legal textbook. Only recently 
have lawyers produced advice guides and texts which begin from the 
woman's perspective rather than from their own. Instead of asking 
the lawyer's question, 'What are the provisions of family law ? etc. ' 
recent texts have started to pose the question 'What reliefs are 
available for this woman T. Joanne Foakes for example lists some 
32 different remedies available for battered women including criminal 
assault charges, rape prosecutions, trespass actions, sueing for 
damages, injunctions, divorce, magistrates' matrimonial orders and bind 
over orders (Foakes, 1984). Part I will adopt this type of approach 
by looking at the remedies available as well as those deemed 
appropriate by the legal profession. This fragmentation of the 
history of law as regards women victims made the collection and 
presentation of material for Part I difficult, but the duplication, 
conflict and inconsistencies of jurisdiction are important factors in 
the discussion. 
Part I comprises four chapters describing the major reforms in the 
periods from the 18th century to the start of the 20th century, 1900 
to the 1960s, 1969 to 1977 and 1977 to 1987. Chapter One situates 
the rest of the history by briefly describing the minimal provisions 
prior to the 19th century period of reforms. Women victims of 
domestic violence could apply for bind over orders for breach of the 
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peace, ecclesiastical court orders for divorce a mensa et thoro, or, 
if wealthy wives protect themselves with equitable settlements or 
divorce via a Parliamentary Act. The attempts made during the 19th 
century to curb men's violence to wives through reform of the 
criminal law, the creation of a civil divorce procedure and 
empowerment of magistrates to offer their own types of matrimonial 
relief are discussed. For the majority of the population however 
the law would have seemed irrelevant, inaccessible and unconcerned. 
During this period, and thereafter, women's ability to escape 
husbands' violence depended upon their social class, physical ability 
to escape, economic resources to support themselves and, in the 
absence of family or community protection, power to keep their 
whereabouts secret. Even when legal provisions existed, as in the 
ecclesiastical court powers, intervention was not likely unless the 
man's violence threatened a woman's life or limb. 
In Chapter Two the immediate impact of reforms in the 19th century 
are evaluated from statistical data and a survey of historical 
studies. Chapter Two describes how the early provisions were made 
increasingly more accessible to less well off people. From the turn 
of the century up to the 1960s the wealthy woman's ability to leave 
a violent man with the help of the courts was made gradually more 
available to a larger proportion of the population. The most rapid 
expansion during this time took place in the area of 'family' law. 
The, period up to the 1960s saw a shift in the relative positions of 
criminal and matrimonial remedies. Family law reforms were based 
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upon an assessment of fault which was subject to an expansion in its 
definition and an increasing relevance to men's as well as women's 
complaints. The grounds for the provision of matrimonial relief in 
divorce and magistrates' courts were expanded to cover a greater 
variety of matrimonial 'faults', not dust adultery, cruelty, desertion 
and neglect to maintain but also forced prostitution, drunkeness, drug 
addiction, and so on. 
During this time the courts also began to define situations where 
assaulted and 'blameless' wives could remain in the home on the 
breakdown of the marriage or when husbands attempted to evict them. 
Unequal provisions for rich and poor persisted especially between 
magistrates' and divorce court remedies. For working class women 
however matrimonial remedies were made more accessible as well as 
more necessary due to the policies of public authorities which 
demanded court orders as prerequisites to their consideration for 
housing provision, financial and child care agreements. 
To qualify for legal protection, a battered woman had to experience 
severe violence from her husband as well as have her own behaviour 
judged. The courts would only intervene in cases of severe ('grave 
and weighty') violence towards 'blameless' wives. Remnants of the 
Church's control over the marriage 'sacrament' ensured that separation 
and divorce would not be easily gained. Whilst more grounds for 
complaint existed, women were still constrained in their ability to 
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obtain relief as a result of their husband's counter allegations or 
assertions about their wives' adultery. 
Even the criminal jurisdiction of magistrates' courts was affected by 
a marriage saving philosophy similar to that found in the matrimonial 
law. The value attached to reconciliation encouraged the use of 
stalling tactics such as repeated adjournments in magistrates' courts 
dealing with both family and criminal cases in the hope that couples 
would sort things out for themselves. The legal approach to 
situations of domestic violence against women was 'decriminalised' as 
many women victims could no longer turn to the criminal law 
administered by the magistrates for emergency relief. By the later 
1960s the 'protection' afforded by the criminal law declined 
significantly in. importance for cases of wife assault. Through 
their harsh policies the courts and public authorities exacerbated 
the problems confronting women victims of domestic violence. 
Chapter Three outlines the main trends in the law during and after 
the period of divorce law reform and on the creation of domestic 
violence legislation. Divorce law reform abolished the 'fault' based 
system and brought a reduction in the grounds of divorce to just one 
- irretrievable breakdown proved on the basis of five facts. One of 
these facts, the concept of unreasonable behaviour, replaced the 
former standard of cruelty. The trend established by court 
decisions prior to the 1969 Act away from a reliance upon the 'grave 
and weighty' standard for assessing violence was thereafter 
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accelerated towards an emphasis upon personal incompatability. In 
Chapter Three statistical data shows a paradoxical feature of the 
abolition of the fault based system - despite the movement away from 
fault or 'bad conduct' as a prerequisite for relief, allegations of 
unreasonable behaviour in divorce petitions continued to grow 
substantially. The analysis of published statistics suggests a 
correspondence between the increased share of women's petitions and 
the growth of petitions alleging a partner's unreasonable behaviour. 
During this period changes in the information supplied in Criminal 
Statistics revealed a high incidence of cases of domestic violence 
against women. In 1969 for instance, the Home Office began to 
publish statistics showing the relationship between victims and 
offenders in cases of homicide. Although research studies into 
homicide statistics had previously shown domestic violence against 
women to be the largest single relationship category of homicides, 
Criminal Statistics had previously recorded the relationship between 
victims and offenders only for cases of murder followed by suicide. 
The discussion in Chapter Three shows that the activities of 
supporters of battered women, public concern about the inadequacy of 
legal provisions and the demands made by interested parties in 
Parliament led to further investigation of the problem and 
recommendations for reform. After repeated requests to the 
government and Home Office additional information on the numbers of 
women criminally assaulted and denied help by the police was given to 
Parliament and later to a Select Committee On Violence In Marriage 
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(1975). Chapter Three shows there is evidence to suggest that 
during the 1960s to early 1970s, that the problems of battered women 
worsened. The numbers of spouses killed and assaulted each year 
and the rate of refusals battered women recieved when applying for 
housing, welfare and legal protection had increased in real terms. 
Chapter Three describes how attempts to alter the policies of legal 
and public bodies towards women victims of domestic violence brought 
new legislation to, cover domestic violence injunctions and 
applications for public housing as homeless persons. The newly 
created National Womens Aid Federation (NWAF), formed from a network 
of womens' groups supporting refuges for battered women, struggled 
for and won a number of specific policy changes including public 
funding for refuges and the inclusion of unmarried women in 
statutory provisions. Chapter Three describes NWAF's and the Select 
Committee's suggestions for reform and the government's response. 
The suggestions of the Finer Committee on One Parent Families and 
the Select Committee for the 'creation of a unified and comprehensive 
approach to the legal and welfare problems of women victims of 
domestic violence and, along with NWAF, special financial provision 
for women's maintenance and for refuge provision, are also 
discussed. Only one out of the 32 recommendations made by the 
Select Committee was ever implemented. The recommendations of the 
Finer Committee have been consistently ignored. Chapter Three shows 
that' the policy measures implemented in the 1970s to help women 
victims of domestic violence were minimal reforms. 
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Chapter Four shows that in the 1980s even these minor concessions to 
battered women's needs have been subject to erosion in a cost cutting 
and reactionary climate. Chapter Four also includes statistical data 
which illustrates the continued growth of behaviour allegations in 
matrimonial law. National, regional and local statistics on the 
implementation and enforcement of matrimonial remedies and 
injunctions are included to show the continued growth of these and 
the severe problems associated with their enforcement. The regional 
statistics show considerable variation in the implementation and 
enforcement of the domestic violence legislation. 
The late 1970s and early 1980s brought a great deal of court 
activity concerning the 'correct' interpretation of domestic violence 
legislation, ousters, powers of arrest and emergency (ex parte) orders 
being especially subjects of controversy. An analysis of case law 
demonstrates that the provisions quickly lost their discretionary 
scope and subsequently much of their capacity to fulfill the 
emergency needs of women victims. The debates in the Family 
Division of the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords shifted from the issue of emergency protection on to the more 
rigorous assessment of women's needs and the identification of 
situations where non-intervention might be more appropriate. Legal 
discussions became largely preoccupied with the all too ready 
availability of protective measures for women and the effects of 
these upon men's rights. At the same time, due to the policies of 
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many local authorities, women's rights to housing in emergency 
situations had to be 'clarified' or negotiated by the law. 
By the 1980s both the legal profession and the battered women's 
movement were expressing unease about the adequacy and applicability 
of the 'protective' legislation to deal with the problem of domestic 
violence against women. Research on the experiences of women who 
visited refuges supported women's complaints about the continuing 
inadequacy of the new legislation and general lack of interest in its 
enforcement and welfare provisions. During the early 1980s the 
courts and policy makers tended to advise that women's complaints 
about men's unreasonable behaviour or violence were best kept out of 
the law. Simultaneously, the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 
1984 reintroduced men's complaints about women's behaviour into 
realms of consideration. Concerns about the increased use of 
matrimonial injunctions especially as regards the matrimonial home 
and the still growing share of petitions containing allegations of 
unreasonable behaviour were expressed by the expanding conciliatory 
movement who added their suggestions to the contemporary calls for 
reform towards a less adverserial and more unified approach to 
matrimonial breakdown. 
Ironically, within the criminal jurisdiction recommendations were 
being made for more legal action in cases of domestic violence 
against women. In the 1980s attention was increasingly centred 
upon the interpretation of policy at the local and national levels. 
Page 15 
Introduction. 
National crises in inner city policing, adverse publicity over West 
Yorkshire police's handling of the mass murderer Peter Sutcliffe, 
Thames Valley police's insensitive treatment of rape victims and the 
collection of the first National Crime Survey helped to make the 
policing of cases of violence against women into an issue. Further 
research commissioned by the Metropolitan Police into their approach 
to cases of domestic violence against women found a high rate of 
refusal to implement and enforce the available provisions (Edwards, 
1986). New policy initiatives, such as police training schemes, 
special violence against women units and rape suites at local police 
stations, at the time of writing still in an experimental stage, were 
suggested as partial remedies to the legal problem. Chapter Four 
briefly considers this latest trend and the recent recommendations 
for further reform and debates about the future. 
Part II breaks with the more conventional legal discussion by 
focusing on women and their needs. Part II is based upon the 
analysis of women victim's needs in contemporary socio-legal 
discourse. As the researcher's intention was to look at the law in 
its social context, the discussion includes the definition of women's 
needs in legal cases from the 'grass roots' (interactional level 
between clients and solicitors) to solicitors and the court case 
outcomes, to the debates of the published law reports, press coverage 
of court cases and policy recommendations and explanations concerning 
the problem in academic texts. Part II looks at violence against 
women in socio-legal discourse from the level of recounted experience 
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to its ideological representation. Part II emphasises the use of 
written and spoken language in interactional settings to define 
women's needs. 
In Chapter Five the methods employed in the research for Part II are 
outlined. Chapter Five contains information on the sources of data 
collection and the assumptions made about the nature of language and 
the law. Prior to the 1970s, surveys which were victim oriented, 
rather than offender based, were held to be too difficult to warrant 
the serious attention of academics (Gelles, 1980). In recent years 
feminist research on domestic violence against women has contributed 
a great deal to the established methods of study. Feminist work on 
the law and on language however is a much newer area of interest and 
less guidance was available from this source to help with the present 
research. Chapter Five outlines the decisions made about the 
collection and analysis of survey and textual data in relation to 
feminist, socio-legal and socio-linguistic approaches. 
Chapter Six contains the analysis of the research findings on women's 
experiences of the legal system. It is based upon interviews with 20 
women and 6 legal advisors plus the examination of 15 case records. 
As the method-employed in the research looked at women's experiences 
of gaining relief by following their progression through cases which 
were initiated, dropped, 'lost' or 'won', information on the women's 
involvement in many more legal cases was yielded. The 20 women who 
volunteered for the survey had been involved in a total of 54 legal 
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cases. The high number of legal cases reflected the women's 
problems in obtaining legal relief. Most had experienced false 
starts and failures before arriving at practically useful outcomes. 
The survey included a whole range of cases from assaults to divorce 
to injunctions to separation orders but all but two of the 54 cases 
arose as a result of a partner's unnacceptable behaviour which the 
women described as 'violence'. Chapter Six describes some of the 
extremely violent behaviour involved in the women's relationships. 
Eleven out of the twenty women had experienced violence which 
threatened life. 
The women gave a number of reasons for their initial contact with 
the law. These ranged from emergency and welfare needs to orders 
from family and friends or what is best described as 'chance' 
involvement. Involvement with the law was lengthy for most of the 
women surveyed, the time range being from 6 weeks to 12 years. 
Although all eventually obtained the legal outcome desired, most 
expressed some dissatisfaction with the law and its treatment of 
their needs. For some women legal involvement had adverse effects 
leading to further violent assault, financial loss, distress to the 
children and the aggravation of feelings of guilt and shame. The 
women's experiences supported general complaints about the law as a 
secondary assault. The reasons for these feelings included the well 
known and common complaints about police, lawyers', magistrates' and 
judges' reluctance to intervene, trivialisation and distortion of the 
behaviour alleged and of the women's needs. Feelings of 
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powerlessness, a lack of control and a belief that lawyers and women 
speak different languages were also recounted such that even 'good' 
solicitors could be seen to be alienated. 
Some women allowed research upon their case records collected from 
solicitors' offices. A textual analysis of case records found the 
process of transforming women's needs into 'good' cases depended more 
upon lawyers' concerns than women's needs. Women's needs and 'good' 
cases, i. e. those which succeeded, seem to have been judged as one 
and the same. Chapter Six shows how stylistic variations and 
linguistic transformations had effects upon subsequent contextual 
shifts in meanings. The relevance of ambiguity in legal discourse 
and its exploitation for the creation and transformation of good 
cases is demonstrated with the use of specific examples. 
Chapter Seven takes up a similar theme. Chapter Seven is based on 
a textual analysis of over 300 decisions traced from the published 
Law Reports where a male spouse, cohabitee or lover's behaviour had 
provided the original impetus for legal involvement. As in Chapter 
Six, a broad range of legal cases are included from manslaughter 
appeals to damages actions to divorces and injunctions etc. The 
inclusion of a wide range of cases is possible in this chapter 
because the analysis is not concerned with their specifically legal 
content. The precedents, principles and matters of statutory 
interpretation which were discussed in Part I play a minor role in 
Part II. The cases are examined in terms of the relevance of 
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behaviour to legal intervention., Examples are used to show how the 
behaviour ranged in importance from being irrelevant to holding a 
central position in the text. The strategies employed for 
countering allegations, justifying violent behaviour, trivialising it, 
ignoring it or even making it a serious 'grave' matter are discussed 
on the basis of the textually constructed relationships between men, 
women, witnesses, experts and the law. Chapter Seven suggests how 
the judiciary and legal actors legitimate their roles - as upholders 
of public order, protectors of 'private freedoms', impartial 
arbitrators and just men concerned not to punish the sick or stupid - 
by making violence between men and women into something else, e. g. 
an understandable response to 'provocation', a facet of the victim's 
behaviour, an individual problem, etc. In reported decisions the 
debates often revolve around the court's ability/power to intervene. 
Four key concerns of the interventionist problem - the public/private 
divide; justification and counter-allegation; expert vs legal decision 
making and justice vs protection - are used to illustrate some of the 
discursive techniques found to have been employed. 
The press plays an important part in the representation of women 
victims' needs in socio-legal discourse. For many individuals, press 
reports are the only source of information on the workings of the 
law. Chapter 8 is based on the analysis of 105 reports of cases of 
domestic violence against women traced from the 'quality' non-tabloid 
press between the years 1983-1986. Although the non-tabloid press 
may rigorously defend its accurate and impartial reporting, newpaper 
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coverage of cases of domestic violence against women are first and 
foremost 'stories', the general population's 'entertaining' accounts of 
legal cases. Chapter 8 looks at how the behaviour of wife 
batterers and wife killers and women's victimisation are described 
and made into 'good stories' in the non-tabloid press. Examples are 
used to show how the bald reference in the narrative to men's active 
involvement in the crimes is a rarity. Like the court reports, press 
reports more commonly explain, distort and justify men's acts of 
violence towards women. Freed from the constraints of legal 
language, but with the additional need to entertain the public, at the 
misogynistic extreme, press reports may even glorify domestic 
violence against women by portraying wife assaulters and wife killers 
as national heroes. It is noted that the glorification and 
sexualisation of acts of violence- against women in press reports is 
not limited to 'wives'. The heroic form of murder was attributed to 
a number of relationships between men and women, e. g. a stranger or a 
son and explanations of the reasons for the crimes were commonly 
offered in terms of 'appropriate' heterosexual behaviour. Two cases 
which shared common features in being pre-planned crimes committed 
by high status men against unfaithful, -'sexually promiscuous' wives 
are discussed at length to illustrate the similarities and differences 
between the coverage of assaults on wives and assaults on women in 
general. The discussion shows that, even when reporting cases 
involving a maximum sentence for murder where a husband's acts were 
strongly denounced, the use of violence against women can nonetheless 
be given tacit suport. 
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Chapter Nine is the concluding chapter. Chapter Nine brings 
together the preceding discussions in Part I and Part II. The 
definition of women victim's needs from the level of the individual 
case to the law report to press coverage and the precriptive 
discussions of academic disciplines are briefly compared and 
contrasted. Chapter Nine examines the emphasis on domestic violence 
against women in academic discourse by looking at recent debates in 
the therapeutic, sociological and feminist work which inform socio- 
legal and reformist strategies. In common with press and legal 
reports, academic discussions have traditionally explained, justified 
and excused men's use of violence against women. Academic 
discourse, especially prior to the 1970s, has been preoccupied with 
an individualism which prioritised the victim's behaviour and 
pragmatic concerns about the 'treatment' of offenders. However more 
recent research and debate in the academic discipline, especially in 
feminist work, has gone beyond the limited pragmatic concern with 
the 'repair' of individuals to emphasise structural and material 
impediments to the eradication of domestic violence against women. 
Feminist work has stressed gender inequalities and the need to 
restructure relations between men and women. Part of this has 
involved taking on the job of challenging the established practices in 
law and society which help to perpetuate and maintain men's violent 
oppression of women. Chapter Nine contains a review of feminist 
analyses of domestic violence against women. 
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Chapter Nine sums up a theme which runs throughout the thesis, i. e. 
that whilst the disparate practices from the grass roots level 
between solicitor and client to the technical concerns of the Law 
Reports to the cultural representations of the Press and prescriptive 
findings of academic research and political debate may contribute to 
the secondary assault of women victims of domestic violence, and the 
subsequent neglect/distortion of their needs, the possibility for 
change is not precluded due to their domination by an 
overdeterministic patriarchal structure. The research argues that 
the exclusion of women from access to the means of legal relief by 
individual actions at the grass roots or by institutional responses 
has marked effects upon women's experiences of victimisation, 
contributes to their secondary assault and, as a result, should be 
stopped. But the double victimisation of women could also result 
from the practices of individuals genuinely concerned about battered 
women's problems - solicitors seeking to achieve 'good cases', judges 
acting as 'protectors', newspaper editors publishing and commenting on 
cases of 'public interest', academics and policy reformers establishing 
explanations and directives. Chapter Nine shows how inappropriate 
treatment programmes for violent men and women victims were 
suggested by people such as Erin Pizzey who claimed a genuine 
concern for and understanding of battered women's difficulties. The 
discussion is completed with some concluding remarks about the 
research's findings on some future possibilities for the empowerment 
of women victims involved with the law. Whilst prescriptive 
conclusions on the basis of exploratory work need to be guarded it is 
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hoped that this qualitative survey will leave scope for further work 
and exploration on this topic. It is hoped that future work will 
continue to emphasise the need to stress the effects of domestic 
violence upon women, and children, and to search for ways to give 
victims more control over the definition of their needs. 
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Wives Victims and Viragos - Law Reform and Domestic Violence 
Against Women In The 19th Century. 
The foundations for many of the contemporary features of the law 
relating to domestic violence against women were laid down in the 
context of the radical legal changes which occured during the 
nineteenth century. In the Victorian era there was a complete 
overhaul of an antiquated and chaotic system of courts, of criminal 
law, laws of property, punishment principles and methods of trial and 
evidence. The various superior courts of the church, of common law, 
equity, admiralty and bankruptcy, administering separate bodies of 
law, using different procedures and even different languages were, by 
the 1873 Judicature Act, reformed into a new system governed by just 
one supreme court competent to deal with all cases. Reforms to the 
law relating to domestic violence against women thus took place 
within this climate of centralisation and professionalisation of the 
law. The discussion will begin with the period immediately prior to 
the nineteenth century reforms. 
Early Involvements. 
Friends, neighbours and relatives have always had some involvement in 
domestic violence against women (see Dobash & Dobash, 1981; Homer, 
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Leonard & Taylor, 1985; Ross, 1983; Tomes, 1977. ) The sort of 
assistance neighbours can offer a woman experiencing domestic 
violence from her husband - especially refuge and immediate 
protection - is frequently of greater value than legal provisions. 
Ross's study of a pre 1914 London community found women indeed 
placed great emphasis upon neighbourly support in situations of 
domestic violence. This pattern was confirmed by my own previous 
study of local court cases in Uxbridge between the years 1853-1903 
(Radford, 1983). 
The women's rights campaigner Frances Power Cobbe and the Victorian 
historian William Andrews asserted that in earlier times the peasant 
community regulated themselves with the aid of rituals such as 'rough 
music' or 'riding the stang' (see Andrews, 1890; Cobbe, 1876. ). This 
basically involved ridicule, torment or torture of an offender by a 
mob. In rural areas wife beaters were supposedly dumped into the 
horsepond, with or without the help of ducking stools (Andrews, 
1890). Although mob intervention between man and wife has been 
found to have continued well into the twentieth century, there is 
scant evidence to satisfy present day historians as to its 
effectiveness in curbing domestic violence against women. At best, 
only the most extreme violence, that likely to result in brutal 
murders, was controlled by the community (Dobash & Dobash, 1981; 
Tomes, 1977. ). 
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The protection the law offered a woman in the early nineteenth 
century varied greatly according to her income. Theoretically, in 
the early half of the nineteenth century, a woman's complaints could 
be dealt with by the King's law (by e. g. appeal to the local justices 
for a bind over order for breach of the peace), the common law (which 
condoned the husband's use of some violence), the ecclesiastical court 
(for a divorce a mensa et thoro), the courts of equity (for wealthy 
wives who could afford to use civil law equitable settlements) or 
direct to Parliament (for a private Act to be passed for a divorce a 
vinculo). 
Bind over orders for breach of the peace had been established since 
at least the 12th century to enable local magistrates and worthy men 
to deal with the constant threats to public order-which occured. By 
the mid nineteenth century, local magistrates were praised with great 
powers of intervention into marital relations (see e. g. Wharton, 
1853). A recognizance to keep the peace would be forfeited if the 
husband subsequently committed or threatened actual bodily harm on 
the wife. Husbands who breached the peace and attacked their wives 
again would be fined or imprisoned if unable to pay. 
Bind overs could also be used to back up a man's violent attempts to 
keep his wife under control. According to Andrews (1890), scolding 
wives could be classified as offenders against the public peace. 
Any wife taking her husband before the court would be the subject of 
extra scrutiny because of the directive that applications for bind 
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over orders made on the grounds of 'malice' or 'vexation' would fail. 
Wives were very much at the mercy of the magistrate's sympathy and 
subsequent interpretation of their cases as deserving. 
The laws relating to marriage, divorce and legitimacy developed in 
an era where government of the family was a husband's privilege. 
Upon marriage, a woman became ferne courverte, she lost her separate 
legal status of ferne sole and came under her husband's tutelage. 
This meant that the bulk of her rights - to own property, hold 
custody of her children, etc. - and obligations, torts or liabilities 
passed over to her husband. (A wife could still be prosecuted 
separately criminally. ) Even custody of the wife's body belonged to 
a husband. Should she flee he could secure a writ of habeus corpus 
for her return. As he was legally responsible for her, he had the 
right to restrain her with the use of moderate correction or to force 
her to return home should she leave his house without due cause. 
Since the time of King Henry II the church courts had been 
responsible for the laws of marriage, divorce and legitimacy. 
Marriage in the Canon law was a holy sacrament and totally 
indissoluble. Although the Church law required that a husband treat 
his wife with 'conjugal kindness', a precise definition as to the level 
of this kindness was lacking. The power to discipline a wife was 
supposedly confined to that within 'reasonable bounds' but there 
seems to be little agreement as to what was reasonable punishment. 
In theory, should a husband refuse to receive his wife at home with 
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'conjugal affection' he could be excommunicated from the church and 
imprisoned. Yet, even a wife's protection from starvation by a 
miserly husband was not guaranteed. Although the husband's 
provision of the necessaries of life (board, lodgings, clothing, 
medical care, furnishings) suitable to his station in life were 
implied by the laws of marriage, a woman had no way of impelling him 
to provide these for her if he unjustly refused to do so. Her only 
relief from starvation in the absence of means to support herself lay 
in application to the church court or to the parish for Poor Law 
relief. 
A husband's cruelty was recognised by the ecclesiastical courts as 
grounds for a divorce a mensa et thoro (a form of judicial 
separation) and as a defence against the restitution of conjugal 
rights. The early Canon law defined cruelty as deadly hatred 
between the spouses evidenced by violence causing danger to life. 
Conduct had to be proved to be cruel, so only severe physical 
violence obvious to the court would produce any relief. The 
ecclesiastical court would not interfere into the marriage unless the 
cruel behaviour made cohabitation so unsafe for the wife that it was 
impossible for her to discharge the duties of married life. Women 
who provoked violent treatment from their husbands would be advised 
to amend their own behaviour instead. A further catch for assaulted 
wives existed in that if the court believed she had condoned her 
husband's violence, by for example returning to him after she had 
left, she would be refused help. 
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A divorce a mensa at thoro was not really a divorce as such in that 
it only removed the woman's obligation to live with her husband. 
She could not remarry and he still retained his rights and 
obligations regards her financial dealings. A wife (or husband) who 
left a marriage could be forced to return by the ecclesiastical court 
on hearing a petition for the restitution of conjugal rights (Stone, 
1977). The husband's cruelty could be taken as a valid defence 
against his petition for restitution of conjugal rights but if he 
claimed that he had not meant to hurt his wife the court could insist 
she return. 
Wealthy women were able to obtain some personal protection from 
exploitative husbands via equitable settlements and, very rarely, 
divorce by Parliamentary Act. Absolute divorce (with the right to 
remarry) was not possible at all until 1698 and even then it was 
used exclusively by men, wanting to divorce wives for adultery. No 
women brought divorce cases before Parliament until 1801. Many 
would have been deterred by the cost, which was from 200 to 5000 
pounds. 
Generally inspired by a wealthy family's desire to prevent scoundrels 
from marrying heiresses and making off with the family fortune, 
marriage settlements in an equity court prior to a marriage meant 
that a woman's -property could be held in trust for her. This 
allowed her the comparative freedom of being able to use the income 
and, under certain conditions, the property itself. The unequal 
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provision of legal remedies for wealthy and poor women has been a 
persistent feature of the history of the law and domestic violence 
against women. 
19th Century Reforms Of The Criminal Law. 
Magistrates and the police, disturbed about the incidence of local 
cases of violence against wives, became increasingly critical of the 
legal remedies from the 1850s onwards. In Parliament, Thomas Phirin 
introduced a limited return on assaults upon women and children in 
London and urged corporal punishment of wife beaters as a solution. 
This demand for the flogging of wife beaters re-emerged periodically 
over the next 30 years or so. In March 1853, the government 
responded to the mounting pressure with a bill which aimed to offer 
women and children the same level of protection as that which the 
courts afforded 'poodle dogs and donkeys'. For wives this merely 
added to the magistracy's already existing powers to bind over 
husbands to keep the peace. The Act for The Better Prevention And 
Punishment of Aggravated Assaults Upon Women And Children empowered 
magistrates to summarily' punish those convicted of an aggravated 
assault on' women' and males under 14 years of age with a term of 
imprisonment, with or without hard labour, of 'up to six months, or 
with a: fine of up to £20. The offender would also be bound over to 
keep the peace following the expiration of the sentence for up to six 
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months. Should he fail to keep the peace, he could be returned to 
prison by the magistrates for a maximum term of 12 months. 
Between 1855-1860 1,960 men were sentenced under the act, one third 
of whom had been found guilty of wife assault (May, 1978). There 
is no doubt that the new legislation was used by wives in 
desperation. But the risks associated with charging a husband with 
this type of violent assault could outweigh the protection afforded 
women and children by the prison sentence. Not only were the wife 
and children left vulnerable to a husband's revenge whilst awaiting 
his trial for violent assault or following his release from prison, 
those unable to find paid work would be forced on to the stringent 
mercies of the Poor Law. 
Family Law Remedies. 
An early attempt was made in the House of Commons in 1830 by Dr 
Phillimore to gain serious consideration of civil divorce. Dr 
Phillimore argued that Parliament was not the right body to give 
divorce a vinculo and urged for a royal commission to look into 
alternatives in the courts of law. The motion was defeated after a 
brief debate and the matter lay dormant for almost twenty years 
(Stetson, 1982). 
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A Royal Commission was appointed to look at the idea of civil divorce 
in 1850. The commission's recommendations were implemented in the. 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 which passed over responsibility for 
matrimonial cases from the Church court to the new Court for Divorce 
and Matrimonial Causes based in London. The act introduced divorce 
in its presently understood form. The provision of legal relief for 
women however was still greatly unequal to that offered to men. 
Men could divorce their wives on the sole ground of adultery but a 
wife had to prove that her husband had committed intolerable 
adultery, i. e. adultery accompanied by incest, bigamy, sodomy, 
bestiality, rape or cruelty. Thus, unless a husband was adulterous 
as well as violent, a woman could not obtain a divorce in law. 
The grounds for divorce were based on the principle that marriage 
could be legally ended only if an innocent spouse had proved the 
partner's guilt of a matrimonial offence. If it should be found that 
the petitioner was not innocent, had condoned or connived the 
offence, then the court could dismiss the petition. The divorce a 
mensa et thoro persisted in the form of a legal separation which 
allowed a woman to live apart from her husband if he maltreated her. 
But again, if the court felt that the wife had contributed by 
provocation to the man's violence, it would refuse her a decree. 
The 1857 Act did not alter at all the legal principles applied by the 
courts examining the violent behaviour of men towards their wives. 
Although more wives were now able to become divorced due to the 
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reduced costs of the procedure, it was still only very severe 
violence which was acted upon by the court. A series of court 
decisions had shifted attention from violence which threatened life 
or limb to that which caused injury to health. Problems in 
deciding whether conduct was violent or not, what could be termed 
mental cruelty, whether a more 'refined' wife suffered 
disproportionately were almost inevitable (see Chapter 2). 
The court held the power to order a husband to pay alimony and child 
support. A wife had no right to maintenance as such but this could 
be given in some cases at the discretion of the court. The act 
instructed the court to take into account the wife's wealth, the 
husband's ability to pay, and the conduct of both the parties if 
making a financial settlement. Husbands could sue the alleged 
adulterer for damages and use this money if he wished for the 
support of the children and maintenance of the wife. Women had no 
corresponding rights against their husbands' lovers. Whilst living 
apart from her husband a woman could now be treated as a ferne sole, 
resuming the property rights and status of a single woman. 
The creation of civil divorce did bring substantial changes to the 
procedure involved in getting a decree. The ecclesiastical court 
proceeded on written evidence only (libels). The new Divorce Court 
operated with oral hearings, so a husband could now appear in court 
to counter the wife's allegations. In the ecclesiastical court, the 
onus of proof for violent conduct lay with the wife. The new rules 
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of evidence and procedure allowed a shift in the onus of proof 
towards the husband. Divorce was very much a public affair and 
undoubtedly a most painful matter for those involved. Under the 
provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, a jury could be called 
to judge the alleged conduct of the spouses. The press published 
lurid and intimate details (see Radford, 1983). 
The expense of a divorce or separation petition continued to be too 
great for working class women and only one court in the entire 
country was able to hear cases. Technically it was possible for the 
poor to go to Somerset House Divorce Registry to take out forms 
pauperia swearing to have an income less than £50 per year and thus 
dispense with the court fees (of about £40), but this was seldom 
taken up. No protection was given to women who had run away from 
violent men or were married to men who were not technically 
deserters, but who came and left as they pleased, taking with them 
the woman's earnings. 
Flogging. 
Discontent continued to rumble over the inadequacy of the 
magistrates' powers to protect working class women. In the House of 
Commons on May 18th 1874, Colonel Egerton Leigh rose to call 
attention to the 'very insufficient punishment' given to wife beaters 
and to recommend public flogging as a cure. The 1853 Aggravated 
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Assaults Act of 24th and 25th Victoria did not give sufficient 
punishment in wife 'assault cases. Although under the Act a man 
might be imprisoned for up to six months, it did not actually prevent 
him from continuing his violent behaviour on release. 
In 1874, the Home Secretary sent around a circular to members of the 
judiciary and police in order to guage opinion on the matter of 
flogging. Although the majority who sent in returns were in favour 
of flogging no action was taken and by the late 1880s calls for 
public punishment fizzled out. One problem noted by opposers of 
corporal punishment was that even if applied to only extreme cases, 
flogging ' brutalised' individuals was not only a suspect but also an 
arbitrary solution (a strong man may scarcely flinch whilst another 
near died). As Justice Keating pointed out to the Home Secretary in 
1874, flogging was of little use to the victims and had failed as a 
deterrent for wife assault in Leeds (Report on Brutal Assaults, 1875). 
Emphasis gradually shifted on to reforms which would protect victims 
by offering them viable alternatives to abusive relationships. 
The Creation Of Magistrates' Matrimonial Remedies. 
Magistrates and feminists took up the theme about the difficulty of 
enforcing the law to deal with cases of wife assault when the women 
lacked alternatives to abusive relationships. Poor women had 
precious little practical relief from the law until magistrates were 
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given the power under an Act proposed by Frances Power Cobbe 
(Matrimonial Causes Act 1878) to release women from their obligations 
to live with violent husbands. This ' poor person's divorce' is 
said to have laid the foundation for the modern law's approach to 
matrimonial proceedings in magistrates' courts (Eekelaar, 1984). The 
1878 Act empowered the court to grant a non-cohabitation order, 
custody of children under the age' of ten years and maintenance, if a 
husband had been convicted of an aggravated assault on the wife. 
The provisions obviously applied only to very extreme cases of 
prosecuted cruelty. Husbands were still able to avoid their 
responsibilities as any charge of adultery by the wife, before or 
after the award would remove her right to relief. The numbers 
using the act were very small and pressure continued for more 
generous provisions. 
Many women were physically prevented from leaving violent husbands 
due to the ruling in Re Cochrane (1840) where it was held that a 
husband could confine his wife if she refused to cohabit with him. 
Although the Matrimonial Causes Act 1884 had taken away a husband's 
power to enforce a restitution of conjugal rights, it had not altered 
his common law rights to custody of her body. It was not until 
1891 that the Court of Appeal was able to argue positively that a 
husband had no right to forcibly assume custody of his wife's body 
(R. v Jackson (1891)). Whether or not he could kidnap her remained 
undetermined until the 1970s (see Chapter 3). 
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In 1895 the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act consolidated 
and improved on the 1886 act and the 1878 Matrimonial Causes Act by 
allowing married women to apply to the magistrates' courts for 
separation and maintenance orders if their husbands had: 
i. been convicted of an aggravated assault under S. 43 of the Offences 
Against The Persons Act 1861 
ii. been convicted on indictment for assault and sentenced to at 
least two months imprisonment or fined £5 
iii. deserted them 
iv. been guilty of persistent cruelty so as to make their wives leave 
home 
v. wilfully neglected to maintain so as to cause their wivesto leave 
home. 
These grounds for separation and maintenance orders remained the 
basic grounds for legal intervention until an act of 1960 introduced 
some modifications. The 1895 act increased magistrates powers to 
give the wife custody of children up to the age of 16 years. 
Maintenance provisions were set at a maximum of £2 per week. No 
order would be given to wives proven guilty of adultery or 
connivance. 
In 1902 husbands also acquired the right to apply for separation 
orders. Section 5 of the Licensing Act 1902 marginally extended the 
powers given magistrates to cover cases in which either spouse was a 
habitual drunkard. By the start of the 20th century therefore 
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women who suffered unprovoked violence from their husbands which 
caused injury to their health were able to apply for a mixture of 
criminal and matrimonial provisions. They could be granted non- 
cohabitation orders, or divorces, own their own property and keep 
their earnings or be given maintenance. Their access to the 
provisions varied according to their social class and their own 
'blameless' behaviour. In Chapter 2 the analysis of statistical data 
will give an indication of the impact of these reforms before 
continuing the historical discussion. 
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Expanding And Equalising Grounds ; Reconciling Provisions. 
1900-1960s. 
Introduction. 
This chapter, an historical progression to the previous, will outline 
the relevant changes in the statute, case law and procedure relating 
to domestic violence against women from the start of the 20th 
century up to the 1960s. Information from one of the women 
interviewed for the survey in Part II will be used at the end of the 
chapter to illustrate some of the severe practical difficulties women 
still faced in the 1960s. Table 1 presents a summary of the main 
changes influencing the law in this period. Table 1 reads from left 
to right and lists (without hieracrchy) six key categories of changes 
which took place from the start of the century up to the 1960s. 
In the early nineteenth century the punishment of violent men by way 
of the criminal law had been the major preoccupation of those 
involved in reformist debates. By the twentieth century the 
emphasis had shifted towards reform of the family law as a means of 
alleviating the problems of abused wives. By the second half of the 
twentieth century, the courts were dealing with more family law cases 
than cases of criminal assault (Table 2). 
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Table 1: Summary of Reformist Trends 1900 to 1960s. 
1. Type of adjudication. 
In public In private 
2. Main gender of petitioners. 
Male Female 
3. Features emphasised in debates on court procedure. 
Humiliation Conciliation 
Punishment Reconciliation 
Protection Special 'family' 
Criminal approach. 
4. Definitions of violence/cruelty. 
Objective Subjective 
5. Grounds for dissolution of marital union. 
Unequal - preference 
male grounds 
Offences likely to 
hamper lineages of 
family (adultery, VD, 
life-threatening cruelty) 
Unequal - preference 
female grounds 
Offences making 
married life a 
practical impossibility 
(adultery, VD, life- 
threatening cruelty, 
insanity, failure to 
maintain, etc. ) 
6. Allocation of costs. 
Equal grounds 
Faults of 
partners making 
married life 
intolerable 
Paupers costs only Legal aid 
Everyone has rights as long as they Subsidised 
can afford to pay for them 
Economic individualism Means tested benefit 
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A previous study of cases of domestic violence against women in one 
Middlesex court found that following the 1895 Act a rise in the 
number of reported applications by assaulted wives to magistrates for 
matrimonial relief accompanied a decline in the reported numbers 
prosecuting for criminal assault (Radford, 1983). The selected 
period of research into the court's work ended at 1903 therefore no 
firm conclusion can be drawn as to the permanence of the trend. 
TABLE 2: Average Numbers Of Matrimonial Orders and Cases of Non-Indictable 
Assault In Selected Years, 1900-1967, England and Wales. 
YEAR. Divorce Judicial Magistrate Aggravated Common 
Sepn. Matrimonial assaults assaults. 
1900 600 80 8000 
1920 3090 13603 512 32589 
1938 9970 14382 154 14663 
1954 55 12811 
1958 22584 71 24089 
1962 33818 28306 
1967 25 9790 
Sources : Civil Judicial Statistics, 1969; Criminal Statistics, 1947,1954, 
1967. 
Further discussion will show that despite the decline in use, 
applications to magistrates for criminal prosecution as well as for 
matrimonial relief remained important to women who suffered domestic 
violence well into the twentieth century. 
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By the turn of the century, the divorce court was issu ing some 600 
divorces and 80 Judicial separations per year and magistrates were 
granting approximately 8000 separation and maintenance orders 
(McGregor, 1957). At this time England had one of the lowest 
divorce rates in the Western world. Divorce petitions did not 
overtake the summary proceedings offered to wives under the 1895 act 
until the 1960s. 
Although feminists had campaigned for easier divorce and judicial 
separation with the intention of improving women's positions, men in 
fact were granted these orders by the new court of Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes* more frequently than were women (Table 3). 
Women may have been apprehensive about going to court because if 
they lost the case they would have to pay the court costs and might 
lose custody of their children as well. Compared to the previous 
under-utilisation of divorce bills by women however this would have 
been a substantial increase. From the end of the 17th century to 
1857, there were 330 Divorce Acts before Parliament and only four 
of these were passed in order to grant women dissolutions. The 
first woman to get a divorce this way was Mrs Addison who succeeded 
with her Act in 1801. 
Due to the requirement not to grant orders in cases where collusion 
was found petitions for divorce and judicial separation had a high 
4Ths now court o1 Divorc- and Matrimonial Caus. s was ineorooratsd 
etc. tho Suprwmw Caurt in 1e-93 as this Probat.. Divorco and Admiralty 
Division - law studwnts f11orantly rwfmr to this as th. division for 
wills, wivss and wrmcks, 
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failure rate. Magistrates granted orders to 74% applicants between 
1893-1909 (McGregor et al, 1970). In the divorce court, between 
1858-1907 63% to 84% of men's petitions and 65% to 94% of women's 
petitions were granted (Savage, 1983). It was not until after 1910 
that the rate of divorce began to rise dramatically. The 1910 court 
issued 581 decrees. By 1920 this had risen to 3,090. 
Table 3: Proportion of Petitions For Dissolution By Husbands and Wives, 
1859-1908, England and Wales. 
1859-63 1874-78 1884-8 1894-98 1904-08 
Husbands 62% 60% 58% 58% 56% 
petitions. 
Wives 38% 40% 42% 42% 44% 
petitions. 
Source : McGregor, 1957. 
The twentieth century brought more grounds on which orders could be 
granted, improvements in the availability of legal aid and in the 
accessibility of the courts. As the twentieth century progressed, 
the courts' matrimonial work expanded dramatically. There was a 
gradual shift towards dissolution of marriage as the most frequently 
sought legal remedy and women became the majority of the petitioners 
in both divorce and summary jurisdictions. 'The rest of this chapter 
will show how specific changes in the law, mainly in criminal and 
matrimonial law, contributed to the gradual decriminalisation of 
remedies. 
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Implementing The 1895 Act. 
Problems arose with the new matrimonial powers in the summary courts 
almost immediately. Magistrates, who lacked formal legal training, 
were frequently criticised by the judiciary and reformist elite for 
misinterpreting and wrongly executing their legal responsibilities in 
matrimonial cases. Occasionally this 'ignorance' was seen to have 
'favoured' women. In the case of Cobb v Cobb in 1900 for example, 
the magistrates awarded the wife £1 a week maintenance from her 
husband's total wage of 23 shillings. Having spent two spells in 
prison for maintenance arrears, Mr Cobb, a railway porter, raised 
enough money from train passengers and other sympathisers to return 
to court, amidst much publicity, where his maintenance obligation was 
reduced to 8 shillings per week. The Cobb case offers an early 
example of the dual morality persistently applied to maintenance 
cases - incomes below the subsistence level are loudly and publicly 
condemned by the legal profession as inappropriate for men but 
ignored as an inevitability for women and children (see Chapter Four). 
Separated women unable to provide for themselves by employment, 
faced a choice between uncertain maintenance, the Work House or 
returning to violent husbands. Maintenance, limited to a maximum of 
£2 per week had to be enforced by the wife herself. It is very 
likely that women who had left violent and oppressive husbands found 
the responsibility of collecting their own maintenance troublesome. 
The difficulty in getting it must have given many no choice but to 
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set up house with other men or take in lodgers when possible. The 
ex-husband could then complain to the court that his wife was guilty 
of adultery and her right to maintenance could be lost for good. 
One single act of adultery or a resumption of cohabitation with the 
husband for six weeks were sufficient to revoke an order of 
maintenance. 
Three private members bills in the early part of the twentieth 
century had sought to increase the. security of working class wives. 
The first bill, the Assaults on Wives (Outdoor Relief) Bill was 
introduced by Mr J. C. Wedgwood in 1900 and aimed to give outdoor 
relief at a rate of 10 shillings per week to women whose husbands 
were sentenced to over one month's imprisonment for aggravated 
assaults upon their wives. Mr Philip Snowden's Summary Jurisdiction 
Bill of 1911 was drafted to give women the right to maintenance 
without the involvement of the Poor Law Guardians by use of an 
attachment to earnings order (separated wives did not get this for 
another 50 years or so). The third, the Summary Jurisdiction 
(Matrimonial Causes) Bill, introduced in 1913 and again in 1914, 
sought to expand the grounds on which an order could be granted to 
include adultery, wilful desertion or the husband insisting upon 
sexual intercourse with the wife whilst knowing that he suffered 
from venereal disease. Changes in the law governing divorce however 
again became the preoccupation of the reformers and these relatively 
minor alterations were lost in favour of 'broader' debates. 
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The Second Phase Of Divorce Reform. 
Divorce reform became a public issue again because of the efforts of 
Judicial and legal elites, such as Lord Gorrell, a former president of 
the Divorce Court and member of the House of Lords. Reforms were 
intended to bring 'justice' to the law by expanding and equalising the 
provisions offered to men as well as to women. For the next thirty 
years debates over the expansion of the grounds for divorce raged 
throughout government and legal quarters. In 1906 the Divorce Law 
Reform Union was organised by M. L. Seaton-Tiedemann. The union 
did much to publicise the growing dissatisfaction with the law. It 
was composed of lawyers and others concerned that the divorce laws 
were unrealistic and caused a great deal of suffering to those 
involved. Members argued that many wives (and some husbands) were 
left desolate by being bound to drunken, criminal, insane, or cruel 
and violent spouses and they were not under current law free to 
remarry. The union wanted the grounds of divorce to be expanded to 
include insanity, desertion, drunkeness and penal servitude. Such 
proposals were rigorously opposed by the Church, still committed to 
the idea of indissolubility of marriage. Lord Gorrell (or Sir 
Gorrell Barnes as he then was known) composed a great tract of 
complaint against the law's illogicalities as part of his Judgement of 
the case of Dodd v Dodd in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty 
Division in 1906. In 1909, he again brought the matter of divorce 
law reform before Parliament through a motion in the House of Lords 
to extend jurisdiction in divorce matters to the county courts. The 
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Asquith government responded by appointing a Royal Commission on 
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes in 1909 and handing the chair to Lord 
Gorrell. The Commission was to look at the law of divorce and 
matrimonial causes, including separation orders, and the work of the 
magistrates and recommend changes. The final report and evidence 
was published as an extensive four volume compendium in 1912 (Royal 
Commission on Marriage and Divorce, 1912). 
The inadequacy of the magistracy was a recurrent theme of the 
Report. The Commission wanted to take away magistrates' powers to 
grant separation orders leaving them with only limited powers to 
grant orders in cases needing immediate protection or support. By a 
majority of eleven to three, they favoured an expansion of the 
grounds of divorce to include adultery, desertion for three years, 
cruelty, incurable insanity, habitual drunkeness and imprisonment 
under a commuted death sentence; equal grounds for divorce between 
men and women; expanded provisions for nullity to failure to 
consumate, insanity, venereal disease and pregnancy at the time of 
marriage; a limitation of the publication of divorce case details and 
a reduction in cost for divorce procedures. The report met with a 
very hostile reception and greatly due to Church opposition, the 
government failed to act upon its recommendations. After Lord 
Gorrell's death in 1913, his son introduced a Bill to the House of 
Lords in an attempt to bring to law the recommendations on which the 
Commission had agreed but had to withdraw it as it was too late in 
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the session for discussion. Before it could be reintroduced war 
broke out and the second Lord Gorrell was killed. 
Feminists favoured an equalisation of the grounds for divorce between 
men and women. Millicent Fawcett had skillfully argued in her 
evidence to the Gorrell commission that unequal grounds for divorce 
allowed a double standard of morality between men and women. Women 
were expected to forgive a husband's adultery unless he aggravated it 
with violent behaviour or desertion etc. whilst men could divorce 
their wives for just one act of adultery. Two more bills were 
introduced into Parliament in 1920 and 1921 attempting to enact some 
of the Gorrell commissions proposals but both failed to become law. 
It was not until feminists drafted their own bill for equal grounds 
in 1923 that their demands were accepted by Parliament. 
Carol Smart has argued that by the first half of the twentieth 
century, the belief that a husband's adultery was as disruptive to 
family stability as a wife's had taken hold (Smart, 1984). There 
certainly was less resistance to the essentially procedural, equal 
treatment reform of divorce law than to the highly controversial 
expansion of grounds of divorce. The Matrimonial Causes Act of 
1923, sponsored by Lord Buckmaster, succeeded because it aimed 
simply to make adultery, equally for men and women, the sole ground 
for divorce. But this new 'equality' in divorce provision probably 
had little effect on women victims of domestic violence. Although 
the divorce rate increased from an average number of 2954 petitions 
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between 1916-1920 to an average of 4052 for each year between 1926- 
1930, changes in procedure allowing the poor's undefended cases to be 
heard in Assizes towns accounted for the rise in petitions more than 
'reforms' in the grounds of divorce (McGregor, 1957). 
Maintenance. Prostitution and Working Class Wives. 
The lawmakers' eagerness to grant orders on equal grounds for men 
and women did not extend to the magistrates' courts. In fact the 
very opposite occured, reforms here allowing an expansion of the 
grounds for the granting of orders. The Summary Jurisdiction 
(Separation and Maintenance) Act of 1925 increased the grounds for 
the granting of orders for both husbands and wives but a wife's 
grounds for complaint were more compendious than were a husband's. 
The Bill was introduced to Parliament in 1924 under the direction of 
the National Union for Equal Citizenship and taken up by the 
Conservative government. Between 1925 and 1960 husbands had three 
grounds for complaint upon which to apply for a magistrates' order 
0. the wife's persistent drunkeness, 2. cruelty to the children, 3. 
adultery) whilst wives had a total of ten ( 1. a husband's conviction 
for violence against his wife, 2. his persistent cruelty to her, 3. his 
persistent cruelty to the children, 4. his habitual drunkeness, 5. his 
drug addiction, 6. his insistence upon sexual intercourse with her 
whilst being venereally infected, 7. his compelling her into 
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prostitution, 8. his adultery, 9. desertion, 10. wilful neglect to 
maintain her or the children). 
Much of the impetus for the 1925 Act seems to have sprung from 
despair about the moral standards of working class wives rather than 
from an awareness of their real problems in escaping from violent 
men. A great proportion of the debates on the Bill centred upon 
whether or not husbands could force wives into prostitution. 
Feminist supporters of the Bill argued that the problem for working 
class wives was not a husband's physical compulsion that they should 
become prostitutes but other types of behaviour far more ' devilish'. 
The lack of accomodation at the time meant further that wives had 
nowhere to go to live apart from violent men. Whilst awaiting the 
hearing of her case before the magistrates for a separation order, a 
battered woman was forced to live in absolute destitution-or maintain 
herself as best she could. In a time of great economic depression, 
with unemployment rife some separated women may have had no choice 
but to support themselves by prostitution. Prostitution offences 
averaged at 4,317 cases being tried per year in the magistrates' 
courts between 1920-1924 compared with averages of 3,130 per year 
between 1925-1929 and 1,555 per year between 1930-1934 (Criminal 
Statistics, 1947). 
Those who emphasised the economic dependence of women as being at 
the root of the prostitution problem were treated with great 
hostility in the House of Commons. Some male M. P. s feared wives 
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were too well protected by the law and there was a danger of them 
abusing their legal privileges in order to bully their husbands. Mr 
Storry-Deans for instance tramped out the following tale of the 
'silly, capricious wife' who makes her long suffering husband's life a 
misery 
A lady got an order against her husband, I gather the conduct 
complained of was not very bad, but she contrived to persuade 
the magistrates that she had been deserted by her husband, 
because in a temper, when she said she wondered how he managed 
to live with her if she were so bad-tempered as he suggested, 
he replied, "Get out, then". She took him at his word and got 
out, and she thereupon got her order from a sympathetic bench 
of magistrates. Benches of magistrates are rightly sympathetic 
to the claims of women. That is my experience. They gave 
this lady her order. She went away to live in a distant part 
of the country, and the husband faithfully paid the amounts due 
under the order. After a while, at his urgent solicitation, she 
returned to him and lived with him for about a week, and then, 
without any quarrel having taken place, she again left him. He 
did not apply for the order to be annulled, and he continued to 
pay her the allowance. After another three or four months she 
returned again and lived with him for ten days - one week and 
two weekends. Then she went away again and the husband ( .... ) 
applied for the order to be discharged. ( .... ) We do not want 
to take away or to injure any right which women have, but on 
the other hand we do not desire to put into the hands of any 
woman who might be capricious the power to act in the manner I 
have explained. ' 
Mansard, 1924,4 July. ) 
Another M. P. complained wives may frame their separation orders, hang 
them over the fireplace and bring them down to periodically remind 
their husband's of their duties (Hansard, 1924,4 July). In 
comparison to the attitudes aired in debates about violence against 
women in the nineteenth century, there was a hardening of sympathies 
in the 1920s. Ardent masculinists in the nineteenth century had 
attempted to convince reformers that battered women did not need 
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protection in law because they merely fought back. In the 1920s 
they denied women were assaulted altogether. 
Any legal imbalance which favoured wives was a very long way off 
acting as a positive discrimination for the protection of women. 
Although cases such as the one described by Mr Storrey Deans may 
have occured, many of the provisions which 'favoured' wives were 
largely unworkable in practice. For example, a woman was often 
reluctant to have her husband charged with criminal assault before 
she could apply to the civil jurisdiction. Although the 1925 Act 
was meant to relieve women of the need to leave the husband before 
going to the court to complain of his cruelty or neglect to maintain, 
if she was unable to find separate accomodation within three months 
any order made would lapse. In practice then, a wife was still 
obliged to render herself homeless by leaving her husband to have a 
separation order of any value. 
Reconciling Marital 'Differences'. 
Despite the persistent difficulties faced by women leaving violent 
men, the 1925 Act must have brought some improvement. Following 
the 1925 Act, maintenance applications rose from 9,553 in 1900 to 
15,991 in 1930 (McGregor, Gibson & Blom-Cooper, 1970). The seeds of 
suspicion regards the genuine nature of a woman's claims however 
were begirgng to show signs of germination. Criticisms of the 
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magistracy's gullibility hardened. Reformist debates in the 1930s 
showed grave concerns that magistrates were not only unskilled 
muddlers but they in fact aggravated marital upsets. The idea of 
persuading magistrates to effect reconciliations rather than protect 
wives became an important theme. As early as 1912, the Royal 
Commission on Divorce had noted the wastage in court time caused by 
couples who later reconciled their differences : 
We find that a very large percentage of the persons separated 
by such orders become reconciled afterwards.... largely through 
pressure caused by the increased cost of living separately, by 
some witnesses this percentage is placed as high as 50 or even, 
in some cases, as high as 75. 
Mansard, 1936-7, Vol. 319, Col. 1939) 
Efforts to encourage reconciliation were proffered in the late 1920s 
and originally focused on changes to the court environment. The 
Court of Domestic Relations Bill was introduced into the House of 
Commons three times between 1928 and 1930. Each time separate 
court buildings to deal with the matrimonial cases of the working 
classes were proposed. In 1934 Lord Listowel introduced the 
Summary Jurisdiction (Domestic Procedure) Bill to produce a special 
conciliation procedure whereby one spouse could summons the other to 
appear before the court to help them resolve their differences. 
Lord Merrivale also tried to introduce a Bill on the same subject 
into the House of Lords but withdrew it on hearing that the 
government had set up a committee of enquiry. Chaired by a Mr 
Harris of the Home Office, the Departmental Committee on Social 
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Services in Courts of Summary - Jurisdiction was to look into social 
services in the magistrates courts especially in terms of matrimonial 
disputes, probation officers and conciliation machinery. Their 
report, published in March 1936, stressed the shortage of reconciling 
influences in the magistrates courts. The Committee had examined 
136 witnesses and held 47 meetings in the first review of 
matrimonial powers in the summary courts since their creation in the 
19th century. Figures returned from the courts after a request for 
further information showed that in London 79% of complainants first 
saw a probation officer for reconciliation work, resulting in only 9% 
of cases then going before the court for adjudication (McGregor et 
al, 1970). For women victims of domestic violence this delay would 
have greatly increased the dangers associated with taking a complaint 
to court. Unless she was living elsewhere in the meantime, the 
husband's scope to coerce her into dropping the charges would have 
been great. 
Having a smaller volume of work altogether, things seem to have been 
better for women visiting courts in the non-metropolitan areas. In 
the County Borough and County Divisional Courts only 28% of couples 
saw a probation officer first, 22% to 40% of whom later carried on to 
have their cases heard (McGregor et al, 1970). Acting tentatively 
upon the encouragement gained from these figures, the Committee 
recomended courts should, at their discretion, promote the work of 
conciliators and make further use of interim orders in the hope that 
couples may sort themselves out without court involvement. Some 
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procedural changes would be needed to defuse the rampant hostility 
exhibited when cases came to court. Cases should be heard at 
special sessions and even evening sittings could be tried. The bench, 
which could presently comprise an intimidating group of 30 or so 
magistrates adjudicating one case, ought to be restricted to a 
maximum of three magistrates, one of whom should be a woman, and 
they would be empowered to sit in private. 
In 1936, Sir Arnold Wilson took up themes from the Committee's report 
and twice urged the government to consider its recommendations. Sir 
Arnold, also worried about magistrates' lack of training, added the 
new complaint-of middle class bias to the list of their shortcomings. 
The issues were given at last a formal hearing during the readings 
of the Summary Procedure (Matrimonial and Other Matters) Bill in 
1937. Supporters of the Bill pointed out how the legal protection 
for women victims of domestic violence was now 'satisfactory'. 
Battered wives could now get non-cohabitation orders, maintenance, 
custody of the children and court costs, but husbands were in a less 
favoured position having fewer grounds on which to apply for relief. 
The unsatisfactory court environment worked to deny individuals their 
legitimate rights. Hearings were packed with 'a host of busybody 
neighbours' attending for morbid reasons along with a press who 
gained profit from sensationalising private affairs. Whilst some 
speakers, e. g. Mr Rathbone and Mr Messer, pointed out how wives were 
the most likely to be oppressed in court and intimidated into silence, 
others believed they Ahestrated the entire shambles : 
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A wife may have been dejected because of a fancied neglect, and 
she gets neighbours to sympathise with her, and before you know 
where you are, trouble arises. 
(Mr Macquister, Hansard, 1936. ) 
The majority of the House however agreed that the Summary Procedure 
Bill would preserve the family against break up by implementing most 
of the Departmental Committee's recomendations, (i. e. encourage 
reconciliation, a further use of probation officers and interim 
orders, special sittings apart from criminal cases, restriction of the 
bench to three magistrates one of whom should be a woman, 
restrictions upon the press and witnesses permitted in court). 
Apart from a change of name in 1937 to the Summary Procedure 
(Domestic Proceedings) Bill, the proposals were agreed to be very 
good and became law that year. 
Expanding The Grounds For Divorce. 
At about the same time another private members bill proposed a 
liberalisation of the law of divorce by expanding the grounds on 
which orders could be granted. This time, in addition to resistance 
from the Church, the Bill faced strong opposition from powerful 
members of the government of the day. For example, the Lord 
Chancellor, despite the recommendations of his legal colleagues, 
opposed further 'liberalisation' because of fears that it would 
increase the work load of the courts and create a need for more 
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Judges in the Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division. The bills 
sponsors, Alan Herbert and Rupert de la Bere, helped by the Divorce 
Law Reform Union, lawyers and feminists, scored a major coup in 
debates by arguing that the bill aimed to preserve respect for the 
church, law and marriage not destroy them. With such limited 
grounds for divorce, the law, the institution of marriage and the 
Church fell into disrepute. Prospective petitioners were faced with 
committing either adultery or perjury to legally end their 
relationships. If they were unwilling to do either, they were forced 
to live 'in sin', out of wedlock, increasing the population of 
illegitimate children. Some practising clergy reinforced this 
argument by pointing out that marriage should be based upon the 
desire to dwell together out of sheer affection and respect for one 
another, not duty for duty's sake. In a letter to the Times, the 
Archdeacon of Coventry wrote of the stupidity of England, a 
Protestant country, clinging on to adultery as the sole ground of 
divorce whilst Catholic neighbours offered further grounds. 
Herbert and De is Bere took up the issue of reconciliation by trying 
to argue that the summary courts, being courts for more immediate 
relief, should be persuaded to exercise their capacities in this 
respect. Mr Claud Mullins, a magistrate in the South West of 
England, had supplied them with information on the potential here. 
In seven months he had had 220 summons for relief out of which only 
89 orders needed to be eventually made. Most of the wives were 
said to be 'better off' without court involvement because the problem 
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at the root of their difficulties was later found to be a 'medical 
matter' which could be referred to a doctor. Mr Mullins did not 
mention whether the wives or the husbands received medical treatment. 
nor what this consisted of. 
TABLE 4: Petitions for Divorce Showing Grounds and Proportion of Male 
and Female Petitioners, 1938-1968, England and Wales. 
1938 1958 
Total filed 9970 25584 
Adultery 4989 (50%) 11553 (45%) 
Desertion 3909 (39%) 8880 (35%) 
Cruelty 699 (11%) 4869 (19%) 
By Husbands 4649 (47%) 11540 (45%) 
By Wives 5321 (53%) 14044 (55%) 
1962 
33818 
15366 (45%) 
9160 (27%) 
5791 (17%) 
14271 (42%) 
19547 (58%) 
1968 
54036 
26011 (48%) 
11147 (21%) 
12753 (24%) 
20130 (37%) 
33906 (63%) 
NOTE: Where totals do not add to 100x, remaining petitions were based on 
other grounds. 
Sources : Civil Judicial Statistics, 1962,1968. 
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1937 liberalised divorce law further when 
implemented in 1938 by adding to adultery the offences of cruelty, 
desertion for three years and the incurable insanity of the other 
spouse as grounds for divorce. Adultery however remained the most 
common ground for divorce until the passing of the Divorce Reform 
Act 1969 (Table 4). 
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Immediately following the Act, the number of divorce applications 
increased. There was a peak increase during and after the second 
world war and another increase in petitions for divorce in 1950 when 
the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 came into force. During the war 
large numbers of servicemen and women were in need of legal 
assistance with their marital difficulties so the government of the 
day set up a rudimentary system of legal aid to deal with service 
divorces. The Rushcliffe Committee in 1949 noted the legal 
profession's anxiety that the government take on responsibility for 
legal services. Legal aid was thus introduced as a lawyer's 
insurance policy as well as a welfare benefit. 
Table 5: Divorce Petitions Filed England And Wales 1937-60. 
Year. Filed by Filed by Total. 
husband. wife. 
1937 2.765 2,985 5,750 
1942 6,303 5,310 11,613 
1944 10,154 8,236 41,704 
1946 26,429 15,275 41,704 
1948 18,456 18,619 37,075 
1950 13,207 15,889 29,096 
1952 14,705 19,065 33,770 
1954 12,708 15,639 28,347 
1956 12,538 15,215 27,753 
1958 11,540 14,044 25,584 
1960 12,109 15,761 27,870 
Source : (Smart, 1984, p. 33). 
The grounds for divorce between the years 1950 to 1960 also changed 
in proportion towards a much lesser emphasis upon desertion and 
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greater reliance upon cruelty and adultery ( adultery 43%, cruelty 
13%, desertion 42% in 1954 to adultery 53%, cruelty 19% and 
desertion 26% in 1966). Changes in the grounds for divorce 
coincided with changes in the share of divorces granted to wives in 
comparison with husbands. Most war time divorces were granted to 
men (in 1945 this peaked at 65%). At other times, women obtained 
more than half the divorce petitions (55% in 1954) (Table 5). Men 
and women petitioned equally on the grounds of adultery and 
desertion but 95% of cruelty petitions were brought by women 
(Stetson, 1982). Thus, the increase in the frequency of the 
petitions based upon cruelty coincided with an increase in the 
numbers of women petitioning for divorce. 
In 1956, the Morton Commission (set up in 1951 to review the law of 
divorce and matrimonial causes, including magistrates powers) 
recommended further minor expansions in the grounds for divorce to 
cover wilful refusal to consumate the marriage, artificial 
insemination by donor without the husband's consent and detention as 
a mental defective of dangerous and violent propensities (Royal 
Commission On Marriage And Divorce, 1956). Minor changes affecting 
the divorce of insane spouses were brought -in by the Divorce 
(Insanity and Desertion) Act 1958 and the Mental Health Act 1959. 
A more significant reform for women hoping to divorce violent men 
was introduced in 1965. The Matrimonial Causes Act modified the 
bars to collusion and condonation which had prevented many couples 
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from getting divorced even though their marriages had broken down. 
The abolition of the principle of condonation in relation to cruelty 
brought some relief for battered wives in cases where their 
forgiveness was likely to be asserted or assumed. Allegations of 
2, bmr:; ýauu:, ýi. Zauu 01 vl emt T. zAs; ttomIdi brA, or, 1Ai-, {l£tran fkr. A4V z, %-Atn, 
returned repeatedly to violent husbands due to lack of accomodation 
or other means of support. Women who returned to their husbands 
were at a great risk as they would have to await a further act of 
violence to revive the past incidences in order to abolish the 
condonation barring a divorce. 
'Traditional' Remedies. 
Despite the importance attached to the matrimonial powers of summary 
and divorce courts, many women, wives and cohabitees, continued to 
depend on the more 'traditional' powers of magistrates to enforce the 
peace. Statistics showing the numbers of bind over orders do not 
include information on the sex and relationship of complainants and 
offenders. In the 1960s however, academic and practising lawyers 
were stressing the continued use of these orders for emergencies in 
cases of domestic dispute. The frequency of applications for orders 
to keep the peace and the attitudes of the judiciary towards their 
imposition seem to have changed little since the nineteenth century : 
There is a popular superstition which will probably endure as 
long as Justices of the Peace themselves that magistrates have 
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a sovereign specific which is a remedy against all the ills a 
wife can suffer at the hands of her husband. This specific is 
known as a Protection Order - sometimes affectionately as a 
"Protection". Although such an order is unknown to magisterial 
law today, wives go on asking for it at a busy court at the 
rate of about four per week. Furthermore they appear to think 
it can be granted upon application as readily as a doctor writes 
out a medical certificate, and once obtained will unfailingly 
frighten the husband into better ways. The magistrates 
certainly have been entrusted with great powers to protect one 
spouse from the misconduct of another and to compel a husband 
who is not maintaining his family to do so. But they are not 
so summary and informal as this. 
(Giles, 1963, p. 208. ) 
The Magistrates Court Act of 1952 did provide a broad scope for 
intervention in theory by bringing within its compass not only 
failure to keep the peace but failing to ' be of good behaviour'. 
The maximum punishment was committal for six months but should an 
offender be committed for failing to find sureties, the court could 
later reduce or dispense with them on fresh evidence. This Act 
aimed to apply the reconciling philosophy to parties involved in 
disputes covered by the bind over powers. In stark contrast to the 
nineteenth century police court, where neighbours gathered almost as 
if at a social event to witness cases and frequently interrupted 
proceedings, the public were no longer admitted into the court. The 
size of the bench was curtailed, S56(2) of the 1952 act required the 
bench to be made up of no more than three justices, whenever 
practiceable of both sex. 
Although the press could still attend, S58 severely curtailed their 
reporting powers. The aim of these procedural changes were: 
Page 63 
Expanding And Equalising Grounds : Reconciling Provisions. /2. 
to encourage a friendly and conciliatory attitude, the 
proceedings may be as informal as is consistent with a fair and 
legal hearing. 
(Giles, 1963, p. 208). 
TABLE 6: Persons Aged 21 and Over Dealt With Summarily For Cases Of Assault 
And Result Of Proceedings. 
Not guilty 
No. /No Sentence Bound 
Year Offence Persons Passed* Over 
1947 Aggrav. 128 M 31 M 13 M 
Assault 6 F4F - 
Common 11,368 M 5,292 M 2,336 M 3,740 M 
Assault 5,627 F 2,941 F 1,883 F 
1954 Aggrav. 53 M 19 M 4 M 
Assault 2 FiF - 
Common 8,642 M 4,615 M 1,148 M 2,879 M 
Assault 4,169 F 2,485 F 925 F 
1967 Aggrav. 22 M6M - 
Assault 3 FiF - 
Common 7,057 M 3,750 M 1,114 M 1,450 M(+743)# 
Assault 2,733 F 1,445 F 611 F 
1968 Aggrav. 38 M9M 2 M 
Assault 8 F2F - 
Common 6,879 M 3,576 M 1,176 M 1,409 M(+718)# 
Assault 2,579 F 1,392 F 638 F 
Found 
Guilty & 
Sentenced 
74 M 
2F 
803 F 
30 M 
IF 
759 F 
14 M (+2)# 
2F 
380 F(+297)# 
23 M(+3)# 
4F 
283 F(+266)# 
* Category includes charges withdrawn or dismissed, persons sent to 
institutions under mental health acts, absolute and conditional discharges. 
# Bracketed figures indicate cases where proceedings were not yet complete at 
the time the statistics were published. 
Sources : Criminal Statistics, 1947,1954,1967 & 1968. 
Statistics show that the bind over powers were indeed applied very 
frequently to cases of assault even if these were aggravated (Table 
6). For the years 1947,1954,1967 and 1968 bind overs were used 
for between 13% to 33% of common assault cases (in keeping with 
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sentencing patterns in general, female offenders were more likely to 
be bound over than males). 
TABLE 7: Average Numbers Of Assaults Tried Selected Years, 
England & Wales, 1900-1962. 
Year Indictable Aggravated Common 
Assault Assault Assault 
1900-4 160 1310 48 149 
1905-9 158 1021 38 827 
1910-14 135 781 33 560 
1915-19 56 354 24 118 
1920-24 75 512 32 589 
1925-29 60 347 25 089 
1930-34 43 214 18 389 
1938 40 144 14 540 
1945-49 59 131 17 094 
1955-59 199 62 12 107 
1962 269 49 10 626 
Sources : Criminal Statistics, 1938,1948,1958,1962. 
Charges for assault had nonetheless declined since the start of the 
century. Table 7 shows the average numbers of indictable assaults, 
aggravated assaults and common assaults brought from 1900 to 1962. 
The figures show a marked decline in assaults during the two wartime 
periods when a large proportion of the male population were away 
fighting. The other years showing a decline coincide with the 
introduction of more grounds for divorce, i. e. 1925-1929 and 1938. 
Although there appears to be a coincidence between the divorce law 
reforms and the drop in prosecutions for assault cases, the rise in 
the numbers of divorces granted was small in comparison to the fall 
in the assault prosecutions. Furthermore, the decline in the 
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numbers of assaults recorded however do not give any indication of 
the number of applications made yet not counted because the justices 
considered other remedies more appropriate. It could be that the 
reconciling philosophy and the existence of expanded grounds had an 
impact on the number of applications refused and withdrawn so that 
increasingly more women could have been denied legal relief. 
The continued applications for bind over orders by wives caused 
bafflement to the legal profession at the time although there are a 
number of possible explanations for this. After divorce or judicial 
separation these were the only remedies available against persistent 
pestering for women who could not afford to take actions for 
trespass or damages in the County Court. For unmarried women 
without their own tenancies, bind over orders and assault actions for 
damages were the only options available. As a complaint to the 
magistrates could entirely pre-empt threatened violence, bind over 
orders had the scope to be broader than even the contemporary 
remedies provided by matrimonial injunctions. Having a husband 
bound over to keep the peace would also serve as 'proof' of his past 
violence should this be insisted upon by a solicitor, magistrate, or 
housing officer. As separation orders at the time were ideally 
supposed to be temporary, women victims of domestic violence could 
attend court on a number of occasions, become involved with probation 
officers concerned to effect reconciliations and find the pressures 
to return to the violent husband too great to resist. Bind over 
orders might have provided some protection for wives in this 
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situation and would indeed be their only options if separation orders 
were no longer a possibility. The interviews conducted during the 
survey discussed in Part II demonstrated well why some women had 
little option but to use magistrates' orders (see Part II, Chapter 
Six). Although Chapter Six will discuss at length the findings of 
the survey, it is worth looking at one example briefly now to 
illustrate the problems women encountered when applying for legal 
help in the 1950s and 1960s. Bearing in mind that practice varied 
from court to court, interview data showed strong pressures on some 
wives to reconcile even in cases of life threatening violence. One 
woman, whom I shall refer to as 'Una' *, first approached the courts 
for help in 1955, obtained 13 separation orders, telephoned the police 
on many more occasions and eventually, after twelve years and his 
attempted murder of her, succeeded in getting a divorce from her 
husband. Una's husband had been imprisoned for three months for 
cruelty to his children, released and returned to the family, served 
an 18 month prison sentence for grevious bodily harm to his wife, 
released and sent back to the family, nine days later attempted to 
murder her again by stabbing her and again sent to prison for three 
months, released and arrested repeatedly for six months until Una was 
granted her divorce. During this time, Una was coerced into 
reconciliation procedures by the court, probation officer and prison 
welfare officer who clung on to their opinions that her marriage 
* All the namoa of women Antorviowod hav boon chanflod as well a" 
any other details which could load to th. ir identification. 
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should be preserved, in spite of their awareness of her husband's 
violence. Their unrealistic beliefs in his capacity for reform and 
reconciliation reinforced Una's husband's view that he could do what 
he liked in the privacy of his home. 
Whilst the courts urged women to effect reconciliations when applying 
for bind over or matrimonial orders, they penalised them for their 
continued cohabitation if applying for property adjustments. Under 
the Married Women's Property Act 1882, no criminal proceedings could 
be taken against a husband whilst the wife was in cohabitation. If 
therefore a husband damaged/removed a woman's property he could not 
be prosecuted if she remained in cohabitation. Even if she left the 
home the courts might not intervene on her behalf due to confusion 
over which situations allowed the wife's evidence to be heard. In 
1953 for example, Mr Moore set fire to the lodging house in Bradford 
where his wife had fled in order to escape his violence. It was 
necessary for a higher court to clarify whether or not Mrs Moore 
could be heard as a competent witness in the trial of her husband 
for arson (R v Moore (1954)). 
The criminal law still gave tacit support to men's access rights to 
their' wives bodies. A case in 1946, DPP v Holmes, reiterated the 
special importance the criminal law attached to a woman's act of 
adultery. Mr Holmes had quarrelled with his wife because a man in 
the local pub had winked at her. Mrs Holmes later said that she 
would admit to being unfaithful if it would make her husband feel 
Page 68 
Expanding And Equalising Grounds : Reconciling Provisions. /2. 
less guilty about his ongoing adulterous relationship with Mrs X. 
When they got home Mr Holmes hit his wife repeatedly on the head 
with a hammer. He then killed her by strangulation because he said 
he did not like to see her suffering. The next day he left home to 
meet Mrs X. When tried for murdering his wife, Mr Holmes claimed 
he was not guilty because of the provocation she had given him by 
admitting adultery. Although Mr Holmes was found guilty of murder 
because he had no corroboration that his wife had committed adultery, 
the House of Lords confirmed that, if he had corroboration such as 
finding her in the act of adultery, this would have been sufficient 
provocation to reduce the charge to manslaughter. A wife's adultery 
was to be considered the one special case in the law of provocation 
(Holmes v DPP (1946)). 
In a later case the Court of Appeal condoned cases of wife rape 
providing that husbands did not use undue force. In Rv Miller in 
1954 the court held that just because a woman left her husband and 
lodged a petition for divorce it did not mean that she had revoked 
her consent to sexual intercourse with him. Mrs Miller was raped by 
her husband 14 months after she had left him and 2 months after she 
had lodged a petition for divorce. Mr Miller argued that ever since 
she had gone he had been trying to get her to come back. He 
claimed that the rape was evidence of his efforts. The court 
supported Mr Miller's right to continued sexual use of his wife but 
argued that he must not use undue force to obtain it. It was 
decided he could not be charged with rape but, because of the 
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violence used in his attempt to obtain his conjugal rights, he could 
be charged with causing actual bodily harm (R v Miller (1954)). 
Gender Equality In The Magistrates' Courts. 
This disregard of inequalities in the criminal law stands in stark 
contrast to the almost obsessive fears of reformers about unequal 
grounds of complaint within the family law. The lawmakers' concerns 
over equal grounds for complaint did eventually turn upon claims 
within the summary courts. The power to make separation and 
maintenance orders was expanded and consolidated in the Matrimonial 
Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960. This Act brought 
together some previously disparate statutes and incorporated as well 
some of the Morton Commission's recommendations. The grounds, laid 
out in Si, aimed 'as far as humanly possible' to put the husband and 
the wife on an equal footing even though by the 1960s wives were 
the enormous majority applying for relief. The grounds now included 
all the hotch potch of greivances which had developed within the 
fault based system - desertion, persistent cruelty, being found guilty 
of an assault upon the complainant, attempting to commit or actually 
committing certain sexual offences, committing adultery, insisting 
upon sexual intercourse whilst being infected with a venereal 
disease, addiction to drugs or alchohol, compelling the wife into 
prostitution, neglecting , 
to maintain the wife or children. 
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As proof of the allegations, witnesses might be required, and would 
be preferrable, if the husband contested a wife's explanation of her 
injuries. Women who could not, persuade friends or neighbours to 
attend the court were, as in the 19th century, dependant upon the 
sympathies of the bench. In the absence of reliable witnesses, 
magistrates were urged to draw upon their own discretion as to the 
truth of the allegations. Whilst it was not necessary to demand 
the high standard of proof required in criminal cases, the court 
should do its best to discover what was true beyond reasonable 
doubt. According to Davis v Davis (1950) the magistrate would need 
strict proof beyond reasonable doubt of acts of cruelty alleged. 
Some courts' rather zealous attempts to encourage reconciliations 
were given an approving nod by the Act, a depressing prospect for 
battered wives. In his discussion of the Act, one legal academic 
noted :' From every point of view the wife will be advised to let 
the probation officer try his hand at reconciliation before the court 
acts at all' (Giles, 1963, p. 209). Section 59 of the Act introduced 
more daunting powers to stall proceedings through the provision of 
interim orders on the hope that whilst the couple continued to 
cohabit, they would reconcile themselves. 
The Definition Of ' Cruelty' In The Courts. 
Meanwhile, in the courts, certain changes were being made by judges 
to the laws regulating violence to -wives. The emphasis upon 
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individualism (each case having to be Judged according to the 
specific facts of the case) meant that no irony was detected in a 
lawyer's recommendation that magistrates treat a woman's allegations 
of even life threatening violence with scepticism whilst judges or 
Law Lords debate exhaustively whether it is cruel to break a man's 
masonic regalia. In the higher courts a gradual shift in emphasis 
towards more subjective standards of cruel behaviour was advised 
through judicial interpretation, although confusions arising from a 
conflict between subjective and objective definitions continued to 
provide case law with developmental detours. When cruelty is 
defined subjectively variations in standards could be justified with 
relative ease. Some emphasis upon subjective definitions would be 
relevant in all cases of cruelty where proof of injury to health was 
a prerequisite for a petition. Because of variations in temperament 
or physique between individuals, conduct which caused injury to the 
health of one person may not cause injury to that of another. A 
further individualisation of standards of cruelty would inevitably 
provide even greater scope for a judge's own personal beliefs and 
biases regards appropriate social norms. In the case of Usmar v 
Usmar for example it was held that a wife's constant nagging could 
amount to cruelty (Usmar V Usmar (1949)). Mrs Horton's 'malevolent' 
damage to her husband's masonic regalia, cigarette case and 
spectacles was taken to be sufficiently malicious as to constitute 
cruelty and an 'evil unwifely spirit' (Horton v Horton (1940). (Mr 
Horton had tried to solve his own problems before seeking a divorce 
by taxing his wife 24 shillings from her housekeeping as recompense 
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for the damage to his glasses and calling in the family doctor to 
deal with her ' hysterical' belief that he wanted to poison her). 
Criminality and imprisonment could be cruelty depending on the 
circumstances of the case. It would not be cruel if the wife was 
involved in the activities, by for example attending meetings of the 
husband's gang (Boushall v Boushall (1964)). A summons for custody 
of the children could be cruelty in view of the background to the 
parties' relationship (Buxton v Buxton (1965)). 
As Lord Thankerton put it in Watt (or Thomas) v Thomas (1947): 'The 
law has no footrule by which to measure the personalities of the 
spouses' (quoted in Biggs, 1962. ). This certainly gave scope for 
gender biased judgements. In Meacher v Meacher in 1946, it was 
held that a husband was within his rights in assaulting his wife 
because she had disobeyed his orders not to visit her relations. 
(This decision was reversed at the Court of Appeal on the ground 
that the husband's demands were unreasonable. His 'right' to 
discipline as such was not altered ) (Meacher v Meacher (1946)). 
Mrs McKenzie's husband was ticked off by the court in 1959 for 
giving her the 'hardest smacked bottom she had ever had' as 
punishment for adultery. . 
The court argued that his attack was 
savage. Had he punished her as one punishes a naughty child, it 
would not have been cruel (McKenzie v McKenzie (1959)). The 
maltreatment of children, through a series of judgements in the 1950s 
to 1960s, even in the absence of the wife and without any malicious 
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intent against her, was held also be evidence of cruelty to a wife 
(see Wright v Wright (1960)). 
Whether or not refusal of sexual relations was a cruelty depended 
upon the circumstances of the case, the age of the spouses and the 
stage in the marriage of the refusal (Evans v Evans (1965); B(L) v 
B(R) (1965)). Lack of desire for sex would not be cruel even if it 
was known this could cause injury to a partner's health (P vP 
(1964)>. In P (D) v P(J) (1965) however it was said to be cruel if 
one partner sexually excited the other and then refused intercourse. 
Due to the overinflated importance attached to male sexual desires 
this meant in practice that a wife's refusal of intercourse could be 
cruelty whilst a husband's would not (see Kaslefsky v Kaslefsky 
(1951), Clark v Clark (1958), PvP (1964), B (L) vB (R) (1965), P (P) 
vP (J) (1965), Evans v Evans (1965) ). Lord Denning took a 
particularly bleak view of such behaviour by a wife : 
the wilful and unjustifiable refusal of sexual intercourse is 
destructive of marriage, more destructive, perhaps, than 
anything else. Just as normal sexual intercourse is the 
natural bond of marriage, so the wilful refusal of it causes a 
marriage to disintegrate. 
(Kaslefsky v Kaslefsky (1951)) 
Sexual intercourse was so 'normal' a need for husbands that some 
judges condoned their use of force to consumate the marriage 
(Saunders v Saunders (1947)). 'Normal' sexuality offers variable 
standards of conduct for men and women and it was not until 1966 in 
Page 74 
Expanding And Equalising Grounds : Reconciling Provisions. /2. 
a case at the Court of Appeal that the principle sexual frustration 
could be equally cruel to wives was applied. Mrs Sheldon managed 
to prove her case of alleged cruelty on the basis of her husband's 
refusal of intercourse having offered corroborative evidence to 
convince the court that her health had suffered, not only from sexual 
frustration, but also from the frustrated urge to have her own child 
(Sheldon v Sheldon (1960). Where it could be shown that a woman 
was a lesbian or merely had a close relationship with another woman, 
the courts readily interpreted it as a wife's cruel behaviour 
(Gardner v Gardner (1947); Spicer v Spicer (1954)) yet a man's 
rejection of heterosexual relations would not necessarily encourage a 
court to find grounds for a divorce (Bohnel v Bohnel (1960); Coffer v 
Coffer (1965)). 
Judges sometimes disagreed with one another over appropriate 
standards of behaviour in marriage. In Lauder v Lauder, Lord 
Merriman P. and Pearce J. found that the husband's deliberate moody 
and sulking conduct was cruel yet Singleton L. J. argued it was not 
serious (Lauder v Lauder (1949)). Similarly, in Squire v Squire, 
Hodson J. disagreed with Tucker and Evershed L. J. because he felt that 
the conduct of a sick wife in keeping her husband awake reading to 
her was not sufficiently grave and weighty to be cruel (Squire v 
Squire (1949)). 
In some cases the emphasis upon subjectivity could lead to 
sympathetic treatment of a wife's complaints. In 1955, for instance 
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Lord Goddard held that a husband's insistence that his wife 
masturbate him was a 'filthy practice' and a cruelty (Lawson v Lawson 
(1955) ). Similarly, Lord Merriman, President of the Probate Divorce 
and Admiralty Division, decried a man's persistent sexual demands 
upon his wife as cruelty. But, any boost for women's rights awarded 
by such decisions was ambiguous because the emphasis on variable 
standards virtually invited a division between 'deserving' and 
'undeserving' wives with a consequential reaffirmation of the victim 
blaming ideology that some wives 'asked for it'. The following 
extract from Lord Merriman's judgement illustrates the ambiguity of 
the approach as, on the one hand, a progressive step for women (by 
acknowledging the hardship created by persistent or forced sex in 
marriage) yet, on the other, a retrograde step (in stating that some 
wives were more tolerant of their husband's needs/desires): 
No one can sit here as long as I have sat without realising 
that there is great diversity of standards between one set of 
spouses and another as to what is or is not a normal standard 
of sexual intercourse. What will be regarded as grossly 
excessive demands by one wife (or by the husband as the case 
may be) will be regarded as quite normal and reasonable by 
another wife or husband. (.... ) There are things strictly 
outside what may be called normal sexual intercourse which will 
be regarded by one wife (or one husband as the case may be) as 
so revolting as to be unmentionable, whereas other couples will 
regard them as nothing more than natural, normal love-making. 
(Holborn v. Holborn (1947)). 
Up to 1964, it was held that conduct must be voluntary to be cruel. 
Thus, accident, mistake or aspects of insanity, no matter what the 
effects upon the victim, could not constitute legal cruelty. By 1964 
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it was possible to obtain a divorce on the grounds of a partner's 
cruelty, without proving intent to commit harm. Proof that an 
intolerable situation had arisen was henceforth sufficient in order 
to obtain relief. According to the new line of thinking, no conduct 
is inherently capable or incapable of being cruel; the effect of the 
conduct in the circumstances of the individual case must always be 
the criterion. Thus, no distinction could theoretically be drawn 
between objectively violent and non-violent conduct, or between 
physical and mental cruelty, because the only issue should be whether 
injury to health was caused as a result of the conduct. 
Although it might seem a simple standard to state, the existence of 
injury to health created considerable difficulty because of doubts as 
to the scope and meaning of the term itself. It was not until 1952 
that the published cases from the courts positively stated that 
certain effects of violent behaviour, such as bruises or similar 
contusions were actual injuries to a partner's health. Mrs Fromhold 
for example had petitioned for a divorce on the ground of her 
husband's cruelty, alleging that he had treated her with violence on a 
number of occasions, as a result of which she suffered pain, bruises, 
a black eye and some cuts. Only after appealing to the Court of 
Appeal could Mrs Fromhold obtain legal acceptance that her husband's 
behaviour was cruel and resulted in injury to her health (Fromhold v 
Fromhold (1952)). 
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The inclusion of conduct resulting from mental illness presented 
particular problems. In Swettenham v Swettenham (1938) being of an 
incurably unsound mind was defined as a state which was 
'irrecoverable'. The test was whether the respondent was capable of 
managing him/herself and his/her affairs including the 'problems of 
society and married life' (see also Whysall v Whysall (1960); Chapman 
v Chapman (1961); Robinson v Robinson (1965)). In earlier times, 
injury to health may have been easy to define in that mental 
disorders were not considered unless they *were manifested in a 
physical way. With the expansion of pyschiatry and psychology, 
injury to health could no longer be proved as a physical fact. 
Unhappiness resulting from a partner's conduct would not necessarily 
constitute an injury to health, whereas a 'neurosis' or medically 
quantifiable mental disorder may. Mental distress could only be 
seen as. injurious to health if it was 'grave and weighty' according 
to a judge's discretion. To see if conduct was grave and weighty, 
the court had to make due allowance for illness because accusations 
from an insane person were seen as less hurtful than similar 
accusations from a sane person. Insanity could not be a defense 
against cruelty allegations if the conduct was objectively (i. e. 
physically) violent. If the conduct was not found to be physically 
cruel, in the absence of intent insanity would be a defence (Crump v 
Crump (1965)). By the mid 1960s therefore successive 
interpretations of 'cruel' behaviour in the courts had resulted in a 
most confusing, inconsistent and over-meticulous body of case law. 
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Maintenance. 
The area of the law with perhaps the greatest practical impact, 
maintenance, was yet to be touched by the reformers' equality of 
provisions trend. It was taken for granted that husbands would 
support wives. This also meant that men could not claim 
maintenance from wealthy wives. Until 1970, divorce law did not 
oblige a wife to pay maintenance to a husband except where he was 
classified as insane and kept in hospital. This lack of reciprocity 
encouraged judges' preoccupations with the behaviour of a wife who 
had to 'earn' her maintenance by being virtually beyond reproach. 
Even women who were badly battered by their husbands could have 
their maintenance reduced if the court decided they had been 'unkind' 
to their husbands. Mrs Courtney for instance had divorced her 
husband on the ground of his cruelty but the court reduced her 
maintenance because of her conjugal unkindness (Courtney v Courtney 
(1966) ). Adulterous wives were rarely awarded maintenance even if 
the 'adultery' was committed years after the husband's desertion 
(Eekelaar, 1978; McGregor et al, 1970). This meant that separated 
wives had to remain 'chaste' for the rest of their lives to evade a 
husband's discovery of 'adultery'. In MvM, a woman lost her right 
to maintenance because it was discovered that she had borne a child 
by another man eleven years after separating from her husband (M vM 
(1962) ). It takes little imagination to realise that the law of 
maintenance gave substantial potential for a man's surveillance of 
his separated wife. This gained a further boost when a wife's need 
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to 'earn' her maintenance became a principle of statute law under the 
Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act of 1960. (This 
Act, as the previous discussion noted, was devised to put men and 
women on as equal a footing as possible. ) 
State assistance for battered women did not offer an attractive 
alternative to maintenance. McGregor et al found in their study of 
the magistrates' matrimonial jurisdiction that three quarters of wives 
got their orders within six. weeks (McGregor et al, 1970). In urgent 
cases, or if the maintenance was late in arriving, women were forced 
to go for state assistance from the National Assistance Board (the 
NAB was created in 1948 to take over relief provided for the poor by 
the Poor Law Guardians). The Board could insist the woman return 
to the court to check that the maintenance had not arrived. In 
rural areas travelling from the court to the NAB office would have 
been expensive in time and money. In 1965 the DHSS began issuing 
regular order books for women whose husbands were persistent 
defaulters. 
Many women, separated from their husbands due to domestic violence, 
were made more vulnerable to further assaults by the procedures of 
the, National Assistance Board. Women could be pushed unwillingly 
into legal action for a maintenance order by the Board, who felt it 
their duty to encourage them to claim maintenance rather than claim 
from the state. Even if an ex-husband did not take up the 
opportunity offered by the court proceedings to physically harass or 
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discover the whereabouts of a woman, his potential to inflict further 
grief was huge if he managed - to evade or delay any maintenance 
payments he had been ordered to honour. 
Iniunctions, Non-Cohabitation Orders and Housing Rights. 
Injunctions derived from equitable remedies and could originally only 
be provided by the High Court of Chancery. An injunction is 
an order of a court requiring a party either to do a specific 
act or acts (a mandatory or positive injunction) or to refrain 
from doing a specific act or acts (a prohibitory or negative 
injunction). 
(Bean, 1982, p. 3. ) 
In other words, they are used to amend or prevent an infringement of 
legal rights. For the sake of clarity, three further types of orders 
should be defined at this stage 
A perpetual injunction, as the name suggests, is a final order of the 
court and usually only granted after a full trial on the merits of 
the case. 
An interlocutory injunction is a provisional measure taken at an 
earlier stage in the proceedings before the court has had the 
opportunity to hear and weigh fully the evidence on both sides. - It 
is generally expressed to continue in force 'until the trial of this 
action or further order'. 
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An interim injunction is even more temporary and remains in force 
until a specified date/time e. g. 10.00 a. m. Wednesday Ist July. 
Injunctions to exclude/remove another from property or to prevent 
molestation had been available under property and tort law since at 
least the 19th century. The expense involved, coupled with the 
requirements to be a property owner or to prove actionable assault 
respectively meant that battered women took up these protective 
options rarely. Wives petitioning for divorce could get 
interlocutory injunctions for protection by application to the High 
Court or, after 1967, to the County Courts. These would provide 
temporary protection only although moves were made in the courts to 
marginally extend their scope. In Cook v Cook (1964) for example, it 
was held that an injunction could be granted after the decree nisi of 
divorce to last until the decree absolute. In Robinson v Robinson 
one year later it was held that if molestation was the reason for 
the injunction, it could continue after the granting of the decree 
absolute, providing the orders were not made too freely (Freedman v 
Freedman (1967)). 
Towards the end of the 1960s, the legal profession tried to 
encourage battered women to use injunctions in preference to 
magistrates' orders. In contrast to the position in the divorce 
court (see Table 2), by 1966, complaints of cruelty had lost their 
dominance in cases before the magistrates courts. McGregor et el 
(1970) found that in 1966, the single grounds of a sample of 1,271 
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orders were as follows : 
desertion 47% 
wilful neglect to maintain 31% 
persistent cruelty 14% 
adultery 7% 
When multiple complaints were included in the analysis the figures were : 
desertion 70% 
wilful neglect to maintain 47% 
persistent cruelty 22% 
adultery 11% 
Separation orders still ranked very highly even though magistrates 
had long been advised to use them only as a last resort. At the 
turn of the century they had been granted automatically but the 
procedure was criticised repeatedly from the time of the Gorrell 
Commission onwards. In 1903,93% of magistrates orders included 
non-cohabitation clauses, by 1935 this had fallen to an average of 
61% of orders and to 40% by 1964. McGregor et al found that of 
549 live court orders, 30% of the non-cohabitation clauses had been 
inserted by the order of the court itself, and not always when 
cruelty had been alleged by the wife. Of the non-cohabitation 
clauses included in 1964, cruelty was alleged in only 62% of cases. 
Furthermore, some courts seemed more prone to insert the orders than 
others. In the Northern court A, 37% of orders had non-cohabitation 
clauses, only 55% of which contained allegations of persistent 
cruelty. In Northern court B, 33% had non-cohabitation orders, 86% 
of which contained allegations of persistent cruelty. For three 
London courts, the clauses were included far less frequently, in only 
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14% of orders, 73% of which were based upon persistent cruelty. In 
one South Western court, the approach was very strict, only one 
separation order was made. McGregor et al concluded that the 
clauses were included in orders by the court clerks out of defiance 
or misunderstanding of High Court directives (McGregor et al 1970). 
In Corton v Corton (1965) the ' habit' was severely criticed and cases 
where a wife needed protection said to ' hardly arise'. Women 
'truly' needing protection were advised that they could obtain 
injunctions from the High Court for non-molestation or from the 
County Court by starting divorce proceedings. As magistrates had no 
statutory powers to enforce non-cohabitation orders anyway, an 
injunction had scope to be a more useful sanction for a woman in 
need of protection. A non-cohabitation order would not force a 
husband to leave the matrimonial home, it only relieved the spouses 
of their obligations to live together. Although problems may be 
encountered if a woman later wanted to apply for a divorce on the 
ground of desertion because non-cohabitation orders would act as a 
bar to this plea (MacKenzie v Mac Kenzie (1940)), they did act as 
legal barriers. to a husband returning to live with his estranged 
wife. 
Separated wives had but minimal rights to housing unless they had 
their own strict legal claims upon property. Rights to housing on 
divorce were also partly contingent upon the court's evaluation of 
moral behaviour. Up until the end of the 1950s the law of 
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matrimonial property was based upon the separate property principle 
derived from the Married Women's Property Act 1882. Thus, although 
a wife was allowed to own her own property, ownership was 
established most often by the name in which the property was held. 
The conveyancing practice of registering matrimonial homes in the 
sole name of the husband (even when a wife was in reality intended 
by a couple's agreement to be joint owner) rendered the man the sole 
legal owner. A woman had no strict legal rights' to the home unless 
she could prove that she had contributed to the deposit or mortgage 
payments. The common division of resources between married couples 
where a husband paid the mortgage installments and the wife used her 
salary for food and general upkeep of the household was not 
necessarily guaranteed recognition sufficient to establish an interest 
in the property by the court. If a woman was not engaged in paid 
work, her household chores were not regarded as economic 
contribrutions. 
After the case of Bendall v McWhirter (1952) the courts accepted that 
a deserted wife had rights of occupation and this right was given 
statutory force in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1958. But a husband 
could relatively easily evade this obligation to a former wife by 
selling the home, unbeknown to her, to an innocent third party or by 
making himself bankrupt. In Montgomery v Montgomery (1965), the 
High Court held that-an injunction to exclude the husband from the 
home would not be granted for cases where the wife had no property 
right in the home, Similar insecurity for wives and children existed 
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in the rented sector as property rights to a tenancy were likewise 
established on the basis of the named tenant, i. e. the husband. 
Courts at the time lacked the power to transfer tenancies into a 
wife's name so for many battered women prospects were a bleak choice 
between continued abuse or homelessness and the loss of the children 
into local authority care. 
Separation orders may have helped women effect 'transfers' of local 
authority tenancies, especially as injunctions were limited to cases 
where wives could prove legal rights. Some enterprising individuals, 
faced with much suffering, found ways to mitigate the harsh 
principles applied to matrimonial housing. The experiences of one 
of the women interviewed for the survey discussed in Part II 
illustrate not only the difficulties women faced at the time but how 
concerned individuals could, if motivated, find a way around the legal 
obstacles, After Una's* husband's , final attempt to stab her to 
death, the police, a solicitor and a housing officer devised a 
technical eviction of her and her husband in order to transfer the 
tenancy into her' name and reinstate her in the matrimonial home. 
She described how this was achieved as follows : 
He spent eighteen months in prison for the attempted murder, 
which the court whittled down to grevious bodily harm because 
he was so full of remorse. I had no choice but to let him 
come back after being in prison. The council house was in 
joint names and he would not have his name off the rent book. 
He was out of prison for nine days and he assaulted me again. 
He attempted to stab me to death. The priest got the police 
and they sent him back to prison for three months. The Chief 
Inspector of police said that if there was no divorce I would 
soon be a corpse. The police and my solicitor and a housing 
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officer had to work out a 'technical eviction'. We had to put 
a coffee table outside the front door and they held a ceremony 
to evict us both and I was reinstated in the house. The 
police could intervene more then. So I called the police each 
time he appeared then and proved the house was in my name. 
So I had protection for six months and he was arrested over and 
again until the divorce. This was the only way I could get a 
divorce. This was before they had things like the Matrimonial 
Homes Acts, The police could not stop it as it was in his own 
home and he could do what he wanted. 
Having the property in her sole name provided the final solution to 
her twelve year struggle for legal protection. In her case, only by 
'exploiting' the law during this period, was relief and protection 
from her husband's violence obtained. This ironic feature of women's 
experiences with the law will be discussed further in Part II. 
A wife's right to stay in the matrimonial home was improved slightly 
by the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967, which protected a spouse's right 
to remain in the matrimonial home against claims made by third 
parties, as long as the spouse's right had been registered. Section 
1 of the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 gave wives some protection from 
eviction by husbands although the provisions were not greatly used 
and by 1974 only 57 orders were being made per year (Judicial 
Statistics, 1974). Section 1 gave protection from eviction or 
exclusion from the matrimonial home to spouses not entitled to 
occupation by virtue of estate or interest etc. A wife without 
these rights could not be evicted or excluded from the home without 
a court order and she could apply for court permission to enter and 
occupy the home should her husband try to exclude her otherwise. 
Providing one spouse had the right to occupy the home, Section 2 of 
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the Act allowed the other partner to apply to the court for an order 
declaring, enforcing, restricting or terminating these rights to 
occupy. The Act also allowed the court to except part of the 
dwelling from occupation of the spouse (especially if it had a 
business use); to ask for periodical payments for the part so 
occupied; and to impose obligations for its repair and upkeep. The 
provisions in the Act gave rise to illogical and unworkable court 
decisions (see Chapter 3). Further amendments to the law concerning 
injunctions and housing rights will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 will continue to trace the history of reforms in terms of 
the linear progression of statute, debates, cases and policy 
directives in the era of divorce reform. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
From Divorce Reform To Domestic Violence Legislation 1969-1977. 
Introduction. 
In contrast to the 19th century phase of domestic violence law 
reform, legislative measures aimed at alleviating the problems of 
battered women in the latter 20th century followed reforms to the 
law of divorce. -t In the early 1970s the term 'battered women' was 
coined by the women's liberation movement to become accepted 
terminology. Legal minds in Parliament and the courts, wrangled 
with the definitions of 'cruelty', 'unreasonable behaviour' and 
'domestic violence'. Substantial changes to the procedure and 
availability of divorces brought the dissolution of an unhappy 
marriage within the scope of a much broader range of the population. 
Women continued to be the majority of consumers, by 1975 they were 
bringing 70% of all petitions for divorce, 36% of these being granted 
to petitions particularising the unreasonable behaviour of husbands. 
As an emergency or even speedy remedy for women victims of domestic 
violence however, divorce would not have been a viable option. It 
was obviously of no relevance to cohabiting women needing legal 
protection from violent men, nor to those with such scarce resources 
that they lacked alternative accomodation and income support whilst 
awaiting a decree. Until the growth of the refuge movement, these 
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women had little alternative but to continue to use the summary 
court provisions, where the fault based -doctrine of relief still 
operated. Criticisms of the magistrates' courts, by bodies such as 
the Finer Committee on One Parent Families, bubbled throughout the 
1970s but no positive action was taken until the numbers of 
matrimonial applicants using the summary courts had greatly declined. 
In the 1970s the involvement of the criminal law in cases of 
domestic violence against women was frequently criticised. Women 
connected with the expanding refuge movement complained of the 
refusal of the police and courts to implement the criminal law for 
domestic disputes. At the same time the pleas of some lawyers and 
enforcers giving evidence before the Select Committee on Violence in 
Marriage to maintain a separation of civil and criminal matters were 
repeated elsewhere in the debates on marital rape, wife kidnap and 
police powers to intervene in domestic disputes. A crossing of the 
so-called 'civil-criminal divide' was eventually achieved in new 
legislation covering domestic violence injunctions. 
The early 1970s brought many changes in legal and welfare provision 
for women victims of domestic violence. The feminist movement 
campaigned for and won a number of reforms to the law and social 
policy affecting women's position in society, and specifically in the 
area of domestic violence against women, alterations to family and 
housing law, local and central government aid for the provision of 
refuges. There is not space here to include a discussion of the 
struggles of the women's liberation movement, although reference will 
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be made to this briefly in parts of the chapter. Supplementary 
information can be found in the comprehensive discussions of a 
number of contemporary texts, particularly Coote & Campbell, 1982; 
Schechter, 1982. As in previous chapters the discussion which 
follows will centre upon the specific responses of the law in 
relation to domestic violence against women. First the next wave of 
divorce reform will be described, followed by an outline of 
subsequent shifts in judicial interpretation in the case law relating 
to cruelty and conduct. The position in magistrates courts and 
statistics on their Use will provide a background to the calls for 
reform made by bodies such as the Finer Committee. The final 
sections will look at the provision of injunctions, developments in 
the criminal law, the Select Committee on Violence in Marriage and 
the efforts to introduce legislation to cope with emergency 'relief 
and housing rights for battered women. 
The Pressure For Divorce Law Reform. 
Reform and liberalisation of the law governing divorce resurfaced in 
Parliament in the 1960s this time due to concerns about the effect 
of the fault-based doctrine on 'illicit unions', illegitimacy and the 
reputation of the law itself. Fears were expressed in many sections 
of society, including the Church, that publicity arising from 'hotel 
divorces' and the effects of a court enquiry into matrimonial 
offences made a mockery of the law. Whilst violence against women 
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was taken into account in the ensuing debates, there was scant 
reference to the need to protect abused women which had been so 
important during the earlier phase of reform (see Chapters 1& 2). 
The main consideration now was the alleviation of marital conflict by 
laying to rest. 'dead marriages' for the sake of all involved, 
especially children. Marital violence, when mentioned, tended to be 
seen as an effect of the breakdown rather than its cause (see Smart, 
1984; SPCK, 1966; Law Commission, 1966. ). 
In 1964, two private members-bills, the Family Preservation Bill and 
the Strengthening of Marriage Bill, were put forward (unsuccessfully) 
to halt 'marital decline'. In July 1966, the Church published its 
own review of divorce law in its report Putting Asunder. -A Divorce 
Law For Contemporary Society (SPCK, 1966). This argued that a 
government's laws could not attempt to maintain the moral standards 
of Church law, as they applied to many people who were not connected 
to the Church. The contemporary approach based upon matrimonial- 
fault was unsatisfactory because it created unnecessary conflict, led 
to perversion of law and marriage (through collusion, cohabitation 
and illegitimacy). It was inconsistent and unfair. Guilt and 
innocence were frequently hard to establish as many marriages merely 
broke down. The report suggested replacing the unfair notion of 
'fault' with that of irretrievable breakdown. To prevent a decline 
in the moral value of marriage, i. e. to stop divorce becoming too 
easy, a system of legal inquest into the truth of marital breakdown 
was prof erred. To back up divorce reform, the Archbishop's group 
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suggested that the financial and property laws be revised to protect 
dependent wives. 
Immediately after the publication of Putting Asunder, the Lord 
Chancellor referred the matter of divorce reform to the newly created 
Law Commission. In their report entitled Reform of the Grounds of 
Divorce : The Field of Choice, produced four months later, the 
Commission stated the desired aim of a good divorce law to be the 
provision of a 'decent burial' for 'dead marriages' in order to reduce 
the bitterness of divorce disputes, particularly regards the effects 
upon children (Law Commission, 1966). The Commission maintained 
that matrimonial 'offences' such as cruelty or violence were 
responses to marital breakdown, rather than cause. The present law 
failed to buttress the stability of marriage by not providing scope 
for reconciliation and encouraging illicit marital unions. This was 
unjust to wives and neglectful of the urgent need to protect the 
interests of children. Like the Archbishop's group, the Law 
Commission preferred the principle of marital breakdown, rather than 
offence, to underly the divorce law. Unlike the Archbishop's group 
however, any form of 'inquest' hearing into the viability of marriages 
of parties presenting to the courts for divorce was rejected. This 
would increase the parties' bitterness and be too burdensome for the 
courts. The Commission considered more effective safeguards against 
too free a divorce law could be found by introducing a three year 
bar to divorce, providing the court with powers to adjourn in order 
to facilitate reconciliation and to refuse a decree in cases of wilful 
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deceipt. In the debate on divorce law in the House of Lords in 
1966, the principle of breakdown received overwhelming support (see 
Smart, 1984). 
The Divorce Reform Bill was presented to the Commons in November 
1967 by William Wilson, aided by numerous supporters. On the Bill's 
second reading in February 1968 the sponsors reaffirmed the aims of 
a 'good' divorce law as being: a. to buttress the stability of 
marriage; b. to encourage reconciliation and c. to 'bury the dead 
shell of a marriage that has broken down without bitterness between 
the parties'. Because divorce should no longer be concerned with 
the punishment of one spouse and the relief of the other, blame was 
irrelevant and the only valid ground for divorce now could be 
irretreivable breakdown of the marriage. The other party's 
intolerable behaviour was to be the sole standard to cover the old 
'offenses' of cruelty, insanity, etc. in order to establish whether 
irretreivable breakdown had occured. The 'five facts' put forward as 
proof of irretrievable breakdown provided a compromise solution to 
the Church's system of 'inquest'. 
Any reform to the grounds of divorce however could not help 
unhappily married couples without first improving access to the 
courts and ensuring better financial provision for women and 
children. Faced with opposition in the House that the Divorce Bill 
would be a 'Cassanova's charter', the government promised legislation 
on matrimonial property and financial provision prior to divorce 
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reform. The Law Commission produced a White paper on financial 
relief on divorce in 1967 and a final report in 1969. This formed 
the basis of the 1970 Matrimonial Homes and Property Act which was 
passed prior to the enforcement of the Divorce Reform Act 1969. 
Improved access to the new legal provisions was given through a 
decentralisation of the divorce courts. The Matrimonial Causes Act, 
operative on 11th April 1968, offered divorce on a local basis by 
designating certain County Courts as divorce courts with the power to 
hear and determine undefended matrimonial causes. Defended cases 
still had to be heard at the High Court but a few could be tried in 
the Royal Courts of Justice and at Divorce Towns as County Court 
judges now had the power to hear short defended cases sitting as 
Special Commissioners. (S1 of the Administration of Justice Act 
1970 also renamed, the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty division of the 
High Court the Family Division). 
Thus, the Divorce Reform Act 1969 made irretrievable breakdown of 
marriage the sole ground for divorce. Proof of this would be based 
upon the establishment of one or more of the following : 
a. that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner 
finds it intolerable to live with the respondent; 
b. that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the 
petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the 
respondent; 
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c. that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a 
continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding 
the presentation of the petition; 
d. that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a 
continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding 
the presentation of the petition and the respondent consents to 
the decree being granted; 
e. that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a 
continuous period of at least five years immediately preceding 
the presentation of the petition. 
The 'facts' previously held to establish grounds for divorce, i. e. the 
matrimonial offences of cruelty, adultery, desertion, were retained in 
a modified form. The most significant change was the introduction 
of a form of restricted divorce by consent based upon the two year 
separation of parties prior to the proceedings. Although conduct in 
the form of the five facts was still relevant to obtain a divorce, 
the court's primary consideration had shifted from an examination of 
this for proof of marital 'failure' on to the question of whether or 
not the marriage had broken down. 
Following implementation of the Act, the divorce rate showed a rapid 
growth but throughout the 1970s the conduct grounds continued to be 
used more frequently than both the separation grounds put together. 
The proportions of the total divorces filed on specific grounds for 
1938,1963,1968-1975 are shown in Table 8. 
As with the 19th century phase of divorce reform, initially, male 
petitioners benefited proportionately more from the legislation than 
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did women petitioners. 
women's declined by 4% 
implementation. 
Men's shares of petitions grew by 4% and 
in 1971, the Act's first year of 
TABLE 8: Alleged Grounds In Divorce Petitions Filed As Percentages 
Of Totals 1938,1963,1968-1975, England & Wales. 
GROUNDS 1938 1963 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Cruelty/behaviour 7% 23% 28% 28% 29% 22% 27% 29% 31% 33% 
Adultery 50% 54% 53% 54% 56% 27% 31% 30% 30% 29% 
Desertion 39% 32% 25% 23% 21% 13% 11% 8% 6% 4% 
Separation - - - - - 42% 36% 36% 36% 35% 
Other grounds 4% 0.6% 0.3% 0.2% 0.3% 0.08% 0.02 % 0.01% 0.01% - 
By husbands 46.6% 41.8% 37% 37% 36% 40% 35% 34% 32% 30% 
By wives 53.4% 58.2% 63% 63% 64% 60% 65% 66% 68% 70% 
TOTALS 9970 36385 54036 60134 70575 110017 109822 115048 129993 138048 
NB : As multiple grounds are included in the percentages columns do not total 100%. 
SOURCES : Civil Judicial Statistics 1963,1968,1969,1970,1971,1972, Judicial 
Statistics 1974 & 1975. 
All the 'fault' grounds declined at the time of introduction of the 
Divorce Reform Act as a 'backlog' of divorces based on separation 
grounds were cleared (see Table 8). Bearing in mind certain factors 
which affect the comparative value of these figures (e. g. the practice 
of listing prior to 1961 only the first allegation made in multiple 
allegations), the figures for the rest of the early 1970s do suggest 
the Divorce Reform Act was followed by a clear rise in the number of 
petitions filed on the ground of cruelty/behaviour corresponding with 
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a decline in the proportion of petitions alleging desertion and 
adultery. Were these changes the result of the new grounds in the 
legislation or were other factors operating to bring an increase in 
cruelty/behaviour petitions ? 
Petitions based upon desertion and adultery may have proportionately 
declined for the following reasons 
a. a shift in men's and women's filing behaviour from petitions on 
the ground of desertion to separation grounds; 
b. a shift in men's and women's filing behaviour from petitions on 
the ground of adultery to separation grounds; 
c. a higher and growing proportion of female petitioners in 
relation to male petitioners; 
d. a relative easening of the required particulars for a petition 
on the ground of behaviour and/or less stringent demands for 
proof; 
e. an increase in cases of domestic violence against women and/or 
women's use of the law for relief. 
Probably all factors hold some explanatory relevance. Point d. will 
be discussed later in this chapter. Further calculations may shed 
some light on the validity of points a., b. and c. (see also Haskey, 
1982). 
Table 9 shows wives growing share of divorces coincided with an 
increase in the percentage of petitions based upon cruelty. However 
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there are fluctuations in the growth of cruelty/behaviour petitions 
which do not directly match the increase in women's petitions e. g. in 
1956,1957,1959,1963,1965. Between 1954 and 1959, cruelty 
petitions increased by 4 percentage points, an increase which could 
have two likely explanations a. greater ability of women victims of 
domestic violence to obtain legal help, b. changes in interpretation 
of 'cruelty' ground in courts (see Chapter 2). 
TABLE 9: Divorce Petitions Filed Alleging Cruelty/Behaviour As 
Ground c. f. Percentage Of Total Petitions Filed By Wives, 
1938,1954-1975, England & Wales. 
YEAR CRUELTY WIVES YEAR CRUELTY WIVES YEAR CRUELTY WIVES 
1938 7% 53% 1961 22% 57% 1969 28% 63% 
1954 16% 55% 1962 22% 58% 1970 29% 64% 
1955 16% 55% 1963 23% 58% 1971 22% 60% 
1956 18% 55% 1964 25% 60% 1972 27% 65% 
1957 19% 55% 1965 26% 60% 1973 29% 66% 
1958 19% 55% 1966 27% 61% 1974 31% 68% 
1959 20% 55% 1967 28% 63% 1975 33% 70% 
1960 20% 57% 1968 28% 63% 
SOURCES : Civil Tudicial Statistics 1964,1968,1972 & 1975. 
Table 10 shows the numbers and percentages of divorces granted on 
certain grounds to husbands and wives for 1968-1975. It can be 
easily seen from these figures that men very rarely divorced during 
this period on the ground of their partner's behaviour whereas for 
divorcing women, well over a third made some reference to their 
partners' behaviour. Proportionately, men were more likely than 
women to be granted divorces on the grounds of their partner's 
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TABLE 10: Percentage Of Total Divorces Granted To Wives & Husbands 
On Certain Grounds/Facts, 1968-1975, England & Wales. 
GROUNDS/FACTS . 1968 1969 1970 
Total WH Total WH Total WH 
Behaviour/cruelty 22% 33% 3% 22% 34% 4% 22% 34% 4% 
Adultery 57% 49% 70% 58% 50% 70% 59% 50% 73% 
Desertion 25% 23% 30% 24% 21% 28% 21% 19% 25% 
Separation - - - - - - - - - 
Other grounds 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Share of total 100% 61% 39% 100% 60% 40% 100% 62% 38% 
TOTALS 47959 29 450 18509 54151 3 2750 2 1401 6 1090 37673 23417 
GROUNDS/FACTS 1971 1972 1973 
Total W H Total W H Total W H 
Behaviour/Cruelty 18% 24% 4% 21% 30% 5% 23% 33% 6% 
Adultery 21% 34% 44% 32% 26% 37% 32% 27% 41% 
Desertion 15% 15% 15% 11% 28% 9% 8% 9% 7% 
Separation 30% 26% 38% 39% 16% 48% 38% 33% 47% 
Other grounds 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Share of total 100% 60% 40% 100% 63% 37% 100% 65% 35% 
TOTALS 88460 52 796 35664 109944 68817 41127 106522 69622 36860 
GROUNDS/FACTS 1974 1975 
Total W H Total W H 
Behaviour/cruelty 26% 35% 7% 28% 36% 8% 
Adultery 31% 27% 41% 31% 26% 40% 
Desertion 6% 7% 6% 5% 6% 4% 
Separation 39% 33% 47% 37% 32% 48% 
Other grounds - - - 0.01 0.01 - 
Share of total 100% 67% 33% 100% 69% 31% 
Totals 117017 78268 38749 122397 84103 38294 
SOURCES : Raw figures from Civil Judicial Statistics 1968,1969,1970,1971, 
1972,1973; Judicial Statistics 1974,1975, (as in Table 12). 
adultery, although the percentage of men's divorces granted on this 
ground declined greatly from a peak of 73% just before the Divorce 
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Reform Act 1969 to 40% by 1975. This change in men's petitioning 
behaviour supports point b.. 
Women's petitions on the ground of adultery also declined in relative 
terms, although less dramatically than men's petitions. The figures 
also show a drop in the use by both male and female petitioners of 
the desertion ground on the introduction of the separation grounds 
(point a. ). 
The success rate for specific grounds would ultimately effect filing 
behaviour through a solicitor's advice to clients. Had there been 
more time available for the study comparisons could have been made 
between the numbers of petitions for divorce granted on specified 
facts and the numbers of petitions filed. Comparative figures for 
filing and granting petitions" will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
Divorce for women victims of domestic violence was undoubtedly made 
'easier' following the changes to availabilty and procedure in the 
early 1970s. The following discussion will suggest however that the 
1970s saw as well an increased need for legal intervention. The 
most likely causes of this increased need were 1. the restriction of 
battered women's options due to economic and social policy changes, 
and 2. feminist success in publicising this 'hidden crime' and 
creating new alternatives. 
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Case Law Developments From Cruelty To Unreasonable Behaviour. 
The trend away from the 'fault' based doctrine in divorce law had 
repercussions for the interpretation of unacceptable behaviour in the 
courts. Goodrich v Goodrich (1971) was one of the first cases to be 
tried under the new law. In this case Mrs Goodrich had petitioned 
for an `injunction and a divorce on the ground of her husband's 
cruelty. The petition was set aside and the husband applied under 
the new law alleging the unreasonable behaviour and adultery of his 
wife. His allegations consisted of the claim that married life was 
impossible because Mrs Goodrich persisted in making 'false charges' 
of cruelty against him. Granting the husband's petition, the court 
held that the test of intolerable behaviour was purely subjective, 
and related to whit was intolerable for this particular man and this 
particular woman. 
Clashes between the objective and subjective approaches however still 
continued to dog decision making in the courts, especially when 
confronted with what were considered to be women's 'trivial' 
complaints. Whilst women's allegations of violent treatment could be 
quite closely scrutinised by the court (or if not here by solicitors 
testing their viability prior to hearing) it was not until 1974 that a 
husband's bare denial of allegations was held to be insufficient to 
establish his case. (see Andrews v Andrews (1974)). A woman's mere 
assertion of fear of further assault or violence was not enough 
evidence of the irretrievable breakdown. of her marriage. In Ash v 
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Ash in 1972 a woman's claims that she still feared further assault 
from a violent and alchoholic husband were dismissed as mere 
assertions. In this case Mr Ash had previously given an undertaking 
not to molest Mrs Ash. In an attempt to guarantee some protection 
whilst awaiting a divorce, she had changed the locks to the house to 
bar his entry. Mr Ash's violence had been admitted by him and 
corroborated by others yet Mrs Ash's behaviour became the main 
concern of the court. -Scantily masking its inconsistency' with various 
appeals to legal principles, the court applied an objective approach 
to Mrs Ash's 'assertions' of fear of further assault and a subjective 
approach to the particulars describing Mr Ash's violent conduct. In 
relation to his violent behaviour the court had to decide : 
can this petitioner, with his or her character and personality, 
and with his or her faults and other attributes, good and bad, 
and having regard to his or her behaviour during the marriage, 
reasonably be expected to reside with this respondent ? 
This justified therefore some judgement of Mrs Ash's behaviour to 
discover whether she was so well accustomed to 'this sort of life' 
that the violence would be insignificant. Some women still clearly 
had to put up with their lot, although fudges seldom said so directly, 
tending to talk of 'spouses', 'petitioners' or 'partners' when making 
this point: 
a violent petitioner can reasonably be expected to live with a 
violent respondent ;a petitioner who is addicted to drink can 
reasonably be expected to live with a respondent similarly 
addicted; a taciturn and morose spouse can reasonably be 
expected to live with a taciturn and morose partner; a 
flirtatious husband can reasonably be expected to live with a 
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wife who is equally susceptible to the attractions of the other 
sex; and if each is equally bad, at any rate in similar respects, 
each can reasonably be expected to live with the other. 
(Bagnall, J. 140, Ash v Ash, (1972)). 
The possible implications of this type of reasoning, i. e. emphasising 
the application of equality principles on conditions of inequality 
will be further examined in Part II. The unfairness of applying 
'equal' principles in this case with biased standards of evaluation or 
proof will no doubt be obvious. 
The test of unreasonable behaviour was said in some cases to be 
similar to that applied to constructive desertion under the 'old' law. 
Pheasant v Pheasant in 1972 was a case where the husband's 
allegation of cruelty by the wife - i. e. her refusal of sexual 
intercourse - was held to be a problem (neuroses) of his own 
creation. Here again it was argued that the test of unreasonable 
behaviour could not be purely subjective (looking at the report it 
seems there were fears the courts would be out of a job). 
Ultimately the courts had to decide whether behaviour was 
unreasonable in terms of the personalities and characters of spouses 
to prevent the law of divorce from being: 
reduced to a series of almost hysterical assertions by the 
petitioner and calm rebuttals by the respondent. 
(Pheasant v Pheasant (1972)) 
This sort of activity had the potential to increase the bitterness 
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and humiliation of divorce and could make a mockery of the concept 
of. desertion (all deserters claiming that it was the unreasonable 
behaviour of their partners which justified their leaving). A broad 
approach to the matter, as applied in the case of Lissack v Lissack 
in 1951, was recommended. This would require the court to: 
consider whether it is reasonable to expect this petitioner to 
put up with the behaviour of this respondent, bearing in mind 
the characters and difficulties of each of them, trying to be 
fair to them both, and expecting neither heroic virtue nor 
selfless abregation from either. 
(Lissack v Lissack (1951)). 
Rather than emphasise the outmoded concept of the matrimonial 
offence, the courts ought to favour an approach based upon breach of 
obligation by one spouse or-another. 
Reasoning on these lines inevitably raised problems of intent for any 
breach of obligation occuring due to a spouse's mental illness. 
Problems in fitting the breach of obligation test to situations of 
ill-health were noted soon after the Pheasant decision in the case of 
Katz v Katz in 1972, where a wife alleged the unreasonable behaviour 
of her mentally disturbed husband. Here the husband's habit of 
writing eccentric letters to public figures, obsession with tape 
recorders, long periods of silence, 'cabbage-like' trances, and 
constant playing of loud music on a transistor radio were described 
by his counsel as caused by mental illness and, as a result, falling 
short of the category of 'grave' behaviour. the counsel argued that 
Page 105 
From Divorce Reform To Domestic Violence Legislation 1969-1977 /3. 
neutral, silly and irrational acts could only be unreasonable if the 
perpetrator intended to do harm. The court held that in such cases 
where judgement of intent was irrelevant, some form of objective test 
not based upon breach of obligation would be needed to decide 
whether the behaviour was harmful. A test which made reasonable 
allowances for an individual's mental difficulties was necessary. A 
method along the lines of that established in Williams v Williams was 
recommended. Suitably amended, this would allow that 
a decree should be pronounced against any such an abnormal 
person .... because the facts are such that, after making all 
allowances for his disabilities and the temperaments of both 
parties, it must be held that the character and gravity of his 
behaviour was such that the petitioner cannot reasonably be 
expected to live with him. 
(See Katz v Katz (1972)). 
The constructive desertion test was finally abandoned as 
inappropriate to the modern law in 1974. The case of Livingstone- 
Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard in 1974 has been a much quoted 
example of the less stringent approach to the concept of unreasonable 
behaviour applied under the new law. This case arose from yet 
another dispute over a woman's petition which was said to be based 
upon 'trivial' allegations. Mr Livingstone-Stallard's 'trivial' abuses 
of his wife included a whole range of oppressive, degrading and 
violent behaviour - treating her as a stupid child, constantly 
criticising her, calling her names, being rude and boorish, spitting at 
her, kicking her out of bed, following her around in a car, bruising 
her arms and legs and threatening to kill her. One February night 
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he forcibly locked her out of the house (in her nightclothes) and 
threw cold water at her from a bedroom window. Mr Livingstone- 
Stallard's counsel tried to maintain that these acts were not of 
sufficient gravity to allow a divorce on the basis of constructive 
desertion under the old law. To prove constructive desertion, the 
court needed to weigh the gravity of the conduct against the 
sanctity of the marriage bond. Mr Livingstone-Stallard, who used to 
tell his wife daily that 'in order for them to be happy, wives have 
to be subservient to their husbands', had argued that his young wife 
had simply got fed up and walked out. As Ash v Ash, Pheasant v 
Pheasant and Katz v Katz (all in 1972) had firmly established that 
incompatibility of temperament was not enough to entitle a petitioner 
to relief, Mrs Livingstone-Stallard should be refused a divorce. (Mr 
Livingstone-Stallard is quoted in the case as being eager to continue 
his 'training' of his wife. ) Rejecting the notion of constructive 
desertion, Dunn J held that it was nowadays more-helpful when dealing 
with behaviour cases to assume that a contentious case was being 
tried by judge and jury who would ask the question: 
would any right-thinking person come to the conclusion that 
this husband has behaved in such a way that this wife cannot 
reasonably be expected to live with him, taking into account the 
whole of the circumstances and the characters and personalities 
of the parties ? 
(Dunn, J. 771, Livingstone-Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard (1974)). 
Mrs Livingstone-Stallard was therefore granted her divorce. 
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One effect of the Livingstone-Stallard case was to encourage the 
courts to emphasise the history of behaviour during a marriage 
rather than select isolated acts. This would have benefited the 
significant proportion of women controlled by fear resulting from 
threat, sexual violence and domination by husbands who used physical 
force and violence more occasionally. In 1975 a court was able to 
announce again that objective tests of behaviour were irrelevant. 
In O'Neill v O'Neill of that year, only a test based upon the history 
of the marriage would be relevant for legal consideration. 
A further shift from the preoccupation with intent was executed in 
the case of Thurlow v Thurlow in 1975 which arose from negative 
behaviour caused by a woman's illness. Mr Thurlow petitioned to 
divorce, his wife alleging her. unreasonable behaviour because of the 
maleffects on his own good health resulting from her epilepsy, 
neurological disorders and permanent hospitalisation. In the 
judgement, Rees J claimed that it was not helpful, to distinguish 
behaviours such as violence and abuse from negative action such as 
silence or total inactivity because both could be patently 
unreasonable. The problem in this particular case was, could 
involuntary behaviour caused by sickness (here mostly of the physical 
type) be unreasonable ? According to the decisions in Williams v 
Williams (1963) and Katz v Katz (1972) mentioned above, involuntary 
behaviour could only be unreasonable if the 'character and gravity of 
the behaviour is such that the petitioner cannot reasonably be 
expected to reside with him. ' This meant according to Rees J. the 
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case must be decided on the individual facts with regard to all'the 
circumstances of the case. A good law should protect the petitioner 
from injury, including injury to health caused by having to remain 
married to a woman who was a 'human vegetable'. Negative behaviour 
could therefore be relevant in some circumstances if the effects were 
unreasonable. 
Despite the trend away from emphasis upon the objective calculation 
of harm resulting from specific acts of violence, women victims of 
domestic violence could still find themselves unable to qualify for a 
divorce due to lack of proof of irretrievable breakdown. Until 
refuges offered some alternative and women's rights to accomodation 
were altered, those with miminal financial resources could find 
themselves sentenced to remain in a violent situation by legal 
technicalities. Subject to variations in local policy 
implementation, some women could discover they had no right to 
housing from the local authority without first petitioning for a 
divorce. But, they could not petition for a divorce based upon 
unreasonable behaviour unless they left home, i. e. had alternative 
housing. Women hoping to obtain divorces on other grounds need not 
necessarily live in separate accomodation from their husbands, 
providing they lived separate lives (not sharing cooking and 
cleaning, having independent finances and no sexual relations) (see 
Mouncer v Mouncer. (1972)). Maintaining this sort of arrangement 
long enough to satisfy the court a marriage warranted dissolution 
would be very difficult for women tied to violent men. In Bradley v 
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Bradley in 1973 the wife had already obtained two separation orders 
from magistrates as a result of her husband's persistent cruelty but 
he had ignored these and remained in the house. Having seven 
children and after being advised that the local authority would not 
house her until she obtained a divorce, Mrs Bradley had little choice 
but to remain there with him. Because of her fear of the husband, 
she continued to cook and clean for him and share the same bed. 
Mrs Bradley filed a petition for divorce alleging her husband's 
unreasonable behaviour and particularising numerous acts of violence 
but this was dismissed when the court 'discovered she was still living 
with him. Fortunately, the Court of Appeal overturned this decision, 
Lord Denning arguing that, although one could usually conclude that 
if a woman remained with her husband his behaviour must be 
tolerable, this case was exceptional as Mrs Bradley clearly had 
nowhere to go. Scarman LJ attempted to further weaken the policy 
of barring women from legal relief merely because they stayed with 
their husbands 
There are many, many reasons why a woman will go on living with 
a beast of a man. Sometimes she may live with him because 
she fears the consequences of leaving. Sometimes it may be 
physical duress, but very often a woman will willingly make the 
sacrifice of living with a beast of a husband because she 
believes it to be in the true interest of her children. Is 
such a woman to be denied the opportunity (.... ) of calling 
evidence to show that, although she is living with him, yet the 
family situation is such and his behaviour is such that she 
cannot reasonably be expected to do so ? 
(Scarman LJ, Bradley v Bradley (1973) at 753. ) 
The recognition by the courts that some battered women were unable 
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to leave violent men was a significant improvement on the 
constructive desertion philosphy. 
The Relevance Of Conduct To Maintenance Awards. 
The previous chapter showed that prior to divorce law reform, the 
court would usually award an 'innocent' wife one third of the family's 
joint income for her own maintenance plus maintenance for the 
children. Over the years judges worked out a formula for 'just' 
payments, adjusting down the woman's maintenance in cases of her 
'misconduct'. An 'innocent' wife, technically, was not to be forced 
into a standard of living less than her husband's. 
The Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act of 1970 contained an 
attempt to remove a divorcing partner's financial need to dwell upon 
issues of conduct. This Act made awards less discretionary by 
providing guidelines to the courts to use when making property and 
financial settlements on divorce. It authorised courts to require 
periodical payments, lump sum payments, or the transfer of property 
between spouses on divorce. When granting orders the courts were 
expected to leave the parties in a financial situation as close as 
possible to that before the divorce, although they may take into 
account the conduct of the parties if this should be so 'gross and 
obvious' that it would be unjust to ignore it. Either partner, man 
or woman, could claim maintenance and a share in the matrimonial 
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property (usually the home or family' business) based upon their 
contributions to the care of home or family, or on their work for the 
business. 
Prior to the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act it was feared 
that if individuals were prevented from raising matters of conduct in 
maintenance proceedings, the numbers of defended divorce petitions 
would increase (see Tumath v Tumath (1970)). In practice this meant 
giving a husband the power to contest his wife's right to 
maintenance. Although technically some maintenance could be awarded 
even to a woman found to be solely responsible for the marital 
breakdown (see Iveson v Iveson (1967)) only rarely did the emphasis 
upon conduct in maintenance hearings work to benefit women. (One 
such rare example was where maintenance could be increased because 
the marriage had lasted longer than it should have done because of 
the husband's obstruction of divorce proceedings (see Brett v Brett 
(1969)). 
With the introduction of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 
1970 and the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 'guilt' was no longer 
relevant to the granting of maintenance. Section 25(1) reads : 
It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to 
exercise its powers (.... ) to have regard to all the 
circumstances of the case including the following matters, that 
is to say - 
(a) the income, earning capacity, property and other 
financial resources which each of the parties to the 
marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable 
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future; 
(b) the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities 
which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely 
to have in the foreseeable future 
(c) the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the 
breakdown of the marriage ; 
(d) the age of each party to the marriage and the duration 
of the marriage ; 
(e) any physical or mental disability of either of the 
parties to the marriage ; 
(f) the contributions made by each of the parties to the 
welfare of the family, including any contribution made by 
looking after the home or caring for the family ; 
(g) (.... ) the value to either of the parties to the 
marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which by 
reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage 
that party will lose the chance of acquiring. 
and so . to exercise those powers as 
to place the parties, so far 
as it is practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to 
do so, in the financial position in which they would have been 
if the marriage had not broken down. 
In the courts the idea of a discount on a man's liability to pay 
maintenance was quickly held to be repugnant to the principles 
underlying the new legislation. In Ackerman v Ackerman in 1972, the 
Court of Appeal over-ruled a lower court's decision to cut a woman's 
maintenance award because of her conduct in retaliating against the 
extreme violence of her husband. In Wachtel v Wachtel in 1973, the 
relevance of conduct under the new law was further reviewed. Here 
it was decided that, although legislation obliged courts to have 
regard for the conduct of parties, judges should not get involved in 
holding lengthy 'postmortems' to find out who had 'killed' a 
marriage. Except in the very small proportion of cases where the 
conduct of one party had been so obvious and gross that it would be 
unjust to order the other party to give financial support, the court 
should not reduce an order for financial provision merely because of 
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what was formerly regarded as guilt or blame. Later decisions 
confirmed that such cases would be extremely rare so that the effect 
of Wachtel v Wachtel was to virtually make conduct irrelevant in 
contrast to the earlier approach. 
In Harnett v Harnett (1973) the wife's conduct in sleeping with a 
youth did not excuse the husband's violence nor mitigate his liability 
to maintain her. According to Sir George Baker in WvW (1975) the 
conduct needed to be so gross that an 'ordinary mortal' would throw 
up his hands and say 'surely that woman is not going to be given any 
money'. For a few cases of gross misconduct, a man's financial 
liability might be increased. In Jones v Jones (1975) the husband's 
conduct after a decree of divorce justified a variation in the 
maintenance order by way of a lump sum payment. Three months 
after their separation on divorce, Mr Jones had attacked his ex-wife 
with a knife and disabled her hand with the result that she was 
unable to continue in her employment as a nurse. Although Mr Jones 
had been imprisoned for his crime and Mrs Jones had received a 
payment from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, it was held to 
be unjust when calculating financial settlements to ignore his 
responsibility for her inability to support herself. 
The shift away from an emphasis upon the woman's conduct in 
maintenance cases. would not of course make husbands more generous 
or more wealthy. The problems noted in Chapter One during the 
discussion of the Cobb case - where a low standard of living was 
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intolerable for the husband but an inevitability for the wife and 
children - were left untouched. Chapter Four will show that the 
lesser emphasis upon conduct in maintenance hearings became a 
subject of much complaint by the 1980s. 
Magistrates' Matrimonial Remedies And Their Use By Working Class 
Women. 
In the magistrates' courts the grave and weighty standard still 
applied for. the granting of orders in cases of domestic violence 
against women. Applications for matrimonial relief here continued 
to be judged according to the 'fault' system and the feelings of 
guilt experienced by parties involved were aggravated by the courts' 
practice of mixing criminal and matrimonial hearings (see Chapter 2). 
The Finer Committee Report, published in 1974, criticised the stark 
contrast in the means of justice offered to applicants in the divorce 
courts and the magistrates' courts. A decree of *Judicial separation 
could be made by a divorce court according to the principles 
established by the 1969 act, but magistrates could not make a non- 
cohabitation order without proof of one of the offences set out in 
the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960. Whilst 
all the traditional bars to relief - i. e. connivance, collusion, 
condonation and conduct conducing - had-been abolished in the divorce 
court jurisdiction, apart from collusion in relation to cruelty, these 
continued to apply to the magistrates' courts. 
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In the 1970s, approximately half of those who went before the 
magistrates for relief sought a divorce later. This continued 
emphasis upon matrimonial offence fitted ill with the new divorce 
law. Unlike the divorce courts where all but 'gross and obvious' 
conduct was ignored, in the summary courts however gross the 
husband's conduct and whatever a wife's needs, she was automatically 
barred from obtaining relief for herself if she committed adultery 
unless she could show her husband had connived, conduced or condoned 
it by his behaviour. 
It has already been noted that the summary court jurisdiction in 
matrimonial matters had traditionally been a matter of concern to the 
judicial elite (see discussion in previous chapters). Magistrates 
were criticised in appeal cases for their neglect of legal principles 
and procedures in cases of cruelty to women prior to the creation of 
further inequities on the introduction of the Divorce Reform Act (see 
Blaise v Blaise (1969); Vye v Vye (1969); Aggas v Aggas (1971); 
Brewster v Brewster (1971). ). Following the implementation of the 
Divorce Reform Act, jurisprudence of the matrimonial offence for the 
divorce court was dramatically reduced making interpretation of the 
law more difficult, especially for lay members of the magistrates' 
courts. 
The Finer Committee pointed out that the matrimonial jurisdiction of 
the magistrates' courts continued to be a service mostly offered to 
working class women or those with limited means in need of immediate 
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relief (Finer Committee, 1974). The double standard applied to the 
provisions of divorce courts and magistrates' courts in matrimonial 
matters thus adversely and disproportionately affected working class 
wives. Tables 11 and 12 give details of the type and scale of work 
handled. The tables show the numbers of matrimonial, maintenance 
and bind over orders made during the years 1969-1974 and 1968-1975. 
TABLE 11 : Summary Of Magistrates Orders Granted 1969 to 1974. 
YEAR Bound Over (no charge or Matrimonial Maintenance 
conviction) wife. 
1969 7,594 (8,862) 20,045 (29,408) 17,424 (26,753) 
1970 7,483 (8,510) 20,934 (30,321) 18,557 (27,905) 
1971 8,802 (9,877) 19,483 (28,143) 17,407 (26,009) 
1972 9,478 (10,508) 16,817 (27,782) 16,592 (25,472) 
1973 9,938 (10,819) No figures 13,657 (20,993) 
1974 No figures No figures 8,899 (12,027) 
() Bracketted figures show numbers of applications made. 
Source : Criminal Statistics 1969,1970,1971,1972 and 1973; Civil Judicial Statistics 
1969,1970,1971,1972,1973; Judicial Statistics 1975. 
As with the tables for earlier chapters, it is not possible to see 
from these statistics exactly how many cases of domestic violence 
against women came before the courts. The comparative decline in 
bind over orders for cases of assault continued, although the use of 
these orders without a charge being made increased to almost 10,000 
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per year by 1974 (the last date in this period for which figures are 
available). 
As magistrates' matrimonial orders greatly outnumbered bind over 
orders, it could be reasonably assumed that women would be more 
likely to use the remedies of the matrimonial law. In the absence 
of access to local court records, there is regrettably no way of 
discovering how many women victims of domestic violence had their 
applications thrown out or bind over orders made instead of 
separation orders. 
In contrast to the position at the start of the century, magistrates' 
orders were now very much less common than divorces. Magistrates 
matrimonial work began a sharp decline in the 1970s most probably as 
a result of the continued emphasis upon 'fault' based approaches. 
Table 11 shows that applications before magistrates had a high 
failure rate. About one third of the cases before magistrates 
failed to get the relief sought. By 1972 only 27,782 orders were 
made and the number fell steadily thereon each year. Magistrates 
were also at a distinct disadvantage in being less able to 
investigate the financial circumstances of separating couples. This 
meant that husbands had great scope either to deceive the court or 
mislead it by under-estimating their incomes in order to cut their 
liability to maintain. Should this fail, they could disappear and 
evade payment altogether. 
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TABLE 12: Persons Aged 21 and Over Dealt With Summarily For Cases Of Assault And 
Result Of Proceedings, 1968 to 1975. 
No. Not guilty Bound Found 
Year Offence Persons /No Sentence# Over Guilty 
1968 Aggrav. 10 M 2M - 7M(+1) 
Assault 2 F - - 2F 
Common 2,873 M 1,593 M 498 M 737M(+45) 
Assault 872 M 557 F 197 F 114F(+4) 
1969 Aggrav. 17 M 6 M 2 M 9M 
Assault - - - - 
Common 3,219 M 1,916 M 579 M 706M(+18M) 
Assault 956 F 593 F 249 F 114F 
1970 Aggrav. 9 M 2 M - 6M(+1) 
Assault 1 F - - 1F 
Common 4,736 M 2,856 M 988 M 866M(+26) 
Assault 1,472 F 866 F 446 F 159F(+1) 
1971 Aggrav. 14 M 5 M 1 M 7M (+i ) 
Assault 1 F 1 F - - 
Common 5,560 M 3,047 M 1,233 M 1,015M(+265) 
Assault 1,852 F 1,017 F 568 F 175F(+92) 
1972 Aggrav. 7 M 2 M 1 M 4M 
Assault 4 F 3 F - 1F 
Common 5,226 M 2,842 M 1,106 M 1,055M(+223) 
Assault 1,977 F 1,108 F 575 F 215F(+79) 
1973 Aggrav. 19 M - 2 M 16M(+1) 
Assault 5 F - i F 4F 
Common 6,195 M 3,381 M 1,326 M 1,213M(+275) 
Assault 2,177 F 1,230 F 623 F 226F(+98) 
1974 Aggrav. 16 M 2 M 3 M 11M(+1) 
Assault 2 F 1 F - 1F 
Common 6,987 M 3,814 M 1,282 M 1,491M(+400) 
Assault 2,475 F 1,374 F 677 F 272F(+152) 
1975 Aggrav. 38 M 9 M 2 M 24M(+3M) 
Assault 8 F 2 F - 2F(+4) 
Common 5,879 M 2,579 M 1,176 M 1,396M(+728) 
Assault 2,579 F 1,393 F 638 F 282F(+266) 
# includes dismissed, mental health act, conditional and absolute discharges. 
Sources : Criminal Statistics 1968,1969,1970,1971,1972,1973,1974 & 1975. 
In the case of Roberts v Roberts in 1970, the problem of sharing a 
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limited income on separation was considered with a further 
complication. In this case the court was faced with legal and 
moral problems arising from maintenance where a man had remarried 
and was required to maintain two families on a limited wage. In 
these situations where people had small incomes, the Finer Committee 
noted that both divorce and magistrates' courts had difficulties 
enforcing the 'principle that an 'innocent' wife should not suffer 
extra. financial hardship on divorce. Although it was repeatedly 
stressed that divorcing men had obligations to maintain their ex- 
wives and children before meeting any new expenses from second 
wives, the numbers of maintenance defaulters showed very few put 
this moral exhortation into practice. Even those men with 
relatively generous incomes would most likely see their main 
financial obligations as being with the family with whom they 
presently shared a home. 
Women with inadequate maintenance had to turn to what the Finer 
Committee called the 'third system of family law', i. e. the 
Supplementary- Benefits Commission. In the 1970s the SBC were 
themselves responsible for a large proportion of applications in the 
magistrates' courts (see Finer Committee on One Parent Families, 
1974). Earlier chapters have shown the development of 'public' 
support for deserted and battered women through the Poor Law 
provisions to the NAB and later SBC. Unlike the magistrates' and 
divorce courts the Supplementary Benefits Commission assumed it 
would be easier to enforce maintenance for the family with whom a 
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man lived rather than for those he had left elsewhere. This meant 
that the Commission took into account a man's obligations and present 
living expenses with his new family before calculating his liability 
to maintain the wife and children he no longer lived with. The 
Supplementary Benefits Commission made up shortfalls if women 
applied for financial support as divorced and separated wives. 
Women unable to support themselves therefore swapped their economic 
dependence upon an individual man for dependence upon the state. 
For women who had experienced domestic violence even the subsistence 
level of Supplementary Benefit could have offered a relative 
improvement in their standards of living. To some men, keeping a 
woman short of money, clothing or food is just another strategy of 
abuse (see Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981; Homer, Leonard & Taylor, 
1984; Pahl, 1980; Rose, 1978. ) Poverty was still the most likely 
outcome of divorce and separation for women and children, whether 
'innocent' or 'guilty' according to the old dicta. 
Women victims of domestic violence had considerable problems 
obtaining benefit because of the 'liable relative' rule, established in 
the Ministry of Social Security Act 1966. Re-enforcing the Poor Law 
philosophy, this 'rule' was designed to ensure that the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission encouraged women to first try to enforce their 
maintenance orders rather than draw upon state benefit. Pressure 
was put upon women' to effect reconciliations even if these were 
patently impractical and likely to have dangerous results (see 
Streather & Weir, 1974). Should a woman escape persecution from 
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liable relative officers, she might still face persecution from the 
social security 'snoopers' who enforced the cohabitation rule. Women 
on Supplementary Benefit could lose their rights to claim if they 
were judged to be cohabiting with a man. Cohabitation (at one stage 
this meant little more than sexual relations) and maintenance were 
assumed to go hand in hand. In a survey of single mothers who lost 
benefit as a result of cohabitation Ruth Lister found only five out 
of the fifty women regarded themselves as the 'cohabiting' man's 
common law wife and only four women had received financial 
contributions from the men concerned (Lister, 1973). 
The assumptions about obligations to maintain -in the laws of 
maintenance and social security were much criticised for their 
inconsistencies (see Finer Committee, 1974). Under divorce law for 
example it was assumed a man's responsibility was to maintain his 
first wife and children even if he had a new family of dependents. 
Only if his first wife remarried would she lose her rights to 
maintenance. Her cohabitation with a new partner was no longer an 
automatic ground for the cessation of maintenance. In the 
magistrates' courts and under social security provisions however the 
woman's cohabitation or sexual relations with another man would still 
be grounds for loss of maintenance or benefit. Under social 
security law the husband's obligations to support was with the family 
with whom he cohabited, the SBC providing benefit instead for his 
first family. For low income families these inconsistencies were 
most marked. Divorced men could find themselves liable under a 
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court order to pay" maintenance to an ex wife and children leaving 
insufficient income to maintain their present dependents. As any 
maintenance received would be deducted from her Supplementary 
Benefit some divorced or separated women were no better off for 
receiving the maintenance, especially if the husband's reluctance to 
pay caused delays in its receipt. In these situations the three 
systems of family law could aggravate the problem of poverty faced 
by many families with young children (see discussion in Chapter 
Four). 
To cope with inequities and inconsistencies arising from these three 
systems of family law and to alleviate the financial problems of one 
parent families the Finer Committee made a number of recommendations 
1. The 620,000 one parent families who were estimated to exist at 
the time should be given a guaranteed maintenance allowance, 
available by right (but subject to an earnings rule). - Together 
with a proposed tax credit scheme designed to lift individuals 
out of the poverty trap the average income for a one child one 
parent family would have been £15.35p per week. 
2. The Supplementary Benefits Commission would continue to assess 
a husband's maintenance contributions but, even when he did not 
have new obligations to a second family, he should be allowed 
to retain subsistence for himself. 
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3. The magistrates' courts' matrimonial jurisdiction would be 
abolished and responsibility for collecting maintenance pass to 
a new system of family courts offering their own family court 
welfare service. 
4. The Supplementary Benefits Commission should stop trying to 
encourage women to initiate court proceedings to get 
maintenance. 
5. The Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 should be amended to allow the 
courts to exclude a husband from the home even if he was the 
sole owner or tenant and Rent Acts should be amended to allow 
possession orders to be suspended to enable the spouse in 
possession to have the tenancy restored. Council and Housing 
Association tenants should be given the same security of tenure 
as private tenants. 
6. Daycare and employment facilities for women should be improved 
to enable those with dependent children to become self- 
supporting. 
The Committee also recommended a reversal of the reconciliation 
philosophy urged upon magistrates courts. It was at last suggested 
that once in court, reconciliation was probably too late anyway. 
Conflict diffusing energies should instead be expended on 
conciliation, i. e. reaching moderate agreements on separation terms by 
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negotiation with the parties and an impartial advisor. The emphasis 
upon conciliation and a unified approach to family law via a family 
court system was to become a matter of great importance to reformist 
debates in the 1980s. 
A number of these proposals, if implemented, could have improved the 
situations faced by women trying to leave violent marriages. In a 
written statement to the Select Committee on Violence in Marriage in 
1975 the National Women's Aid Federation urged that the government 
especially consider introducing the Guaranteed Maintenance Allowance 
and the tax credit scheme for children (Select Committee on Violence 
in Marriage, 1975). The low priority given to meeting women's needs 
meant that any special financial provision to provide temporary 
housing or refuges for battered women and their children had to be 
wrung out of government bodies by women's groups working mostly at 
the local levels. In later debates on domestic violence against 
women government attention centred mostly on the legislative 
measures which involved minimum costs. 
Matrimonial Iniunctions. 1969-1975. 
Chapter 2 showed that women victims of domestic violence not able to 
petition for a divorce or judicial separation could obtain injunctions 
for non-molestation by bringing a civil action for tort of assault 
and battery and exclusion orders by bringing actions for trespass in 
Page 125 
From Divorce Reform To Domestic, Violence Legislation, 1969-1977/3. 
the county court (assuming they held the tenancy of the home). 
TABLE 13: Injunctions And Property Orders 1972-1976. 
YEAR Numbers of injunctions granted : 
S17 MWPA 1882 S1 MHA 1967 Matrimonial Injunction 
1972 607 -- 
1973 908 -- 
1974 929 57 5336 
1975 837 48 8676 
1976 -- 13,341 
MWPA = Married'Women's Property Act 1882. 
MHA = Matrimonial Homes Act 1967. 
SOURCES : Civil Judicial Statistics 1972,1973; Judicial Statistics, 1974,1975. 
Whilst this option technically existed for the benefit of cohabitees, 
lawyers giving evidence to the Select Committee on Violence in 
Marriage pointed out that the provisions were seldom used, being 
dependent upon an individual solicitor's knowledge of and/or interest 
in being involved in the procedure (Select Committee on Violence in 
Marriage, 19,75). Knowledge of the procedures, whether or not 
correctly used, was noticeably on an upward wave. The numbers of 
matrimonial injunctions applied for and granted increased 
significantly from the start of the decade (see Table 13). 
Without analysis of divorce court records at the local level, 
comparison with earlier years is impossible because there are no 
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figures published which show the numbers of matrimonial injunctions 
granted during the 1960s. Some further calculations however can 
demonstrate the significance of the rise in the number of injunctions 
in the 1970s. The increase in petitions based upon 
behaviour/cruelty has already been mentioned above (and in Chapter 
2). By 1968 24% of petitions alleged the cruelty of a spouse. By 
1976, matrimonial injunctions were granted in 13,341 cases. The 
total number of divorce decrees filed that year were 143,698 (42,866 
by husbands and 100,832 by wives). Injunctions might therefore have 
been granted in approximately 9% of divorce cases. (The actual 
figure is impossible to discover without a study of local divorce 
statistics as some petitioners may have had additional injunctions 
(e. g. ousters) for earlier petitions. ) - Assuming these would only be 
applied for if the particulars in a petition concerned the 
unreasonable behaviour of a spouse which accounted for (49,231) 34% 
of the petitions filed, injunctions could have been awarded in as 
many as 27% of these cases based upon behaviour. Simply put, by 
1976 well over one quarter of petitions based upon the unreasonable 
behaviour of a spouse could have- included applications for an 
injunction. Figures for 1975 show that a small proportion (252) 
were obtained ex parte, three quarters of these being granted in 
large cities (Freeman, 1978). 
Changes in the procedure and recent decisions in the courts convinced 
some members of the legal profession that this area of the law could 
now be adequately applied to cope with the emergency needs of women 
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victims of domestic violence (see e. g. Ian Percival, Hansard, 13 
February 1976; Michael Irvine, Select Committee on Violence in 
Marriage, 26 March 1975). The remainder of this section will 
outline the general principles governing the granting of injunctions 
at the time to provide a context to the future debates on reforming 
this area of the law. 
Chapter 2 described how the High Court's powers to grant an 
injunction was set out in SS 43 and 45 of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925. Sections 45 and 43 allowed the 
court some discretion in the granting of such orders to enable the 
parties to a dispute to settle matters finally in law without 
hindrance or interference. The County Court's jurisdiction, laid 
down in S 74 of the County Courts' Act 1959, was potentially as broad 
as that of the High Court but later decisions placed certain 
restrictions on the granting of injunctions. In Des Salles d'Epinoix 
v Des Salles d'Epinoix (1967) it was decided that there must be 
sufficient nexus between the subject matter of the main action and 
the relief sought by injunction. The decision in Montgomery v 
Montgomery in 1965, established than an injunction could only be used 
to support a legal right. During the 1970s, the courts defined a 
woman's personal right to remain in the home as one such right 
capable of protection from an injunction (see Gurasz v Gurasz (1969); 
Jones v Jones (1971); Softley v Softley (1975)). Such orders could 
only be temporary though because the right to remain in the home 
ceased on termination of the marriage (see Vaughan v Vaughan (1953); 
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Brent v Brent (1975)). Any proprietry interest a woman had in the 
home was yet another separate right (see Phillips v Phillips (1973)). 
Prior to domestic violence legislation in 1976 then, matrimonial 
injunctions could be obtained ancilliary to a divorce or judicial 
separation according to the following general guidelines on :- 
A. The definition and substantiation of 'molestation' 
Although injunctions were commonly called the most 'drastic' orders 
(see Hall v Hall (1971); Bassett v Bassett (1975)), the courts could 
take a relatively generous approach to the definition of 
'molestation'. For example, in Vaughan v Vaughan (1973) it was held 
that communication could, depending on its fact and degree, amount to 
molestation. Mr Vaughan, who had been committed to terms of 
imprisonment at least five times for physically assaulting his wife, 
continued to pester her, stopping short of using violence, for years 
after their separation. In this case the words 'molest' and 'pester' 
were held to be the same and a new non-molestation injunction was 
issued. In Jones v Jones (1971) an ouster injunction was granted in 
a case where no violence had occured at all due to the court's belief 
that it would be 'impossible' for the wife to live in a house with 
the husband and his mistress. A similarly 'generous' approach to 
the substantiation of allegations existed. In Hunt v Hunt in 1975, 
the wife had made repeated allegations of the hus band's violence and 
left home as a result. She applied to have him ousted on the 
grounds of. his violence and emotional disturbance to the children so 
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that she could return. She was not able to substantiate her 
allegations by offering further proof such as doctor's evidence etc. 
The Court of Appeal decided that it was not necessary for her to 
provide definite proof on the truth of the allegations. All that 
was needed was evidence sufficient to enable them to conclude that 
they might be true. In her case there were sufficient grounds to 
conclude that this was so. (This approach to the truth of 
allegations in matrimonial cases, where there is great emphasis upon 
the judge's assessment of validity is not limited to cases of 
violence, see Browne v Pritchard (1975)). 
B. Duration: 
The court could make an injunction before, during and after a 
matrimonial suit. A non-molestation injunction could be granted to 
last or even made after the --decree absolute (see e. g. Robinson v 
Robinson (1965); Ruddell v Ruddell (1967); Devas v Devas (1969); Rooke 
v Rooke (1969); Stewart v Stewart (1973)) but the courts were 
reluctant to oust a man if the marriage was already dissolved (see 
Montgomery v Montgomery (1965)). 
C. Protection of Children 
A broader approach for ousters was applied to cases where violence 
against the children had also taken place. In Adams v Adams (1965), 
Beasley v Beasley. (1969), Phillips v Phillips (1973) and Stewart v 
Stewart (1973) the exclusion of the former husband was justified in 
terms of the need to protect the welfare of the children. Powers to 
Page 130 
From Divorce Reform To Domestic Violence Legislation, 1969-1977/3. 
do so were said to arise from the inherrent jurisdiction of the High 
Court to protect children. The County Court had no such 
jurisdiction, the statutory powers here failing to cover the exclusion 
of the former husband. Ousters to protect women were temporary 
remedies only (Jones v Jones (1971); Robinson v Robinson ( 1965); 
Brent v Brent (1974)). 
D. Limitations On Ousters To Protect Women Only : 
In cases where the husband had not used violence against the 
children as well, exclusion from the home could only take place to 
protect the wife-from molestation pending the hearing of the suit for 
divorce or judicial separation. Women hoping to divorce a violent 
man within the first three years of marriage had additional problems 
because of confusion over whether or not the court was empowered 
to oust husbands in such cases at all. A non-molestation order 
could definitely be granted within the first three years of marriage 
(see Mc Gibbon v Mc Gibbon (1973)) but in only one case (McLeod v 
Mc Leod (1974)) was it suggested the husband could be ousted in 
these circumstances, and here the wife was the sole tenant of the 
matrimonial home. 
E. Extreme Circumstances: 
Ouster injunctions could only be granted if it was impossible for a 
couple to live together (see Hall v Hall (1971)). In Mamance v 
Mamance (1974) this was further clarified as meaning only 
circumstances where it was both 'imperative' and 'inescapable'. This 
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strict reasoning could even apply to cases involving children. In 
the Mamance case the order was refused despite the husband's proven, 
repeated violence and the feared maleffects of this behaviour upon 
the wife's two small children. 
F. Lack of alternative accommodation for children: 
In sympathy with the concern over housing shortfalls in the 1970s, 
some judges expressed the opinion that it would be easier for a 
single man to find alternative accomodation than for a woman with 
small children (see e. g. Gurasz v Gurasz (1969); Bassett v Bassett 
(1975)). Uncertainty as to the powers to grant ouster injunctions 
lead to two conflicting approaches being established by the Court of 
Appeal. Decisions such as those in Mamance v Mamance (1974) and 
Hall v Hall (1971) stressed the exceptional and emergency nature of 
such orders. Cases such as Bassett v Bassett (1975) and Hunt v 
Hunt (1975) took an essentially 'welfare' approach by suggesting that 
the court should place greater emphasis upon the needs for housing 
and stability for the. children involved. Judge Ormrod stressed the 
need for orders for protection to override property interests : 
I 
My conclusion is that the court, when it is dealing with these 
cases, particularly where it is clear that the marriage has 
already broken down, should think essentially in terms of homes, 
especially for the children, and then consider the balance of 
hardships .... property rights as between the spouses are of 
comparatively minor importance. 
(Ormrod, J. Bassett v Bassett, 1975). 
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G. Non-intervention into local authority decisions: 
This area of injunction law provides another example of unequal 
standards operating for the relief of poorer women victims of 
domestic violence. Local authority tenancies were generally 
regarded as being excepted from the courts' powers to make property 
adjustments under S4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and S7 of 
the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967. In Brent v Brent (1975) the court 
supported this general principle of non-intervention into local 
authority policy and refused to oust a man after the decree nisi for 
divorce. Reluctance to intervene in local authority decisions was to 
be a recurrent theme in the later 1970s. 
For women owning or renting their homes, if the tenancy was in joint 
names or the woman's sole name, exclusion of the husband could 
alternatively be obtained via S1(2) of the Matrimonial Homes Act 
1967. This act gave a wife rights to occupy the home even if she 
had no beneficial interest in it or *strict legal right to do so (see 
Baynham v Baynham (1969)). Powers to exclude a husband were 
limited though to the protection of a married woman's accomodation 
rights only. ' In Maynard v Maynard (1969), court powers to grant an 
injunction regulating occupation were limited to SI of the 
Matrimonial Homes. Act 1967. Women who needed permanent 
settlements were here advised to first obtain a decree absolute for 
divorce and, if the husband failed to leave the matrimonial home, to 
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apply to the County Court for an action against him as a trespassing 
stranger. In Tarr v Tarr (1971) a court held that a property owning 
spouse could not be permanently excluded from the home. This 
decision gave rise to a number of cases where, instead of excluding a 
violent husband, the court divided the home into separate 
accomodation giving e. g. the wife sole use of a bedroom and living 
room and the husband the remainder. For women victims of domestic 
violence this solution-was extremely impractical if not dangerous. 
Many solicitors avoided injunction cases because of the expense 
demanded in time and effort (see Meredith, 1977). For women in need 
of emergency protection, the procedure for obtaining an injunction 
was dogged by potential delays. To apply for an injunction a 
woman's solicitor had to serve a summons or notice of application on 
the husband at least two clear days before the hearing. Whilst it 
was technically possible to abridge this period in certain cases a 
Practice Direction issued in 1972 stressed that only a very small 
proportion of injunction cases should be seen to be so urgent that no 
notice to the husband was required. The summons or notice of 
application had to be supported by affidavits setting out the grounds 
on which relief was to be sought. Should there be an extreme 
emergency, affidavits could be lodged later and the case heard ex 
parte (i. e. without the husband's presence). For a non-molestation 
injunction, a woman had to prove that she or the children were in 
such immediate danger from further assault that they needed 
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protection before the matter could come to court. An ex parte 
ouster order would succeed very rarely indeed. 
Up until 1974, injunction cases were heard with the public present in 
an open court. Leaving aside the obvious distress likely to result 
in women having to describe in public their previous experiences of 
victimisation, this would have increased the potential for a husband's 
harrassment by enabling him to bring friends or relatives into court 
to intimidate his wife. Fear of the husband's and associates' 
proximity in the court was an intimidating factor of the legal 
experience remembered by all the women surveyed/interviewed for this 
study who had been to court (see Chapter Six). Those unable to 
bring their own moral support would be at a distinct disadvantage 
here. Should the husband succeed in obtaining an adjournment for 
the hearing, the delay and harassment problem would be further 
aggravated. 
The public should be aware that for a long time the courts have 
been accustomed to granting injunctions at the shortest notice 
if the correct procedures are used. I have telephoned a judge 
on a Saturday afternoon to find out whether he is home and then 
gone to his home - and having given an undertaking to file a 
petition - and have obtained from him the necessary order 
without proceedings having ever been started. The fudge made 
an order for the protection of children. So informal were the 
proceedings, that when the judge made the order he asked what 
he should write it on. There were no papers in this case - no 
writ, or anything else. These speedy procedures are available 
now .... the difficulty is knowing who to ask at the time when 
advice is needed. 
(Ian Percival, Hansard, 13 February 1976. ) 
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This confident incantation of correct practice contrasts sharply with 
another (more experienced in this field) lawyer's claim that : 
you have actually got to present (the court) with a near corpse 
before they will take emergency action . 
(Margueritte Russell, 20 March 1975, Select 
Committee on Violence in Marriage. ) 
One researcher on violence against women, Jalna Hanmer, later quipped, 
mention of the inadequacy of injunctions 'put a sparkle in the eye ' 
of Select Committee members (Sutton & Hanmer, 1984). Legislative 
reform of injunctions would be a zero cost way of doing something to 
help women victims of domestic violence. Throughout the early 
1970s battered women and those involved with their legal difficulties 
had complained that injunctions were too slow to offer effective 
emergency relief, could enhance a husband's scope for harassment and 
were difficult or even impossible to enforce (see Select Committee on 
Violence in Marriage, 1975; Hansard, 1976; Meredith, 1977. ). Even if 
a woman succeeded in getting her violent husband into court, by 
giving an undertaking to behave well in the future he could forestall 
further proceedings. Breach of an injunction was a contempt of 
court which could technically result in a fine or committal to prison 
but again, many a husband could evade these sanctions by purging his 
contempt - basically apologising to the court. ' The woman had to 
apply for court notice of contempt herself when her husband broke 
the injunction. He was then given two days' notice of the committal 
hearing and the case could be adjourned if he decided to contest the 
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charge. Should she succeed in proving the injunction had been 
broken, the husband might be imprisoned. Even when he was 
committed to prison for a breach of an injunction he need only purge 
his contempt by promising the judge he would behave himself in 
future and the whole process would start over again. A husband 
could go for six months avoiding imprisonment whilst continuing to 
attack and harass his wife. Injunction proceedings could go along 
this yo-yo route of assault-court-apology for some considerable time. 
As injunctions were civil proceedings, the police felt justified in 
washing their hands of the proceedings on the grounds that only 
bailiffs were responsible for enforcement. Bailiffs, as court 
employees, worked office hours and were of little use to women who 
had emergencies at evenings or weekends. 
In their evidence to the Select Committee on Violence in Marriage in 
1975, National Womens Aid Federation (NWAF) described one woman's 
three year struggle to gain legal protection from injunctions. It is 
worth quoting this here in full because the extract demonstrates so 
well the experience of many women who attempted to use the law for 
protection : 
1972 : Mr D (the husband) attacked his wife fracturing 
her skull and left arm. He was imprisoned for 
a term of nine months and released after six. 
Mrs D started divorce proceedings but took the 
husband back on release into her home, because 
of his pestering. The violence began again. 
5-10 Nov. 1974 : Mrs D left with the children to go to the local 
authority's Homeless Families Accomodation. 
She applied for the divorce to be made absolute 
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and was granted - non-molestation and ouster 
injunctions which were served on the husband. 
11-12 Nov. 1974 : Mrs D returned home and was molested when her 
husband broke into the house. The police were 
called but Mr D had gone when they turned up. 
Mrs D then brought an action for breach of 
injunction and a warrant for arrest and a 
committal -order was made. Mr D was not 
arrested. 
13-28 Nov. 1974 : There were more breaches of the injunction. 
Mrs D returned to the Homeless Families Unit 
but her husband continued to pester and molest 
her here. The bailiffs escorted Mrs D to take 
her children to school but her husband was not 
seen that day. 
28 Nov. -22 Dec. 1974: Mrs D moved into a refuge. Her husband 
visited her there about ten times. The police 
were called and told of the warrant but Mr D 
evaded arrest. The police claimed they could 
only arrest Mr D if they caught him in the act 
of breaching the peace. The warrant for 
contempt of court was said to be a civil 
matter for the bailiffs to enforce. 
22- Dec. 1974 : Mrs D went home to collect some clothes for the 
children where her husband threatened her with 
a knife. He then visited the refuge- and kicked 
the door. He lived in the house, in 
disobedience of the injunction, for three months. 
Mrs D told her solicitor. 
Feb. 1975 : Mrs D found a bed missing from her home and 
told her solicitor. 
3rd March 1975 : Mr D was arrested for breaching the peace at 
the refuge. The police were told of the 
warrant and the injunction and Mr D went before 
the magistrates the next day. Mrs D told her 
solicitor this so that the contempt warrant 
could be served but the solicitor said she had 
to go to court to do this herself. Mrs D, who 
had small children to look after, arrived at the 
court late in the morning and so missed the 
case. Mr D had been fined and had gone. 
Most of Mrs D's furniture was taken from her 
house by the husband. 
(Extracted from Select Committee on Violence in Marriage, 1975). 
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Police Involvement and The Criminal Law. 
Requests to enforce a separation of criminal and civil law matters 
appeared in a number of the debates about the state of the law in 
the 1970s. Evidence submitted to the Select Committee on Violence 
in Marriage by NWAF and Erin Pizzey's publication of battered women's 
experiences in her book 'Scream Quietly Or The Neighbours Will Neer' 
(Pizzey, 1974) demonstrated that a number of women, like Mrs D. 
above, were still turning to the criminal law and the police for 
protection. Following the publicity generated by Pizzey's 
involvement in Chiswick Women's Aid and the compilation and 
circulation of a dossier of battered women's experiences with the 
law, -certain concerned M. P. s attempted to find out from the Home 
Office the actual numbers of women turning to the police and criminal 
law for emergency relief. During the period 1973-1975, a number of 
Written Answers to Jack Ashley and others from representatives of 
the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Scotland stressed 
it was not possible, nor economic, to distinguish from published 
statistics on offences known to the police assaults by husbands on 
their wives (see e. g. Hansard 20 June 1973 140 WA; 26 June 1973 WA 
322; 4 July 1973 140 WA; 5 July 1973 WA 171; 1974 WA 445; 13 Nov. 
1974 WA 139. ). In a written report to the Select Committee on 
Violence in Marriage in 1975, NWAF drew on research into homicide 
statistics from the 1950s and 1960s to show how a large proportion 
of women victims had been killed by their husbands/cohabitees (Select 
Committee on Violence in Marriage, 26 March 1975). 
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My own data for the 1970s drawn from the Home Office publication 
Criminal Statistics shows that spouse/cohabitee/lover killings 
amounted to 21-30% of all homicides during the period 1969-1976 
(1969 = 23%; 1970 = 22%; 1971 = 25%; 1972 = 21%; 1973 = 28%; 1974 = 
29%; 1975 = 28%; 1976 = 30%) (Criminal Statistics, 1972; 1973; 1974; 
1975; 1976. ). As homicides per million population increased from the 
1969 level of 6.8 offences per million people to 9.2 in 1975 (an 
increase in the rate of about 26%) the larger proportion made up of 
these spouse killings represents a most alarming increase which has 
not yet been adequately researched or explained. Working backwards 
from the percentages to the plain figures, about 76 spouses were 
killed in 1968 compared with 126 in 1975. So not only were a large 
proportion of women being killed by their spouses/cohabitees each 
year but the actual numbers dying this way were increasing. 
Further research which examined the DPP's homicide records for the 
period 1969-1977 could yield more information on the increase in 
spousal killings. later discussion will show that the alternatives 
for women victims of domestic violence coupled with the frequently 
applied, inappropriate reconciling efforts of housing departments, 
benefit officers and magistrates' courts undoubtedly made it more 
difficult for women to leave violent relationships. Discussion of 
the sentencing policies will also show a possible link between 
findings of diminished responsibility and attempted or actual wife 
killings (see discussion below and also Chapter Six). It is possible 
that the increase in spousal-homicides was partly a result of the 
increaseed difficulty women had when trying to leave a vciolent 
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relationship, i. e. more battered women did not escape in time to save 
their lives. 
Available statistics on assaults from unpublished figures show a 
similarly depressing situation. In July 1973, Jack Ashley informed 
the House of Commons that on the basis of a Staffordshire report, 
where 320 battered women had contacted the local police for 
assistance in the last year, up to 16,000 requests for help from the 
police were being made by battered women in England and Wales each 
year (Hansard, 1973). This estimate of 16,000 swamps the actual 
numbers of aggravated and common assault prosecutions made. Table 
12 above shows that the maximum number of prosecutions for assault 
in the period 1968 - 1975 made by magistrates was just over 9,000. 
Figures-, forwarded from the Bedfordshire police to the Select 
Committee on Violence in Marriage in 1975 gave further evidence of 
many more women victims of domestic violence attempting to use the 
criminal law than appeared in the statistics. Out of 288 cases of 
domestic violence against women notified to the police, only 73 
continued to a prosecution. Of these 73 cases, 8 offenders were 
imprisoned or given suspended sentences, 31 were find or bound over 
to keep -the peace, 5 were given probation orders, 17 received 
conditional or absolute discharges and 12 were otherwise dealt with. 
Research started in 1974 into over 32,000 Scottish police and court 
records when published in 1980 found that 25% of all assaults known 
to the police and courts were assaults by husbands on their wives 
(Dobash and Dobash, 1980). , 
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According to representatives of the Home Office at the time 
The law does not discriminate between assault by a husband on 
his wife and other assaults. Any assault constitutes a 
criminal offence. 
(Jack Carlisle, Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
Hansard, 20 June 1973. ) 
0 
Yet glaring examples of discrimination against wives were being 
problematised before the courts, Select Committee and Parliament. 
Leaving aside for a while the gap between reality and practice which 
formed the experience of most battered women who spoke out at, the 
time and for this study, this statement was patently incorrect even 
on the basis of the principles advanced by practitioners of the 
criminal law. Not only did the criminal justice system 'fail' to 
offer women victims of domestic violence equal rights in principle, 
but inequality was practised and justified. Wives, and all victims 
of family violence, were excluded from claims for compensation from 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, created in 1968. Paragraph 
7 of the scheme initially excluded family victims because of: 
1. problems associated with facts - lack of witnesses, -dangers of 
connivance, fraud, etc. 
2. fears that the compensation would find its way into the hands of 
the offender. 
Even if separated. from an ex-husband, women victims of domestic 
violence could still be excluded, by way of their past relationship, 
from a claim for compensation. 
, 
In Rv Criminal Injuries 
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Compensation Board ex parte Staten in 1972, Lord Widgery of the 
Divisional Court bent his legal rhetoric over backwards in an attempt 
to avoid paying out damages to a battered woman. In this case, Mrs 
Staten no longer shared the bedroom with her husband and had ceased 
to cook and clean for him. According to the principles of 
matrimonial law, she was no longer. living with Mr Staten as his wife. 
She had remained in her council flat following the assault by her 
husband because, having eight children, she had no alternative 
accomodation. Despite a non-cohabitation order from the magistrates 
Mr Staten refused to leave the home. Mrs Staten was deemed to be 
ineligible for relief on the ground that the family exemption phrase 
in Paragraph 7 of the scheme referring to couples 'living 
together.... as members of the same family' had an 'ordinary', 'natural' 
meaning not that derived from the principles of matrimonial law (see 
Chapter Four for discussion of the scheme when wives were no longer 
excluded from claims). 
Whilst the courts found little difficulty in concluding that injuries 
incurrred by a woman running away from violence were the-result of 
the offender's threat and thus constituted an assault in themselves 
(see Rv Roberts (1971)), uncertainty as to whether wives could be 
physically prevented from doing so by their husbands persisted. The 
case of Rv Jackson in 1891 (mentioned in Chapter 1) established that 
physical confinement of a wife by a husband to enforce his order for 
the restitution of conjugal rights was unlawful. Rv Reid in 1972 
concerned a similar case where a woman, still married to her husband, 
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was physically removed by him against her will. In the judgement of 
this absurd case the court noted the English law's lack of guidance 
on whether a husband's removal of his wife constituted 'kidnap'. A 
dispute arose as to whether a man had to conceal his wife to be 
guilty of this offence or whether the mere removal of her from the 
place where she wanted to be was a kidnapping. It was decided that, 
although a woman's consent to sexual intercourse on marriage could 
be assumed on her behalf (hence husbands could not be guilty of 
rape), her consent to his companionship and other forms of 
intercourse could not. Therefore the act of taking away Mrs Reid 
constituted a kidnapping offence. 
Having thus settled the matter of whether or not wives who ran away 
from their husbands could be physically brought back by them, the 
question remained-as to whether or not husbands could still visit 
separated wives to satisfy their 'conjugal rights'. Certain 
limitations on the presumption of a wife's consent to sexual 
intercourse were made by the courts in the 1970s. In Rv O'Brien 
(1974), the woman's decree nisi of divorce was held to be sufficient 
to revoke her consent and in Rv Steele in 1976, the husband's 
undertaking not to molest his wife was taken as being the same 
revocation of consent as an injunction. In two infamous cases of 
gang rapes upon battered wives however, the courts weakened the 
ability of all women to obtain prosecutions by making consent 
virtually irrelevant. Court, decisions in rape cases demonstrate 
quite clearly how it is not just violence. against wives which the law 
Page 144 
From Divorce Reform To Domestic Violence Legislation 1969-1977/3. 
and society legitimates but violence against women within relations 
of 'normal' heterosexuality. In the cases Rv Cogan and Leak and DPP 
v Morgan, both in 1975, the husbands had invited other men back to 
their homes to have sexual intercourse with their wives, telling 
their guests to ignore any protests as the pretence of refusal or 
apparent distress was 'normal' to their lovemaking. In Cogan and 
Leak, the invited rapist was found not guilty on the ground that he 
believed Mrs Leak was consenting to intercourse. This was a classic 
case of a man believing that when a woman says 'no' she means 'yes'. 
In Mrs Morgan's case, the three men who raped her with her husband's 
help, argued that they were not guilty if they believed she had 
consented, even if this belief was not based on reasonable grounds. 
Although the House of Lords upheld the verdict of guilty of rape in 
this case, this was a decision forced by the violence involved (Mr 
Morgan and his three accomplices had dragged the sleeping woman out 
of a bed shared with her children in order to forcibly rape her) 
rather than any apparent respect for the woman's right to say no. 
These two cases gave rise to a great deal of controversy over the 
law of sexual offences, culminating in the Heilbron Report, (1975) and 
new legislation designed to over-turn the decisions. In S11A of the 
Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 rape was defined to include the 
case where the rapist was reckless of whether a victim consented. 
Husbands who used, excessive force on , wives during the exercise of 
their conjugal rights could technically be found guilty of actual 
bodily harm, rather than rape. Getting the police to enforce the 
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criminal law in situations of domestic violence against women was 
however exceedingly difficult according to the evidence submitted to 
Parliament and the Select Committee on Violence in Marriage. Women 
victims of domestic violence repeatedly stressed that the police 
often refused to become involved in assaults which were just 
'domestics' (Select Committee on Violence in Marriage, 1975). 
Even when I fled to a police station with my face covered with 
blood all they did was write a report down in a book. 
(Quote from a letter to Jack Ashley, Hansard, 1973. ) 
The question of how the criminal law is not enforced is one of great 
importance. Failure to prosecute is not the only way in which the 
law could resist treating cases of domestic violence against women 
with appropriate severity. Prosecution followed by 'lenient' 
sentencing or whittling down a charge to a less serious offence are 
also important factors (see Stanko, 1985). Statistical evidence on 
these matters however tends to be rather ambiguous. The -Home 
Office statistics on violent crimes, even after some secondary 
analysis to compare crimes of violence against women with other 
such offences do not always offer much insight into whether 
discriminatory treatment is part of the criminal justice system. 
Statistics show that terms of imprisonment are not necessarily the 
guaranteed (nor necessarily desireable) outcome for any of those 
charged with violent offences. Historically and on humanitarian 
grounds, sentencing for homicides and other offences is variable from 
a suspended term to life imprisonment.. Only the charge of murder 
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carries a mandatory life sentence. Tables 14 and 15 show variations 
in the outcome of cases of homicide for the years 1968 . to 1975. 
TABLE 14: Final Classification Of Offences Initially Recorded By The 
Police As Homicide, 1968 to 1975. 
Year of recording 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Initially recorded by 
police as homicide 420 395 396 459 480 465 599 510 
Currently recorded as 
homicide 360 332 342 407 410 391 527 451 
Decided by court to be: 
Murder 73 69 91 85 88 82 148 84 
S2 Manslaughter 56 64 66 78 93 82 105 78 
Other manslaughter 114 117 111 134 137 142 169 166 
Infanticide 26 17 15 17 18 9 16 6 
Court decision pending - - - - - - 7 34 
Suspect died/suicide 47 28 21 42 32 32 33 26 
Suspect found insane 8 10 5 14 10 6 5 5 
No further proceedings 6 10 10 5 10 3 11 9 
No suspect 30 17 23 32 22 35 33 43 
Current homicide offences 
per million popn. 7.4 6.8 7 8.3 8.4 8 10.7 9.2 
No longer recorded as 
homicide 60 63 54 52 70 74 72 59 
Decided by court to be 
lesser offence 23 21 14 16 23 17 21 20 
No offence on grounds of: 
Self defence 17 16 11 13 12 28 17 17 
Accident 19 21 26 19 29 19 28 16 
Other grounds 1 5 3 4 6 10 6 6 
Source : Criminal Statistics, 1975. 
Convictions for murder between 1968-1975 ranged between 16-25% of 
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all offences initially recorded as homicide convictions for 
manslaughter from 40-48% of all offences initially recorded as 
homicide. If spouse/cohabitee/lover killings for the years 1973 and 
1974, are compared with other types of homicide, it can be seen that 
suspects charged with murder or manslaughter were more frequently 
föund guilty (see Table 16). 
Table 15 : Final Classification Of Offences Initially Recorded By The Police 
As Homicide, 1968 to 1975, Percentages. 
Year of recording 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Initially recorded by 
police as homicide 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Currently recorded as 
homicide 86% 84% 86% 89% 85% 84% ý88% 88% 
Decided by court to be: 
Murder 17% 17% 23% 18% 18% 18% 25% 16% 
Manslaughter 40% 46% 45% 46% 48% 48% 46% 48% 
No court decision* 22% 16% , 
16% 20% 15% 16% 14% 16% 
Other* 7% 5% 2% 5% 13% 2% 3% 8% 
i See Table 18 above for full category. Source: Crim inal Statistics, 1975. 
Men who kill their wives/cohabitees would undoubtedly be much more 
easily discovered as offenders than strangers who could escape from 
a locality leaving no evidence of association with the victim. For 
wife/cohabitee killers therefore the police would invariably have to 
prosecute. Unlike assault cases where the culprits too frequently 
evade prosecution and arrest, in domestic homicides the 'lack of 
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severity' occurs because the offenders are much more likely to have 
reduced terms of imprisonment due to their greater likelihood of 
Table 16 : Outcome of Spousal And Other Homicides Compared, 1973-1974. 
Outcomes for Homicides 1973, Percentages. 
Relationship Man- Decision No Suspect No 
to victim Murder slaughter pending suspect dead proceeding 
Spouse/cohabitee 
Lover 21% 58% 1% - 22% - 
Relative/associate 13% 76% 4% - 6% 2% 
Other 22% 34% 10% 31% 3% - 
Total % 17% 59% 5% 7% 8% 4% 
Totals 78 222 23 33 38 2 
Outcomes for Homicides 1974 
Relationship Man- Decision No Suspect No 
to victim Murder - slaughter pending suspect dead proceeding 
Spouse/cohabitee 
Lover 22% 54% 7% - 12% 1% 
Relative/associate 17% 69% 4% - 9% 3% 
Other 28% 14% 28% 28% - <1% 
Total % 21% 51% 11% 7% 7% 2% 
Totals 114 274 61 40 37 9 
Sources : Criminal Statistics, 1973 & 1974. 
being able to mitigate the severity of a sentence following findings 
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of provocation or 'diminished responsibility'. Research on diminished 
responsibility and the courts by Susan Dell shows that wife killing 
comprises the largest category of diminished responsibilty homicides. 
Wife killings accounted for 38% of the findings of diminished 
responsibility between 1966-1969,35% between 1970-1973 and 42% 
between 1974-1977. Dell's research suggests the tide is begining to 
turn against the wave of lenient sentencing. The latest trends in 
her analysis show a less 'lenient' approach to the sentencing of wife 
killers than was formerly the case. An increasing number of 
domestic killings were however considered unsuitable for 
hospitalisation, the offenders serving terms of imprisonment instead 
(Dell, 1984). 
Reported crimes are of course the mere tip of an iceberg. A 
greater proportion of offences are never turned into statistics. 
Recent work on the enforcement of the law in cases of domestic 
violence against women has examined the discretionary decision making 
role of the police (Farragher, 1985; Stanko, 1985). The Association 
of Chief Police Officers specified to the Select Committee on Violence 
in Marriage the following factors affecting their decision to 
intervene 
(i) the seriousness of the assault; (ii) the availability of 
witnesses; (iii) the character of the alleged assailant; (iv) age, 
infirmity, etc.. of the complainant; (v) previous domestic history; 
(vi), the wishes of the complainant; and (vii) if prosecution 
ensued against the wishes of the complainant, would the 
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domestic situation be adversely affected. 
(Select Committee on Violence In Marriage, 1975). 
Mark Carlisle, Minister of State for the Home Office stressed the 
most frequently voiced complaint of the police that not only were 
women unwilling to prosecute cases of assault by husbands but once 
in court they changed their minds and dropped the proceedings. 
Research into the prosecution of cases by battered women does not 
support this assertion. In the mamoth study into police and court 
records completed by Rebecca and Russell Dobash, only 6% of assault 
charges brought by battered women against their husbands were 
dropped before the final adjudication and then only after 
considerable postponement of the court proceedings (Dobash & Dobash, 
1980). Without alternative accomodation or some form of protection 
from further assault it would be difficult for women to resist 
pressures put on them not to prosecute. 
Domestic Violence Legislation 
In the early hours of 16th July 1973, Jack Ashley initiated an 
adjournment debate in the House of Commons on the problem of 
domestic violence against women and put forward a fifteen point plan 
of government action. Along with yet another request that the 
government collect' statistics on the numbers of battered women 
criminally assaulted, the plan demanded better protection from the 
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criminal law, the police to prosecute cases of assault themselves 
providing protection for women in the meantime, funding for refuges, 
the provision of emergency benefits and temporary accomodation, equal 
rights to the matrimonial home with the automatic right of sole 
occupation to whichever partner had custody of the children. 
In September 1973 a Working Party paper published by the Home Office 
and the Law Commission suggested a separation of matrimonial affairs 
from the criminal law. This recommended empowering magistrates to 
grant non-molestation orders as well as non-cohabitation orders with 
possibly powers also to prevent husbands from entering the 
matrimonial home. These orders would work like injunctions and be 
enforceable by ä fine or imprisonment. 
In February 1974 a joint circular on the homelessness of battered 
women was issued -by the DHSS' and sent to all local authorities. 
Government funding for the nation's first refuges, the Chiswick house 
set up by Erin Pizzey and Camden Women's Aid (ex-Brixton), was 
provided' by 'way of grants through the urban aid programme with 25% 
payable from the local authorities. By July 1974 there were around 
forty refuges in the UK. Figures for November that year show, 
thirty local authorities were fully or partially funding refuges 
housing 352 women victims of domestic violence and theirSchildren 
(Hansard, 1974).. Secure and direct central government funding for 
refuges however was a matter which was consistently dodged. Apart 
from DHSS grants for funding central offices, since the begining of 
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the refuge movement in the UK,, government financial support has come 
via encouraging local authority subsidies and housing association 
grants. 
In July 1974, William Hamilton announced to the Commons that he had 
taken over from lack Ashley the -fob of 'championing the cause' of 
battered women. He asked for a grant of £55,000 to enable the 
Chiswick group to buy an empty house to expand their grossly 
overcrowded premises. He also demanded that the government 
consider examining the feasibilty of legal aid by phone for women in 
emergency situations, police rather than bailiff enforcement of 
injunctions, the automatic denial of access to children of husbands 
divorced as a result of unreasonable behaviour and the full transfer 
to wives on such a divorce of rights to the matrimonial home. 
That same month, the leader of the House of Commons announced a 
Select Committee was to be set up in the Autumn to investigate the 
problem of family violence. This would look at woman and child 
abuse and make recommendations for future policy. When formed the 
Committee had thirteen members, just three being women until a 
fourth, Gwyneth Dunwoody, joined in March. 
Before the Committee had completed its work Jack Ashley presented a 
private members bill designed to alleviate the housing problems of 
women victim of domestic violence. The Battered Wives (Rights To 
Possession Of The Matrimonial Home) Bill aimed to give courts the 
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power to make an order for the total right to occupation of the 
matrimonial home for the wives of men convicted of acts of violence 
against them. This very simple and short bill was intended to 'put 
the shoe on the other foot' by evicting violent men from the 
matrimonial home. Ashley argued that the threat of property loss 
might deter some men from committing, grevious bodily harm on their 
wives. Where the- bill scored points for simplicity it lost them for 
vagueness and in consequence had a rough ride in Parliament 
resulting in its failure. The violence which Ashley aimed to curb 
was grevious bodily harm yet this was nowhere expressed in the bill. 
Following prosecution a husband would lose his rights to occupation 
but the wording concerned ownership rights. Edward Lyons, MP for 
Bradford West complained about the neglect of equality principles in 
the bill, battered spouses rather than battered wives should have 
been -the subjects of new legislation. Some lawyers in the house 
objected to the use of the 'journalistic', 'emotive' and imprecise 
phrase 'battered women'. - Most resistance however came on the 
grounds that not only would the bill hamper the trend towards 
discretionary decision making in family law but property rights could 
be interfered with. 
NWAF made some demands of their own in a written memo to the Select 
Committee in March 1975 (Select Committee on Violence in Marriage, 
1975). Not one of the 30 recommendations at this stage concerned 
matrimonial injunctions, the emphasis centred on improving battered 
women's immediate needs for security, housing and financial provision. 
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NWAF wanted unmarried, cohabiting women to be included in any 
proposals for reform not just wives. They suggested greater care 
and understanding by employees of the DHSS of women's needs to keep 
secret their whereabouts, better and more generous provision of 
emergency payments by the DHSS, guaranteed maintenance for women and 
increased family allowances as recommended by the Finer Committee, 
adequate funding and local authority help for refuges in each area 
with a population above 50,000, the recognition of all battered women 
as homeless, local authority housing departments' cooperation in 
situations where women needed to move or transfer tenancies to 
different areas, the provision of short term accomodation for women 
awaiting divorce property settlements, research into the causes and 
prevention of domestic violence against women in conjunction with 
NWAF. Many of NWAF's specific, practical demands were met, albeit'on 
a goodwill basis by local authorities working on advice from refuge 
support groups. The most crucial demands however, for funding for 
refuges and guaranteed income supplements for separated women, were 
consistently dodged. 
Some members of the legal profession who gave evidence before the 
Select Committee supported the remedies suggested by the Home Office 
and Law Commission. Sir George Baker and Mr Justice Arnold, the 
Solicitor General, spoke in favour of giving the police powers of 
arrest for injunctions. But the Metropolitan Police in a memo 
before the Committee expressed concern about the mix of criminal and 
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civil law matters plus the extra burden this would create for an 
already overstretched police force. 
On 17 December 1975, with overwhelming support from Select Committee 
Members, Jo Richardson presented . her Domestic Violence Bill. This. 
turned out to be the only recommendation of the Select Committee 
implemented. It aimed to amend the law relating to matrimonial 
injunctions and provide the police with powers of arrest for breach. 
In no way was the Bill put forward as a panacea for battered women. 
It was devised to rectify just one of the problems highlighted by the 
Select Committee. Unlike Jack Ashley's precursor, thanks to drafting 
assistance from members of the Lord Chancellor's Department the 
. opponents' scope to negate the bill on technical grounds was cut 
down. As a concession to the male equality lobby, the bill's 
wording applied equally to a man or a wife, i. e. a man could get an 
injunction against his wife. ý Perhaps the biggest improvement 
offered by the bill was the ability to provide quick action in cases 
of emergency. Clause 1 aimed to provide injunctions for non- 
molestation and exclusion without the need to initiate ancilliary 
court proceedings. Clause 2 gave powers of arrest to the police. 
It would be the duty of the police to find a judge and get the 
offender before him/her. If this could not be done within 24 hours, 
the offender would be released. Clause 3 allowed courts to order a 
spouse's exclusion from the home. Clause 4 covered co-ownership so 
that these women could obtain the same rights to protection from 
eviction etc as those with no ownership rights. Section 1(2) of the 
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Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 was amended, over-ruling the, decsion in 
Tarr v Tarr (1973) so that either spouse could apply for a court 
order restricting to other's occupation rights. Provisions for 
cohabiting women in Sections 1 and 2 of what later became the 
Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 were 
introduced at the bill's committee stage in the House of Commons. 
There were a number of shortfalls in the Domestic Violence and 
Matriminial Proceedings Act right from the start however. Only men 
-and-women who were living together as husband and wife were covered 
by the statute. The Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings 
Act did no give courts powers to grant injunctions after a divorce so 
these types of injunctions- -were in this respect narrower than the 
matrimonial kind (see discussion above). This meant that after a 
divorce, separation or cessation of cohabitation women were not 
eligible for injunctions under the act. Molestation was defined as 
in matrimonial law to refer to 'pestering'. ' The next chapter will 
show that this made non-molestation injunctions relatively 'easy' to 
obtain. The arrest powers though did not deal with the arrest and 
prosecution policy adopted by the police. Although the police 
technically had powers of arrest in cases of actual bodily harm, 
their actual implementation of these powers could still be foregone. 
The Law Commission Report on Matrimonial Proceedings in Magistrates' 
Courts published in October 1976, endorsed earlier recommendations to 
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empower magistrates to grant personal protection and exclusion 
orders. Magistrates did not get these powers until 1978. 
Homelessness And Domestic Violence Against Women. 
1976 brought more expansion for the refuge movement. NWAF grew 
from 38 affiliated groups in 1975 to well over 100 in 1977. 
Securing alternative accomodation, temporary or permanent was also a 
growing problem however (Rose, 1978). Matrimonial property reforms 
and alterations in security of tenure did not greatly affect a local 
authority's essentially discretionary power to provide accomodation to 
divorced and separated women. It has been argued that women's 
access to housing is largely dependent upon their position in the 
family (see Pascall, 1986). Poverty and the low status ascribed to 
women living without men has historically worked to limit their 
ability to become owner occupiers or sole tenants of local authority 
accomodation though the 1970s again brought some improvements here. 
A Law Commission survey in 1972 found over half owner occupied 
homes were held in joint names, the remaining 42% being in the 
husband's name alone and just 5% in the wife's name. The shift 
towards joint ownership increased women's financial status and 
ability to find alternative housing on divorce (having one half of 
the income from the sale of the home rather than a third). For 
local authority tenants a trend towards joint tenancy (see above 
discussion) did not necessarily guarantee better housing security. 
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The decline in privately rented accomodation which occured during the 
1960s and 1970s pruned the chances of women alone and with 
children to find alternative and crisis accomodation. Local 
authority , policies thus became of crucial importance as the 
alternatives had withered away. Whether ultimately owner occupiers, 
private sector or local authority tenants, temporary accomodation 
from local authorities became a priority for women victims of 
domestic violence. 
Local authorities operate housing policies primarily for an assumed 
population of 'standard' family types - elderly couples, parents with 
dependent children, etc. Their preferrences are expressed in a 
variable and discretionary manner at the local level through their 
selection of households which are eligible for accomodation and 
through the allocation of properties from stock to individual 
applicants. The following discussion will show how statutory duties 
for local authorities to assist the homeless have historically 
provided the scope for the exercise of discretion. 
N 
Under the provisions of -the National Assistance Act 1948 S 21 (1)ß 
local authorities were under -a duty to provide : 
(1) residential accomodation for persons who by reason of age, 
infirmity or any other circumstances are in need of care and 
attention which is not otherwise available to them. 
(2) temporary accomodation for persons who are in urgent need 
thereof, being need arising in circumstances which could not 
reasonably have been foreseen or in such other circumstances as 
the authority may in any particular case determine. 
(Quoted from Arden, (1982), p. 3. ) 
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The duty to provide assistance to the homeless extended only to 
persons ordinarily resident in a local authority's area (S24). The 
National Assistance Board /Supplementary Benefits Commission had the 
power to require the local authority to provide accomodation when 
satisfied that a person was in urgent need of it, but the 
determination of situations of urgent need were largely 
discretionary. The Minister of Health gave general guidance regards 
local authorities administrative duties towards the homeless but this 
remained open to considerable deviation. The 1948 Act did not 
impose a full or permanent duty on local authorities to protect all 
the homeless. A duty only existed for the unforeseeable emergencies 
covered (fire, flood or other disaster) (see London Borough of 
Southwark v Williams (1971) 1 Ch. 734 CA). Unless the SBC was 
involved, the duration of the accomodation was a matter for the local 
authority. Urgent need was not matched by permanent need (see 
Roberts v Dorset County Council (1976) 75 LGR 462). - 
Three problems arose from the provisions in 1948 Act, the essentially 
discretionary duties and subsequent temptation to allocate 
accomodation on the basis of availability rather than need; disputes 
arising from the definition of an applicant's 'ordinary residence' 
resulting in some local authorities merely shuttling the homeless out 
of their area; and the division of responsibilities between 
authorities within. a locality which resulted in the 'yo-yoing of the 
homeless between different offices and departments. This was 
aggravated by the Local Government Act 1972 (operative 1 April 1974) 
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which altered the boundaries and responsibilities of local 
authorities. Social services outside. London and in non-metropolitan 
areas became the responsibility of county councils but housing the 
responsibility of district councils. 
Although the Seebohm report had recommended that local authorities 
should take increased reponsibility for housing 'vulnerable families' 
children were frequently taken into local authority care purely 
because of their parents' lack, of accomodation. The Minister of 
Health's Circulars 20/66 and 19/67 urged local authorities not to 
split up families in temporary accomodation but research commissioned 
by the DHSS showed that in some areas of the country very little 
progress had been made (see Glastonbury (1971); Greve et al (1971)). 
Between 1962-1963,3,610 children in England and Wales had been 
taken into care merely because of their parents' homelessness. This 
figure represented 7.4% of all the care receptions for England and 
Wales. Between 1967-1968 the numbers dropped to 1,983 (4% of 
total) but they began to rise again so that by 1970 2,693 (5.2%) were 
removed from their families. Research published by Shelter in 1972 
cited a number of local authorities using the offer (threat) to take 
children into care as a technique to frighten away homeless 
applicants (Bailey & Ruddock, 1972). 
A significant number of the homeless were divorced or separated 
women with children (as many as two thirds in non-metropolitan areas 
according to Glastonbury (1971)) or immigrant families who had been 
Page 161 
From Divorce Reform To Domestic Violence Legislation 1969-1977/3. 
evicted (Greve et al found 30% of homeless applicants were 
immigrants (Greve et al (1971)). . The Cullingworth Committee found 
that divorced and separated women and immigrants were unjustly 
disadvantaged in their attempts to obtain public housing by local 
authorities' methods of selection, assessment and grading of 
applicants (Cullingworth, 1973). The residence eligibility rule was 
impossible for any newcomers to fulfill. Afro-Carribean and Asian 
immigrants were especially disadvantaged. They had been actively 
recruited from overseas to satisfy the economy's need for cheap 
labour yet the government neither made nor encouraged housing 
provision for them. To qualify for a place on the local authority 
waiting list they had to satisfy a residence requirement between 6 
months to five years. (Similar discriminatory policies had been 
employed for the provision of building society loans (Rex and Moore, 
1967). ) In some parts of the country the residence requirement was 
so severely interpretted that Shelter was led to conclude that merely 
having a previous address was sufficient grounds for some local 
authorities to refuse assistance (Bailey & Ruddock, 1972). Other 
eligibility rules could include a rag-bag of excuses for 
discrimination against Asians or Afro-Carribeans, large families, 
cohabitees, ex-slum dwellers, ex-lodgers, furnished tenants, and so 
on. These were backed up by the policies used for the allocation of 
permanent accomodation by assessment techniques which aimed to find 
the most 'appropriate' dwelling for an applicant but could result in 
the creation of public housing ghettoes/dumping grounds. If an 
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applicant refused an offer of housing an authority might argue that 
its responsibility had been discharged. 
The true extent of the homelessness problem in the early 1970s will 
probably never be known as the government statistics measured only 
those actually given temporary accomodation. A very large number of 
the homeless were unsuccessful in their applications for emergency 
assistance. In 1969, only 2,569 were admitted into local authority 
hostels out of 8,913 applicants. In 1970,10,149 applications were 
made but only 2,898 were admitted (Bailey & Ruddock, 1972). 
Available research shows that a large number of homeless applications 
were made by women victims of domestic violence even though many 
would be either turned away or forced back home for a 
'reconciliation'. Greve et al found husband-wife 'disputes' accounted 
for 34% of homeless persons admissions in London in 1959 compared 
with one fifth from 1966-1970. The decline in admissions was 
attributed by the researchers to a much smaller admission rate due 
to the close scrutiny and suspicion of domestic violence cases. 
Only 24% of women victims of domestic violence applying as homeless 
persons were accomodated compared with a rate of 53% for married 
couples with children, 32% for women alone with children and 7% for 
cohabiting couples (Greve et al, 1971). Battered women were not 
considered to be 'genuine' cases for relief on the grounds that they 
stayed in temporary accomodation for such short times. 
In the survey there were accounts of wives admitted to 
temporary accomodation at their doctors' request to recover from 
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quite severe beatings; there were husbands who threw their 
dinner at the wall or the furniture out of the window; there 
was an attempted strangling and a knife fight in which the 
husband was stabbed in the stomach. This suggested the 
occasional need of a temporary refuge for families for a few 
days, but the problem was an unpopular one for official or 
police interference, and at least one authority had responded to 
the growing demand by deciding that ill-treated wives no longer 
qualified for admission. They said that the wife in almost 
every case returned home voluntarily after one or two nights in 
hostel, and therefore such women were not technically homeless 
(Glastonbury, 1971, p. 213). 
Local authority reluctance to house battered women must have had a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of the Select Committee on 
Violence in Marriage. In Greve et al's study 37% of women 
accomodated because of domestic 'disputes' stayed for only one week, 
50% for under a month. Most were said to return home again (Greve 
et al, 1971). Glastonbury found 21% of his sample in temporary 
accomodation were women victims of domestic violence and asserted 
that the majority used the hostel to enforce a domestic 'cooling off' 
period. As women victims of domestic violence were also frequently 
the subject of 'reconciliation' attempts by the local authority, or 
were given travel warrants to return home, evicted by the Housing 
Department as a matter of policy after just six weeks, kept in 
appalling conditions in ex-prisoner of war camps, shared dormitories 
which housed the local vagrant alchoholic population, or were refused 
Supplementary Benefit on the grounds that their claims of marital 
breakdown were insincere, refused separation orders by magistrates 
with the result that they lacked sufficient 'proof' of violence to 
convince housing departments a tenacy transfer would be possible, it 
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is not surprising, leaving aside the problem of a husband's 
harassment at the hostel, many had no choice other than to return 
home (see discussion above and in Chapter 2; Glastonbury, 1971; Greve 
et al, 1971). 
As previously noted, in February 1974 a Joint Circular, DOE Circular 
18/74, DHSS Circular 4/74 directed at social service and housing 
departments was issued. This aimed to encourage the transfer of 
housing stock held by social service departments for homeless 
accomodation to local authority housing departments and to 
rationalise allocation policies by identifying priority groups amongst 
the homeless. The priority groups, families with dependent children, 
those homeless through emergencies such as fire or flood, those 
vulnerable due to old age, disability, pregnancy or other special 
reason, closely resembled those later defined as being priority need 
in subsequent legislation. The Circular emphasised the importance 
of providing 'family' housing, urged that husbands, wives or children 
should not be separated unless there were very sound reasons (such 
as the need for refuge of victims of domestic violence). By 'mid 
1975 a government review found that 40% of housing authorities in 
England and Wales had not followed the advice in the Circular 
(Hansard, 8 February 1977). Despite a committment expressed in 
Parliament in February 1976 to legislate on the problem of 
homelessness, the issue became dependent upon private members' 
applications. 
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With the support of members involved in the Select Committee on 
Violence in Marriage and backing from some voluntary bodies involved 
with the homeless, Stephen Ross introduced the Housing (Homeless 
Persons) Bill to Parliament to make provision for the homeless and 
those threatened with homelessness, to give assistance to voluntary 
bodies working with the homeless and to repeal S25 of the National 
Assistance Act 1948. Clause 1 was said to offer the very first 
statutory definition of homelessness and to put 'beyond doubt ' that 
all battered women were to be treated as homeless persons (Hansard, 
8 February 1977). Like the 1974 Circular, one-primary aim of the 
Bill was to keep families together. Authorities were to have duties 
to -provide assistance to homeless persons in priority need. Priority 
need contains four specified categories: those with dependent 
children, those homeless/ threatened homeless due to fire, flood or any 
other disaster; those or any persons usually living with them 
vulnerable due to old age, mental or physical handicap/disability or 
other special reason and pregnant women. Due to the intention to 
keep families together, an individual living apart from her/his 
children/other members of the family for no reason other than a lack 
of suitable accomodation could now be defined as homeless. 
Homelessness in the Act was defined not merely-as a persons' physical 
lack of ä roof but in terms of having no accomodation which s/he is 
entitled to occupy with anyone else who normally resides with 
her/him. A battered woman's inability to return home was also 
covered by the Act. A person would be homeless if s/he had 
accomodation but could not secure entry to it (by being locked out, 
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etc), or occupation would lead to violence/threat of violence from 
someone living there who is likely to carry out the threats. Those 
living in caravans and other mobile homes unable to find a 
residential site and those threatened with homelessness in the next 
28 days were also defined as homeless. The legislation was 
intended to rationalise provision by placing responsibility for the 
homeless on district and borough councils (S19). There were 
provisions to enable the transfer of stock from social services to 
housing departments. The provision of a uniform and national 
w 
definition of situations where local authorities could shift their 
responsibility for the homeless on to other areas was also attempted 
in the local connections clauses. These were devised to make 
individuals employed in an area eligible for temporary relief even if 
they were newcomers or had family and historical connections 
elsewhere. To encourage 'good policy' interpretations of the 
provisions a Code of Guidance was issued with the bill. 
Although most M. P. s admitted a need for legislation on the matter, 
from the outset the bill encountered great hostility. W. R. Rees- 
Davies described it as a 'charter for scroungers and scrimshankers' 
(Hansard, 18 February 1977,905). George Cunningham suggested that 
women would become pregnant in order to acquire a priority need for 
accomodation and later terminate their pregnancies. Toby Jessel 
feared queue jumpers, especially 'foreigners', abusing the provisions 
and warned that 'Families can contrive to make themselves homeless by 
stirring up family quarrels' (Hansard, 18 February 1977,931). 
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This current of paranoic suspicion led to a flurry of amendments to 
the bill, the House of Lords alone providing a total of 57. The 
biggest alteration came with the local authority safety mechanism 
against abuse by way of the new intentional homelessness category. 
Conservatives fought for the inclusion of this category to halt a 
feared onslaught of undeserving queue jumpers. Basically this 
addition meant that if a homeless person had done something or 
failed to do something which resulted in his/her homelessness he/she 
would be intentionally homeless and ineligible for temporary 
accomodation. The potential for local authorities to use this 
category to deny assistance to women victims of domestic violence 
was noted at the time by Millie Miller, an Ex-Select Committee member 
(Hansard, 8 July 1977 1590-1733). 
Critics argued that the bill only became law because ' MPs believed it 
to be better than nothing: 
They believe that this rotten Bill ( .... ) is better than the 
properly drafted, properly constructed and properly conceived 
Bill that we would have if we put this one where it belongs - 
in the river - and started afresh next year with the advantage 
of the consideration given to this measure this year ( .... ) in my 
seven years in the house there is no doubt that this is the 
worst drafted, worst constructed, worst conceived and worst 
prepared Bill I have ever seen. 
(George Cunningham, Hansard, 27 July 1977). 
Despite the conclusions of homelessness research that provision was 
matched more to the availability of stock than to the level of need, 
no extra financial provisions were made to enable local authorities 
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to better accomodate the homeless. , Ross, the Bill's supporter in 
fact argued that property was standing empty and shortage was not 
the biggest problem (Hansard, 8 February 1977). The adequacy of 
this provision in improving the housing situation of women victims of 
domestic violence will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Summary. 
In summary then, the 1970s saw an increase in the numbers of women 
victims of domestic violence making applications to the law for 
relief. Homicide and assault statistics show an alarming rise in 
cases of domestic violence against women during this period. In 
comparison with previous years, forty extra 'spouses' were killed in 
1976. There is no way of telling for sure whether these extra 
deaths occured because marriages became more violent or society less 
willing to intervene to prevent them. In the 1970s the alternatives 
for women trapped in violent relationships declined due to the lack 
of private rented accomodation and the unabashed refusal of housing 
departments, social services and police to become involved. 
Publicity surrounding the problem and the growth of the refuge 
movement along with the trend in matrimonial law to facilitate the 
provision of dissolutions, injunctions and financial agreements would 
also have had some effect on the increased need for legal 
involvement (see discussion in Part II). Further research would be 
required to show whether or not the position of women victims of 
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domestic violence was qualitatively worse in the early 1970s than it 
had been in the rest of the later 20th century. The last chapter in 
this section will look at the workings of the new domestic violence 
legislation in the 1980s and the latest attempts at reform. 
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Reforms In The 1980s. 
Introduction. 
In this chapter the main trends in reform of the law in relation to 
domestic violence against women between the years 1977-1987 will be 
discussed. In contrast to the preceding phases of reform where 
statutory innovations brought most changes in these years alterations 
in policy matters and procedures had a greater impact. During the 
_y_ears 
1977----L987 the courts held an important role in interpreting 
the new 'protective' legislation. Considerable conflict arose over 
the policy issues involved when granting orders to exclude a 
spouse/partner from the matrimonial home and the provision of 
emergency housing on relationship breakdown. Criticisms of the 
adverserial nature of matrimonial cases grew into a persausive and 
powerful conciliatory movement. Domestic violence legislation and 
other measures devised to protect individuals and their children from 
further abuse were feared to have adverse effects, especially by some 
members of the conciliatory movement. Concerns were also 
expressed in the courts that unscrupulous individuals may try to 
manipulate the law in order to score tactical advantages over their 
partners in matters of housing, custody or finance. The following 
discussion will demonstrate that by the mid 1980s the courts' 
Page 171 
Reforms In The 1980s. /4. 
attention had emphasised predominantly the 'draconian' effects the 
new legislation had upon men's rights. 
Persistent references to the (unsubstantiated) need to decrimininalise 
the legal approach to cases of domestic violence against women (e. g. 
Maidment, 1978; Pizzey & Shapiro, 1982) made a stark contrast with 
feminist calls for the more adequate policing of violent men (e. g. 
Edwards, 1984; Hanmer & Saunders, 1984; Radford, 1986; Stanko, '1985). 
Feminist demands for more adequate policing, especially to treat all 
. cases of violence against women as crimes of 
'public' importance, were 
the inevitable outcome of the anger which arose from the publicity 
attached to . the killings of women such as Balwant Kaur, stabbed by 
her husband in 1984 at the door of a refuge. 
Legislation at last settled years of dispute over whether or not a 
wife should/could be compelled to give evidence against a violent 
husband. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act made wives 
compellable witnesses against their husbands in cases of violent 
assault. The legislation however had little effect upon the 
prosecution rate for criminal assualts in the 'domestic' context as 
police discretion over viable cases and 'serious' assaults was left 
unreined. The criminal law saw a number of other policy and 
procedural innovations still in their infancy. These are refered to 
briefly in the final section of this chapter althoughtno conclusions 
as yet can be drawn as to their impact upon the police involvement. 
At the time of writing initiatives for the future seem likely to turn 
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back towards an emphasis upon the remedies offered by the criminal 
law. 
The De-Legalisation Of Divorce & Growing Emphasis Upon Behaviour. 
Special procedure had been introduced in 1973 and extended in 1977 
to cover all undefended cases. To obtain a dissolution by special 
procedure a petitioner had to file an affidavit to be examined by the 
registrar. A certificate would be produced to be read in court 
where the divorce would be announced. By 1978 97% of all divorces 
were granted by special procedure. This had grown to 98% by 1980. 
The examination of facts in special procedure petitions is 
considerably less stringent in comparison to a heard case. This 
worked to further remove the emphasis upon active behaviour and 
objectivity in unreasonable behaviour petitions. , Although special 
procedure was intended to offer an easier and less traumatic method 
of granting divorces, it was also a cost cutting measure. Legal aid 
was- removed from undefended cases at the same time, but no savings 
to the Legal Aid Fund resulted. Even though by 1986,20% of divorce 
petitions were brought by personal application rather than through a 
solicitor (Judicial Statistics, 1986), solicitors' involvement- and 
applications to the Legal Aid Fund continued to increase because of 
their work in the allied matters of. financial provision, housing and 
custody. 
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In 1980, the Law Commission published a Working Paper which 
criticised the three year bar to divorce claiming that it worked to 
merely postpone dissolutions thereby causing unnecessary hardship. 
Since 1977 the numbers of judicial separations had risen from 211 to 
3,650 in 1979 and there had been a corresponding drop in magistrates' 
matrimonial orders. The increase in judicial separations is said to 
have been largely a consequence of the three year bar to divorce and 
applicants needs for settlements without the magistrates' emphasis 
upon fault based conditions (see Bromley, 1981; Hoggett & Pearl, 1983; 
Maidment, 1982. ). The only way to get a divorce in the first three 
years of marriage involved proving 'exceptional hardship' as a result 
of the spouse's 'exceptional depravity'. This ground was seldom 
applied for or argued successfully (see -C vC (1979)). With some 
reservation, mainly based on a fear that marriages of convenience may 
increase --especially among immigramts (see Law Commission, 1980, 
p. 181), the Law Commission recomended a reduction in the three year 
bar to a one year bar to divorce. 
The Family Law Sub-Committee of the Law Society urged further 
reforms to finally abolish the relics of the matrimonial offence 
system (see Family Law Sub-Committee, 1979). The Booth Committee, 
set up in 1983 to investigate possible reforms of matrimonial 
procedure wanted to cut out the need to furnish respondents in 
divorce cases with. particulars of behaviour unless this should be 
requested by them specifically, and to abolish the requirement that 
an adulterer's name be included in a petition (Booth Committee, 1985). 
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Some suggested taking' the trend to its logical conclusion by 
abolishing the judicial aspect of divorce altogether, recognising it 
as merely an administrative matter. This movement towards 'private 
bargaining' would restrict the courts' job to adjudicating matters of 
finance and child care provisions (Burgoyne, Ormrod & Richards, 1987; 
Mnookin, 1979). 
Statistics on petitions filed and granted show that 'private 
bargaining', whatever its merits, would increasingly have concerned 
the issue of unreasonable behaviour. Table 17 shows the grounds 
for divorce petitions filed in England and Wales between 1976 and 
1986. Petitions based upon the unreasonable behaviour of a partner 
continued to increase so that by 1986 they comprised 46% of all 
petitions. The growth in behaviour petitions was accompanied by a 
decline in petitions alleging desertion and separation. As wives' 
share of the total number of divorce petitions had a more modest 
increase from 707. of the total petitions filed in 1976 to 72-73% by 
the later 1980s, unlike the previous decade (see Chapter 3), their 
increased share of the total would not account for the growth in 
petitions on behaviour grounds. The . 1980s therefore brought an 
increased tendency of petitioners to base their complaints on the 
unreasonable behaviour of their partners. 
Table 18 shows the petitions filed on the basis of the specific facts 
alleged by husbands and wives. This shows that both-husbands and 
wives substantially increased their complaints of their partners' 
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behaviour in petitions for divorce. The percentage share of wives 
petitions alleging unreasonable behaviour increased from 45% of wives 
petitions in 1976 to 55% in 1986. 
TABLE 17 : Facts Cited In Divorce Petitions Filed In England & Wales, 
1976-1986, Percentages. 
FACTS 1976 1977 
Behaviour 34% 39% 
Adultery 29% 28% 
Desertion 4% 4% 
Separation 34% 30% 
Other 0.8% 0.3% 
By husbands30% 27% 
By wives 70% 73% 
Totals 143698 
16707 
1978 
35% 
27% 
3% 
34% 
1% 
29% 
71% 
162 
4 
1979 
37% 
27% 
3% 
32% 
1% 
28% 
72% 
L50 
16281 
1980 1981 
38% 39% 
28% 28% 
3% 2% 
30% 30% 
0.8% 0.6% 
29% 27% 
71% 73% 
170882 
57 16907 
1982# 
42% 
28% 
2% 
28% 
0.5% 
27% 
73% 
17345 
6 
1983# 1984# 1985# 
42% 32% 43% 
29% 26% 29% 
1.5% 1.5% 4% 
29% 29% 25% 
0.1% 0.02% 0.05% 
27% 28% 27% 
73% 72% 73% 
2 178940 190481 
168428 
1986# 
46% 
29% 
1.5% 
24% 
0.07% 
28% 
72% 
179884 
NB. Multiple grounds are included so columns do not add up to 100%. 
*= %ages calculated from estimated figures based on two month court surveys. 
#= %ages calculated from estimated figures based-on two month court surveys and 
rounded up to ten. 
Sources : Judicial Statistics 1976,1977,1978,1979,1980,1981,1982,1983,1984, 
1985,1986. 
This increase in behaviour allegations was accompanied by a decline 
in allegations of adultery or separation in wives petitions. 
Husbands' petitionq on the basis of the unreasonable behaviour of 
their wives showed a very dramatic increase from 11% of husbands 
petitions relying on this fact in 1976 to 22% in 1986. For husbands 
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the shift towards behaviour petitions started around 1980. Husbands 
petitions based upon a period of separation saw a corresponding 
decline from 1980 onwards whilst petitions alleging their wives 
adultery increased from 39% in 1979 to 43% in 1986. For husbands 
therefore the trend away from petitions on the basis of a period of 
separation to those relying upon allegations of behaviour or adultery 
was a more radical and more recent trend than for wives (see 
Chapters 2 and 3). 
The pattern of decrees granted shown in Table 19 indicates that 
although more behaviour petitions succeeded to the award of decrees, 
the growth in the proportion of decrees granted on this basis was 
much smaller than the increased tendency of husbands and wives to 
file on this basis. Behaviour petitions were also the least likely 
of all petitions to proceed to the granting of a decree. 
1985 saw an increase in the numbers of petitions filed and granted 
due to the implementation of the Matrimonial And Family Proceedings 
Act 1984 which allowed parties to initiate divorce proceedings after 
just one year of marriage. There was a 6% increase in petitions 
granted for divorce in 1985 followed by a 6% drop in 1986. This 
bulge in divorce cases was accompanied by a decline in judicial 
separation and nullity petitions. 
As with previous divorce reforms (see Chapters 2 and 3) the reform 
brought in with the 1984 Act provided more immediate relief for men. 
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TABLE 18 : 
fi 
Percentage Of Divorce Petitions Filed Alleging Certain Facts, 
Total, Wives & Husbands, 1976-1986, England & Wales. 
r`1 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
FACTS T W H T W H T W H T W H 
Behaviour 34% 45% 11% 28% 49% 13% 35% 46% 11% 37% 48% 14% 
Adultery 29% 25% 40% 28% 24% 39% 27% 23% 39% 27% 24% 39% 
Desertion 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 
Separation 34% 29% 47% 31% 25% 45% 34% 29% 47% 32% 27% 47% 
Total 100% 71% 29% 100% 73% 27% 100% 71% 29% 100% 72% 28% 
1980 1981 1982 1983 
FACTS T W H T W H T W H T W H 
Behaviour 38% 48% 14% 39% 49% 15% 42% 51% 17% 42% 51% 18% 
Adultery 28% 24% 40% 28% 24% 41% 28% 23% 42% 29% 24% 41% 
Desertion 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1.5% 1% 2% 
Separation 30% 26% 43% 30% 25% 41% 28% 24% 40% 29% 25% 40% 
Total 100% 71% 29% 100% -73% 27% 100% 73% 27% 100% 73% 27% 
-1984 1985 1986 
FACTS T W H T- W H T W H 
Behaviour 32% 51% 18% 43% 52% 21% 46% 55% 22% 
Adultery 26% 24% 43% 29% 24% 42% 29% 24% 43% 
Desertion 1.5% 1.5% 2% 4% 5% 3% 1.5% 1% 2% 
Separation 29% 24% 38% 25% 21% 34% 24% 20% 33% 
Total 100% 72% 28% 100% 73% 27% 100% 72% 28% 
Sources : Calculated from raw data in judicial Statistics, 1976,1977,1978,1979,1980, 
1981,1982,1983,1984,1985,1986. 
Following the introduction of the Matrimonial and Family. Proceedings 
Act 1984 the proportion of men's petitions granted increased whilst 
the proportion of women's petitions decreased. By 1986 20% of men's 
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TABLE 19 : Percentages Of Divorce Petitions Granted On The Basis'Of Certain 
Facts, Total, Wives & Husbands 1976-1986, England & Wales. 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
FACTS TWHTWHTWHTWH 
Behaviour 30% 40% 8.5% 31% 41% 9% 32% 41% 10% 33% 42% 11% 
Adultery 30% 26% 41% 29% 25% 39% 28% 24% 39% 29% 28% 40% 
Desertion 5% 5% 4% 4% 4H 3% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Separation 35% 30% 47% 36% 31% 48% 36% 32% 48% 35% 30% 46% 
Total % 100% 70% 30% 100% 70% 30% 100% 70% 30% 100% 70% 30% 
Totals 130616 39731 94851 151533 45835 97425 
90885 136086 41235 105698 139503 42078 
1980 
FACTS TW 
Behaviour 33% 42% 
Adultery 30% 25% 
Desertion 3% 3% 
-Separation 34% 30% 
-Total % 100% 70% 
Totals 150385 
1052! 
H 
12% 
40% 
3% 
45% 
30% 
45086 
39 
T 
35% 
30% 
2% 
33% 
100% 
1472; 
1981 
WH 
44% 12% 
25% 43% 
2% 2% 
28% 43% 
70% 30% 
104532 
26 42694 
T 
37% 
30% 
2% 
30% 
100% 
15491 
1982 
W 
47% 
25% 
2% 
26% 
72% 
33 
1069 
H 
14% 
43% 
2% 
41% 
28% 
48015 
48 
T 
38% 
30% 
2% 
30% 
100% 
14911 
1983 
W 
47% 
25% 
2% 
26% 
72% 
10811 
30 
H 
15% 
42% 
2% 
41% 
28% 
00 
41090 
1984 1985 1986 
FACTS TWHTWHTWH 
Behaviour 40% 48% 18% 40% 48% 18% 42% 51% 20% 
Adultery 30% 25% 42% 30% 25% 45% 30% 25% 43% 
Desertion 2% 2% 2% 4% 5% 3% 2% 2% 2% 
Separation 29% 25% 39% 26% 22% 34% 29% 22% 46% 
al % 100% 71% 29% 100% 72% 28% 100% 71% 29% Wals 
147140 42400 116570 152100 43610 
104740 161400 44830 108470 
NB. 4 = estimates on basis of two month courts survey, # estimates on basis of two 
month courts survey rounded up to ten. 
Sources : Judicial Statistics, 1976,1977,1978,1979,1980,1981,1982,1983,1984, 
1985,1986. 
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petitions were granted on the basis of allegations of the 
unreasonable behaviour of their wives c. f. 51% of wives' decrees 
granted on this basis that year. The biggest increase in men's 
petitions alleging the adultery of their wives occured following the 
introduction of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act of 1984. 
Later discussion in the chapter will show that the Act's provisions 
encouraged men's allegations on the basis of their wives' conduct. 
Between 1976 and 1983 however men's allegations of unreasonable 
behaviour increased from 8.5% to 15% of their petitions and wives' 
from 40% to 47%. Af ter 1985 the growth in men's petitions on this 
basis was very rapid, from 15% in 1983 -to 20% in 1986 compared with 
47% in 1983 for wives to 51% in 1986. Although therefore the 
Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 had some affect on the 
increase in behaviour petitions there must have been other factors at 
work in addition. 
In Chapter 3 the increase in behaviour petitions 1963-1975 was 
discussed. It was noted that changes in the proportion of petitions 
alleging certain facts are the likely result of a number of different 
factors such as a. shifts in filing behaviour from one fact/ground to 
another; b. changes in the proportions of male and female petitioners; 
c. an easening of the required particulars and standards of proof for 
petitioners on that basis; d. a net increase of violence/unreasonable 
behaviour in society or/and a greater willingness to use the law for 
relief. Table shows an overall shift from petitions based upon 
separation, desertion and other facts towards petitions which were 
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based upon claims of unreasonable behaviour. The share of petitions 
which alleged unreasonable behaviour increased by 12% 1976-1986 
(from 34% to 46%) whilst petitions which alleged desertion, 
separation or other grounds declined by a total of approximately 
12.5% (from 4% to 1.5% for desertion petitions, from 34% to 24% for 
separation petitions and 0.8% to 0.07% . 
for petitions brought on other 
grounds). Leaving aside for a while the question of an increasingly 
violent society/growth of spousal violence, a shift towards behaviour 
based petitions could suggest a growing reluctance/inability of 
individuals to wait the necessary time or effect the marital division 
required to base a petition on the facts of separation or desertion. 
Academic-wisdom at present holds that petitions alleging unreasonable 
behaviour have increased because they offer a speedy route to 
divorce without the need to involve another person to cite as an 
adulterer (Burgoyne, Ormrod & Richards, 1987). If this were totally 
the case though one might reasonably expect an increase in petitions 
on this ground after the reduction of the divorce bar to one year. 
Men's petitions based upon unreasonable behaviour of their wives 
effectively doubled in the decade from 11% in 1976 to 22% in 1986. 
Men's petitions which alleged adultery by their wives increased more 
slowly from 40% in 1976 to 43% of total in 1986. Petitions based 
upon desertion and separation declined by a total of 15%, men's 
desertion petitions falling from 3% to 2%, separation petitions 
falling from 47% 1976 to 33% 1986. - 
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Women's petitions alleging the unreasonable behaviour of their 
husbands increased by 10% between 1976 to 1986 (from 45% to 55%), 
with all the other allegations declining by 12% (adultery petitions 
from 25% to 24%, desertion petitions from 4% to 1%, separation 
petitions from 29% to 20%). ' Both husbands and wives might 
therefore have been equally prone to opt for 'speedy' dissolutions by 
basing their petitions upon behaviour grounds. 
Point b. has already been considered and does little to explain the 
increase in petitions alleging behaviour between 1976 to 1986. The 
introduction of divorce by special procedure might offer some support 
for point c., i. e. the lesser standard of proof required for 
allegations to succeed (see Freeman, 1976). Ormrod, Burgoyne & 
Richards (1987) stress the relationship between social class and 
allegations of unreasonable behaviour and adultery. Although 
domestic violence and unreasonable behaviour are by no means class 
specific (Dobash & Dobash, 1980) the ability of those with scarce 
resources to bring petitions on separation or other grounds would be 
limited by economic factors such as the lack of alternative 
accomodation. Couples with young dependent children have been found 
to be the most likely group to base petitions upon allegations of 
behaviour, men in this group more frequently alleging the adultery of 
their wives (Ormrod, Burgoyne & Richards, 1987). Later in this 
chapter, discussion. of housing policy may shed further light on the 
increase in behaviour petitions particularly since 1980. . 
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Family lawyers have noted that there are considerable regional 
variations in petitioning behaviour (Eekelaar, 1984). It is unlikely 
that these variations result because Northern marriages are more 
unreasonable than those in the South. Many other factors will 
affect petitioning behaviour, e. g. local court and solicitor policies, 
local authority policies, economic factors etc. Research into 
regional trends in behaviour petitions, although regretably limited by 
the lack of statistical documents and refusal of access to cases 
held, did cast some light on national trends. Tables 20 and 21 show 
the proportion of petitions alleging certain facts in Court A for a7 
year period and Courts B and C for the years 1984 and 1985 (before 
and during the recent divorce 'bulge'). The Lord Chancellor's 
Department in 1985 was advising court staff that it was only 
necessary to store their individual statistical returns relating to 
the previous two years, so that as the next year's batch were 
produced those for three years ago were shredded. The Lord 
Chancellor's Department, working with computerised data, would follow 
a similar policy with live and dormant data so that access to data 
for earlier periods would have involved turning dormant data, stored 
in compressed forms on data storage discs, back into a workable form. 
This would have involved access to computing facilities of comparable 
power to that of the Lord Chancellor's - Department. The effort 
involved would obviously have been unjustified. The discovery of 
statistics for a seven year period for Court A was mostly a matter 
of luck. Most courts are unable to store more paperwork than is 
absolutely necessary but statistical returns for the whole seven year 
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period were discovered by chance in a drawer by the Court Clerk in 
Court A. 
Tables 20 and 21 show that there are considerable variations in the 
filing and granting of petitions based upon allegations of 
unreasonable behaviour. Court A, an urban area within the Northern 
Court Circuit, suffering considerable economic deprivation, showed the 
highest rate for filing and granting petitions on this basis, in 1985 
having 56% of all petitions alleging unreasonable behaviour (63% of 
wives and 34% of husbands) and granting 47% divorce decrees on proof 
of this fact (56% wives' decrees and 21% husbands' decrees). Court 
B, a wealthy town in a rural area of the South Eastern Circuit, and 
Court C, an industrial growth area in the South Eastern Circuit, had 
proportions of petitions filed and granted on behaviour facts lower 
than the national rates for 1984 and 1985. 
Table 20 shows that Court A had a similar pattern of change to that 
seen in the national trends, although the increase in husband's 
allegations of unreasonable behaviour were much greater than the 
national trend increasing from 6% of husbands decrees in 1979 to 21% 
in 1986 cf. 8,5% all decrees granted on behaviour basis England and 
Wales 1976 to 18% in 1985. Court A saw also a marked increase in 
husband's petitions based upon adultery and decline in those relying 
on separation facts. In all courts husbands' petitions on the basis 
of unreasonable behaviour were more likely to proceed to full divorce 
status. Women's behaviour petitions, were the least likely to 
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continue to this status in Court A. 
'BLE 20 : Facts. Alleged In Divorce Petitions Filed By & Granted To Husbands 
And Wives At Court A For Two Months Each Year 1979-1985, Percentages. 
FACTS 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Total H W Total H W Total H W Total H W 
Behaviour (34%) (14%) (41%) (48%) (10%) (61%) (37%) (10%) (26%) (40%) (17%) (50%) 
26% 6% 35%- 35% 16% 41% 39% 14%- --49% 39% 13% 49% Adultery (30%) (32%) (28%) (20%) (37%) (15%) (29%) (41%) (26%) (27%) (40%) (22%) 
30% 30% 30% 31% 39% 29% 32% 49% 30% 35% 52% 24% 
Desertion (2%) (4%) (1%) (2%) (1%) (2%) (4%) (2%) (4%) (1%) - (2%) 
6% 12% 3% 3% 1% 3% 2% 1% 2% 3% 2% 4% 
Separation (35x) (50%) (29%) (29%) (49%) (22%) (32'%) (48%) (28%) (31%) (44%) (26%) 
40% 
. 
53% __32% 32% 43% 28% _27% 48% 
20% 26% 33% 24% 
Total % (100%) (26%) (74%)(100%) (25%) (75%) (100%) (22%) (78%) (100%) (29%) (71%) 
100% 31% 69% 100% 25% 75% 100% 27% 73% 100% 28% 72% 
Total (212) (56) (156) (287) (71) (216) (281) (61) (220) (294) (84) (210) 
108 34 74 268 67 201 295 80 215 327 93 234 
FACTS 1983 1984 1985 
Total H W Total H W Total H W 
Behaviour (38%) (11%) (49%) (44%) (16%) (53%) (56%) (34%) (63%) 
35% 17% 29% 39% 20% 48% 47% 21% 56% 
Adultery (36%) (45%) (32%) (30%) (39%) (27%) (24%) (40%) (18%) 
29% 31% 28% 32% 44% 26% 29% 46% 22% 
Desertion (2%) (4%) (1%) (2%) (2%) (2%) (1%) (1%) (1%) 
3% 2% 3% 1% 1% 1% 2% 5% 1% 
Separation (25%) <49%) (23%) (25%) (44%) (19%) (18%) (44%) (16%) 
34% 51% 29% 29% 34% 26% 22% 28% 20% 
Total'% (100%) (27%) (73%)(100%) (25%) (75%)(100%) (27%) (73%) 
100% 23%% 77% 100% 33% 67% 100% 27% 73 
al (310) (85) (225) ( 251) (64) (187) (369) (98) (271) 
280 65 215 224 73 151 293 78 215 
NB. Bracketed figures = petitions filed, figures without brackets = decrees granted. 
In Part II women's experiences of individual court and solicitors' 
policies will be discussed. In the absence of research into cases 
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held in the courts, it is not possible to conclude whether there were 
similarities or qualitative differences between men's and women's 
behaviour petitions. 
C- 
4-TABLE 21 : Facts Alleged In Divorce Petitions Filed By, & Granted To Husbands 
And Wives At Courts B&C For Two Months In Each Year 
1984-1985, Percentages. 
FACTS 1984E 
Total H 
Behaviour (26%) (10%) 
371 26% 
Adultery (35%) (37%) 
23% 34% 
Desertion -- 
Separation(40%) (53%) 
36% 40% 
Total % (100%) (32%) 
100% 21% 
Total (246) (78) 
163 35 
W Total 
(33%) (37%) 
41% 31% 
(33%) (28%) 
24% 34% 
- (3%) 
- 2% 
(34%) (32%) 
35% 33% 
(68%) (100%) 
79% 100% 
(168) (185) 
128 114 
1984C 
H 
(12%) 
8% 
(33%) 
49% 
(4%) 
3% 
(51%) 
35% 
(26%) 
68% 
(49) 
37 
1985B 
W Total H 
(46%) (34%) (8%) 
42% 31% 39% 
(26%) (38%) (46%) 
27% 30% 47% 
(2%) (0.4%) - 
1% 0.4% - 
(26%) (28%) (45%) 
30% 39% 41% 
(74%) (100%) (30%) 
32% 100% 30% 
(136) (239) (71) 
77 217 64 
W Total 
(34%) (44%) 
13% 36% 
(34%) (26%) 
23% 32% 
(0.6%) (1%) 
0.6% 5% 
(21%) (28%) 
38% 27% 
(70%) (100%) 
70% 100% 
(168) (171) 
153 199 
1985C 
HW 
(17%) (54%) 
16% 46% 
(46%) (20%) 
43% 26% 
- (2%) 
6% 5% 
(37%) (25%) 
34% 23% 
(27%) (73%) 
34% 66% 
(46) (125) 
67 132 
NB. Bracketed figures = petitions filed, figures without brackets = decrees granted. 
Part ' II will examine gendered aspects of the legal approach to men's 
and women's allegations of unnacceptable behaviour and the 
relationship between statements in petitions and women's experiences 
of violence in a marriage. Later discussion will also demonstrate 
that legal concerns with 'sex equality' had a significant impact upon 
case law approach to matters of behaviour, conduct and violence. 
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When coupled with housing policy and economic decline, especially 
in inner cities, these encouraged the increased tendency of men 
and women to allege unreasonable behaviour. 
Magistrates Courts. 
Reform of the fault based grounds for relief in the magistrates' 
courts was recommended in 1976 by the Law Commission (Law 
Commission 1976; and see Chapter 3). The ground of persistent 
cruelty was replaced by an 'unreasonable behaviour' standard and 
bars to relief abolished. The reform was a little late in the 
day to remedy the problems caused by over 90 years of double 
standard provision. By 1978 magistrates were dealing with only 
6% of- matrimonial cases in England & Wales (Gibson, 1982). 
Their main work was enforcing maintenance orders which wives had 
obtained in the divorce court, rather than in issueing their own 
orders., 
The ' Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act* -1978, 
implemented on the Ist February 1981, abolished the summary 
powers to grant separation orders and gave magistrates instead 
similar more limited powers to the county courts to issue 
personal protection and exclusion orders on behalf of wives. 
Injunctions under the Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) 
Act were relatively simple to obtain and the approach less formal 
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than in the County Court. But, personal protection orders only 
dealt with the use, threat or incitement of violence not with the 
'pesterings'included in the County Courts' powers to stop 
'molestation'. Applicants had to prove actual bodily harm, or 
its threat, had already occured to qualify for protection. 
Threats of violence were not sufficient cause for action. The 
Law Commission recommended mental cruelty be excluded from the 
concern of the summary courts due to the belief that magistrates 
would not be competent to assess the expert evidence of 
psychiatrists or doctors. There was no guarantee magistrates 
would abandon the old notions of 'fault' by interpreting matters 
of unreasonable behaviour consistently with the divorce court. 
In Bergin v Bergin (1983), a higher court had to overrule the 
magistrates' decision to refuse an order to a woman who had 
suffered a number of violent attacks (resulting in severe 
bruising and black eyes) on the grounds that she had no call to 
leave home. The magistrates had argued that because Mrs Bergin 
had 'put up with' her husband's violence on previous occasions, 
her claims that she was presently in fear of him were not true. 
In Vasey v Vasey (1984), the woman was refused financial 
provision by the magistrates on the ground that, as she had 
deserted her husband, her conduct negated any claim to relief. 
Magistrates could exclude a violent partner from the home, order 
him to leave, prohibit him from entering it and require him to 
allow the wife to enter and remain in residence. But to do 
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this, certain conditions had to be fulfilled first. The court 
had to be satisfied that a. the appellant and/or the children 
were in danger of physical injury and b. the respondent had 
already used violence to the appellant and/or the children, had 
threatened it and used it against another person or had 
threatened it in contravention of a previous order made (see 
S16(3) and S16(4)). The danger to the woman and/or the children 
had to be 'real' inasmuch. that fear, was held to be insufficient 
grounds for the order (see McCartney v McCartney (1981)). There 
was-no power to allow the wife re-entry without exclusion. 
For cases of imminent danger a single justice. (rather than the 
usual three required) could make an expedited order (forbidding 
the use of violence, not excluding the culprit) which could last 
for 28 days at which date another order might need to be made. 
Expedited orders were very much slower than the_ emergency 
procedures- in the County Court -and there were no special 
procedures available to cover holidays. 
The arrest powers were also more limited than the County Court 
powers. Again, magistrates could only attach powers of arrest 
if they were satisfied the spouse had already injured the other 
spouse/children and was likely to do so again. Justices were 
obliged to state why they considered powers of arrest were 
necessary (see Widdowson v. Widdowson (1982)). If no powers of 
arrest were attached the appellant had to apply for a warrant to 
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arrest the partner who could then be fined for up to £1,000 or 
imprisoned. Two months was the maximum period of imprisonment 
which could be imposed for breaching an injunction under S63(3) 
of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980. - This directive was 
confirmed in Priest v Priest in 1981 where-the Court of Appeal 
ordered the immediate release of a man after repeated periods of, 
imprisonment for contempt of an injunction. For contempt, where 
an injunction without powers of arrest was breached, magistrates 
could only committ the culprit for one month's imprisonment (Head 
v Head (1983)). Whilst the County Courts were similarly limited 
to a maximum one month's sentence for contempt (Peart v Stewart 
(1983)), they were able to impose consecutive (and suspended) 
sentences for contempt (Lee v Walker (1985)). 
The lesser protection provided by this Act perpetuated the 
tradition of second class remedies from magistrates courts. To 
make things worse, the problem of police inaction which hindered 
the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act's 
provisions was soon plaguing magistrates' provisions. The 
service of injunction papers on the other spouse had to be 
executed prior to the hearing of the case and this was the 
specific responsibilty of the police. McCann's research into 
magistrates' personal protection and exclusion orders in three 
courts in Northern England revealed 14% of applicants had cases 
adjourned to a later date because the police had not yet served 
the papers on the spouse. Expedited orders had to be made as a 
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last resort for cases where papers were continually left unserved 
(McCann, 1983). 
Most applications for Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates Courts) 
Act injunctions are made on summons. McCann found 77% of 
applications made by summons (McCann, 1983; see also McCann, 
1985) and this is supported by the Home Office figures which show 
expedited orders to comprise 33% (2,940) of applications in 
England and Wales in 1982,32% (2,560) in 1983,30% (2,680) in 
1984 and 34% (2,350) in 1985 (see Home Office Statistical 
Bulletins, 1984,1985,1986. ). About two thirds of the women 
who applied for injunctions in magistrates courts therefore had 
to wait for about two weeks for a hearing. Two weeks is a long 
time to have to avoid further assault or harassment from a 
husband bearing a grudge over the proceedings. 
This delay in obtaining a decision must have had considerable 
affect on the withdrawal rate of applications, Expedited orders 
had a much lower refusal and withdrawal rate than orders for 
injunction by summons, 7% expedited orders being refused or 
withdrawn 1983 cf 53%, of applications by summons being refused or 
withdrawn, 6% of expedited refused/withdrawn 1984 cf 52% 
applications by summons and 9% of expedited refused/withdrawn 
1985 cf 49% applications by summons (Home Office Statistical 
Bulletins 1984,1985,1986. ). Table 24 below shows furthermore 
that applications for injunction in the magistrates courts were 
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much more likely to be refused or withdrawn than were the 
speedier Domestic Violence Act injunctions. 
Table 24 also shows that, as suggested by the principles embodied 
in the legislation, powers of arrest are harder to get for 
magistrates' injunctions and the actual arrests made very small 
in number, only 2% of spouses arrested for breach of injunctions 
in 1984 and 1985. About half the injunctions granted in England 
and Wales are orders for non-molestation without powers of arrest 
attached. In 1985,47% (9,202) of orders under the Domestic 
Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 were for non- 
molestation only and 50% (2,254) of injunctions under the 
Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates Courts) Act 1978 were-for non- 
molestation only (see Judicial Statistics 1985; Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin, 1986). 
At first the Domestic Proceeedings (Magistrates Courts) Act 1978 
seemed to have had the desired effect of increasing the workload 
of the magistrates courts (see Table 22). But by 1985, 
enthusiasm over the 'expansionist' trend had started to decline, 
all applications apart from affiliation and attachment to 
earnings showing a real drop in numbers (see Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin, 1986). In some respects the expansionist 
trend may have been much more modest than at first appeared. 
Changes in the collection of statistical information from the 
magistrates courts introduced in 1982 affect comparative figures. 
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The substantial increase in maintenance applications from 7194 
in 1978 to 27330 in 1983 has been held to be the result of 
incomplete information prior to the new system of collection (see 
Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 1986). Figures collected 
under the new system were also overinflated by the fact that all 
applications relating to family protection under the Domestic 
Proceedings (Magistrates Courts) Act 1978 were counted as 
injunctions. Serious discrepancies in the totals and lack of 
continuity from year to year necessitated contacting Home Office 
statisticians for clarification. 
TABLE 22 : Applications To Magistrates 1976-78, 
England & Wales. 
1982-85, 
YEAR -Other Matrimonial* Family protection Maintenance 
-1.976 26143 N/A 9705 
1977 27701 N/A 8782 
1978 25928 N/A 7194 
1982 52640 (58%) 8920 (10%) 28570 (32%) 
1983 46360 (57%) 7950 (10%) 27330 (33%) 
1984 46190 (57%) 8720 (11%) 26040 (32%) 
1985 43360 (59%) 6960 (10%) 22350 (31%) 
Sources : Judicial Statistics, 1978; Home Office Statistical 
Bulletins, 1984,1985,1986. 
4 Other matrimonial includes custody, access, guardianship, 
affiliation, permission to marry and registrationof orders made 
by High Court, County Court, Court in Scotland or Northern 
Ireland and court outside the UK. 
It appears that there was some double counting in the first two 
statistical bulletins so that where an application for personal 
protection or exclusion included a request for the attachment of 
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powers of arrest, this would be counted as two injunctions. The 
figures in Table 22 have been adjusted to conform with the 
present accuracy level of the Home Office. 
Statistical changes had an impact on the recording of the use 
made of bind over powers. From 1980 onwards Criminal Statistics 
does not include records of these in cases of non-indictable 
assault. The latest available statistics for the years 1976, 
1978 and 1979 show a big decline in the number of common assault 
cases brought and subsequently dealt with by way of bind over 
orders. 1976 had 491 bind over orders issued for 3,052 common 
assaults committed by males, 1978 had 578 for 3458 common 
assaults committed by males and 1979 had 464 for 2744 common 
assaults committed by males (Criminal Statistics, 1976, pp. 106- 
107; Criminal Statistics, 1978, pp. 200-201; Criminal Statistics, 
1979, pp. 212-213). 
Not long after the implementation of the Domestic Proceedings 
(Magistrates Courts) Act 1978 the policy of compelling applicants 
to use the summary court proceedings for injunctions was ascribed 
to the Legal Aid authorities (see Bean, 1982). The Legal Aid 
Act 1979 expanded the Green Form scheme of granting legal aid 
from £25 to £40 and allowed legal assistance to be extended from 
advice to representation in court. The main areas dealt with 
under the Green-Form scheme since 1979 have been family matters 
in the magistrates courts (see Legal Action, 1983). As *the 
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discussion in the next section will show, although steps may have 
been taken to force applicants to' use summary provisions in the 
first instance, the provisions in the county, and divorce courts 
still offered broader and more permanent relief. 
Injunctions, 'Protective' Legislation And The Courts. 
In Grenfell v Grenfell (1978) Ormrod LJ reminded the court that 
divorce was only possible on the ground of. irretrieveable 
breakdown. The term 'unreasonable behaviour' was said to be a 
'misnomer' in that it was not the behaviour as such which was 
unreasonable but its effects upon the other spouse. This 
concern with the effects of violent behaviour upon women was all 
too often absent when making decisions about the domestic 
violence legislation. 
Since 1983, injunctions under the Domestic' Violence and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act have been the most important form of 
matrimonial injunction. Table 23 shows that injunctions under 
the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act almost 
doubled between the years 1983 to 1986, whilst other injunctions 
and those granted under the Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates' 
Courts) Act declined. In proportion to behaviour petitions 
filed, injunctions ancilliary to divorce had an uneven pattern of 
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TABLE 23: Injunctions & Property Orders Granted England & 
Wales, 1977-1986. 
Year S17 MWPA MHA Matrimonial DVMPA DPMCA 
(1,993) (3,072) 
1977 409 64 13,319 2,853* - 
(1,850) (7,826) 
1978 459 62 13,167 7,310 - 
(1,942) (8,525) 
1979 271 65 14,016 8,086 - 
(1,171) (8,373) 
1980 292 72 16,275 8,073 - 
(7,601) 
1981 - - 17,409 7,300 
(9,790) 
1982 - - 26,428 9,573 11,200 
(12,825) 
1983 602 1,079 15,051 12,458 7,950 
(16,536) 
1984 323 1,898 12,097 16,156 8,720' 
(183) (1,602) (20,066) 
1985 172 1,342 - 19,555 6,960 
(267) (1,405) (23,510) 
1986 375 1,193 3,869 23,049 - 
4= figures for June-December 1 977 only. 
Sources: Judicial Stat istics, 1977,1978,1 979,1980,1981, 1982,1983, 
1984, 1985,1986; Nome Office Statistical Bulletin, 1984,1985, 
1986. 
growth and decline du ring the years 1977-1986. In 1977, the figure 
for injunctions ancilliary to matrimonial proceedings was 21% of the 
figure for petitions filed on the basis of unreasonable behaviour. 
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By 1981, this figure had grown to 26%. For 1982 it saw a huge 
growth to 37%. 1983 brought a decline to 22010 and by 1986 a sharp 
fall to just 5%. 1986 shows a marked shift from injunctions 
ancilliary to matrimonial proceedings to those issued under the 
Domestic Violence & Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976. 'Injunctions 
under the Matrimonial Homes Acts and the Married Women's Propert Act 
grew but these were a tiny minority of those issued. The following 
discussion will look at the effects of court decisions and legal 
policy on the pattern of injunction use. 
Dissatisfaction with the working of injunctions was voiced very 
shortly after the implementation of the Domestic Violence and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act (see Ansell, 1979; Meredith, 1973; NWAF. 
1977). Ansell's research shows that some solicitors considered it 
-necessary to have proof of violence before making an application for 
an injunction (Ansell, 1979). Courts later endorsed this practice by 
arguing (albeit inconsistently) that some evidence of violence was 
generally required. In Spindlow v Spindlow (1979) it was argued 
that a wife had to have some evidence of molestation first to qualify 
for a non-molestation order ancilliary to divorce proceeedings. In 
cases concerning injunctions under the Domestic Violence and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act and the Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates 
Courts) Act violence rather than molestation was required (see Homer 
v Homer (1982)). Magistrates furthermore required some objective 
proof of violence and need not rely on the subjective feelings of the 
woman. Her fears of assault could be discounted as exaggerations 
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or fancy (McCartney v McCartney (1981)). In an advice booklet for 
women on the new law, NWAF advised women not to go to solicitors but 
to try and get injunctions for themselves (NWAF, 1980). . The 
disadvantages of using solicitors were they were not available 24 
hours a day, hence seldom about when needed, they disliked and 
avoided this aspect of matrimonial work, were ill-informed about the 
new provisions and might try to force clients to take alternative 
proceedings (e. g. a divorce) because they want the income (NWAF, 
1980). The success rate of injunctions would be vitally affected by 
solicitors' skills and the specific practices employed at each court. 
Unfortunately, the Lord Chancellor's Department does not publish 
figures on the numbers of Domestic Violence Act injunctions classed 
as having been 'withdrawn', only those refused. Research into the 
. available 
figures held by one court in the North of England (Court A) 
-revealed rates which seemed to fluctuate considerably. In 1982,60 
applications (46%) for injunction were withdrawn/refused, in 1983 27 
(22%), 1984 just 4 were recorded as being refused or withdrawn (4%) 
but by 1985 this had increased again to 59 (37%). Table 25 below 
shows that the number of injunctions granted by Court A doubled in 
1984. This suggests a possible link between court and solicitors' 
'policies' at the time and the rates of withdrawal. Another factor 
affecting the success of the cases could be the policies of the local 
Law Society in granting legal aid (see Part II). 
Although cohabitees are covered, Domestic Violence and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1976 injunctions only apply to those living together 
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TABLE 24 : Injunctions And Property Orders 1977-1986, Showing Numbers 
Refused/Withdrawn, Arrest Powers and Arrests Made In England & Wales, 
Northern, London and Southern Court Circuit Areas. 
C 
YEAR TYPE TOTAL NUMBER GRANTED REFUSED WITH POWERS OF ARREST 
Total North Lond. South Total North Lond. South Total North Lond. South 
1977 DVA 2853 385 703 690 219 36 35 50 1100 16G 323 278 
'/. 100% 13% 25% 24% 7% 9% 5% 7% 39% 43% 46% 40% 
1978 DVA 7310 835 1688 1694 516 51 74 129 2172 195 617 641 
7.100% 11% 23% 23% 7% 6% 4% 7% 30% 23% 37% 38% 
1979 DVA 8086 776 2028 1793 439 50 44 104 2751 154 929 816 
% 100% 10% 25% 22% 5% 6% 2% 5% 34% 20% 46% 46% 
1980 DVA 8091 774 2254 1903 300 36 78 77 2957 202 1050 916 
7.100% 10% 28% 24% 4% 4% 3% 4% 37% 26% 47% 48% 
1981 DVA 8470 876 1745 2293 301 17 78 70 3074 365 600 1100 
9.100% 101: 20% 27% 3% 2% 4% 3% 36% 42% 34% 481, 
1982 DVA 9573 975 1809 2610 217 29 38 42 3549 361 704 1294 
% 100% 10% 19% 27% 2% 3% 2% 2% 37% 37% 39% 50% 
--=DPMCA 5114 --- 3386 --- 1189 --- 
N 100% --- 40% --- 23% --- 
1983 DVA 12458 1544 2296 3001 367 52 57 82 4036 4.77 874 1252 
% 100% 12% 18% 24% 3% 3% 2% 3% 32% 30% 38% 42% 
DPMCA 5130 --- 2820 --- 852 --- 
% 100% ---" 35% --- 16% --- 
1984 DVA 16156 1929 3350 4029 380 47 68 93 5057 510 1230 1569 
7.100% 12% 21% 25% 2% 2% 2.2% 31% 26% 37% 39% 
DPMCA 5406 --- 3314 --- 869 --- 
% 100% --- 38% --- 16% --- 
1985 DVA 19555 2088 3831 4835 511 61 120 86 5794 603 1438 1877 
% 100% 11% 20% 25% 3% 3% 3% 2% 30% 29% 38% 39% QDPMCA 
4524 --- 2436 -. -. - 905 --- 
'. 100% --- 35% --- 20% --- 
1986 DVA 23049 2120 4416 6011 461 42 105 110 6802 562 646 2179 
S 100% 19% 19% 26% 2% 2% 2% 2% 30% 27% 15% 36» 
Sources : Judicial Statistics 1977,1978,1979,1980,1981,1982,1983,1984,1985, 
1986; Home Office Statistical Bulletin 1983,1934,1985,1986. 
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TABLE 24 : 
(contd. ) 
Injunctions And Property Orders 1977-1986, Showing Numbers 
Refused/Withdrawn, Arrest Powers and Arrests Made In England & 
Northern, London and Southern Court Circuit Areas. 
Wales, 
CA 
TYPE ARREST POWERS ADDED ON* ARRESTS MADE* COMMITTALSI 
Total North Lond. South Total North Lond. South Total North Lond. South 
1977 DVA 134 6 47 31 228 34 126 58 93 13 5 30 
', G 8% 3% 14% . ... 8% 8% 9% 18% 8% 3% 3% 0.7% 4% 
1978 DVA 241 21 54 75 456 51 66 156 96 8 34 10 
% 5% 3% 5% 8% 6N 6% 4% 9% 1% 0.9% 2% 0.5% 
1979 DVA 143 20 28 64 520 39 82 181 119 12 23 14 
% 3% 3% 3% 7% 6% 5% 4% 10% 1% 1.5% 1% 0.7% 
1980 DVA 270- 30 19 69 445 36 72 92 236 33 56 49 
% 6% 6% 2% 8% 5% 5% 3% 5% 3% 4% 2% 3% 
1981 DVA 361 61 30 104 484 68 48 156 216 24 43 48 
% 7% 14% 3% 10% 6% 8% 3% 7% 3% 3% 2. 2% 
1982 DVA 426 64 49 129 456 55 55 166 198 31 34 41 
% --8°% 12% -5% 11% 5% 6% -3% 6% 2% 3% 2% 2% 
1983 DVA 470 82 65 131 639 95 46 104 293 24 34 110 
% 6% 8% 5% 8% 5% 6% 2% 3% 21'. 2% 1% 4% 
DPMCA - - - - 109 - - - - - - - 
% - - - - 2% - - - - - - - 
1984 DVA 537 116 90 138 569 53 138 143 429 47 136 113 
% 5% 6% 3% 3% 4% 3% 4% 4% 3/. 2ä . 4% 3% DPMCA - - - - 129 - - - - - - - 
% - - - - 2% - - - - - - - 
1985 DVA . 741 75 240 135 671 76 85 233 232 35 35 103 
% 6% 5% 11% 5% 3% 4N 2% 5% 1% 2% 0.9% 2% 
DPMCA - - - - 106 - - - - - - - % - - - - 2% - - - .- - - - 
DVA 662 61 126 212 793 83 91 314 368 37 32 87 
% 4% 4% 4% 6% 3% 4% 2% 5% 2% 2% 0.7% 1% 
Sources : Judicial Statistics 1977,1978,1979,1980,1981 , 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986; Nome Office Statistical Bulletin 1983,1984, 1985, 1986. 
* See notes. 
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NOTES ON TABLE 24. 
DVA = Injunctions granted under the Domestic Violence and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976. 
DPMCA = Injunctions granted under the Domestic Proceedings 
(Magistrates Courts) Act 1978. 
Total granted: 
percentages for Northern, London and Southern Circuit areas are shown 
as percentage of total for England and Wales. 
The Home Office does not publish comparable figures to the Lord 
Chancellor's Department to show the number of injunctions granted. 
Home Office figures show the numbers of applications, not all of 
which are granted. Figures for injunctions under Domestic 
Proceedings (Magistrates Courts) Act 1978 had therefore to be 
calculated from Home Office Statistical Bulletins Table 2 which shows 
number of applications made and percentage rate of refusal and 
withdrawal. 
1982 figures for injunctions under the Domestic Proceedings 
(Magistrates Courts) Act 1978 are based upon Home Office estimates 
as only 67 magistrates courts were included in the collection of 
information that year. The new system of data collection was 
extended to all magistrates courts on 1st January 1983. - 
1977 figures for injunctions under the Domestic Violence and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 based upon Lord Chancellor's 
department estimates on the-basis of six month figures. This makes 
early figures less reliable for comparative purposes due to seasonal 
variations in applications. 
Refused/Withdrawn : 
No figures available on the numbers of injunctions under the Domestic 
Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 withdrawn apart from 
those from own research not included in this table. 
Percentages show applications refused/withdrawn as percentage of all 
applications. 
Arrest powers added on : 
Percentages shown in proportion to injunctions granted without powers 
of arrest. 
Arrests made : 
Percentages in proportion to all injunctions granted. 
Committals : 
Percentages in proportion to all injunctions granted. 
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as husband and wife so problems arose if a husband only began his 
violent campaign after leaving home. In one case, that of McLean v 
Nugent (1979) the Court of Appeal allowed an injunction to be granted 
two months after the couple had ceased to live together as husband 
and wife. In another, the court claimed to have some jurisdiction 
where the parties had been occupying separate rooms in a two roomed 
flat (Adeoso v Adeoso (1980)). But more usually, problems would 
occur for women whose husbands continued to harass them after 
separation. Mrs White for example had applied for an exclusion 
order under the Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates Courts) Act but her 
husband continued to harass her and threaten her with violence late 
at night. This behaviour was not covered by the magistrates' order 
so she applied under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1976, hoping to get an injunction preventing 
'molestation'. This was refused her on the ground that she and her 
husband were no longer living together as husband and wife (White v 
White (1983)). 
Powers of arrest could only be attached under the Domestic Violence 
and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 after an assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm had occured (S2). Actual bodily harm involved 
more than a slap and generally required a wound or mark as proof. 
Within just five months of the implementation of the Domestic 
Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 the Court of Appeal 
was arguing that powers of arrest could only be attached in cases of 
persistent disobedience of injunctions. In Lewis v Lewis (1978) the 
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Court of Appeal issued a warning that powers of arrest should not be 
considered routine. A research study of injunction cases at a 
London County Court in 1978 found considerable variation among 
judges in the attachment of powers of arrest and the granting of 
exclusion orders. Some judges claimed they would never allow 
powers of arrest or exclusion orders at all (see Ansell, 1979). The 
Lewis case sanctioned some degree of economy for arrest powers by 
confirming they could only be given in, exceptional situations and 
then only for an initial period of three months, although an applicant 
could return to court to have the power renewed should danger be 
still 'reasonably apprehended' ( Practice Note (1978) & Practice Note 
(Domestic Violence : Powers Of Arrest) (1981) ). . In Horner v 
Horner 
(1982) the husband had a history of physical violence to his wife 
but, because of the attachment of powers of arrest to a non- 
molestation order, he had ceased his physical attacks and resorted to 
other methods of harassment such as sending . 
threatening letters and 
intercepting her whilst out walking. In this case the judge argued 
that because the husband's last act of violence had occured nine 
months ago, the continuation of the powers of arrest for 
'idiosyncratic' behaviour would be 'unjust'. 
This had an effect upon-the number of injunctions passed with powers 
of arrest. Table 24 shows a decline in the attachment of powers of 
arrest from 39% in 1977 to 30% of Injunctions granted in 1936. 
Even if attached though, this would not necessarily mean that an 
arrest would be made. The Domestic Violence and Matrimonial 
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Proceedings Act 1976 and Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates Courts) 
Act 1978 offered no remedy for police and court reluctance to 
enforce injunctions (see Chapter 3). Police discretion over whether 
to intervene was unaltered so even when breaches occured they still 
often refused to arrest violent men (see Binney, Harkell" & Nixon, 
1981; Farragher, 1985; Meredith, 1978; Pahl, 1982). The study by 
Binney, Harkell & Nixon (1981) of women living in refuges found 
arrests were made in only 20% of life threatening cases of violence 
and in only 15% of cases where severe bruising or black eyes were 
apparent. Farragher's observation of the Staffordshire police 
involvement in 26 domestic disputes confirmed the police reluctance 
to intervene in 'private matters' and their continued assertion that 
women needed time to think things over or would withdraw charges 
(Farragher, 1985). Fielding's research gives examples of the various 
rationalisations offered by individual police-officers to justify their 
own unwillingness to prosecute. One experienced police officer 
employed concepts of 'community policing' to justify his policy on 
'domestic' cases, arguing that, due to the racial tension in the area, 
it was not in the 'community's interests' to arrest a man who had 
chased his wife down the street with an axe threatening to chop her 
up. Ignoring the fact that it was the 'community' i. e. neighbours, 
who called out the police in the first place, and not mentioning 
(assuming they knew) to the woman the existence of refuges etc., the 
police 'settled' the dispute by confiscating the axe (see Fielding, 
1988). 
Page 204 
Reforms In The 1980s. /4. 
Tables 24 above & 25 below show the rarity of committal orders. 
A committal could be ordered for breach of an injunction with powers 
of arrest attached even if the victim did not apply. But unless the 
breach was 'absolutely gross' it was considered bad practice to 
committ without hearing the victim's view (Boylan v Boylan (1981)). 
Both the arrests made and the committal rate for breach of 
-Injunctions under the Domestic Violence & Matrimonial Proceedings Act 
1976 have declined since 1977, In 1986 arrests were made in just 
3% of all injunctions issued. This is true also of the London 
circuit area, despite periodic announcements by the Metropolitan 
police that their policies are changing. Jan Pahl's research 
-suggests that having--a power of arrest attached to an injunction 
might hinder a husband's willingness to attempt further assaults 
(Pahl, 1982). If powers of arrest could be attached to many more, 
or all, injunctions this would at least - cut out some of the 
complications of committal procedure. Due to the emergency nature of 
committal orders the courts have recently encountered some problems 
over solicitors' and court officers' neglect of procedural formalities. 
-In fact, even the Master of the Rolls has confessed that procedural 
formalities seem to have been invented by some courts/solicitors, -the 
outcome being an inability to prosecute a man, proven to have been 
consitently violent, due to the lack of a signature on one document 
or lack of a staple holding together an affidavit and notice to show 
cause (see Lee v Walker (1985); Burrow v Iqbal (1985); Williams v 
Fawcett (1985); Ngyen v Phung (1985); Hussain v Hussain (1986); 
Wright v Jess (1987); Harmsworth v Harmsworth (1987)). 
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Policy on arrest and committal varies significantly from area to area. 
Table 25 provides a summary of injunctions under the Domestic 
Violence & Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 issued by Courts A, B&C 
between 1982-1985. These figures, obtained from unpublished 
material held by the Lord Chancellor's Department, show enormous 
differences between the three areas over injunctions issued with 
powers of arrest and actual arrests made. Court A, the busiest 
court of the three issued net many less injunctions under the 
Domestic Violence & Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 than the other 
two courts although more petitions on the basis of behaviour were 
applied for. Tables 20 and 21 above show that Court A was a much 
busier court handling 224 divorce cases for the two months 1984, cf 
163 at Court B and 199 at Court C, and 293 divorce cases for the two 
months in 1985 cf 217 at Court B and 199 at Court C. The smaller 
number-of injunctions issued was not due to lesser demands made by a 
smaller client population in Court A. More magistrates' injunctions 
were probably granted in this area than in Courts areas B and C. No 
figures from the summary court were collected due to time 
constraints, but Home Office figures show a higher rate of 
applications for magistrates' orders in Northern Court areas (Home 
Office Statistical Bulletin, 1986). Earlier discussions have argued 
a link between applications to magistrates and level of income (see 
Chapters 2&3, Finer et al, 1974. ). 
Bearing in mind that some women might be driven to an application 
for an injunction under the Domestic Violence & Matrimonial 
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Proceedings Act 1976 due to problems arising from the lesser 
protection offered by Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 
orders, Court A, where interviews with solicitors and court staff 
revealed a hardline approach demanded by one County Court judge in 
particular (see Part II), has a low rate of enforcement. In 1982 no 
powers of arrest were issued with injunctions at Court A, compared 
with 66% and 76% issued with powers of arrest at Courts B and C 
respectively. Although the attachment of powers of arrest at Court 
A increased to 16% of injunctions by 1985, and both rates at Courts B 
and C declined, B dramatically down to 26%, this rate is still far 
below the national average. Court A was also least likely to add 
powers of arrest on to already existing injunctions. Actual arrests 
made in the area of Court A were consistently below national average, 
just one man recorded as being arrested for breach of injunction 
during the whole four year period. Courts B and C had more variable 
rates on arrest, the first two years having rates much higher than 
the average but declining from then onwards. Variations in arrests 
made could be caused by a number of factors. Possibly, although 
unlikely, violent men in Court Area A were more likely to obey 
injunctions than in areas B and C. As the police have the 
discretion to arrest violent men on the- basis of other statutory 
offences, or may not in fact arrest at all but merely ask him to 
'accompany me to the station', it is not possible to draw positive 
conclusions about enforcement policies in the three court areas 
without further research into police and court procedures. Further 
discussion of these variable practices at the local level will take 
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TABLE 25 : Summary Of Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 
Injunctions Granted By Courts A, B and C, 1982-1935. 
YEAR TOTAL GRANTED WITHDRAWN/REFUSED 
Total A B C Total A B 
1982 9575 70 116 50 217 3 8 
% 100% 0.7% 1.2% 0.5% 2% 4% 7% 
1983 12458 98 68 47 367 4 0 
% 100% 0.8% 0.5% 0.4% 3% 4% 0 
1984 16156 193 74 67 380 4 3 
% 100% 1% 0.4% 0.4% 2% 2% 4% 
1985 19555 101 86 83 511 2 1 
100% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 3% 2% 1N 
WITH POWERS OF ARREST 
Total A B C 
5 3549 0 77 38 
10% 37% 0 66% 76% 
9 403G 6 39 23 
19% 32% 6%, 57% 50% 
6 5057 25 33 42 
9% 31% 13% , 45% 63% 
0 5794 16 22 58 
0 30% 16% 26% 70% 
YEAR ARREST POWERS ADDED ON ARRESTS MADE 
Total ABC Total ABC 
1982 426 2 13 2 456 0 11 3 
% 8% 3% 12% 4% 5% 0 9% 6% 
1983 470 064 639 0S4 
% 6% 0 9% 9% 5% 0 12% 9% 
1984 537 173 569 524 
% 5% 0.57.9% 4% 4% 3% 3% 6% 
1985 741 042 671 143 
% 6% 0 5% 2% 3% 1% ` 5% 4% 
Sources Totals from Judicial Statistics 1982,1983,1984 & 1985. Figures for Courts A, 
B and C are unpublished figures obtain from data held a t Lord Chancellor's Department. 
NOTES ON TABLE 25. 
I granted : 
Courts A, B and C percentages show their proportion of cases in relation to total granted 
in England & Wales. 
Withdrawn/refused . - 
Work on original data held at Court A revealed a discepancy between court and Lord 
Chancellor's Department figures see comments above on page ? Withdrawn/refused 
percentages as proportion of total applications shown in Lord Chancellor's Department 
figures. 
Arrest powers added on : 
Percentages shown in proportion to injunctions granted without powers of arrest. 
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place in Part II. 
Court powers to grant ex parte orders were also decreased through a 
series of decisions and Practice Directions. In Ansah v Ansah 
(1977) Morgan v Morgan (1978) and a Practice Note issued from the 
Family Division of the High Court in 1978, it was advised that there 
must be real danger of serious injury or irreperable damage to the 
woman or children to justify granting orders in the absence of the 
offender. The following quote from the above mentioned Practice 
Note suggests some concern that injunctions in such circumstances 
may not have been genuinely urgent : 
The President is greatly concerned by the increasing number of 
applications being made ex parte in the Royal Courts of Justice 
for injunctions (.... ) 
An ex Parte application should not be made, or granted, unless 
there is an immediate danger of serious injury or irreperable 
damage. A recent examination of ex parte applications shows 
that nearly 50% were unmeritorious, being made days, or even 
weeks, after the last incident, of which complaint was made. 
This wastes time, causes needless expense, usually to the. legal 
aid fund, and is unjust to respondents. 
(Practice Note (Matrimonial Causes : Injunctions), 1978). 
Very similar concerns about the abuse of the law were exhibited in 
connection with exclusion orders. The exclusion of a violent 
partner from the matrimonial home was arguably one of the most 
controversial issues concerning matrimonial injunctions faced by the 
courts in the late 1970s to 1980s. Powers to exclude a man from 
the matrimonial home also exist, as part of divorce, property and 
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custody matters. In recent years confusion has arisen in the courts 
as to the degree of overlap between principles applied in domestic 
violence injunction cases and those arising from cases of divorce, 
custody and property settlements. By 1983, the House of Lords were 
trying to argue that the same principles should be considered in all 
cases of excluding men from the home, no matter what the legislative 
initiative (see Richards v Richards (1933) and discussion below). 
At first the courts laboured over the issue of whether or not they 
were empowered by the domestic violence legislation to exclude a 
violent man from the whole of the home at all. In BvB in 1977, 
the first case to be heard concerning the Domestic Violence 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 at the Court of Appeal, a woman 
with two children applied to oust from the local authority home the 
man with whom she had lived for the past eleven years. The court 
concluded they only had powers to confine him to part of the home as 
he held sole tenancy. Two days later on the 23rd October in the 
case of Camplin v Jenkins (1978), a county court judge's decision that 
courts could exclude violent men from homes where their 
wives/partners were sole or joint tenants was over-ruled. 
The third case heard was that of Davis v Johnson (1973). Eileen 
Meredith, a London solicitor with experience of a number of 
injunction cases, claims that Johnson had heard about the. case of 
Camplin v Jenkins and only then decided to take the matter of his 
exclusion from his council flat to the Court of Appeal (Meredith, 
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1978). A special appeal court of five judges was set up to explore 
what the Act meant, the rights of cohabitees, whether needs for 
personal protection could override property rights, whether the court 
could use Select Committee material as a guide to interpretation of 
the Act and whether the Court of Appeal could overturn its own 
decisions. The decision to uphold the exclusion of Johnson from the 
council flat of which he was the sole tenant brought an outcry that 
the Court of Appeal had set a precedent for a 'mistress's charter'. 
In this case on further appeal to the House of Lords, it was held 
that: 
Section 1 of the Act is concerned to-protect not property but 
human life and limb. But, while the section is not intended to 
confer upon unmarried women property rights in the home, it 
does enable the county court to suspend or restrict her family 
partner's property right to possession and to preserve to her a 
right of occupancy (which owes its origin to her being in the 
home as his consort and with his consent) for as long as may be 
thought by the court to be necessary to secure the protection 
of herself and the children. 
(Lord Scarman, Davis v Johnson, 1978). 
Yet, the over-riding of property rights in this case was clearly 
stated as being limited to emergency provision only. As ouster 
injunctions were only to be regarded as 'first aid' remedies, property 
rights were suspended by the courts leaving scope for permanent 
solutions (by way of tenancy transfer pending local authority 
decision or - the provision of alternative accomodation) to be made 
later on. In Hopper v Hopper (1978) Judge Ormrod stressed the 
importance of clearly stating the temporary nature of injunctions: 
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the injunctions which are granted should be either expressly 
limited in some way or it should be made perfectly clear to 
both parties that the protection of the injunction will be 
withdrawn after the lapse of a reasonable time - the reasonable 
time being enough to enable the wife to make other arrangements 
for her accomodation or to take steps in the case of a married 
woman, to get her matrimonial status clarified, and to enable 
the court to exercise its power to make property adjustment 
orders. If this is not done this Act will become a means of 
oppressing some people severely. 
(Ornirod, L. J. Hopper v Hopper, 1978). 
In the above case Stamp L. J. reasoned that the fact that the 13 year 
old daughter who had a broken arm was required to sleep in 
uncomfortable conditions upon a camp bed could not 'possibly outweigh 
the undesireability of driving her stepfather out of the house at 
very short notice. ' A Practice Note issued by Sir George Baker in 
1978 recommended that courts impose time limits on injunctions and 
that for most cases a period of three months would suffice initially 
(Practice Direction (1978)). The same reasoning was adopted in 
Morgan v Morgan (1978). In Freeman v Collins in 1983 this time to 
find alternative accomodation was further limited to one month 
(Freeman v Collins (1983). Although in one, case of repeated assault 
it was held if the woman concerned had some legal right to occupy 
the property already by being the sole/joint tenant, perpetual or 
indefinite exclusion injunctions might be possible (Spencer v Camacho 
(1983)), courts have recently confirmed the temporary nature of 
exclusion orders, especially if no children are involved in the 
proceedings (see Waugh v Waugh (1981); Wooton v Wooton (1983)), and 
the fact that they must be carefully used to prevent abuse (O'Malley 
v O'Malley (1982)). Ousters under the Matrimonial Homes Act may 
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allow a longer period. In Fairweather v Kolosine (1983) an ouster 
was made for a period of five years without 'substantial' allegations 
of violence. 
The difficulty in balancing decisions to-oust between the need to 
offer effective temporary protection for women and children and the 
protection of individual property rights resulted in two conflicting 
strands of reasoning in the Court of Appeal in the 1970s (see 
Chapter 3). One strand followed the reasoning in Bassett v Bassett 
(1975) and Walker v Walker (1978) where the welfare of the children 
and their needs for secure accomodation was held' to be the paramount 
concern. The other strand established by cases such as Rennick v 
Rennick in 1977 and Elsworth v Elsworth -in 1978 argued that the 
reasonableness of the wife's reasons for --leaving was of prime 
importance. In Myers v Myers (1982) there had been one- incident of 
violence and the court decided that this was not likely to recur. 
However in Samson v Samson (1982) the decisions in Elsworth and 
Myers were severely criticised and not followed. It was held that 
the question of whether the wife was justified in leaving the 
matrimonial home was irrelevant (see also Harding v Harding (1979)). 
By 1982 the academic lawyer David Bean was asserting that : 
if the wife has children and wants the husband to go he will be 
ordered out' 
(Bean, 1982, p. 97. ) 
This child centred approach to matrimonial injunctions coincided with 
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a rise in women's petitions granted on the basis of unreasonable 
behaviour. In 1980,42% of women's petitions were granted on the 
basis of unreasonable behaviour. By 1982, this figure had risen to 
47%. Although the tendency of wives to allege unreasonable 
behaviour, as seen in the grounds on which petitions were filed in 
Table 18, grew more slowly from 48% of petitions filed by wives in 
1980 to 51% of petitions filed by wives in 1983, there-was a more 
rapid growth in the proportions granted to wives on this basis. 
This more rapid growth is most likely caused by changes in case law. 
Women. with children desperate for some legal protection may 
ultimately have succeeded in getting ousters when other routes to 
relief had been tried and failed. In O'Brien v O'Brien (1985) the 
woman had an emergency order for personal protection because her 
husband had kicked her in the face and fractured her nose. When 
the order expired, the magistrates refused to extend it and Mr 
O'Brien returned home forcing Mrs O'Brien to leave due to fear of 
further violence. She then applied successfully for custody of the 
children and a temporary ouster order from the County Court. 
Of course if the husband had custody of the children the courts 
might well have excluded a wife instead (see Beard v Beard (1981); 
Lee v Lee (1983)). In Smith v Smith (1980) theouster case was 
adjourned until the custody of the children had been decided. This 
practice was confirmed in the case of TvT (1986). Women who left 
home with their, children because of a husband's violence further 
risked being penalised by the courts for disrupting the children's 
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lives. In Re W (1983), a wife who left with her children (and who 
had interim custody granted her) to go into a woman's refuge had her 
application for an ouster refused due to the court's belief that she 
would not return home anyway. The custody of the children and 
occupation of the matrimonial home was transfered to the husband 
instead due to court concern that their mother's moving might further 
disrupt their schooling. Decisions such as Re W do little to assist 
battered women's attempts to leave violent men. 
In the 1980s the 'fair, just and reasonable' rhetoric was applied with 
increasing favour to injunction and ouster cases. Mrs Miller's case 
in 1982 painfully highlighted that this rhetoric applied only to 
decisions affecting men and a proposed fettering of their rights. 
In Miller v -Miller (1982) the wife left home with her daughter 
leaving her son behind with her -husband in the matrimonial home. 
Mrs Miller began divorce proceedings and applied to oust her husband. 
Her application was refused on the ground that it would not be fair, 
just or reasonable to oust the husband from the home if a non- 
molestation order with powers of arrest attached was granted to 
protect her from further violent attacks. 
In Richards v Richards in 1983 the House of Lords attempted to 
establish conclusively the principles which should govern the 
provision of matrimonial injunctions. The Richards case did not 
arise from an application for an ouster order under the Domestic 
Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 but judgements were 
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made nonetheless in reference to this act which subsequently caused 
considerable confusion as to the relevance of the act at all to 
married women (see Levin & Rae (1983)). Mrs Richards had left her 
husband and petitioned for a divorce on the grounds of his 
unreasonable behaviour. The evidence which she offered of 
unreasonable behaviour was said to be 'flimsy' amounting to no more 
than the fact that she could no longer bear to remain in the same 
house as him. As Mrs Richards could not secure alternative 
accomodation for herself and the two children, she applied for an 
ouster order ancilliary to the divorce. The ouster was granted by 
the divorce court judge, even though he considered it to be unjust to 
turn the husband-out of the local authority home; 
I think it is thoroughly unjust to turn out this father, but 
justice no longer seems to play any part in this branch- of the 
-law- (.... ) (the) house (was) provided by the public as a home for 
these fo ur people, and that being so, the public interest is 
best met by installing the children in the home, which means in 
practice, installing their mother too. 
(Quoted by Lord Hailsham, Richards v Richards, 1983). 
The Court of Appeal confirmed the general approach on the grounds 
that the interests of the children were paramount. Whilst awaiting 
the appeal to the House of Lords, Mr and Mrs Richards came to an 
arrangement whereby Mrs Richards occupied the matrimonial home with 
the children during the week but left at the weekend so that her 
husband could move in to take a turn at childcare. On hearing the 
details of the case the House of Lords reversed the previous 
decisions and recommended all future ousters should be governed by 
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the principles -derived from the Matr"iminial Homes Act 1967 (later 
consolidated in the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983). Si (3) of the Act 
says that : 
On an application for an ouster order under this section, the 
court may make such an order as it thinks just and reasonable 
having regard to the conduct of the parties in relation to each 
other and otherwise, to their respective needs and financial 
resources, to the needs of any children and to all the 
circumstances of the case. 
The interests of children concerned, although an important 
consideration, were thus no longer, of paramount concern. In 
making future ouster orders the courts were advised to look also at 
the justice of turning one partner out of the home, the financial 
situation and behaviour of the couple concerned and any other 
individual facts of'the case. Lord Hailsham took issue with the 
suggestions- that it would be in the children's interest to oust the 
father from the matriminial home : 
it is not necessarily in the interests of the children that 
either parent should be allowed to get away with and be seen to 
get away with capricious, arbitrary, autocratic or merely 
eccentric behaviour. It may well be difficult for the court to 
exercise control. But the difficulty is not rendered less if it 
is prepared to throw its hand in so readily. 
(Lord Hailsham, Richards v Richards (1983)). 
Lord Brandon argued that ousters should all be brought under the 
Matrimonial Homes Act, whether or not there was a pending suit for 
divorce or judicial separation, causing some confusion in solicitors 
practices around the country as to whether or not the Domestic 
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Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 applied to married 
women wanting more than a non-molestation order (see Barnard (1983); 
Hamilton (1984); Levin & Rae (1983)). Ouster injunctions ancilliary 
to divorce were abolished as all applications then needed to be made 
by means of an originating summons in Form 23 under the Matrimonial 
Homes Act. This procedure was much more complicated and lengthier, 
involving stating title to the land, giving the Land Registry number 
and details of the mortgage or other interests in the land. The 
procedure could include a search or involve the building society in 
the case (see Levin & Rae, 1984). 
Since 1933 there has been a decline in all injunctions granted except 
those under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 
(Table 23). The Richards decision probably caused more confusion 
than it solved. Recent cases still show signs of conflict between 
the requirement to be just, fair and reasonable (to men) and the 
importance of children's interests. In Burke v Burke (1937) Lloyd LJ 
reasserted the previous worries about women's use of ousters in 
'marginal' cases : 
an ouster order is a very serious order to make. It <.... ) is a 
'drastic order' and an order which should only be made in cases 
of real necessity. It must not be allowed to become a routine 
stepping stone on the road to divorce on the ground that the 
marriage has already broken down and the atmosphere in the 
matrimonial home is one of tension. 
(Lloyd LI, Burke v Burke (1987) 73). 
In Summers v Summers (1986) and Wiseman v Simpson (1988) where 
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allegations of violence were not included in the cases, the courts 
ordered re-trials on the basis that it was necessary to consider, 
given the fact that it was in the children's best interests to have a 
secure home, whether it was just, fair and reasonable to exclude one 
of the partners. 
Housing On Relationship Breakdown. 
Research by Binney, Harkell and Nixon into the destinations of women 
leaving refuge accomodation found that of the 84 women in the sample 
who left Women's Aid refuges in 1980, only 4% were living in the 
former matrimonial home with the partner excluded. Out of 58 women 
who applied for exclusion orders, only 21 actually obtained them. In 
the same year 13 out of the 114 local authorities argued the 
provisions under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings 
Act were sufficient to cope with the homelessness of battered women 
(Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981). The housing prospects for married 
women in owner. occupied accomodation have tended to be better than 
for those in rented accomodation because (providing they are not too 
greatly in debt) they generally have more economic "resources and 
courts have been less concerned about their ability to make a housing 
decision. Court decisions have strengthened women's ability to 
prevent husbands from expropriating all the profit from the sale of 
the home (see Willaims v Williams (1977); Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd 
v Boland (1980). ). Unlike wives, cohabitees could not register a 
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right in an owner occupied home owned by their partners to put off 
potential buyers. Yet, even if a woman was left in the home after a 
divorce the accumulation of mortgage arrears (sometimes due to 
husband's refusal to pay) might lead to the sale of the house and her 
homelessness (Harman v Glencross (1984)). Research by Margaret 
Southwell into '145 post divorce property cases in one city in 
Northern England found little evidence for the belief that one 
partner on -divorce remained in the matrimonial home with the 
children. A matrimonial home in the owner occupied sector was in 
fact more likely to be sold if a couple had dependent children than 
if they were childless. In 36% of the cases, the owner occupied 
home was sold and 76% of these cases concerned a mother who was the 
custodial parent (Southwell, 1985). 
The three most important routes to housing or occupation rights 
involving the courts on relationship breakdown between 1977-1987 
were via decisions based on the Matrimonial Homes Act, the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 or via applications for new accomodation 
as an emergency case under the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 
(see Chapter 3). In Chapter 3 the courts' reluctance to interfere 
into local authority decisions was discussed in relation-to domestic 
violence injunctions. In Regan v Regan (1977) although the court 
had the power to order a tenancy transfer for a local authority 
tenant it declined to do so lest this cause disfavour with the 
authority concerned. In Spindlow v Spindlow in 1979 however the 
reasoning under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 
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1976 was different, Ormrod LS maintaining that the court did have the 
jurisdiction to permanently exclude a violent partner from a local 
authority home. Subsequent statutory enactments and court decisions 
gave the Judges the theoretical power to make the housing decision 
on relationship breakdown but, the reluctance to become involved 
persisted. The Housing Act 1980, which gave increased security to 
local authority tenants tended to shift housing decisions towards the 
courts. As many local authorities by the 1980s were granting point 
tenancies, 
-by 
S28(3) of the Housing Act 1980 both parties would have 
a 'secure' status and a court order might be required to bring the 
local authority to a decision. The Housing Act. 1980 cut the 
discretion of local authorities in cases of domestic violence as some 
felt no longer able to merely switch tenancies from the husband to 
the wife without a prior court decision (see Pearl, 1986). 
Power to transfer tenancy from one spouse to another in cases of 
divorce or nullity under S7 Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 was extended 
to all local authority tenancies under the Matrimonial Homes and 
Property Act 1981. This Act gave the court the power to order the 
transfer on granting of a divorce, nullity or judicial separation or 
with leave of the court at any time thereafter. The landlord's 
consent was not required although s/he had the right to be heard. 
Section 24(la) the Matrimonial Causes Act also empowered courts to 
transfer tenancies for divorced women, but here without the need for 
the landlord to be heard (see Chapter 3). In Rodewald v Rodewald 
(1977) the court held that it was possible to use S24 of the 
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Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to transfer local authority tenancies. 
In Warwick v Warwick (1982), the spouses were joint tenants and the 
wife left due to violence. She obtained a non-molestation order and 
an exclusion order on the advice of the local authority but the 
ouster was revoked on appeal by the husband. The court claimed it 
should not be involved in the local authority's 'obscure housing 
policy games'. The wife had no intention of returning home so there 
was no point in ousting the husband. Rehousing her on welfare 
grounds was the authority's concern not the court's. 
Fears about interfering in local authority decisions were especially 
acute in relation to applications under the Housing (Homeless 
Persons) Act 1977. For women leaving refuges, a new home will 
often be the only feasible answer (Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981). 
By the early 1980s it was apparent that earlier predictions the new 
legislation would not alter variations in local authority practice, 
had come true 
The Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977 is a major landmark in 
social legislation. However if the Act provides tacit 
acknowledgement of the fact that homelessness is attributable 
to the failure of successive governments to provide for housing 
needs it is very far from a panacea. Indeed there is a sense 
in which the Act, to adapt Lord Hailsham's aphorism, is nothing 
more or less than a" gigantic confidence trick (.... ) 
(Amendments to the bill) effectively transform(ed it) from a 
measure which provided homeless persons with a right to 
accomodation into a measure which presents them with a series 
of obstacles which have to be successfully negotiated before 
that right can be claimed. 
(Robson & Watchman, 1983, pp. 1-2) 
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The categories in the -legislation used to assess a housing 
authority's duties towards an applicant - i. e. was s/he homeless, in 
priority need for accomodation, not intentionally homeless and were 
there local connnections" - could all be turned into a battered 
woman's 'obstacles' in the housing race. 
One of the first cases to come to appeal under the Act concerned the 
issue as to whether or -not'the local authority had a duty towards 
applicants living in women's refuges (see Williams v Cynon Valley 
Council (1980)). In this case the judge argued that 
It is important that refuges be seen as temporary crisis 
accomodation, and that women living in refuges are still 
homeless under the terms of the Act. If it was suggested that 
they were not homeless it would be necessary for voluntary 
organisations to issue immediate 28 days' notice when women 
came in so that they would be under threat of homelessness. 
This would be totally undesireable and would simply add stress 
to stress. If living in crisis accomodation took women. out of 
the 'homeless' category then the Act was being watered down and 
its protection would be removed from a whole class of persons 
that it was set up to help and for whom it was extremely 
important. 
(Quoted from Arden, 1985, p. 38). 
Binney, Harkell & Nixon (1981) found that 43% of applicants from 
refuges were not accepted as the responsibility of local authorities 
under the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act and deciding that women 
were 'not homeless' was the>most common reason given for doing this. 
Presumably local authorities which partly funded refuges would not 
have come to the illogical conclusion that the inhabitants were not 
living in emergency accomodation. But even where refuges were 
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partly funded by local authorities, the numbers of battered women 
housed under the Act could be severely limited by homeless persons 
unit's willingness to accept them as 'homeless'. Some local 
authorities opt for a Catch 22 policy to assess the question of 
homelessness. According to the Act (now covered by the Housing Act 
1985) and the Code of Guidance which serves as an aid to 
interpretation, a woman who has a right to occupy a house may still 
be technically homeless if it is 'probable' her occupation would lead 
to violence or threats of violence from someone already living there 
who is likely to carry out the threats. In Rv Purbrook District 
Council ex parte Cadney (1985) the authority's finding that the 
applicant was not homeless was upheld due to the absence of evidence 
to show that violence could result if she did occupy the house. 
Many local authorities demand a high standard of proof of violence as 
pre-requisite for claims-(Arden, 1985). Women are told they have to 
have an injunction as proof of violence yet if they do succeed in 
obtaining one they are told they no longer need housing under the 
Act as the injunction will protect them in their own homes (see 
Binney, Harkell & Nixon (1981); Homer, Leonard & Taylor (1984); Pearl, 
(1986)). 
In Rv Wandsworth London Borough Council ex parte Nimako-Bwating 
(1983) Woolf J endorsed the local authority's view that it was fair 
to assess the reasonableness of the woman's leaving and should 
violence have occured (in their opinion), their duty was only to 
advise her to seek a court order for non-molestation or exclusion of 
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the husband. Women who left their husbands were not to be seen as 
homeless persons in their own right. Although the latest Code of 
Guidance suggests local authorities treat women who fear violence 
with sympathy, the actual practice looks like the opposite of 
sensitive concern: 
0 
one" of the most common complaints of women approaching 
agencies for help was that they did not take the problem of 
battering seriously. Housing Departments were no exception 
and women often said they had been humiliated by the treatment 
they had received : 
They had no right to treat me as they did. I came out 
in tears many times. The housing officer says that he 
hits his wife and vice versa - and that's the way of a 
happy marriage. ( .... ) 
Some women were told that they were not battered because they 
could-not show visible bruising or produce evidence of assault. 
Some were given no reasons at all. 
(Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981, pp. 79-80. ) 
Alternatively the local authority could demand some proof of priority 
need. Pregnant women might be asked for proof of pregnancy 
(doctor's note) and may not be housed until at least seven months 
pregnant in case they should decide to terminate the pregnancy 
(Carew-Jones & Watson, 1985). Single battered women are seldom 
recognised as vulnerable and in priority need as recommended by 
Paragraph 2.12 of the Code of Guidance (Austenberry & Watson (1983); 
Carew-Jones & Watson (1985)). In the Housing Act debates in the 
House of Lords the government made it plain that local authority 
intervention prior to custody or property settlements was 
undesireable (Pearl, 1986). In Rv London Borough of Ealing ex 
Parte Sidhu (1982) the woman concerned only had interim custody of 
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her children and the local authority said she would not be priority 
need until she had full custody. The appeal court held that the 
question of custody was irrelevant to the determination of priority 
need as she already had the children with her in the refuge. If the 
children were left at home however the courts could grant custody to 
the father instead (see discussion above). 
Hoggett and Pearl (1987) quote unpublished research by R. Thornton at 
Cambridge University which shows that out of over 100 local 
authorities surveyed, 547. found women who left home without their 
children due to their partner's intolerable behaviour were found to 
be intentionally homeless. Intentional homelessness has been the 
most controversial aspect of the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act and 
one to which women victims of domestic violence are especially 
vulnerable. Yet, as Robson and Watchman note: 1 
The courts have made it plain that a single transgression 'will 
not easily be cured and that once intentional homelessness 
arises it may hang like an albatross around the applicant's neck 
providing an excuse for refusal of permanent assistance. 
(Robson & Watchman, 1983, p. 6. ) 
The Code of Guidance says: 
In the opinion of the Secretaries of State, a battered woman 
who has fled the marital home should never be regarded as 
having become homeless intentionally because. it would clearly 
not be reasonable for her to return. 
(Code of Guidance, Housing Act 1935 Part III, Paras. 2.16. ) 
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If a woman was found to be intentionally homeless, the local 
authority would have no duty to provide secure accomodation. The 
'failure' to use legal remedies to evict. a partner, by e. g. getting an 
injunction, would allow the authority to call a woman intentionally 
homeless (see Rv Eastleigh Borough Council ex parte Evans (1984); R 
v Wandsworth Borough Council ex parte Nimako-Boating (1983); Rv 
Purbeck District Council ex parte Cadney (1985)). The danger for a 
woman in this situation is that the court might refuse to grant an 
ouster if it feared this would result in the husband's homelessness 
or suspected the council of using the court merely to clarify housing 
duties. In Wooton v Wooton (1984) a cohabiting woman applied to 
have her partner ousted and had the injunction refused on the ground 
that the local authority would not house the man if he was evicted 
but would have to house her and children. The court failed to 
mention that the refusal of the injunction might give the council 
scope to argue-that, as there was no proof of violence, she might be 
intentionally homeless. - In Thurley v Smith in 1984, the local 
authority told the husband that he-would not be rehoused if excluded 
from the joint tenancy; and the wife, temporarily in a refuge, that if 
she applied for an ouster she would be treated as homeless even if 
she failed to get the order. In this case the woman obtained a 
three month exclusion order but it has been- argued that the decision 
demonstrates a growing trend of authorities to press battered women 
into legal. proceedings merely to demonstrate their willingness to 
find housing for themselves (Pearl, 1986). Since the case of 
Greenwich London Borough Council v Mc Grady (1982), local authorities 
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have followed a policy of granting fresh tenancies after the ouster 
proceedings. The Code of Guidance states this practice is 
unreasonable yet authorities argue only the court can show that a 
woman is battered and only the court can show them a way out of the 
tenancy securities brought in by the Housing Act 1980. Although 
the expert in housing law, Andrew Arden, claims local authorities are 
unlikely to get away with such a policy where no 'domestic remedy' 
exists ( e. g. when women are threatened with violence therefore 
unable to get exclusion orders), or where other solutions have been 
tried and proven not to work, in the absence of a battered woman's 
ability to enforce the principles of the homelessness legislation (see 
Robson & Watson, 1983) the ball remains in the council's court. The 
English legal system has yet to allow the class actions used by 
women victims of domestic violence in the USA (see Schecter, 1982). 
Ingleby's survey of divorce cases found, the policy decisions of local 
authority housing departments could work in contradiction to the 
1980s' emphasis upon 'clean break' settlements on divorce (see 
discussion later in this chapter). One of the clients in the survey 
was advised not to sell her equity in the matrimonial home to her 
husband otherwise she would be found to be intentionally homeless 
when applying under the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act (see Ingleby, 
1988). Following the court decision in Rv Rushmoor Borough Council 
ex parte Barrett (1987) tenants in local authority accomodation who 
sell their homes (within a given period of time) to realise equity on 
divorce are liable to pay the discount given them on the original 
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purchase. If' the tenancy of the matrimonial home was merely 
transfered from one spouse to the other however, the discount would 
not need to be repaid. 
Rent arrears which accrued during a violent relationship, over which 
the woman may have had no control, are also a common foundation for 
findings of intentional homelessness (Homer, Leonard & Taylor, 1984; R 
v London Borough of Ealing ex parte Sidhu (1982)). = So is refusing 
an offer of accomodation, even if the woman believes it to be 
completely unsuitable (Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981). Due to the 
declining standards and stock of local authority housing both of 
these problems are likely to increase. For black women trying to 
leave violent relationships the council's tactic of making 'bad offers' 
holds an extra penalty due to the additional burden of racist attacks 
<see Bryan, Dadzie & Scafe, 1985). 
Women trying to leave the area to escape from a violent man may 
still be refered back to their own neighbourhood because of the local 
connections provisions in the Act. The 1985 Act theoretically 
reduced the scope of local authorities to manipulate the local 
connections provisions in order to escape their housing duties. 
Now an authority must give reasons why they do not think a woman 
risks violence in the area where she formerly lived. Husband's 
assurances of future 'good behaviour' might be sufficient reason for 
an authority's refusal to accept responsibility. - In the courts the 
local connections provisions have provided judges with the 
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opportunity to air their racial prejudices (see Rv Hillingdon Borough 
Council ex parte Streeting (1980); In Re Islam (1983); de Falco, 
Silvestri v Crawley borough Council (1980); Rv Reigate Borough 
Council ex parte Paris (1984)). Applicants have been advised in 
Powellian manner that the floodgates to British housing provisions 
will not open for immigrants, or even to the families of British 
citizens who have lived and worked here for many years. In de 
Falco, Silvestri v Crawley Borough Council (1980) Lord Denning advised 
the Italian applicants that they should have stayed where they were. 
In -R v Bristol County Council ex parte Browne (1979) a woman who 
left Eire with her children due, to her husband's violence applied as 
a homeless person in the Bristol area. She was refused housing on 
the ground that she had no local connection. Bristol County Council 
had contacted their colleagues in Eire and been advised that Mrs 
Browne was not at risk from. further violence in her home town and 
they would house her there instead. The court based its assessment 
of risk on the barest of evidence,, Mrs Browne had suffered violence 
in Tralee and been pursued by her husband to Limerick yet Lloyd LS 
was nonetheless satisfied that -she would not suffer 
further violence 
if she went home. 
The Women and Housing Group recommended local authorities house both 
parties on relationship breakdown (Women & Housing Group, 1983). 
This suggestion was backed up by a Working Group for the Women's 
National Commission set up in 1985 to look at domestic violence 
legislation (Women's National Commission, 1985). Housing for both 
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partners would help to side-step the issues raised in the 'marginal 
cases' discussed 'above but could not be achieved without a 
government committment to expand and improve the housing stock. 
The recent history of domestic violence injunctions and homelessness 
legislation has shown a shameful pattern of court and local authority 
evasion of 'both their legal and moral duties, facilitated by a 
growing dearth of resources and voluntarily diminished enforcement 
procedure. 
The Reintroduction Of Conduct Into Maintenance Awards. 
In 1973 Sir George Baker had announced that : 
In these days of 'women's lib' there is no reason why a wife 
whose marriage has not lasted long, and who has no child should 
have a 'bread ticket for life'. 
(Brady v Brady (1973)). 
One feminist lawyer quipped a few years later: 
because of the equality of the sexes a divorced spouse must 
look to the state for support. 
(O'Donovan (1978) p. 184. ) 
In the 1980s criticisms of the no fault basis of divorce and 
maintenance awards escalated. In October 1980 the newborn Campaign 
For Justice In Divorce, formed from a group of articulate and 
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aggrieved divorced men and their new wives blitzed the press and 
academic journals with their 'policy statements'. Two hundred and 
thirty MPs signed a motion for reform of the divorce law more or 
less forcing the Law Commission to become involved in the debate on 
maintenance principles (Smart, 1984). The Law Commission Report, 
'The Financial Consequences Of Divorce', published 1981, proposed the 
government consider abandoning S25(1) of the Matrimonial causes Act 
1973 to replace it with more realistic principles. The Commission 
noted how very little was known about how much maintenance was paid 
or whether it orders were enforced, yet they nonetheless argued that 
ex husbands and their second wives were being unfairly burdened by 
their financial liabilities to former families. Although they 
recommended research, as initiated by the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys, the SSRC and the EOC, they were unable to wait 
for these results. The evidence available at the time strongly 
indicated that women and children were most frequently the financial 
'victims' of divorce and alimony drones were virtually non-existent 
(see Eekelaar & Maclean, 1983; Gibson, '1982). Research since 
published has shown that men on the whole 'gain' whilst women and 
children suffer considerable financial loses on divorce getting very 
little maintenance or property (Eekelaar & MacClean, 1984; Smart, 
1984; Weitzman, 1986). Reform was however held to be both a 
necessary and feasible option to remedy the injustice divorced men 
experienced. The buck of responsibility for initiating reform to 
alleviate the problem of poverty for divorced women in one parent 
families was passed back to the government (see Law Commission, 
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1981). The Commission wanted firm objectives to govern policy on 
maintenance after the proposed repeal of S25(1) to prevent arbitrary 
and unpredictable awards. They recomended that courts-be directed 
to concern themselves with: 
1. the priority for serving children's needs 
of an ex-spouse. Ex-spouses should be 
maintenance payments were not automatic ri 
provisions made for their roles as carers. 
be more aware of the true costs of child 
orders. ' 
rather than those 
made aware that 
ghts for life but 
The courts should 
care when making 
2. an ex-wife's earning capacity and the desireability of both 
parties to a divorce becoming self-sufficient. To encourage 
divorcing women to become self-sufficient courts could- consider 
awarding maintenance for limited terms. 
3. clean breaks wherever possible, although some concern was 
expressed that maintenance should not be merely substituted by 
Supplementary Benefit. The liable relative rule for 
Supplementary Benefit claims- would anyway undermine attempts to 
bring 'clean breaks' by substituting state support as ex- 
husbands would be required to pay maintenance if they had no 
other obligations (see Hulley v Thompson (1981)). The 
Commission suggested courts should not be allowed to dismiss 
maintenance obligations without the woman's agreement (see 
Dipper v Dipper (1980)). 
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Rather vague recomendations were made by the Commission on the 
relevance of conduct to maintenance awards. Conduct should only be 
relevant' in exceptional cases otherwise a renewed emphasis may 
detract from the conciliatory goals to be achieved by the law. 
Whilst conduct should be taken into account in these cases only the 
courts, through case law and examination of the facts of each case, 
could decide which situations were exceptional enough for it to be 
considered. 
Chapter 2 showed how reference to conduct in maintenance proceedings 
always involved the wife's conduct. The husband's violent behaviour 
was only very rarely used to increase a wife's maintenance, and only 
then if it lead to injuries affecting her ability to maintain herself. 
Some lawyers urged a return to the 'old' system of maintenance as 
something which had to be earned through -an ex-wife's chastity and 
good behaviour 
the old law ( .... ) was in accord with human nature. ' It 
acknowledged that there were some guilty wives, and that their 
husbands would not wish, and society should not expect them, to 
maintain them. The 1969 law, as it is applied, says that there 
are so few guilty wives that they are not worth the effort of 
seeking out (.... ) and that whether they like it or not their 
husbands must support them. It therefore appears that in 1969 
the English law repealed a law of human nature. 
It is difficult to think why the law should override both 
human nature and logic by requiring an ex-husband to subsidise 
his former wife's housekeeping when she is either tantamount to 
married to another, or enjoying herself with a succession of 
other men. 
(Green, 1983, pp. 137 & 139) 
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The Law Commission's report on the Financial Consequences of Divorce 
formed the basis of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act which 
received Royal Assent July 12 1984. The amendments made to the 
bill in Parliament were minor. The Act repealed S25 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to remove the principle which required 
the court to place each party on divorce in as close a financial 
position as existed during the marriage. Section 25 had been much 
criticised for its impossible demands and the unjust consequences of 
either reducing some men's incomes to below subsistence level or 
imprisoning them in the event of default (see Hayes, 1983). The Act 
was intended to give priority to children's interests on divorce and 
to encourage the courts to make 'clean break' awards whenever 
possible. But, clean break settlements were a contradiction to 
settlements devised to best serve the children's interests because 
the welfare of the children would necessarily be based upon the 
welfare and level of income support for their carer, i. e. mother (see 
Hughes, 1984; Land, 1984; Symes, 1985). The Act was criticised by a 
number of academics and lawyers familiar with this area of the law 
for being poorly planned and based upon emotive arguments rather 
than hard facts (see' Levin, 1984; Symes, 1985; Smart, 1984. ). The 
proposals failed to distinguish between the different needs on 
divorce of childless marriages, long lasting marriages and those with 
dependent children (Eekelaar & MacClean, 1984; Weitzman, 1986). 
Clean breaks would not improve women's positions post divorce, merely 
remove men's financial liabilities to ex-wives and children whilst 
preserving, if not improving, their other rights to access, custody 
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and continued control. The government of the day might have been 
more effective in securing ex-wives financial independence if the 
emphasis had been shifted from encouraging divorced women to work to 
giving them the opportunity to do so. 
Conduct could now be taken into account when making financial 
provisions unless it would be 'inequitable to disregard it'. Fears 
were expressed during the bill's debating phase that this would be in 
opposition to the conciliatory trend, cause additional bitterness and 
work to the detriment of women (see Hughes, 1984). The issue of 
behaviour is more commonly raised in marriages with dependent 
children (see previous discussion). The only case to date to 
discuss the issue of conduct however evaded the question of the 
changes brought in by the new legislation (Kyte v Kyte, 1987). 
Conciliatory Trends. 
The clean break philosophy applied to maintenance reforms in the 
1980s fitted in with a whole range of reforms designed to smooth 
over the legal approach to marital difficulties in general - family 
courts, conciliation services, specially trained family lawyers, joint 
custody arrangements, rehabilitative maintenance (see Booth Committee 
(1985); Family Law Sub-Committee (1979); Finer Committee (1974); 
Interdepartmental Committee On Conciliation (1983); Law Commission 
(1981); Solicitors Family Law Association (1983). ). In contrast to 
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expectations, it was feared that the trend away from Church based 
conceptions of guilt and innocence in matrimonial law since 1969 had 
brought-more bitterness (see Wilkins, 1984). In 1983 the Booth 
Committee highlighted the problems in matrimonial procedure as being: 
bitterness between the parties, confusion, delays and difficulties in 
reaching conclusions and inordinate costs. 
Due to the collusion bar to divorce, conciliation was an impossibility 
until 1971. From this time onwards some conciliatory imput was 
taking place through the growing involvement of welfare officers. 
In 1970 there were welfare enquiries in 1 out _. of every six 
divorces 
concerning children. By 1977 this had grown to 1 out of every 5 
(Wilkinson, 1981). 
The 1980s conciliatory movement was sold with an almost irresistable 
bundle of 'new' features including: 
a. a priority for children's interests and needs on relationship 
breakdown; 
b. working with the help of a skilled yet impartial arbitrator towards 
a sensible consensus of the parties as to the practical consequences 
of the separation/divorce; 
c. "a shift 
from the adverserial approach towards an inquisatorial 
system with its assumed benefit of conflict diffusion; 
d. better information on practical matters especially through the 
increased use of welfare officers to adequately assess children's 
needs; 
Page 237 
Reforms In The 1980s/4. 
e. a family court system which would be more informal and abolish 
the duplicity and double standard provisions inherent in the old 
court system; 
f. specially trained judges, court staff and conciliators cognisant 
with the financial difficulties of low income families; 
(See Eekelaar (1978); Family Law Sub-Committee (1979); 
Interdepartmental Committee On Conciliation Services (1983); Wilkinson 
(1981)). One of the most attractive features for the government of 
the day was the potential to use conciliation schemes as a cost 
cutting measure. The Royal Commission On Legal Services had pointed 
out the high cost of family and matrimonial cases to the Legal Aid 
Fund. Between 1975-6, matrimonial and family matters accounted for 
87% of the legal aid bill. Between 1977-8, following the abolition 
-of legal aid for undefended divorces, matrimonial sind family cases 
accounted for 74% of the bill (Royal Commission On Legal Services, 
1979). 
At the base of most claims for reform on the conciliatory line was 
the appeal to safeguard children's interests but how this should best 
be done and who was to be responsible for defining and protecting 
the interests 'was seldom clarified (Eekelaar, 1983). A DHSS 
commissioned research study into the helping agencies response to 
domestic violence cases in the 1980s found that the adverserial ethos 
ascribed to solicitors or court officials was rather over-rated. 
Borkowski, Murch and Walker found that 'gladiatorial' solicitors were 
not the majority and in fact solicitors tended instead to describe 
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their approaches as being either 'neutral' or 'partisan'. Most saw 
their roles as involving the provision of practical support, 
counselling, welfare advice as well as more strictly 'legal' duties 
towards their clients (Borkowski, Murch & Walker, 1983). 
The conciliatory arguments in the 1980s frequently used the law 
relating to domestic violence against women as an example of one 
area requiring the (assumed) conflict diffusing tactics of the 
service. Strategies devised to protect women from the injustice 
resulting from men's violence in the home were in the conciliatory 
debates transformed invariably into an injustice against the culprits 
due to the presumed 'overshoot' effects of the legislation. 
Solicitors had become suspicious that injunctions and other 
'protective' remedies were being abused and used for tactical reasons 
(see Borkowski, Murch & Walker, 1983). 
after several years of marriage, virtually any spouse can 
assemble a list of events which, taken out of context, can be 
presented as unreasonable behaviour sufficient on which to 
found a divorce petition (.... ) Because two years is so long to 
have to wait before starting proceedings, it is common to resort 
to the exaggeration of commonplace behaviour, in reality perhaps 
no more than inconsiderate - into unreasonable behaviour, or to 
adultery, committed or admitted, as the pretext on which to base 
a petition which can be filed promptly. 
(Family Law Sub-Committee, 1979, Para. 50. ) 
Although judges avidly demand details, they usually turn out to 
be as trivial as forgetting birthdays or anniversaries of the 
wedding itself. A man can also be accused of sins of omission 
by failing to tell her that he may be late home or something of 
that sort. Unreasonable behaviour can also include threatening 
her with violence. If he does happen to thump her, then it is 
a police matter and she will' probably use it in her divorce 
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petition, regardless of whether she struck him first or verbally 
provoked him. 
(Alimony Survival Guide (1984) p. 33. ) 
We are concerned by the fact that details of alleged behaviour 
set out in the petition (.... ) can at the outset of proceedings 
inflame tempers and enhance bitterness to the extent that 
prospects of conciliation and agreement can be severely 
threatened. We think this is a serious problem. There is 
still a tendency for draftsmen to plead particulars as to 
behaviour stretching over many years. For the most part this 
is unnecessary and can do irreperable harm. 
(Booth Committee (1985) p. 16. ) 
There is no effective sanction against an applicant who seeks 
(an ouster injunction) without proper cause. It is sometimes 
the case that ouster orders are sought in order to give one 
party an apparent tactical advantage over the other in securing 
the occupation of the matrimonial home for an indefinite period. 
(Booth Committee (1985) pp. 38-39. ) 
The exercise of the jurisdiction to oust from the matrimonial 
home before-divorce and the powers of S24 (Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1973) may lead one to conclude that on the breakdown of 
marriage the husband's property becomes the wife's for life, 
just as her's used to become his on marriage. 
(Deech, 1984, p. 257-8. ) 
A divorce on the ground of unreasonable behaviour could involve 
'fabricated' evidence of acts which, objectively speaking, appeared non 
too grave in nature. However, there is no way of telling from the 
technical requirements what behaviour actually occured in the 
relationship. Borkowski, Murch & Walker (1983) found 70 out of 96 
women citing unreasonable behaviour in their petitions had 
experienced 'serious' violence from their husbands. In Part II the 
differences between women's experiences and legal descriptions- in 
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petitions will be discussed further. Erin Pizzey and the -legal 
academic Susan Maidment jumped on to the conciliatory bandwaggon by 
arguing that not only the criminal law but legal intervention per se 
in cases of domestic violence against women was inappropriate (see 
Maidment, 1982; Pizzey & Shapiro, 1982). 
The Booth Committee recommended conciliatory intervention as a means 
of difusing the conflict in matrimonial applications and preventing 
the type of injustices highlighted by the Richards case. 
Conciliation involves a structured scheme for promoting settlements 
between parties and: 
assisting the parties to deal with the consequences of the 
established breakdown of their marriage, whether resulting in 
-divorce or separation, by reaching agreements or giving consents 
or reducing the area of conflict upon custody, support, access 
to and education of the children, financial provision, the 
disposition of the matrimonial home, lawyers fees, and every 
other matter arising from the breakdown which calls for a 
decision on future arrangements. 
(Interdepartmental Committee on Conciliation Services, 1983, p. 2. ) 
By -1984 there were 50 different conciliation schemes working in 
England and Wales (see Wilkins, 1984). One problem with the 
conciliatory approach is that achieving a mutual consensus between a 
violent man and a woman living in fear of his violence is a virtual 
impossibility (Bottomley, 1984). The individualistic problem solving 
approach could increase the tendency of professionals to blame the 
victim and add to women's feelings of guilt. The schemes also offer 
violent men additional scope for abusing the law in order to harass 
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women, especially with allegations about the children's welfare (see 
Part II). The impracticality of conciliation for violent 
relationships was highlighted by research by Davis and Bader based 
upon interviews with 271 consumers of the Bristol and Newport 
schemes. The researchers found 52% of consumers complained of the 
stress caused by having to share the waiting area prior to 
appointment with their spouse. Conciliation became synonymous with 
delay. The courts in the two areas were very reluctant to try 
cases until a conciliation agreement had been achieved. In a number 
of cases, the applicants complained that they felt pressurised into 
agreements especially by welfare officers. Many of these agreements 
then did not survive - in one case the 'agreement' lasted for just 
one access visit. Those that worked did so either because the 
'agreement' merely endorsed the status quo or because one parent had 
been successfully coerced into-compliance (Davis & Bader, 1985). 
Freeman (1979) has pointed out the problems experienced by women 
victims- of domestic violence in the ultimate conciliatory goal of 
family courts elsewhere especially in the USA. The welfare and 
family saving ethos leads to the all too frequent conclusion of 
conciliators that either the husband or his environment can be 
'treated' so that he can be returned to his family. 'cured' and 'safe' 
(Freeman (1979) p. 193). 
Domestic Violence Against Women As A Crime. 
In the 1980s feminist theory had established links between the 
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campaign issues concerning domestic violence against women and rape 
and the whole spectrum of women's experiences of sexual violence 
from pornography to womanslaughter (Dworkin, 1981; Edwards, 1987; 
Kelly, 1987; MacKinnon, 1982; Rhodes & McNeill, 1985; Stanko, 1985. ). 
Rather than pressing for more legislation efforts were increasingly 
concentrated upon the implementation and enforcement of the law, 
especially by regulating the discretion of individuals in the police, 
courts or social services (by better training schemes, complaints and 
review procedures, etc). Calls have recently been made to shift 
attention on to ways of improving women's safety without increasing 
state control of women's lives <Stanko, 1985). 
The criminal law saw some further 'equalising' initiatives in the 
decade 1977-1987. The Home Office Review of Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme 'Report Of The Interdepartmental Working Party' 
(1978) looked at the exclusion of family members from the 
compensation scheme. They found the traditional justifications for 
excluding family members (problems of proof, the need to prevent 
fraudulent claims and the fear of floods of applicants or offenders 
benefiting) were unfounded and recommended reforms. In 1979 the 
scheme was extended to include victims of domestic violence. Of the 
53 family assault cases brought to the Board's attention in the year 
ending March 1981,8 were brought by men, 42 by women and 3 by 
children. Eighteen got awards totalling £21,653. Seven cases were 
withdrawn or abandoned and 28 were rejected for one or more of the 
following reasons : probably not eligible (1); delay in reporting (7); 
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applicant's conduct, character or way of life extinguished claim (4); 
offender not prosecuted (12); injury worth less than £500 
compensation (17); offender and victim still living in same household 
(5) (Freeman, 1982). The seventh report of the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Scheme Board holds details of four cases, two of which 
were refused outright. One concerned a married woman aged 20 
whose husband had been imprisoned for 18 months for an assault 
causing her grevious bodily harm. She had her claim rejected by 
the Board on the ground that her behaviour at the time of the 
incident negated her right to complain. The couple were said to be 
part of a group involved in promiscuous sexual activities such as 
wife swapping and photography sessions of group sex. The Board 
held that as the wife was an 'active' particpant in this she could not 
complain if it got out of hand. She had been attacked by her 
husband because she refused to imitate lesbain sex with another 
woman before an audience, of two men. Her injuries included 
lacerations to the forehead and skull, bruising of the neck, head and 
right hip (Freeman, 1982). 
As successful prosecutions under the criminal law for cases of 
domestic violence are relatively infrequent it would follow that the 
same would apply to these cases before the Board, where prosecution 
is generally required in the absence of a good explanation. The 
existence of the scheme is not widely known and the injuries required 
in order to qualify need to be severe. From the £500 and upwards 
of compensation the Board will also deduct social security and 
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insurance payments received as a result of the injury plus 
compensation gained from the criminal courts (Wasik, 1983). 
Although prosecution for criminal assault cases of domestic violence 
may. encourage the police to treat this as a crime on the same level 
of severity with 'stranger'. attacks, equality in criminal prosecutions 
alone would not give victims sufficient protection. Domestic 
violence in many respects is more dangerous than a stranger attack 
as the offender has extensive knowledge of his victim and thus has 
an advantage in being able to pursue all manner of harassments or 
retributions to-deter her prosecution of him or to satisfy his desire 
for revenge. 'Strangers' are less likely to widen violent campaigns 
to include threats to a victim's family, friends, neighbours, etc. 
Domestic violence cases would need some form of special treatment in 
addition to criminal law remedies. This problem was noted in the 
case of Szczepanski v Szczepanski in 1985. The husband breached a 
non-molestation order by seriously assaulting Mrs Szczepanski with a 
sledge hammer. The police charged him with criminal assault. At 
the proceedings for contempt for breach of the injunction, Mr 
Szczepanski was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment. Hoping to get 
released on bail, he appealled against the committal for contempt on 
the ground that the injunction case should have been adjourned until 
the criminal proceedings were complete. Stephen Brown LI argued 
that the County Court judge was right to hear the case for contempt 
as the Court clearly had to enforce its powers quickly to prevent 
further violent behaviour. 
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The Criminal Law Revision Committee criticised the Offences Against 
The Persons Act 1861 for being too messy and in need of 
consolidation (Criminal Law Revision Committee (1980); see also Griew 
(1983). ). The Committee recommended the abolition of one of the 
very first provisions for battered women, i. e. the provisions 
concerning aggravated assaults. By 1980, a separate category for 
aggravated assaults on women and male children was seen to be 
unnecessary and outmoded. In their 15th Report on Sexual Offences 
the Committee also made recommendations covering marital rape 
(Criminal Law Revision Committee, 1983). They held to past 
precedent by noting the confusions caused over the matter of consent 
by the case of DPP v-Morgan (1976), yet argued that press reporting 
of rape cases gave an unrealistic picture of the actual state of the 
law. The report unashamedly reaffirmed many of the myths of rape - 
particularly the belief that women cry rape to save their honour- 
and concluded that it was just not possible to define 'consent'. 
Recent cases before the courts showed the persistence of illogical 
conclusions about the nature of women's consent. In the case of R v" 
Pigg (1982) the jury had had trouble deciding the matter of consent. 
As Pigg had ambushed and raped two teenage girls telling them he was 
the 'Yorkshire Ripper', it is astonishing that consent had become a 
contentious issue. The Court of Appeal later held that a man is 
reckless to a woman's consent if he gives no thought to her lack of 
consent in circumstances where it would have been obvious she did 
not consent, or he was aware of the possibility of her lack of 
consent but persisted regardless. So, despite the criticisms of the 
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Morgan case and further legislation, rapists could still be found not 
guilty if they believed the victim was consenting. Rights of Women 
had urged the Committee to consider amending the law on rape so that 
emphasis was placed upon sexual intercourse which was against a 
woman's will. The Committee rejected this idea outright arguing 
that this approach would not cover cases where women had no will 
because they were insensible due to being drugged or drunk ! 
The majority of the Criminal Law Revision Committee felt, not 
surprisingly given their views on consent, that rape in marriage 
should not become a new crime. Rape of a wife was held not to be 
as serious as rape by a stranger because wives had had sex with 
their husbands many times before anyway. The Committee also felt 
that as many battered women did not want to leave their violent 
husbands the prosecution of marital rape cases would undermine the 
stability of their marriages. It was feared battered women might be 
pressurised into bringing a prosecution which they would later 
regret. If they succeeded in prosecution, rape as an offence could 
be trivialised so that the public might come to see even 'stranger' 
rapes as not serious. The main reason however for not making rape 
in marriage- a crime was that women might use it as another 
'bargaining counter' in divorce proceedings (Criminal Law Revision 
Committee, 1983). Chapter 3 showed how cases such as Rv Clarke 
(1949); Rv O'Brien (1974) and Rv Steele (1976) established that 
husbands could not be found guilty of rape unless the wife was 
living apart from him and had some legal proof of separation in the 
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form of a decree nisi for divorce or non-molestation order. Her 
physical separation was not enough proof that she had revoked her 
consent to sexual intercourse even if she had petitioned for a 
divorce (R v Miller (1954)). The only concession the Criminal Law 
Revision Committee made on the matter of rape in marriage was to 
recommend a husband be charged for rape in cases where cohabitation 
had ceased. 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee clung steadfast to the belief 
that the criminal law should keep out of marriage. In contrast, the 
provisions in the Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 sought to 
abandon centuries of conflict over whether or not wives should be 
compelled to give evidence against their husbands in cases of 
criminal assault. Under the Act wives were to become compellable 
witnesses for the prosecution in cases of assault on them, or sexual 
or physical assault on a person under 16 years old. The new 
provision however had little impact on the number of prosecutions 
brought by wives against husbands. Even with prosecution powers 
passing from the police to the Crown Prosecution service (under the 
1985 Prosecution of Offences Act) police discretion whether or not to 
instigate the prosecution of offences was unhindered. 
In some cases before the courts women who defended themselves 
against men's violent attacks were given relatively 'lenient' verdicts 
on the grounds of dimished responsibility, provocation or justified 
self-defence. In March 1984, seventeen year old Debbie Bird hit her 
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ex-boyfriend Darren Marder in the eye in response to his slapping her 
in the face and pressing her up against a wall. Mr Marder 
unfortunately lost his eye as a result of Debbie. Bird's action 
although she claimed that she was only trying to defend herself and 
did not think at the time about the glass in her hand. She was 
found guilty of unlawful wounding and sentenced to nine months youth 
custody. On appeal her conviction was quashed the court arguing 
that, although it was desireable for a victim to show an 
unwillingness to fight before using violence in self-defence, this was 
not always necessary. In September 1982 a woman was put on 
probation for two years for shooting her violent husband (Guardian, 9 
May 1985). In November 1983, Mrs Celia Ripley (after serving six 
months in prison) was given a suspended prison sentence of 18 months 
for shooting her husband after years of violent abuse from him 
(Guardian,, 1 Nov. 1983). In September 1984,16 year old Louise 
Legeman was found not guilty of the murder of her father. She had 
hit him with a baseball bat after he had attacked her mother with 
scissors and knives (Guardian 11 Sept. 1984). In 1985 Iqbal Begum 
was freed after serving four years imprisonment following a campaign 
to get her sentence of life imprisonment for murder reduced. Iqbal 
had killed her violent husband after he made threats to assault her 
three children (Guardian, 9 May 1985). In July 1986, Gillian Rendell 
was acquitted of the murder of a husband who had regularly beaten 
her up and called her a slave (The Times, 4 July 1986). 
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The 'lenient' sentencing of women who have killed violent husbands 
may be another result of the 'equalising' trend of reforms in the law, 
giving women who kill a greater chance to plead diminished 
responsibility, (see debates on premenstrual tension and diminished 
responsibility e. g. Allen (1983)). The following list of recent cases 
traced from the national press indicate that although some women 
might be treated 'leniently' for defending themselves after years of 
abuse, husbands' killings of wives for 'misdemeanours' are ranked on a 
similar level of severity for sentencing purposes: 
George Close proved his case of diminished responsibility was caused 
by his wife taunting him about his sexual prowess. 
(Guardian, 24 October 1983). 
Stanley Dingley claimed his diminished responsibility was caused by 
a row which developed because his girlfriend turned off the football 
match on the TV. 
(Guardian, 5 November 1983). 
Michael Telling shot his wife three times and chopped off her head 
but had acted under a diminished responsibility because she had 
affairs with other men and women. 
(Guardian, 22 June 1984). 
Peter Hogg was provoked into the manslaughter of his wife and 
sentenced to four years imprisonment. Mrs Hogg's provocation was 
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having an affair, being 'domineering', 'emotional' and prone to 
'tantrums'. Hogg was released from prison the following year. 
(Surrey Advertiser, 8 March 1985). 
Nicholas Boyce strangled his wife, cut her body into 100 pieces and 
scattered these in different parts of London. He was sentenced to 
six years imprisonment for her manslaughter executed under a 
diminished responsibility and provoked by his wife's nagging. 
Boyce'shome contained a text on criminal law with sections relating 
to defences against murder underlined. 
(Guardian, 10 October 1935). 
Charles Wilson stabbed his wife to death because she teased him 
thereby causing his diminished responsibility. Due to his advanced 
age of 73 years, Wilson was placed under a3 year probation order. 
(The Times, 31 October 1985). 
Albert Bowie claimed diminished responsibility resulting from his 
wife's taunting over his sexaul prowess which caused him to strangle 
her with an electric flex. 
(The Times, 31 October 1985). 
William Wilson claimed he had been provoked by his alchoholic wife 
into killing her by hitting her on the head with a hammer and 
smothering her with a pillow. At age 70 years he was felt to be 
too old to go to prison and received a probation order of 2 years 
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for her manslaughter. 
(Daily Telegraph, 25 January 1986). 
Colin Kemp was acquitted for the murder of his wife having convinced 
the jury that he strangled her during a nightmare. 
(The Times, 3 May 1986). 
In view of the court approach in recent cases of woman killing (see 
also Radford, 1982; Radford, 1984; Edwards; 1987) there is little 
evidence to suggest that the treatment of women offenders represents 
a new drive to irradicate gender bias. 
When their own physical abuse in the marriage is proven over a 
long period of years, women may receive comparatively lenient 
sentences. But it does seem that women must experience 
extremes in degredation, violence and humiliation before they 
may be protected or defended. (.... ) Whilst the court on 
occasion may show some sympathy towards the actions of a 
battered wife, it is unlikely that women will be able to bring 
successful cases of provocation where men are adulterous. 
(S. Edwards, 1987, pp. 166-167. ) 
Published statistics show that spouse killing had declined in 
proportion to other types of homicides by the end of the decade 
1976-1986, as did all family killings. Spouse killings accounted for 
29% (143) homicides in 1976,27% (103) in 1977,27% (134) in 1978, 
29% (156) in 1979; 23% (128) in 1980,29% (144) in 1981,26% (144) 
in 1982,25% (123) in 1983,24% (127) in 1984,25% (126) in 1985,26% 
(158) in 1986 (Criminal Statistics, 1976,1977,1978,1979,1980, 
1981,1982,1983,1984,1985,1986). Killings between friends 
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increased from 18% in 1976 to 27% in 1936 and 'stranger' killings 
increased from 18% in 1976 to 23%, in 1986. Spouse killings- 
therefore declined proportionately after the introduction of the 
domestic violence legislation and the creation of the refuge movement 
although the numbers of actual homicides increased, 17 more spouses 
killed in 1986 than were killed in 1976. As the rate of increase in 
proportional terms and in the actual numbers of spouses killed slowed 
down in comparison to the previous period discussed between 1969- 
1976 (see Chapter Three), it is probable that socio-legal policy 
reforms in response to the needs of women victims of domestic 
violence had some impact. without the reforms, the rate of spousal 
homicides could have been higher. The figures for 1977 show a 
proportional and real drop in spousal homicides. Compared with the 
1976 level, 40 less spouses were killed in 1977. " Only further 
research -could show whether this drop in domestic homicides was the 
result of new policy measures, or greater awareness of the law 
enforcers and caring professions contacted by battered women 
resulting from the publicity attached to the problem at the-time. 
Although by 1986 spouse killings again formed the largest category 
of homicide offences, stranger killings had become a very close 
second. In 1980 in fact, stranger killings amounted to 29% of all 
homicides compared with 23% which were spouse killings that year. 
(The increase in homicides in 1982 was caused by new counting rules 
so that the figures for 1981 and 1982 are not directly comparable). 
Whether or not however the increase in 'stranger' killings represents 
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an increased risk for women's victimisation is another matter. 
Home Office statistics do not break separate categories down on the 
basis of sex, age and relationship. Some of the increase in 
stranger killings resulted from the crimes of just two offenders 
between the years 1975-1983. From 1975-1981, Peter Sutcliffe 
admitted to having murdered 13 women. From 1978-1983, Dennis 
Nilson was found to have strangled and dismembered at least '16 young 
men. Some of the increased 'stranger' killings could have been the 
result of increased gang fights between men, increased racist 
violence, increased abductions and assaults upon children. Some of 
these would have affected women's victimisation but they would not 
necessarily increase the proportional rates. 
In 1983 the results of first National Crime Survey were published by 
the Mme Office (Hough & Mayhew, 1983) showing very low incidences 
of domestic violence and sexual assault. Domestic violence against 
women accounted for just 10% of the assaults recorded (Hough & 
Mayhew, 1983). In a workshop in London devised to assist 
researchers interested in using data from the survey, the Home Office 
team admitted the huge under-estimation of these crimes of violence 
against women likely to result from the methodology and the 
weighting system used for computerising the results . (six or more 
assaults to one person were all counted as six) (see Hough, 1983). 
But, the results of the first survey gave cause for concern in the 
low reporting rate of violent crimes. Only 39% of woundings and 
28% of sexual assaults were reported to the police. The next 
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National Survey found only 60% of woundings and 31% of assaults were 
reported (Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 1986). Maxfield's work 
on the Crime Survey data found women especially reporting a great 
deal of fear about their safety from violent assaults (Maxfield, 
1984). The Home Office began to look into the problem of women's 
fears of violence 'on the streets'. Community studies in Leeds by 
Hanrner 3i Saunders (1934) and in Wandsworth by Radford (1987) found 
a high incidence of direct experience of violent assaults formed the 
basis of women's fears. From her research on cases of domestic 
violence against women handled by two London police stations in 1985, 
Susan Edwards estimated that the Metropolitan police received about 
60,000 calls per year from battered women yet only 2% reached the 
courts and just 0.2% resulted in a custodial or suspended sentence 
(Edwards, 1986). A number of events in the 1980s - race riots, 
experiments in 'community policing', Home Office embarrassment over 
West Yorkshire police's bumbling approach to the arrest of Peter 
Sutcliffe, TV exposure of Thames Valley police's 'sensitive' approach 
to rape cases, etc. - made violence against women a 'policing issue'. 
Local campaigns over police involvement in domestic violence, rape 
and child sexual assault cases together with the local involvement of 
interested individuals on police consultation committees have brought 
experimentation with new approaches to cases of violence against 
women. Some forces, e. g. Manchester, set up 'rape suites', special 
interview and examination rooms for victims of rape. West Yorkshire 
police created a special unit staffed by women constables to deal 
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with cases of violence against women (they did not however include 
domestic violence against women in their sphere of responsibility but 
continued to define crimes of violence against women as 'stranger 
attacks'). The London Metropolitan force set up two working parties 
to look at rape and domestic violence in 1985 and 1986 respectively. 
Mr Chris Smith, M. P. for Islington South and Finsbury leaked details 
of the Metropolitan police's confidential report on their dealings 
with cases of domestic violence against women in November 1986. 
This revealed that many police officers felt that domestic violence 
should not be part of their work at all. The Metropolitan force 
were failing to deal with about 10,000 cases of domestic violence 
against-women per year (The Times, 1986). 
In 1987 the Home Office published a booklet entitled 'VioTlent Crime 
Police Advice For Women On ! low To Reduce 
_The Risks' (Home Office, 
1987). Along with the usual advice that women protect themselves 
from stranger attacks by parking in well lit areas etc. this booklet 
included, on the' very last page, advice for women assaulted by their 
partners. Many individuals, members of organisations, community 
groups and members of the 'caring' professions are working on 
improving links with the police. These initiatives in the criminal 
law are still very much in their infancies so no conclusions can yet 
be made as to their impact upon the legal approach to cases of 
domestic violence against' women. 
The last of the five aims of the Women's Aid Federation England is: 
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to educate and inform the public, ther media, the police, the 
courts, social services, and other authorities with respect to 
the battering of women, mindful of the fact that this is the 
result of the general position of women in our society. 
(National Women's Aid Federation, 1977. ) 
It is now 135 years since the Act For The Better Prevention And 
Punishment Of Aggravated Assaults Upon Women And Children. In the 
past 135 years women have gained the right to divorce, separate and 
actually leave violent men and in certain cases, to take their 
children with them. Women's contributions to childcare, although 
undervalued, are formally recognised in law when courts make 
decisions over the division of matrimonial assets. Domestic violence 
against women is now recognised as a specific category of need for 
emergency and permanent housing provision. Only an historical study 
of individual women's lives could show whether or not women's 
experiences of domestic violence have decreased and their welfare as 
a result improved over the past 130, years. Prpsecutions for 
aggravated assaults on women and children fell from 800 cases at 
just one London police court in 1853 . to 200 in 1889 (Tomes, 1977) to 
1,310 for the whole of, England & Wales in 1900, to 512 in 1920-and 
just 25 by 1967 (see Chapters 2: & 3). A similar pattern of decline 
is shown for common assaults from 48,149 in England and Wales in 
1900 to 32,589 in 1920, to 10,626 in 1962 and 3,551 in 1979 (see 
Chapters 2,3 & 4). The decline in prosecution for assault cases 
has been accompanied by an increased tendency of women use to family 
law provisions for cases of unreasonable behaviour and violence by a 
partner. 
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The shift in consumer use of the legal provisions could lead one to 
conclude that 135 years of domestic violence legislation has not 
erradicated the problem but merely mitigated the worst effects by 
giving women victims some alternatives before a habit of assaults 
deteriorates so that life is threatened. Husbands violently dragging 
their wives from public places and beating them in the streets is a 
less frequent observation than it was 150 years ago, although many 
will still pass by without flinching when an adult violently assaults 
a child. When husband and wife were 'one person', the state did not 
interfere into a man's right to govern and discipline his 'private' 
kingdom of the family. Domestic violence against women could be 
publicly witnessed as a husband's 'moderate' correction. The recent 
cases of wife killing however show that men who strike out in order 
to discipline 'nagging', 'adulterous' or 'provocative' wives can still 
have. --their acts excused as 'understandable' or 
'justified'. Women 
who go to refuges today show the same wounds and have borne similar 
cruelties to their battered sisters of 135 years ago. The history 
of legal changes only partially answers the- question as to whether 
domestic violence. against women has declined or merely been made 
less criminal and increasingly hidden from 'public' view. 
Part II will look at the treatment of women's needs in contemporary 
legal discourse and the relevance of this to the ideological practice 
of violence against women in the present day. 
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PART II. 
The Representation Of Women Victims' 
Needs In Socia-Legal Discourse. 
THE COMPLETE STATESMAN. 
Our grandmothers were noted for their comprehensive receipt 
books on all subjects pertaining to Household Economy. In 
these days when old fashions have come into force again, and 
when Parliament is so frequently occupied with domestic matters, 
we would suggest that "The Complete Statesman, " or a list of 
receipts for the use of both Houses would prove an invaluable 
manual for the use of inexperienced M. P. s, and budding 
legislators. We have only space to offer them two receipts 
taken from the above work. 
1. RECEIPT FOR A GOOD ANTI-WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE SPEECH. 
Take a profound insight into the intentions of Providence with 
regard to the sex, a great admiration for the British 
Constitution, and ditto for the domestic hearth. Add some 
vaticinations, mis-quotations and compliments to your own female 
relations. Throw in a sneer about petitions, if they happen to 
be against your views. A few personalities will also much 
improve the taste. Mix all together well, so that your 
antagonists don't exactly know where they are, and garnish with 
a little coarse pleasantry about the motives of the ladies who 
are foremost in the work. 
The above must be served hot in debate, as when cold in 
next morning's newspapers it is rather insipid. 
2. A GOOD SPEECH TO THROW OUT A MARRIED-WOMAN'S- 
PROPERTY-AMENDMENT BILL. 
Take a tall cousin and set him in the midst for general 
consideration. Then have ready warm respect for the condition 
of marriage, in which two become one, and that one the husband. 
Take feminine incapacity for business, welfare of children, and 
responsibilities and liabilities of husbands; and arrange these 
at intervals, keeping the tall cousin well in view. Add texts 
according to taste. Serve up, to give it a relish, with some 
Joe Millerisms about the quarrels of married couples. 
The above will suit the taste of either House. 
(Englishwoman's Review, 1878, June 15. ). 
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CHAPTER FIVE., 
Language, Legal Discourse And Domestic Violence 
Against Women - Methodology. 
Crime is not something which is inherent or inevitable. "- Crime is 
quite simply that which is designated by the state to be illegal. 
In 1876, Susan Anthony was arrested and fined for voting. A 
twentieth century psychiatrist has since diagnosed her . as a 
masculine, sexually maladjusted woman (Jones, 1980). To the 
crimonologists, that would explain why she became a criminal but it 
would not explain why voting for women was an offence. Whether we 
become prisoners or guards, victims or killers, lies at least as much 
in society as. in ourselves. 
Part II concerns the socio-legal adjudication of acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour in marriage type relationships and the 
relevance of this to women's oppression. The law has been chosen as 
an object of -study because of its role alongside the media and 
academic debate in creating and maintaining symbolic and 
representational effects., The way in which the law, media and 
academia differentiates and 'explains' male violence against women is 
the primary interest., In her discussion of racist murder, Susanne 
Kappeler showed how laws can be used to 'explain' such crimes and 
acquit the murderers. It is also possible for courts to penalise 
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torturers whilst simultaneously supporting their crimes. In racist 
regimes, even when the murderers are prosecuted, the representation 
of torture in the courts and press reports perpetuates the crime and 
torturer's pleasure in its execution (Kappeler, 1986). 
By focusing on how the law explains male violence and thereby 
contributes to women's oppression, the researcher was concerned not 
to create a recipe for pessimism from a conclusion based upon an 
over-deterministic vision of law and society. Whilst not denying 
the gross experience of men's violence in many women's everyday 
lives, feminist critics have argued that images of women as powerless 
victims are themselves creations of patriarchy (Jackson & Rushton, 
1982). The denial of women's power is an important element in the 
patriarchal oppression of women. Feminist research can challenge 
the representation of women as victims by showing that there are 
alternatives, that women can and do survive and fight back. 
This research project was naturally not undertaken in isolation from 
the theoretical/ideological influences of contemporary social science. 
Critical legal theory, feminist theory, jurisprudence and the sociology 
of law have all had an impact upon the assumptions made and the 
methods employed. The study's aims supported the more general 
enterprise of critical legal theory. In a paper summarising the 
recent trends in socio-legal studies Fitzpatrick and Hunt defined the 
project of critical legal theory as follows: 
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explor(ing) the manner in which legal doctrine and legal 
education and practices of legal institutions work to buttress 
and support a pervasive system of oppressive, inegalitarian 
relations. Critical theory works to develop radical 
alternatives, and to explore and debate the role of law - in the 
creation of social, economic and political relations that will 
advance human emancipation. 
(Fitzpatrick & Hunt, 1987, p. 2) 
The aims of Part II simply are to: 
a. look at women's self-defined needs for legal intervention in 
situations of domestic violence 
b. examine how these are translated into legal action; 
c. explore the contributions of a. & b. to the contemporary 
socio-legal discourse, on domestic violence against women. 
d. look at alternatives and ways of empowering women in law. 
Language plays a crucial role in legal definition as both the spoken 
or the written word. In statutes, policy directives and legal=texts, 
language defines the-socio-legal relations between men and women. 
With language lawyers, politicians, victims and defendants are able to 
name some relationships 'violent. ' Anthropologists, linguists and 
social scientists have examined the importance of language in the 
law. The socio-linguist O'Barr and his colleagues for instance 
looked at how specific forms of speech had an impact upon the 
perceived credibility and truthfulness of witnesses (O'Barr, 1982). 
Wodak, another socio-linguist, has recently examined how language, and 
what it was said to reveal about the class status of defendants, 
contributed to the outcome of cases in a Viennese courtroom dealing 
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with severe car accidents (Wodak, 1985). Atkinson and Drew applied 
the conversational analysis of ethnomethodological research to study 
the structure and organisation of behaviour in court (Atkinson & 
Drew, 1979). These studies share a common interest in how language 
expresses power relations - between 'experts' and 'laypersons', 
members of the 'law' and the 'public'. This is perhaps a moot point 
to anyone who has ever been to court or seen the language used in 
legal documents and legal texts. As Melinkoff remarked in 1963: 
What better way of preserving a professional monopoly than by 
locking up your trade secrets in the safe of an unknown tongue. 
(D. Melinkoff, The Language Of The Law, 1963, quoted in 
O'Barr, 1982, p. 23). 
The legal profession has safeguarded its position of power through 
the preservation of a precise legal language which is virtually 
unintelligible to lay persons. Legal language is undoubtedly very 
wordy, lacking in clarity, pompous and dull. With reference to the 
long history of conflicts over the language used in law between 
'populist' and 'traditionalist' lawyers from Jeremy Bentham in 1776 
onwards, O'Barr writes: 
Those who argue for the preservation of the non ordinary form 
of legal language are more concerned with how other legal 
professionals will interpret the language of the law than they 
are with whether the public will comprehend it. Much of the 
courtroom dialogue is addressed 'to the record' (i. e. couched 
with the potential of an appeals court in mind). Legal 
documents are prepared according to standard form books - not 
because these are tried and tested for lay comprehension - but 
because they ensure a greater ability to predict how the courts 
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will interpret such-documents. 
(09Barr, 1982, p. 23). 
In formulating theoretical objectives and methodological matters, the 
researcher has drawn heavily from feminist work on language and the 
oppression of women. I am especially indebted to the work of Gill 
Seidel of the University of Bradford (see Seidel, 1980; Seidel, 1985a; 
Seidel, 1985b). The study of socio-legal discourse and domestic 
violence against women was built upon links with the issues raised 
in debates on pornography and the objectification of women as victims 
(see Dworkin, 1981; Kappeler, 1986; Kuhn, 1985). Feminist theorists 
of language, cultural representations and women's oppression have 
argued that the objectification of women means the simultaneous 
subjectification of men (see Dworkin, 1981; Spender, 1980). They 
have constructed a link between the representations of women (as 
victims, whores, playthings for men) and the creation and maintenance 
of male subjectivities based upon their power over women. On my 
reading of the work in existence few feminists rest their case upon 
a belief in men's conspiratorial agreement as to the victimisation of 
women. It is not possible to ignore the fact that as victims women 
may be variously represented as 'willing', 'aggressive', 'deserving' and 
so on as well as 'passive' or 'undeserving'. 
In a useful overview of the law and the secondary assault of women 
victims, Klien noted, (1981) that what is a 'serious' crime depends 
upon the relationship between victim and offender. The socially 
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determined gravity of an assault and the legal response to it would 
vary as to whether it involved a man attacking the Prime Minister, a 
youth 'mugging' a city commuter, a motorist assaulting a policeman, a 
member of the SAS killing a 'terrorist', a stranger' raping an elderly 
woman,, a husband raping his wife, a 'client' raping a prostitute. In 
1978, Russell and Rebecca Dobash argued that wives were 'appropriate' 
victims for domestic violence (Dobash & Dobash, 1978). Feminists 
have recently suggested that men's- violent control of women's 
sexuality is an essential element in women's oppression (Barry, 1979; 
MacKinnon, 1982; MacKinnon, 1983). In 1984, London Rape Crisis 
Centre parodied police advice for-women on how to avoid attacks into 
the following list of directives on how to avoid rape: 
DON'T GO OUT WITHOUT CLOTHES - that encourages some men. 
DON'T GO OUT WITH CLOTHES - any clothes will encourage some 
men. 
DON'T GO OUT ALONE AT NIGHT - that encourages men. 
DON'T GO OUT ALONE AT ANY TIME - any situation encourages some 
men. 
DON'T GO OUT WITH A FEMALE FRIEND - some men are encouraged by 
numbers. 
DON'T GO OUT WITH A MALE FRIEND - some male friends are capable 
of rape. 
DON'T STAY AT HOME - intruders and relatives can both rape. 
AVOID CHILDHOOD - some rapists are 'turned on' by little girls. 
AVOID OLD AGE - some rapists prefer aged women. 
DON'T HAVE A FATHER, GRANDFATHER, UNCLE OR BROTHER - these are 
relatives who most often rape young women. 
DON'T HAVE NEIGHBOURS - these often rape women. 
DON'T MARRY - rape is legal within marriage. 
To be quite sure - DON'T EXIST. 
(London Rape Crisis Centre, 1984). 
Crimes against women can be legitimated just because the victims are 
women (see also Bland, 1984; Hollway, 1981). 
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Assumptions. 
The methods employed in the research were based on the following 
assumptions about the nature of violence against women, language and 
the law: 
Assumption 1: Domestic violence against-women is linked to other 
violent assaults which women experience. Domestic violence, rape, 
sexual assault, sexual harassment, forced prostitution, incest and 
pornography are some of the varied strategies used by men to 
maintain, by force, violence or its threat, control of women's bodies 
and the institution of heterosexuality. 
Assumption 2: Bias towards women's definitions of violence and 
abuse. Research has shown how crimes of violence against women and 
children are largely 'hidden' crimes (Dobash & Dobash, 1980; Hanmer & 
Saunders, 1984; Radford, 1987; Russell, 1982; Rush, 1980). There is a 
mismatch between what the law calls a 'crime' and women's experiences 
of violent assault (Kelly, 1987; Stanko, 1985). The definition of 
rape in law, (already mentioned, in the discussion of the Morgan & 
Pigg cases) provides a clear example. This could be precised as the 
penetration of the penis into an adult female's vagina in disregard 
of her consent. This precised definition does not cover most of the 
cases of rape in marriage, which Russell's research has shown to be 
very prevalent (Russell, 1982). Furthermore for cases outside 
marriage, the assault on the victim remains even if a court decides 
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the offender did not committ rape because he thought she had 
consented. Because definitions of violent crimes are limited women 
can experience assaults which they are unable to categorise as 
'crimes', 'rapes' which are 'like rape' but not 'proper rape' because 
the aggressor is an intimate who forces intercourse. 
Assumption 3: Women as victims are not absent from the law. 
Lord Denning's well known dicta from the 1950s that woman is : "the 
spoilt darling of the law and man the patient packhorse", (quoted in 
Smart, 1984, p. 29) indicates that women are certainly not ignored by 
the law. Since the 19th century there has been a thriving industry 
amongst 'experts' to study and produce books about women. As Part 
I showed, women in law are more often victims than offenders, but 
their victimisation has often been at the forefront of reformist 
debates. 
Assumption 4: The law is not a unified system or corporate body 
through which lawmakers/governments issue commands or directives. 
Functionalist visions of the law steered by a collective spirit or 
unity of wills and conceptualisations of law as a command have been 
rejected as unnecessarily simplistic thus not useful for explanatory 
purposes. The law here is seen simply as a process of definition. 
Assumption 5: The definition of legal problems and their outcomes 
does not take place in a politically asceptic space. Professionals 
in the legal process have institutional sites and their own shared 
Page 267 
Language, Legal Discourse And Domestic Violence Against Women / 5. 
'cultures' producing and maintaining values, concepts and even 
language. Legal institutions` are male dominated, hierarchical realms 
of 'experts'. The government could be defined as a 'supreme 
speaker'. Language is one of the primary arenas in which meanings 
are constructed. In legal discourse some individuals are speakers 
and some are silent. What is left unsaid may be outside the terms 
of reference and made into an irrelevant consideration. It is 
necessary to look at who is silenced in law and how. 
For writers such as Dale Spender (1980) and Robin Lakoff (1975) men's 
use of language to silence women is crucial. Robin Lakoff (1975) 
put forward the idea of a 'women's language' to explain why and how 
women are silenced by men. Her claims that women speak differently 
from men was based on her detection of their higher frequency use 
of: 
1. hedges and bordering statements, using terms such as 'it seems 
like' or 'I guess I might'. 
2. (super) polite forms such as 'if you don't mind', 'I'd really 
appreciate it'. 
3. tag questions such as 'It is alright, isn't it? ', which suggest a 
need for approval. 
4. speaking in italics by using words like 'very' to accentuate or 
underline. 
5. empty adjectives such as 'divine', 'enchanting', 'lovely', etc. 
6. hyper-correct grammar and pronounciation. 
7. lack of sense of humour (by this Lakoff means women miss the 
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point of jokes). 
8. direct quotation rather than paraphrase. 
9. special lexicon such as using 'magenta' to refer to a colour, a 
word supposedly never used by men. 
10. question intonation in declarative contexts, i. e. phrasing answers 
to questions as questions e. g. answering 'About 3 'o'clock ?' to the 
question 'What time are you going out ?' 
Cameron (1985) takes issue with Lakoff's conclusions about sex 
specific differences in language. In reference to tag questions she 
notes that i. women do not use more tag questions than men; ii. even 
if they did, it would not necessarily mean they were seeking approval 
since tag questions have a range of uses. Taken out of context a 
tag question is meaningless. The tag question '(It is alright), isn't 
it ?' could represent the speaker's desire for approval but it might 
also be used by one demanding deference or by somebody trying to 
coerce the listener into expressing agreement; iii. women's use of tag 
questions will always be explained differently from men's, since it is 
cultural sex stereotypes which determine the explanation of 
linguistic phenomena, rather than the nature of phenomena themselves 
(see Cameron, 1985, pp. 28-56). 
Subsequent work has found that both men and women use 'women's 
language' and, in courts, the main factors determining its use are 
class status and previous experience of the courtroom. O'Barr for 
example renamed women's language 'powerless language', women being 
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more prone to its use only because they are most often found in less 
powerful positions in society (O'Barr, 1982). 
Verbal force and the denigration of what women say as less important 
formed the central concern of Dale Spender's book Man Made Language 
(1980). Spender also examined sexual differences in language use by 
observing discussion in mixed groups. Although her methods were 
rather impressionistic, Spender raised some interesting points about 
how men' and women interact in academic discussion. She argued that 
men in academic groups did more talking and more interrupting than 
did women. Broadening her discussion beyond speech differences to 
the realm of socially relevant meanings, Spender claimed that men's 
control of meaning "(historically created and maintained by their 
domination of the institutional sites of knowledge production) means 
that women's experiences (e. g. of matters such as sexual violence) are 
alienated from their expression in language. She concluded that 
women's use of language is limited to either agreeing with men 
(speaking like men and using their meanings) or remaining silent. 
Applying this analysis of language and power to the case of violence 
against women leads to the conclusion that women's experiences as 
victims are either hidden (as women are 'silenced') or represented in 
a way approved by the male monopoly of meaning (representations of 
violence are 'alienated' from women's true experiences). 
Susanne Kappeler's work on pornography puts forward a similar 
conclusion:, 
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as the authors of culture, men assume the voice, compose the 
picture, write the story, for themselves and other men, and 
about women. 
(Kappeler, 1986, p. 57). 
Spender and Kappeler note that women are not 'silent' because they 
are apolitical or lack the impetus to contest meanings. The 
existence of feminist movements are proof that women do encode 
meanings based upon their own experience with which to challenge 
patriarchy, to such a degree that state violence is used to silence 
them (see Morrell, 1981). 
Assumption 6: The process of definition is interactional and 
relational. Men do not have unchallengeable control over 
meanings as these cannot be 'fixed' if created through interaction. 
The emphasis in the following discussion will be upon the relational 
creation of meanings through analogies, discontinuities and 
differences in discourse. Discourse can be defined simply as the 
framework within which explanations are sought. More formally, the 
working definition of discourse used here refers to a linguistic 
unity or group of statements, constituting and delimiting a specific 
area of concern, governed by its own rules of formation with its own 
modes of distinguishing truth from falsity. Part II will look at the 
representation of women's self defined needs from the grass roots 
level in the solicitor's office upwards through the legal hierarchy. 
Legal texts are treated as representations of domestic violence 
against women. News reports, academic and feminist analyses will be 
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similarly examined as statements on the subject of domestic violence 
against women. 
Methods. 
Information was drawn from three 'levels' of interaction, reflecting 
varying degrees of the abstraction of experience, strategy and text. 
Strategic and experiential sources were limited to the information 
which could be obtained on pre-trial and trial procedures. The 
survey devotes more attention to the written rather than spoken 
word because women who attended court said very little so it did not 
seem necessary to try to persuade more to allow observation of their 
cases in solicitors and the court. Originally the intention had been 
to limit the study purely to textual representations. Through the 
Department of Applied Social Studies, access to county court cases 
was requested from the Lord Chancellor's Department. The timing for 
the request was unfortunate in that the Lord Chancellor's Department 
was about to embark upon its own review of civil justice, the Booth 
Committee was at work on related issues and the conciliatory wave 
had amplified sensitivity over the confidentiality of court records. 
Two other researchers at the time had just been refused access to 
court records*. Correspondence passed between the University 
Department and the Lord Chancellor's Department for eight months. A 
number of our letters were totally ignored. When the final decision 
$ Ga. rc1 Gm.. rt .. nrJ May-qmr. t 13c. uthwW11. 
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was given to refuse access no reasons for this were provided and a 
further three letters had to be written before the Department 
admitted any. Access to records had been refused because of: 
unnecessary disruption to court staff (this later seemed an 
unjustified conclusion because when working on statistical records at 
Court A the Court Clerk urged me to take the research further and 
ask the Lord Chancellor for access to their case records! ); the 
research not being in the 'public interest' because it concerned 
domestic violence against women; the research not being in the 
government's interest; the research not being in the Lord Chancellor's 
interest; the methods of research not being sufficiently 'objective' 
i. e. statistical. 
Borkowski, Murch and Walker obtained access to solicitors' records on 
a DHSS funded project (Borkowski, Murch & Walker, 1983). Getting 
access to these for an independent research project is much more 
difficult. The restrictions solicitors had to impose to protect 
client confidentiality made Margaret Southwell's study difficult (see 
Southwell, 1985). Because of their responsibilities to clients, 
direct access to case records for research purposes cannot be offered 
by solicitors themselves. Access can only be obtained by contacting 
clients for their permission or by solicitors themselves drawing out 
information from the cases on the researcher's behalf. For the 
present study, neither option was viable because of the inordinate 
demands that would have been made on solicitors' time. 
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The decision to go directly to women involved in cases was not made 
until after other access routes had been explored. As it turned 
out, this approach gave far more insight into the development of 
cases and the pattern of women's use of the law than could be gained 
from the court survey. 
The primary sources of information for the research in Part II were 
therefore: 
1. interviews with women to discover how they defined their 
needs and experiences of the legal process. 
2. a survey of women's case records obtained with their help 
from their solicitors. 
3. 'back up' interviews with solicitors and advisers. 
4. reported decisions, points of law/principle which may or 
may not affect directly women involved in the case in 
question. 
5. newspaper reports of cases of husband-wife homicide and 
assaults collected between the years 1983-1986. 
6. theoretical discussions of the problem of domestic violence 
against women in academic and feminist publications. 
The Survey On Women's Experiences Of The Legal Process. 
The qualitative nature of this part of the research project cannot be 
overstressed. It involved a survey of 20 women with experience of 
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54 legal cases, supplemented by interviews with 6 legal advisors. 
The relationship of the survey to the rest of the research study and 
the method of 'data' collection and analysis had a profound impact on 
the sample size. So much has been said recently on the topic of 
'objectivity' in social science and the 'safety in numbers' approach to 
sociological surveys (see Bell & Encel, 1979) that there will be no 
attempt to repeat these issues here. Like other critics of orthodox 
methodologies, feminist researchers have challenged the view of 
sociological research as a one way process of 'fact' acquisition and 
criticised the ignorance - of power relations by 
those using 
established survey techniques (see Currie & Kazi, 1987; Graham, 1983; 
Roberts, 1981; Stanley & Wise, 1983). There are problems for 
feminists who use the social survey because of the 19th century 
assumptions which formed the basis of its value as a research 
technique (Graham, 1983). Instead of being impartial or objective 
tools of research, surveys based upon interviews or questionairres 
are always political, and sometimes unethical and exploitative. 
Domestic violence research raises particularly acute problems for the 
politics and ethics of feminist research (see Kelly, 1984; Stanko, 
1987 and discussion in Chapter 9 ). For example, 'are interviewees 
who volunteer truly willing to cooperate if they are women living in 
refuges? How are women's urgent needs to keep their whereabouts 
and identities secret to be reconciled with putting their experiences 
into print? Unless. the researcher resorts to 'hit and run' tactics 
of research (Stanko, 1987), it is impossible to retain an objectively 
'pure' detachment during the interview. In an effort to curb some 
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of the more abusive aspects of sociological research the project 
aimed to conform to the following ideals: 
1. Non-coercive selection of a sample: 
The researcher tried to minimalise the coercive aspects of surveying 
by offering women choice and some control over the situation. In 
the USA Diana Russell had used a $10 payment for women who 
responded to her survey as a non-coercive method of obtaining a 
response (see Russell, 1982). As this option is not available to 
researchers supported by ESRC grants, a volunteer method was chosen 
instead of recruitment from known 'victim 'populations' as in refuges. 
It was hoped also that advertising for volunteers might give a 
greater chance to contact women not already 'labelled' members of the 
victim population. The' twenty women' were contacted through 
personal contact and introduction, advertising through women's groups 
and in the National press (only one woman responded to a newspaper 
advertisement which cost almost £301). Methodological purists would 
not call the 20 women a 'representative sample', and no claims will be 
made in that respect when discussing the data. The women were 
exceptional by the very fact of their being volunteers. They were 
more likely to be articulate by identifying themselves as able to 
codify their responses to fit the questions covered. 
The second element of choice was the option to take part in a postal, 
telephone or personal (i. e. face to face) survey. Questionnaires 
were shown or sent to women first so that they would know what 
i 
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questions and topics were to be covered. (A copy of the 
questionnaire used can be found in the Appendix. ) All but three 
opted for a personal interview. These three prefered the anonymity 
of a telephone and postal survey. Those who opted for a personal 
interview were given the choice of location so that their privacy of 
identity could be ensured if, for example, they wanted to keep 
personal information such as addresses secret. No names or other 
identifying details were recorded and only the residential region of 
the country at the 
. 
time of interview or the assaults was noted. On 
completing-the interview, the women were asked if they would like to 
read through the transcripts and were given the opportunity to 
correct any points. Six women agreed to provide copies of case 
records from solicitors and they were also asked if they would like 
to examine these before finally deciding whether these were to be 
included in the project. 
Re-reading the transcripts and case studies inevitably meant the 
women needed further interviews. Interviewing was a lengthy 
process, times varied from 2% to 12 hours per woman. Fourteen case 
records were photocopied in the solicitor's office always with the 
woman concerned -present. (One woman allowed an affidavit to be 
read in her home, this making up the full compliment of 15 cases 
discussed in Chapter 6. ) The copy kept for research purposes had 
all the names, addresses and identifying material deleted. The 
preservation of women's privacy was seen to be another important 
component of non-coercive research. Although some extracts from 
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case records and interviews have been reproduced to illustrate 
certain points in the next two chapters, all the identifying features 
have been changed. Extracts were selected to be as general as 
possible to safeguard the anonymity of the women volunteers. 
2. Appropriate priorities: 
Women's needs were an obvious priority. Before making contact with 
potential interviewees, the researcher felt obliged to find out 
appropriate referral agencies for women who may have needed 
advice/assistance. It was assumed that the researcher would have to 
be prepared to go beyond the 'sensitive' approach to personal 
involvement in some cases. 
Personal involvement was inescapable during the interviewing and 
priorities had to undergo some painful re-evaluation. Talking about 
experiences of male violence is a painful matter for women. It can 
revive memories of an abusive relationship and bring back feelings of 
guilt, anger and victimisation (see Kelly, 1984). The 'public 
awareness' of domestic violence against women seldom takes account 
of the psychological effects of battering. In fact research on this 
subject has sometimes been most unhelpful in providing any 
understanding as to the actual effects on women's self-images (see 
Wilson, 1983). Some feminists have drawn an analogy between 
domestic battery and the torturer's relationship with his victim (see 
e. g. Dworkin, 1981; Russell, 1982. ). This analogy suggests that it is 
not the act or series of acts of violence or deprivations which are 
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significant in situations of domestic violence against women but the 
torturer's use in a power relationship of a variety of physical, 
sexual or mental strategies designed to control, belittle or humiliate 
his victim. Torture can alternate with affection, criticism with 
praise, deprivation with abundance, overtures of love with expressions 
of hate. 
Some of the women interviewed complained, 'I can't believe that was 
me'. Being untrained in psychology, the researcher could only apply 
the 'common sense' interpretation that it was as if they had 
remembered the physical, sexual and other cruelties they had 
experienced but partially forgotten the psychological effects. If it 
is difficult during victimisation for women to express their true 
feelings it is even more likely that finding the words to describe 
the experience later on will be difficult. As it is not easy for a 
person experiencing a commonplace complaint such as toothache to 
express how they feel the problems women victims of domestic 
violence have are entirely understandable. With a crime that 'should 
not happen' victims may feel confused and unsure about their own 
evaluations of the events. 
Kelly has pointed out how both researchers and those researched are 
involved in the phenomena of forgeting, minimalising and remembering 
experiences of victimisation (see Kelly, 1987). My own experience 
confirmed this finding. Whilst doing the research I found it 
impossible to divorce my own feelings and experience from what I 
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heard from the women surveyed. The forgeting, minimalising and 
remembering experience is qualitatively different to what social 
scientists call 'reflexivity'. Although I had not been battered by 
the man with whom I lived I had experiences of victimisation by men 
which were suddenly remembered along with their associated feelings 
of guilt. For instance, I remembered when I was 13 years old, I 
accepted a lift in the car of an elderly man who lived along the road 
from my home. During the car journey, this man kept offering to buy 
me sweets and to give me cream cakes for tea if I would agree to go 
to his house with him. At one stage he offered me money. He kept 
putting his arm around me while he was driving along and he touched 
me on the breast and crutch. He said I was a 'pretty girl'. I do 
not think I was frightened of him although I remember briefly 
thinking he might be like the 'Moors murderers' and I had to jump out 
of his moving car to escape because he would not stop. I felt more 
confused and ashamed than fearful. He kept talking about my mini 
skirt and silver shoes saying things like how nice the new fashions 
were, did my mother mind me going out 'like that' and was Ia 'modern 
girl'. My appearance had been a matter of some dispute with my 
father. He said I always looked like a 'tramp' or 'cheap' because I 
had started to wear make up, short skirts and gaudy accessories, as 
was the fashion at the time. Somebody told the police and the 
policewoman who interviewed me reinforced my feelings that either I 
had misunderstood the event (he was being 'friendly' not sexually 
abusive) or had invited his advances by looking like a 'tramp'. News 
of the assault spread quickly in the neighbourhood as I lived in a 
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small Hampshire village where a visit from the police was a rare 
event. My mother heard that the man concerned (who was a popular 
figure in the local pub) had told 'everybody' that I had made false 
i. e. phantasised accusations. It was not until I had talked about 
this event with other women that I could begin to overcome the 
feelings of shame and guilt that were revived with its memory all 
those years later. The process of curing oneself is much more 
complicated if, as for the women in the survey, the victimisation 
has been part of an intimate relationship. 
It is impossible to describe accurately the feeling of powerlessness 
the remembering process created for the researcher. Feelings of 
paranoia, anger and self-doubt were experienced alternately and the 
whole value of the project and its priorities called into question. 
I was sorely distressed at my own naivety in becoming involved in 
research which at the time seemed to do no more than cause women 
pain. As interviewing took place on a one to one basis I felt a 
great pressure to 'say the right things' and always felt inadequate 
to do so. The whole experience caused tremendous self-doubt. The 
reasons for 'my involvement in the self-centred task of academic 
research seemed poor justification for the distress caused. I felt 
that I was the torturer by bringing back women's memories of abusive 
relationships and guilt. Having no confidence in my ability to do 
the work or complete, it with the responsibility it deserved, I had 
several crises when the only solution seemed to be giving up. In 
the end it was the will power and friendship of the women who helped 
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with the survey that kept me and the project going. If battery is 
about controlling women and making them powerless, then the women 
who survive, including those who are able to come for interviews, 
will have started to rebuild their strength and self respect. 
Eventually it was understood that remembering victimisation is 
painful but it can be overcome and might ultimately be turned into a 
source of empowerment (see Kelly, 1985; Stanko, 1985). 
4. Fair representation: 
In 1976 Elizabeth Wilson wrote a pamphlet for the National Women's 
Aid Federation describing the inadequacies of the current body of 
research (Wilson, 1976). In this she criticised Dr J. Gayford's 
publication of an article in The Welfare Officer magazine where he 
described battered women according to a typology, using vulgar, 
derogatory and titilatory namesakes (Wilson, 1976). Academic 
research usually takes much greater care over the representation of 
survey evidence, due to the requirements of, objectivity. Because all 
research is political and subjective however no representation in this 
medium can ever be totally 'fair'. The researcher was loathe to rely 
upon her own (unquestioned? ) subjectivity for the interpretation, 
analysis and presentation of information from the research. 
Searching through published research for help however provided little 
guidance. Qualitative work only rarely includes any discussion of 
how the data was analysed and what were taken to be 'useful' 
extracts for reproduction in the final report. Many researchers 
would be able' to justify their lack of discussion of analytical 
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techniques on the grounds that they never intended to be 'scientific' 
anyway. Research is personal and fundamentally biased. But 
without some self -analysis surely there is potential for subjective 
factors in qualitative research to further 'silence' women (Graham, 
1983). The researcher attempted to control this tendency by use of 
the ethnographer's techniques of hypothesis testing, where there is 
an emphasis upon questioning conclusions and searching for negative 
incidences. 
The questionnaire used in the survey was designed to include a broad 
range of 'behaviour' cases and to take into account the possibility of 
women changing solicitors, shifting from one remedy (e. g. injunction 
to divorce) to another, cases being dropped or lying dormant to be 
revived later. This gave the questionnaire a lengthy appearance 
although women who had been involved in just one case were able to 
bypass most of the questions. When asking for volunteers the 
researcher included women involved in one or more of the following 
cases at any time between 1969 and 1985: 
a DIVORCE where cruelty was alleged. 
a DIVORCE where unreasonable behaviour was alleged. 
a DIVORCE in first 3 years of marriage on the ground of 
exceptional depravity. 
a JUDICIAL SEPARATION where cruelty was alleged. 
a JUDICIAL SEPARATION where unreasonable behaviour was 
alleged. 
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an INJUNCTION as part of a divorce OR under the Domestic 
Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act OR the under the 
Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates Courts) Act. 
an order for occupation under the MATRIMONIAL HOMES ACTS. 
a claim for DAMAGES FOR ASSAULT (as a civil case or to the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board) as a result of an 
assault by a husband, ex-husband, cohabiting or ex- 
cohabitant man friend. 
any other CRIMINAL or SEXUAL ASSAULT by a husband, ex-husband 
cohabiting or ex-cohabitant manfriend. 
It is likely some cases such as actions for trespass, were excluded. 
By listing specific cases the researcher rather optimistically assumed 
that most women would know what sort of cases they had been 
involved in. Whilst this was generally true for women with a lot of 
experience of the legal process others were not at all sure. For 
example, they were able to say they had been involved in an 
injunction but did not know which sort or even whether it was 
brought before a magistrate or judge. For these cases it was 
fortunate that information the women gave on the dates and areas in 
the survey allowed the researcher to work out whether the 
injunctions had been heard at the County Courts or magistrates' 
courts. Although it would have been simpler to just appeal for 
women who had contacted a solicitor, magistrate, judge or the police 
for legal help/advice regards a husband or cohabitee's behaviour the 
listing of specific cases was in the end more fruitful. Women 
identified with 'key words' like 'divorce', 'injunction' and 'assault' 
rather than with the more general reqeust concerning a partner's 
behaviour. It is possible that this feature of self-identification 
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is linked to the forge ting- remembering- minimalis ing process of 
survivors. Although none were traced, the listing of specific cases 
would not have excluded cases where a woman was involved solely 
because the husband had alleged her unacceptable behaviour. 
The use of the questionnaire in the survey varied from a completely 
structured approach (as in the postal survey - only four women used 
the questionnaire this way and one provided supplementary information 
by telephone interview), to a semi-structured approach where the 
questions were used as prompts and for ordering the interview but 
the interviewee was allowed to deviate as much as desired (ten 
women), to an approach verging on the unstructured where, after the 
first few questions a good 'rapport' allowed the women to direct the 
structure of the interview (six women). Notes were taken during the 
interviews and women asked to read these and given the opportunity 
to correct any points. The back up interviews with solicitors and 
legal advisors were unstructured and notes were taken. 
Textual Data. 
The textual data included the case records, reported decisions, 
newspaper reports, theoretical and feminist writings. Because of 
the complexity of the textual data the work was experimental rather 
than founded upon tried or tested methods. A variety of techniques 
were borrowed from other discussions especially from socio-linguistic 
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discourse analysis. O'Barr's work has urged that attention be given 
to the inter-relationship of 'form' and 'content' in legal discourse 
(O'Barr, 1982). Form comprises the taken for granted, almost ritual, 
aspects of communication, the presentational style which may be vital 
to the outcome of the case. If the legal process is seen as one of 
interactive definition, the relevance of the socio-linguistic 'form' 
and 'content' to the creation of meanings cannot be -ignored. An 
examination of stylistics however has its limitations. Style is 
similarly contextual, open to reinterpretation and challengeable. 
The technique employed here has been especially influenced by a 
reading of the Foucauldian techniques employed in the analysis of the 
trial literature concerning the - mass murderer Pierre Riviere 
(Foucault, 1978), the concepts of agency and transition used by the 
socio-linguists Halliday (1978), Fowler et al (1979) & Trew (1979) 
and the emphasis upon coercion in 'discourse employed in the work of 
Seidel (1985a). 
Analysis of the legal material posed the greatest problem because of 
the complexity of legal texts. Some work had recently been 
published by Murphy and Rawlings on the reported decisions of the 
House of Lords (Murphy & Rawlings, 1981 & 1982). This involved an 
analysis of the legitimations and rationalisations used in the texts 
and the way in which they were held 'together as 'units'. In common 
with this approach, the researcher had no interest in categorising 
'legal rules' applied for the interpretation of, -., cases' of domestic 
violence against women. As law and society are inextricably linked 
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cases will reflect the non-legal practices and subjective beliefs of 
those involved more than any 'rules' or legal precedents. The 
experimental analysis used here involved recording the following 
information from the texts: 
1. Precising the text as a narrative: 
This was a matter of practical convenience to allow notes on the 
analysis to be kept separate, from the texts without having to always 
refer back to discover what a case was about. 
2. An investigation into how authors/speakers established their 
legitimacy to be involved in cases and the status of their claims, 
how they rationalised arguments and structured meanings in the text. 
Here the stylistics of socio-linguists had some relevance, as well as 
the techniques employed by Murphy and Rawlings (1981 & 1982) when 
looking at how speakers established their status by allying 
themselves to or isolating themselves, from other points of view and 
establishing which matters were legitimate or relevant for 
consideration. For example, a judge could establish his competence 
to intervene in the legal text by pointing out the consequences e. g. 
by arguing that if the court does not intervene then hardship could 
result. Legitimacy could be established by reference to the court's 
teaching/disciplinary role, e. g. by noting a case concerns the 
admissibility of evidence in magistrates' courts. Or legitimacy 
could be autocratically asserted, for example by a judge forcefully 
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yet vaguely concluding, 'in my opinion the conclusion should never 
have been reached'. 
3. Recording the language used in reference to behaviour. This 
involved noting four features: a. the descriptions of relationships 
(e. g. 'parents strongly emotionally involved'); b. the creation of 
imagery and use of metaphor (e. g. 'the couple were at war'); c. the 
importance of behaviour to the main 'issues' of the case, i. e. whether 
the behaviour was referred to as 'proof' for a previous case, whether 
it was relevant to the outcome of a related case, whether it was in 
immediate dispute as a fact in a present case, etc.; d. the 
differences in the descriptions' of behaviour given by various 
'authors' in the text, e. g. whether by a doctor or judge, wife or 
husband etc. 
4. Recording disputes and ambiguities in the text. Noting for 
example struggles over meanings between counsels, wife and husband, 
psychiatrists and prosecutors etc. The socio-linguist Danet has 
argued that shifts in the use of words from e. g. 'fetus' to 'baby' can 
reflect successive transformations of 'reality' in the evolution of 
court cases (Dauet, 1980). 
5. The following information was tabulated for each text analysed: 
a. The actors involved in the text according to allegiances, e. g. the 
wife, her counsel, judge, husband etc. as For the Wife, For the 
Husband, Arbitrator, Expert and Allegiance Unknown. If actors in the 
4 
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texts were described on the basis of multiple allegiances they were 
counted as multiple actors (e. g. the same doctor's evidence used to 
legitimate husband's and wife's case). 
b. the visibility of the actors, whether the text included their 
claims by reference to them as speaking subjects, by removing them 
from active participation in the text by putting forward their claims 
as already said or not mentioning their claims at all (unsaid). 
c. the 'truths' offered by relevant actors, for example the wife's 
counsel may have argued that a prior case had erred because it 
failed to take into account the doctor's evidence. 
d. the use of active and passive language, transactive and non- 
transactive clauses to construct agencies as in Trew's work. Trew's 
approach involves basically looking at who does what to whom and 
whether language is used to establish direct relationships between 
active or passive agents/victims (see Trew, 1979). Later discussion 
will show that some of Trew's conclusions regards activity and 
passivity in discourse did not fit well with the analysis of legal 
texts because of the interweaving of active and passive states which 
takes place in these inherently ambiguous documents. 
e. the outcome of the case/narrative (if any) e. g. who won or lost an 
appeal. 
f. the reporter e. g. barrister, newpaper reporter/edition, author. 
The analysis of textual material was a very lengthy process. The 
discussion of how the information was organised for this study is 
not intended to be in any sense prescriptive or scientific. Because 
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of the range and complexity of-the material, the methods employed 
had to be adaptive and to some extent experimental. By clearly 
describing the methods employed and assumptions made it is hoped 
that the foundation for further work will be provided. 
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CHAPTER SIX. 
On The Creation Of Legal Cases - Women's Experiences Of The 
Legal System. 
Introduction. 
This chapter describes: a. the interview data collected on women's 
experiences when seeking legal advice or assistance; 
b. the data obtained from the- accounts of the legal process offered 
by legal advisors; 
c. the evidence obtained from case records. 
The aims of Chapter 6 are to : 
1. look at how women described their partners' behaviour and the 
grievances attributed to their relationships; 
2. offer their explanations about how or why they became involved in 
the legal case in the first place; 
3. enquire into the relevance of the legal strategy for the 
fulfillment of their needs at the time; 
4. briefly examine the procedural and interactive features of the 
cases and their affect on the outcomes of cases. This will involve 
a discussion of the interviewees' descriptions of the coercive and 
the partisan features of the legal process and of matters like 
whether the legal process provided them with an adequate opportunity 
to state their grievances. ' The women's complaints about the 
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intimidating practices sometimes associated with legal cases will be 
discussed as well as more positive matters such as how they defined 
'good' solicitors; 
5. look at how the women's grievances were transformed into the 
descriptions of conduct offered to the courts or particularised in 
legal documents; 
6. examine 'appropriate' conduct for legal consideration and 
rationales for these. 
The discussion of women's opinions on proposals for further reform 
and their own recommendations will be included in the last chapter of 
this section. 
The Women Who Helped With The Survey And How They Became 
Involved With The Law. 
Twenty women were surveyed who had experience of 54 legal cases, 32 
dealt with in Court Area A (this was heavily skewed by the 
experience of one woman involved in cases prior to domestic violence 
and divorce law reform who had had a total of 13 separation orders 
from magistrates plus 2 criminal cases and a divorce), 9 in Court 
Area B and 13 in Area C. The 54 cases included : 20 divorce cases 
(4 on cruelty grounds, one brought on the basis of adultery and 
another on the fact of two years separation because the behaviour 
was not considered severe enough for cruelty/behaviour petitions, 14 
unreasonable behaviour cases one including a matrimonial injunction); 
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10 injunctions (all brought under the Domestic Violence and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976); 1 damages action with a non- 
molestation order attached; 15 magistrates orders (13 separation 
orders on the ground of cruelty plus 2 on the basis of unreasonable 
behaviour); 8 cases of criminal assault. 
As the survey was of a qualitative nature and designed to provide 
insight into women's experiences of the law it is worth mentioning 
some features of the sample of women who volunteered for the survey. 
Areas A and C had been areas for the settlement of immigrants of 
Asian and Afro-Carribean descent. Only one woman of Asian descent 
was involved in the survey and she was a resident of Area B. It is 
regrettable that the small sample did not include more black women 
volunteers. Nineteen of the women were divorced or separated from 
the men concerned at the time of interview. One woman volunteered 
for the- survey on the basis of a past marriage and then became 
involved in legal proceedings resulting from her second husband's 
mental and physical abuse. Three of the women surveyed had only 
recently separated from their partners and still had contact with 
them through the access and financial arrangements for their young 
children. The pressures put on two of these women by their 
respective partners' use of the contact provided by the arrangements 
for the children caused them to later resume cohabitation. 
Table 26 shows the ages and marital statuses of the women at the 
time of their initial involvement in each of the 54 cases. The 
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survey contained more married, divorced or separated women than 
cohabitees or women who had experienced violence in more casual 
relationships with men. The ages of the women at the time of the 
survey varied from 19 years old to 62 years old. 68.5% (37) of the 
legal cases concerned women aged between 25-35 years. The age 
distribution compares favourably with existing research into refuge 
populations which show that the three most characteristic stages in 
the 'life cycle' for women to leave violent men occur before children 
are born or any further committments made (i. e. more or less 
immediately); when children begin to notice the violence and be 
affected by it; and when the children are independent or have left 
home (see Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981; Homer, Leonard & Taylor, 
1984; Pahl, 1978). 
TABLE 26 : Ages & Marital Statuses Of Women In Cases Surveyed. 
Age Married Cohabiting Single Divorced/Sepd. 
Under 25 4121=8. 
25-35 13 6- 18 = 37. 
35-45 7---=7. 
45+ 2---=2. 
Total 26 72 19 = 54. 
The survey also showed a high proportion of women with dependent 
children at the time of contact with the legal profession. 89% (48) 
of the cases researched concerned women with dependent- children. 
Of the remaining 11% (6 cases), 4 concerned women with grown up 
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children and the remaining 2 women under 25 years old who were 
childless. 
A high proportion of the cases were brought when the women concerned 
were homeless, 28 occuring when women had left home because of a 
violent assault or threat by their partners (although this 28 
includes the 13 separation orders applied for by one woman). 
Fifteen cases were brought by women whilst living in owner occupied 
homes, 9 by women from local authority tenancies and 2 by women 
sharing accomodation with parents. 
The behaviour of partners mentioned by the women as leading up to 
the decision to apply for legal assistance included two cases where 
unreasonable behaviour formed the basis of evidence for a divorce but 
the women said that violence and abuse were not issues. One woman 
said that she had not been concerned by the husband's behaviour 
mentioned in her petition and had only included this in order to get 
a quick divorce. The second woman said that it was the mental 
effects of her husband treating her like a 'china doll' in a caring 
yet suffocating relationship that formed the basis of her allegations 
in the petition. The other 52 cases were the result of a mixture of 
physical, sexual and mental abuse which the women themselves refered 
to as 'violence'. The violence differed according to whether it had 
ill effects or whether it actually threatened life. Eleven women 
had experienced violence which threatened life. Six women had been 
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hospitalised as a result of attempts on their lives. The following 
list gives an indication of the type of behaviour involved: 
Mental Cruelty - this was spoken of by 5 women. Two men tried to 
convince their partners and others that the women were mentally 
unstable. One man took away his partner's shoes to prevent her 
from leaving the house. Another took away all his partner's clothes. 
Humiliating treatment, such as 'sending' a woman seven times to the 
same shop on a cold night, was often mentioned. One woman was not 
permitted to sit down at all whilst in her husband's presence. He 
maintained this 'rule' throughout the woman's pregnancy. 
Behaviour which was unkind, anti-social or coercive was spoken of by 
most of the women surveyed. This included the man's shouting and 
swearing (4 women); his going out a lot (2 women); his damage to 
property (3 women). Four women complained that their partners had 
treated them as a 'dogsbody'. -Meanness with money was spoken of 
by 8 women. This was always linked to the man's control over money 
and the woman and child(ren)'s deprivation. One man gambled, others 
spent on luxury items for themselves (cars, consumer equipment, 
fashionable clothes) whilst the woman and child(ren) were too poor to 
eat properly and unable to pay the bills. One woman went hungry 
during pregnancy whilst her cohabiting partner expropriated the 
income she earned from two jobs. Another woman - miraculously - 
survived on the Child Benefit paid for one child (about £7 per week). 
The man's laziness was often-experienced along with his meanness 
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with money. Laziness, was spoken of by 4 women and connected with 
their working very hard. Six women spoke of their partner's 
tendency to humiliate them in public. Drunkenness was spoken of by 
9 women. This was always mentioned in relation to the violence 
associated with drunkenness. It was the men being violently drunk 
which the women feared. Seven women spoke of their partner's 
sexual relations with other women. Three women complained of their 
partners' associations with girls aged just 14 or 15 years. His 
jealousy or constant accusations about 'other men' was spoken of by 7 
women. 
Attacks and Injuries. 
Five women described the behaviour mainly in terms of its effects 
upon them, i. e. causing distress, worry and nervous problems. The 
majority however spoke of specific events and acts of violence such 
as punching (12 women); hitting (9 women); kicking (4 women); hitting 
with heavy objects (3 women - these included an iron and a chair); 
threats (3 women); being thrown to the floor (1 woman); being 
grabbed by the hair (2 women); being thrown through a window (one 
woman); the partner banging her head against the wall (5 women). 
Three women spoke of having experienced physical imprisonment. One 
of these three had been locked in her room when the man went out 
or had company. He even enlisted a friend to guard her door. The 
man's use of sexual violence was spoken of by 6 women. These 
assaults included rapes with threats of violence to the woman or to 
others, a rape by drugging the woman so that she was insensible but 
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not unconscious, a rape one - week after an abortion. Two of the 
women had suffered the most horrible anal and vaginal assaults. 
These specific acts resulted in the following injuries to the women - 
a bleeding nose (1 woman); a broken nose (1 woman); bruising (7 
women); a swollen face (2 women); injuries requiring stitches in the 
face (1 woman); black eyes (8 women); cut, lips (1 woman). Kicking 
and violent assaults during pregnancy were described by 4 women. 
One woman had miscarried a six month fetus as a result. Two women 
had had their jaws fractured by their partners and one had to be 
hospitalised for six weeks with her face wired up. Two women had 
been knocked unconscious, one had been left unconscious for eleven 
hours without any medical attention. The survey found life 
threatening violence had been experienced by a high proportion of the 
women. The man's attempts to murder them and/or the children were 
spoken of by 11 women. One woman was attacked with a hammer. 
Four had been attacked with knives. Three subject to strangulation. 
Three men had almost killed their partners by vaginal/anal assaults 
with sharp objects. 
Eleven women spoke of their partner's lack of care for or abuse of 
the children. This behaviour ranged from the men taking no interest 
in the child(ren)'s welfare, to depriving the child(ren) of adequate 
maintenance etc., to using., violence in front of . 
the child(ren) 
(sometimes using them as spectators in order to enhance the woman's 
suffering), to assaults upon the child(ren) as well. One child was 
Page 298 
The Creation Of Legal Cases/6. 
battered and bruised all over his body. One man hospitalised his 10 
month old daughter after trying to strangle her for crying. At the 
age of two this child was tortured in the night by her father forcing 
her to stand still on one spot without falling asleep or fidgetting. 
The list is shocking and distressing and not untypical of the 
behaviour described in the research of women who visited refuges 
(Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981; Dobash & Dobash, 1980). 
Remembering the full extent of the behaviour was a problem for women 
who had experienced violence some years ago. 
I think it is difficult to know how I felt then. Looking back 
is hard. I have played it down a lot. You forget, to 
protect yourself, what happened. I have underplayed the 
violence. The first marriage (1969) was bloody hell. It was 
so awful. 
('Laura', last case 1983). 
I would not want to remember it all. I am only doing it 
because it is important. I have found it devastating recreating 
the past events. I am shocked by how much I, had forgotten 
(.... )I am shocked that one of the acts of violence was when I 
was . six months pregnant 
(.... ) and I did not want to make 
anything of this either at the time. I felt I must have 
condoned it (.... )I blocked off the time when he said he would 
take my son away and again did not register it when I saw the 
file. 
('Eliza', last case 1977. ) 
Some of the women gave explanations for their partners' actions. 
Men who held patriarchal ideas and violence brought on by drink were 
mentioned the most often (six women for each). The next most 
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frequent explanation was the men being 'bullies' (4 women). Jealousy 
was spoken of by 3 women, use of violence. to obtain sexual services 
(2 women), the effects of drug taking, guilt over affairs with other 
women and use of violence to expropriate money (one woman each). 
Why The Women Were Involved With The Law. 
The women offered varied reasons as to why they had become involved 
in the cases in the first place. These have been categorised as 
follows: 
1. Emergency contact - the police were called to prevent further 
damage or a death; or the solicitor would be contacted by a woman 
having left home in fear or following an assault. The urgent need 
to prevent the partner's threatened damage to property was also 
mentioned. 
2. Own initiative - this involved some degree of planning and time 
for decision making. The woman would contact a solicitor or legal 
advisor on her own initiative seeking a final settlement such as a 
divorce or an injunction and/or custody arrangements (for unmarried 
women). 
3. Orders from family/friends/doctors - the women concerned used the 
word 'orders' rather than the word 'advice' to refer to the pressures 
put on them by family, friends and, occasionally doctors. These 
women were experiencing such acute feelings of depression, confusion 
and low self esteem that they felt unable to make their own 
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decisions. They had been told daily that they were unable or 
incapable of making decisions, were reminded by their partners of 
their 'incompetence' to do 'simple' and 'womanly' tasks such as house 
and child care. (Recognition of battered women's loss of self- 
respect after domination and abuse partly explains why WAFE has 
always stressed the importance of 'self-help' in refuges). Two 
women in the survey had been taken to see a solicitor by their 
mothers. Sometimes friends, family and other persons 'in the know' 
(such as GPs ) put whatever pressure they could on the women to end 
the relationship with legal assistance. This was not always 
immediately successful: 
I saw my GP who advised me to get divorced. She congratulated 
me when I did. My husband said if I went to the doctor he 
would say I was mad and take the kids off me. If someone 
tells you this daily it is a big fear. The doctor knew though. 
It is difficult to take that advice though. If you feel really 
ill the advice seems useless. It took me four years to leave. 
You feel you are on a roundabout and there is no way off. I 
never went to the solicitor's as I was terrified I would be 
locked away and lose the kids. 
('Karen', last case settled 1981. ) 
One GP refused to repeat a woman's prescription for tranquilisers on 
the ground that her husband was the patient in need of medical 
attention. He also advised the woman to get a divorce instead. 
Another doctor told a woman that her child would die if she did not 
leave her partner. 
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Pressure put on women to 'help themselves' was often extremely niave, 
insensitive and counter-productive. An abused woman's close friends 
and family are also very vulnerable to violence or harassment should 
her partner suspect their involvement in her leaving home. 
Assistance to women was quickly withdrawn by family and friends in 
some cases where they had returned to their partners having 
previously left. Seven women were unable to turn to their family or 
friends as a result of -their withdrawal of assistance after previous 
resumptions of cohabitation. ' Five more never had this option as 
they were isolated from family and friends. Three interviewees had 
experience of doctors' attempts to separate children from their 
father (by*urging the woman to leave) being frustrated by social 
workers' efforts to bring about reconciliations. 
4. Chance - this was an element in the police involvement in just two 
cases. One woman became involved in a criminal charge of grevious 
bodily harm against her husband because the police accompanied the 
ambulance which was called at. her request. A second woman's 
imprisonment by her partner was discovered when the police called at 
the home to arrest him for other criminal activities. 
5. Diversion - usually this was a tactic employed by individuals 
concerned not to involve themselves in the woman's difficulties. 
This was spoken of especially in respect of the police. Seven of 
the women spoke of contact with the police and five had experienced 
diversionary tactics. Diversion was used to channel the women 
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towards more 'appropriate' remedies such as divorces rather than 
criminal charges, a judicial separation rather than an injunction. 
6. Bureaucratic demands - Part I refered to the possible link between 
the bureaucratic demands of housing departments and public 
authorities (for proof of the alleged behaviour/clarification of 
separate status) and women's use of the law. Five women in the 
survey had experience of this sort of pressure for legal 
clarification by local authorities insisting they apply for separation 
orders, injunctions or final custody settlements. Bureaucratic 
demands were not mentioned at all in court area A except by the 
woman who had been involved in the 13 separation orders prior to the 
1960s reforms. 
7. Welfare needs - these were related to the above. Women sought 
divorces or property adjustment orders to satisfy their needs for 
housing or maintenance for themselves and the children. 
The women's needs for legal intervention can be summed up as : the 
need for personal protection from violence, assaults and harassment 
for themselves, their children, friends or relatives; welfare needs for 
maintenance, support and housing; the need to have legal proof in a 
court order; the need to protect property; and lastly, no need. The 
definition of needs by the women here matches the - conclusions of 
other research (see Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981; Dobash & Dobash, 
1980; Homer, Leonard & Taylor, 1984. ). 
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Twelve cases (involving 11 women and 12 men) represented the only 
legal remedy attempted by the women (although one of these women 
had two cases, a matrimonial injunction and a divorce, these were 
applied for at the same time). The remaining 42 cases were brought 
by just 9 women. This total is skewed as previously noted by the 
13 separation orders and three other cases (total 16) brought by one 
woman prior to the 1960s reforms. Four out of the remaining 8 
women had legal contact for more than one- relationship. Making 
allowances then for second marriages /cohabi tat ions and ignoring 
temporarily the 16 cases brought by just one woman, attempts to 
obtain a satisfactory and final legal outcome averaged at 2 to 3 
cases per woman. This figure does not include the high number of 
changes women made from one solicitor to another or from one firm to 
another to obtain satisfaction for the same one case. Nor does it 
include the ancilliary matters such as custody, access and financial 
settlements. Some women also had regular contact with the police 
but did not regard this as contact with the law and were unable to 
remember the number of times the police visited their homes. The 
criminal cases in the survey therefore refer to only the small 
proportion of cases where the police at some stage urged the women 
to press charges for assault. Seven of the women had experienced a 
'graduation' from a failed criminal case to a divorce or an injunction 
or from an injunction to a divorce (if applicable). Two cases 
showed a different pattern. One woman tried first to obtain a 
divorce and failed because of her husband's resistance and 
determination to defend the petition. Her next contact with the law 
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concerned an aborted prosecution for criminal assault. After 
'talking to' the husband the police urged her not to prosecute him 
for his attempted strangulation. She finally terminated her 
relationship by obtaining a judicial separation. The second woman 
wanted an injunction for immediate protection and did not feel able 
to make a final decision about her relationship at the time. The 
solicitor advised her injunctions were 'not much good' and said she 
should go for a judicial separation instead. This case was 
abandoned. An injunction was applied for again using a second 
solicitor but also abandoned as the husband was prosecuted for a 
criminal assault on his wife and child. 
The suggestion that the women experienced a form of legal 
'graduation' is supported by the amount of time taken by each woman 
to obtain relief during an abusive relationship. For five women, 
legal relief was provided -almost immediately. Another two managed 
to complete proceedings and obtain a divorce in just 6 weeks. For 
the other 13 women the process of obtaining the legal outcome 
desired took from one to twelve years. The 'graduation' period was 
less for women involved with the law following divorce reform and 
domestic violence legislation. The two women with the most lengthy 
contact with the legal system regards the behaviour of their 
partners, 12 years and 9 years, had first contact with the law prior 
to the 1960s and 1970s reforms. Women with substantial resources 
however were able to obtain legal relief relatively quickly prior to 
these reforms. One case heard in 1966 took three months from 
Page 305 
The Creation Of Legal Cases/6. 
start to finish. The variations in the time taken to obtain legal 
relief were mostly related to material factors in the woman's 
relationship. Women who succeeded with just one case were either 
young or those physically able to leave (i. e. not imprisoned by the 
man), find housing and support for themselves and the children. 
Other reasons mentioned by the women for their lengthy involvement 
with the law were difficulties in finding appropriate advice (e. g. 
finding a 'good' solicitor, getting advice on injunctions) and their 
partners' persistence in disobeying/ ignoring court orders or abusing 
the law to further their own ends. Some of the women complained 
bitterly about the ex-husband's/cohabitee's use of the children to 
continue a legal form of harassment by, for example, applying for 
variations over access or maintenance arrangements. One husband 
had tried to convince a magistrate that his wife was 'unfit' to care 
for the children as she had visited the Greenham Common women's 
peace camp. 
In their discussion of 77 women who had consulted solicitors, Homer, 
Leonard and Taylor found a high proportion with very lengthy 
involvement with the law. Of the married women, 20 had their 
proceedings completed in 12 months, 10 in 13 - 24 months, another 13 
took between 2 to over 10 years to reach a conclusion -(Homer, 
Leonard & Taylor, 1984, p. 68). The researchers concluded that: 
Three main groupings apparently occur: those women who see a 
solicitor, start legal proceedings and complete without undue 
delay; those women who because of legal- or domestic 
difficulties, or indecision, complete only after some delay, and 
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possibly a return visit to the refuge, but without the same 
period of crisis; those women who may experience several crises 
in relationships but finally decide to end it. 
(Homer, Leonard & Taylor, 1984, p. 68. ) 
Only six women of the 20 surveyed for this study had visited a 
refuge at some stage. The next section will show however that 
lengthy involvements with the law were problems for the majority. 
The Relevance Of The Law To Need Fulfillment. 
For overall satisfaction, the law provided the main remedy for 2 
women, a partial remedy for 10, was considered a waste of time by 4 
and actually made things worse for four others. Satisfaction was 
strongly linked to expectations. As one solicitor shrewdly observed: 
It is hard to ask women about the value of the legal process 
because many of them have very high expectations. They think 
an injunction or a divorce will be the be all and end all and in 
actual fact they are not. I wonder how many women are told at 
the start what an injunction means. 
(Solicitor, Court Area A. ) 
If magistrates, judges and solicitors themselves consider injunctions, 
divorces and other legal' remedies as 'the be all and end all' it is 
hardly surprising many women take the same view and are 
disappointed. Published research to date 'has also noted a link 
between women's expectations' about what the law can offer and their 
satisfaction with cases (see Borkowski, Murch & Walker, 1983; Pahl, 
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1978). Even women who eventually 'succeed' in'settling their legal 
affairs however may have experienced a number of failures in 
previous encounters with the law (see Homer, Leonard & Taylor, 1984). 
Those who contact the police for physical protection in cases of 
emergency often fail to receive it (Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981; 
Pahl, 1982. ). Five women in the survey had experienced police use 
of diversionary tactics although only one expressed the view that the 
police were biased: 
I hate the police. I felt they put the blame on me. They 
thought I was colluding with my first husband. I felt I had 
provoked it (... ) it was so awful. My face was a real mess yet 
the police made me feel it was provocation. They made me feel 
like a prostitute due to his race. 
('Laura', last case settled 1983). 
One woman said the police had done all they could: 
The police did all they could but their hands were tied. 
('Una', cases pre-1969). 
This woman's experiences with the law were mentioned in Chapter 2 
(pages 67 and 86). The police refused to intervene when called out, 
apart from on the two occasions when very severe assaults took place 
(one on the children, the second an attempted murder of the woman). 
The police claimed an inability to intervene as the man held tenancy 
of the home. They did help, by using their discretionary arrest 
powers, after the council had arranged a 'technical' eviction of the 
husband. 
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The women surveyed qualified condemnation, of the police by noting 
that some were 'good' and some 'bad': 
The police wanted to bring a case. The police came to the 
hospital. It was a broken jaw so could have been GBH. They 
advised me to bring an injunction. (.... ) The police were very 
good. They waited for me to be treated at casualty and saw 
that I got home OK. (... ) The police went to my ex-husband's 
house and gave him a 'roughing over'. This was two male 
police officers. There was no comeback over the criminal case 
though. They urged me to prosecute for a while in the hospital. 
('Greta', last case settled 1980). 
My husband was convicted for assault. He came to the house and 
knocked me unconscious. The police convicted him and he got 
done f or ABH. He appealed against the sentence and lost. 
They asked me in court how I was. I think a lot of their 
sympathy was racism. 
('Laura', last case settled 1983). 
The police were more, for him than they were for me. They just 
said, 'Well you must have provoked him into hitting you. You 
must have provoked him into knocking you around and all the 
rest of it. (They helped) the very first time when he put me 
in hospital. They said, 'You have got to get out for your own 
protection. ' And that's the only time they've helped me. And 
they did go back and get my clothes . for me that 
time. I went 
back there with four big coppers and that's the only time 
they've actually taken me out of the house. Before they'd 
never helped me at all, so maybe I just caught them on a good 
rota, you know, good policemen. 
('Nell', last case settled 1980). 
The police were called and they said they could not do anything 
unless I had an injunction and advised me to get one. (A few 
months ago) my husband abused and threatened me on the phone 
but fortunately my father was in the house when he broke in 
this time. Again the police were phoned but they would not 
intervene without an injunction. On one occasion he broke into 
the house and beat me up. The police were called but it took 
them two hours to arrive on the scene, my husband having been 
in the house all the time. Again an injunction was 
recommended. But all the solicitors said I had insufficient 
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evidence to obtain an injunction even under the Matrimonial 
Homes Act. 
('Harriet', last case settled 1983). 
Events and the actions of individuals other than the police played a 
part in some of the women's dissatisfaction with the law or decision 
not to continue with a particular case. Police efforts at 
prosecution, although hardly strong, could be undermined by a 
woman's treatment in the casualty department for example: 
LR: Have you any complaints about the doctor's behaviour ? 
G: Incompetence. The hospital doctor X-rayed my nose. There 
was a whole queue of people waiting to be X-rayed and the 
person behind me had a broken nose. He looked in my mouth and 
said I had a few teeth broken. I could not talk or eat the 
next morning. I went to my GP, this was a woman GP, she said 
the jaw was OK. When I went to the dentist he diagnosed the 
jaw break. '(.... ) They treated everyone like they had been 
involved in a brawl and this affected my feeling about going 
through with the prosecution. 
LR: Why was the case dropped ? 
G: Two things mostly. I had just got a job and did not want it 
in the papers. I felt it would damage my reputation. I was 
so low. I thought it did not happen to middle class 
professionals. I felt I could have precipitated it. It was 
years before I realised that it was not my fault. ' My family 
knew but I had no friends. All our friends were friends of 
the marriage. The night of the last assault he had first run 
over a friend in his car. He did not prosecute the assault 
either. The third night after the assault my ex-husband 
attempted suicide. It was a catalogue of nasty incidents and I 
felt I could not face it. 
LR: How do you feel now about the case being dropped ? 
G: I felt he was never punished. I wanted to smash his jaw so 
he would see how it felt. 
('Greta', last case settled 1980). 
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Emotional pressures on the women were not just aimed at criminal 
cases. Five other women specifically mentioned emotional pressures, 
mainly from their partners, including attempted or threatened 
suicides. Some probation and welfare officers conspired in this by 
the inappropriate use of reconciling efforts. 
The probation officer tried to chat me up. He tried to 
reconcile me with him and he had assaulted my child. I'd had 
letters from my husband saying he would change and he sent me 
threatening letters from prison and I was really scared. I felt 
he would get me when he came out. 
('Laura', last case 1983). 
The prison welfare officer tried to keep us together. A man 
in prison feels depressed and leans on any shoulder. The 
welfare officer takes his point of view and cannot see the 
damage he has done to his wife and family. So they try to 
keep the marriage together. The solicitor told the welfare 
officer to keep out of the divorce and not to pester me. 
('Una', cases pre 1969). 
Doctors, family and social workers were also mentioned: 
With my second husband my solicitor said I had to get my doctor 
to give evidence to get an injunction but he did not want to be 
involved. 
('Flo', last case 1986). 
I lost my kids to their father. He started refusing access and 
saying. that I was the one who was unfit and violent. His 
family and my family were all involved in it. 
N ('Amanda', last case 1986). 
I was not sure whether I could manage on my own. The social 
services said I could go back with a supervision order on (the 
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child) so the injunction case was dropped. 
('Ivy', last case 1984). 
Although overall she expressed satisfaction with the final outcome to 
her legal cases, lenient sentencing made things considerably worse 
for one woman: 
He was imprisoned with a man who had killed his wife and 
received a five year- prison sentence. After this he knew he 
could kill me and get away with it. He was out of prison nine 
days when he assaulted me again. He attempted to stab me. 
('Una', cases pre 1969). 
Another woman was terrorised by a cohabitee who had previously 
received a nine month prison sentence . for the attempted murder - 
with a shotgun - of his first wife : 
I got to the station and he found me and forced me into the 
car. He took me back home and took away my shoes to keep me 
in the house and stop me from leaving again. He then started 
being revoltingly nice - offering to buy me chocolates and 
saying he loved me. It made me feel sick. He had previously 
been in prison for the attempted murder with a shotgun of his 
former wife. I could not argue with him because he knew he 
could do it to me as well. He told me he could. 
('Belinda', last case 1986). 
Like the police, the women's success rating of solicitors depended 
upon whether they were 'good' or 'bad' types. Nine of the women 
mentioned having trouble finding a solicitor who could give them 
advice of any use. 
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The law seemed to be stacked against me. My first solicitors 
were incompetent and they lost my file. It makes me so angry. 
How could they do that ?I had to get a psychiatrist's report 
to prove that I was OK because he (husband) then alleged my 
maltreatment of the kids. 
('Amanda', last case 1986). 
The second solicitor told me I should put up with his violence 
and abuse. The third solicitor was extremely unsatisfactory. 
She was a real bitch, a woman with a cold manner and smooth 
guise who agreed with everything I said but proceeded to ignore 
all my instructions. I think she lacked the competence to deal 
with the case as she pressed three times for adjournments and I 
needed some income to maintain the children and the house had 
been entirely devoid of furniture when we moved in. 
('Harriet', last case 1983). 
This problem of finding a solicitor who knew his/her job was also 
mentioned by lawyers and legal advisors : 
I have noticed that many women have contacted three or four 
solicitors to try and get an injunction and have been told they 
will have to wait as they are too busy. Where would you go 
for a solicitor if you were not familiar w ith the law ? I'm 
not sure where I'd go. I think some of them just tour the 
streets and end up depressed not being able to find one. 
(Solicitor, Court Area A). 
'Good' solicitors on the other hand got things done 
I had a woman solicitor when I went to the first solicitors'. I 
saw a different person each time so I had to repeat myself over 
and over again. I changed my solicitor and she was very good 
( .... ) On the problem with access, his solicitor sent letters 
to me. She was good. The others had been passing letters 
from one to the other. And there was pressure about the 
contents of the home, the furniture. I did not want their 
bitterness. 
('Janine', last case 1980). 
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Other good qualities were a sympathetic manner, preventing character 
assasination or defending criticism of the women, speed of work and 
taking the time to explain things. 
He (solicitor) has been working throughout for very little 
money. He really is exceptional. He dressed down my 
husband's lawyers when they brought forward their ridiculous 
charges. Nobody else had ever done that before. 
('Harriet', last case 1983. ) 
Two solicitors (one a man and one a woman) were mentioned' as being 
exceptionally good, involving themselves with the women's problems 
much more than required by their professional duty. They befriended 
the women and gave help with things such as finding a job and baby 
sitting. 
The importance of a sympathetic approach was also mentioned in 
reference to judges : 
Judges are not all hard. They can understand you are caring 
for your kids and can sympathise. I was on steriods for 
arthritis and pain killers and anti-depressants. The solicitor 
asked me to show the magistrate the pills. She knew I had been 
in hospital. The magistrate was sympathetic and got me a chair. 
He was genuinely concerned about the illness. 
('Janine', last- case 1980). 
I hit my husband on the head with a brick once and the judge 
asked about it and said I should have done it in the first 12 
months of the marriage. He wished me all the best and said he 
hoped I would find a decent man. 
('Una', pre-1969 cases). 
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The magistrate actually said he was on my side. He said my 
husband was a parasite and I should get rid of him. I had 
always kept the kids and house anyway. But it all falls down 
to the idea that men 'naturally' support women and children. 
('Karen', last case 1981). 
The judge listened for about five minutes, then said he'd heard 
enough and granted me the divorce. 
C'F1o', last case 1985). 
Some women qualified their statements that solicitors were 'good': 
The last solicitor helped me get my costs paid. He employed a 
private investigator and found my ex-husband. This resulted 
mainly through chance and luck though as he knew my ex- 
husband's girlfriend, which helped in finding him. 
('Eliza', last case 1977). 
In some ways he was on my side but he pushed me, for example, 
to get maintenance and things. He had stereotypical moral 
views about what men and women should do. It was hard 
fighting him not to do that. 
('Karen', last case 1981). 
The solicitor bullied me into talking about the violence to 
hurry the injunction case along. It reduced me to tears. I 
knew he had to do it but felt very ashamed. 
('Donna', last case 1986). 
When visiting a solicitors' practice one day to collect a file with 
one of the women involved in the survey the researcher was called 
into his office to discuss whether or not the study concerned 
professional incompetence. Access was agreed after an assurance to 
the contrary and a consultation with a senior partner. This concern 
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must have had some foundation as the interviews found some 
complaints. Three of the women interviewed felt that there had been 
some incompetence by their solicitors. Solicitors were held partly 
to blame for financial loss on divorce: 
When I tried for divorce I wanted financial compensation and it 
did not work. I had three months off work with little sick 
pay. (.... ) I wanted an easy divorce and the £1,500 to be settled 
out of court. He (husband) agreed then changed his mind. My 
solicitor was crap. It went for a chambers hearing. His 
solicitor said things were wrong and the magistrate said we 
would have to come back again. My ex-husband then only 
offered £500. I got the divorce on the basis of two years' 
separation. After the experience in the magistrates' court I 
felt guilty myself and just wanted it over and done with. His 
solicitor was very good. He scared me to death and said he 
had lots to ask me in court. 
('Greta', last case 1980). 
He gave me no advice on the house which had been bought in my 
name. He told me to leave as I had somewhere to go and my 
husband stayed in the house for years before I got any money 
from the house. 
('Eliza', last case 1977). 
I was called into Mrs (solicitor)'s office to discuss the 
maintenance one day and told, much to my horror, that I should 
drop the case because my husband was claiming bankruptcy and a 
zero income. My husband had threatened me two months 
previously that, if I should attempt to claim any maintenance, 
he would write his own, letter to pose redundancy and poverty. 
I warned Mrs (solicitor) about the past threat and expressed my 
disbelief over my husband's poverty. She lost her temper and 
told me I must be paranoid. The claim of bankruptcy was not 
checked out by the solicitor in any way. 
The barrister had not even read the affidavits and the case was 
lost. I eventually dismissed all legal advice and decided to 
represent myself. It was not until the house had to be sold 
that I got literally dragged to see another lawyer. 
('Harriet', last case 1983). 
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After the divorce (pre- 1969) I lost four homes. I was left 
with nothing and had to return to work to survive. 
('Flo', last case 1985). 
Most of the women who had attended court said they had felt 
powerless and humiliated. This frustrated their attempts to get 
justice : 
When they said I was an awful woman they all agreed. The 
sympathies are all with the men. They can identify with him. 
He stands there in his three piece suit and looks very handsome 
and they all confer, nod and agree that he is such a poor chap. 
(.... ) Male lawyers like to treat women as imbeciles at one 
moment but as highly intelligent at the next, when you should 
know better. Its a very patriarchal system. 
('Harriet', last case 1983). 
Even if the outcome of the case was that desired, women felt they 
had been unnecessarily put on trial themselves. This was very 
marked for women who had attended court for a divorce prior to the 
introduction of special procedure: 
The law is a humiliation. They all sided with him. I was 
divorced eventually in 1974. The most awful thing about it is 
the recurrence of guilt feelings. The whole system is stacked 
against women. The law seemed like it was a ritual or 
ceremonial agreement as -to how bad a wife I was. My 
humiliation by my husband was given a legal seal of approval. 
('Sally', last case 1974). 
I was petrified of going to court. It made me feel a criminal 
in front of the judge and everybody listening to you. I was 
worried if I would finally get rid of my husband and was it 
possible. You felt like a criminal in a witness box, yet all I 
wanted was to get rid of a man who tried to take my life away. 
('Una', last case pre 1969). 
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I was nervous of being in the courtroom. .I felt it was important I was shown in a good light and my character was not 
under-valued. I wanted it shown he was the 'baddy' not me. 
It was very important to become divorced so I could start life 
afresh with him in the background. (The court) was full of 
men performing like automatons. I knew I had a part to play 
and was glad when it was over. It was cold and emotionless. 
Distant. I was aware of a mystique. All the court officers 
were involved in a ritual which had nothing to do with me. I 
felt powerless. I knew I had to answer questions. It was 
remote even though it was your own divorce. I felt it was 
important though as the last hurdle in separation. 
('Eliza', last case 1977). 
Although the introduction of special procedure meant that women need 
not attend court for a divorce case, those with children or those in 
need of injunctions still had to go to court and recounted similar 
experiences: 
When you go for custody it is all who looks after your kids if 
you go out. You feel fear that they will take your kids off 
you. I was in the witness box during the maintenance case 
from 1.40 p. m. to 4.40 p. m. They went though everything (.... ) 
Going into court is like going to the dentist. You feel you 
are on trial. You feel guilty. How can these people know ? 
A violent marriage is harder to get out of than to get in. 
You tell the solicitor everything but it is all on one piece of 
paper in court and you hope they have it right. 
('Janine', last case 1982). 
The magistrate unnerved me. My ex-husband made me feel 
uncomfortable. His solicitor looked so cool. The magistrate 
said nothing to make me feel at ease. He questioned my 
solicitor and I got a feeling of disapproval and disbelief. I 
felt they were all on my husband's side. The broken jaw I had 
suffered was said to be irrelevant to the divorce case so I 
looked like a money grabbing female. 
('Greta', last case 1980). 
It is of course not just women who feel criminalised, powerless and 
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threatened when involved with the law or attending court. The Finer 
Committee had stressed the'problems of formality and remoteness and 
criminalisation of family cases in their report of 1974 (see Chapter 
3; Finer Committee, 1974). For women involved in cases of domestic 
violence however the feelings of fear, powerlessness and 
criminalisation have an increased intensity. 
He had a real hold on me I was really scared. I was really 
frightened on all occasions I went to court. In the last case 
when the judge questioned my politics I was shattered. For 
the first case (pre 1969) I was in open court with my father 
and they said I was married to a sexual pervert and my father 
was appalled. The violence was the sexual type. It was like 
being on trial. I had to defend myself. I felt like a 
criminal. It is like a rape case - you are guilty until proved 
innocent. 
('Laura', last case 1983). 
Solicitors And Women's Needs. 
Part I showed how substantive and procedural changes to the law 
resulted in a much broader system of legal intervention into 
matrimonial affairs. As the Booth Committee noted, the examination 
of facts in* divorce petitions, especially in special procedure cases, 
could technically permit the selection of events unrelated to the 
actual grievances resulting in the breakdown of the marriage (Booth 
Committee, 1985). -Whilst this could result in petitions alleging 
non-existent unreasonable behaviour the separation of the stated 
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facts from the women's experiences could, and does, have the opposite 
result by minimalising incidents of violence into just the necessary 
particulars. Women's levels of satisfaction with the legal process 
were related to how accurately solicitors represented their needs. 
Even those who had gained what they expected from the law made the 
point that lawyers' concerns and women's needs are ill matched. 
Solicitors, magistrates and judges were criticised for not listening 
to what the women said, for changing their words or even for putting 
words into their mouths: 
I don't think any of them believed what I said. The third 
solicitor created a pack of lies around my husband's sexuality. 
('Laura', last case 1983). 
The first lot of solicitors shunted me around and I had to 
repeat the complaints over and over again. It wore me out. 
('Janine', last case 1980). 
My solicitor had the information wrong, e. g. the dates. He 
looked unprepared. I had to contradict him in court. He 
really let me down. 
('Greta', last case 1980). 
Some solicitors emphasised aspects of the man's behaviour which the 
woman considered less important or even irrelevant. 
The solicitor was more concerned about what happened to the 
kids, not about me. One big thing they made out of the 
divorce was he didn't keep me but I would rather be 
economically independent anyway. Most of the affidavit was 
concerned with the kids. What he did to me did not really 
matter. He hit me a few times and this was said to be 
unimportant. I can't remember exactly what they said about the 
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kids. It was things like he never took them out, spent no time 
with them, they went without due to his drinking etc. It was 
all factual. The terms left a lot out. Putting it on paper 
left a lot out. 
('Karen', last case 1981. ) 
We were good friends and I did not mind his bisexuality but the 
solicitors could not see this. (.... ) I had to lie to say he had 
left me but it was not like that. I was manipulated to get 
the divorce by playing on his bisexuality. I was asked if he 
had affairs. The solicitor wanted sordid details. (.... ) (For 
my first husband) (pre 1969) the sexual violence they used to 
make him look like a beast, not to help me. 
('Laura', last case 1983). 
Emphasising behaviour against the woman's wishes could be most 
upsetting if she had to attend court and be subject to cross 
examination, as in the following description of a magistrates' case : 
I remember the solicitor asking me did he use foul language and 
I did not think he used it anymore than others. The solicitor 
wanted to make an issue about the use of four letter words 
before the kids but I felt it was the violence that was most 
important. ( .... ) The second lot of solicitors I was very 
unhappy about and wrote to complain but was not sure where to 
send it. I was made into mincemeat in court. My husband's 
list of my behaviour was outrageous. My solicitor was not at 
all supportive and I felt he was not representing me properly. 
He did not take issue with the allegations properly. It was a 
very humiliating experience in court. 
('Eliza', last case 1977). 
Even if the woman had some freedom over the affidavit the solicitor's 
ideas as to what mattered influenced the details emphasised: 
She wrote everything I said down and read back all the notes 
she had taken. For the affidavit she asked questions mainly 
about the sexual side of the marriage. This was OK because he 
wanted his own way all the time. He was tight with money and 
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the affidavit said I was an underpaid housekeeper. . He had 
nights out and I never went anywhere. Solicitors have a way 
of wording things which can make it sound worse than it is. 
('Janine', last case 1980). 
Some of the women offered reasons as to why their complaints had 
been treated in this manner. Bias was one complaint. One 
solicitor was reported to be a wife and child batterer himself. 
One of the local judges in Court Area A was said to be a heavy 
consumer of pornographic material. A legal advisor, a solicitor and 
court staff mentioned that this particular judge was so biased 
against domestic violence cases that solicitors routinely phoned the 
court to discover his mood before deciding whether or not to proceed 
that day. 
The findings of Borkowski, Murch & Walker (1983) give further proof 
that bias can be a problem amongst solicitors. From a survey of 50 
solicitors they found that 38% did not consider it violent for a 
husband to 'shove' a wife, 14% did not think it was unreasonable for 
a husband to force sex and 8% did not consider it violent for a 
husband to threaten to wound his wife. There was a strong 
presumption that women victims precipitated the violence. The 
personality of the woman as a contributory factor to the violence 
was rated as a main cause by 26% of the sample cf 18% who said it 
was more due to a man's personality. 
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Some biased professionals however may pay lip service to impartiality 
by distancing their personal views from their clients' problems. 
Another suggested reason for the distortion and mis-representation of 
complaints was the perceived needs of solicitors to do 'law jobs' by 
acting as translators by putting women's complaints and needs into 
the precise legal language required for legal action. Their ability 
to do this successfully would be very dependent upon their knowledge 
of the area of the law in question. A number of the problems women 
had was due to their solicitors' misunderstanding of the law (see 
also Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981; McCann, 1983). The fact that one 
woman had been told (in 1981) that she had insufficient evidence to 
obtain an injunction against a man who persisted in breaking in to 
the house and punching and hitting her can only be explained by the 
solicitor's misunderstanding or abuse of the law. The solicitors' 
fears that courts will not grant orders seemed to take an inordinate 
precedence over the women's needs for protection. On the other hand 
solicitors might slightly 'massage the evidence' by highlighting acts 
women considered less relevant or describing them in particularly 
damning language in order to make a 'good' case. Although it 
concerns a maintenance application rather than a case directly 
concerned with behaviour the following extract is a good example: 
I will always go back to this woman solicitor because she 
understands more than the men. She had a friend barrister. 
She told me to make a list of in and outgoings for a year and 
not to miss out- anything e. g. carpet cleaning, which I don't do. 
I worked it all out and we made some amendments in her office. 
I forgot the piano lessons for the kids. I thought the court 
would see this as a luxury but she said I could claim it. I 
listed clothing but she helped me fill-in these extras. I 
9 
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could not believe I would get £20 a week. She really fought 
for me and he only offered £4 but she said £20 was more 
substantial and pointed out that I had struggled with nothing 
for years. 
('Janine', last case 1980). 
'Good' solicitors may be the ones especially vulnerable to this need 
to put women's complaints into acceptable legal language. 
Another explanation was the different procedures and requirements 
which existed for different courts. These would not only affect the 
outcome of cases but how solicitors approached them in the first 
place. A legal advisor working in Court Area A claimed that these 
local demands could result in an almost rigid formula of evidence for 
injunction cases consisting of black eyes, bruises, the ripping of 
clothes and sexual jealousy. One solicitor noted how local demands 
could affect regional. variations even in small areas: 
There are big regional variations in unreasonable behaviour in 
divorce and in injunctions. Some county courts have their own 
policies. Like Court A is easy -I can get almost anything 
through as unreasonable behaviour. But in Court X (10 miles 
away) it is terrible. You have to have a signed witness 
statement. Injunctions are bad there too. It depends on 
judges as well you see. There is a judge there who is a right 
beast. Like many of them, he refuses outright to ever attach 
powers of arrest. 
(Solicitor, Court Area A). 
Rivalry between solicitors could also play a part: 
There are also organisational factors which will influence a 
case - inter-departmental jealousies etc. One solicitor could 
ask another for advice on a difficult point of law and not get 
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appropriate help for petty and personal reasons. This will 
affect how a case is handled for a woman. 
(Legal Advisor, Court Area A. ) 
Six women allowed the analysis of their case records. Records of 15 
cases were collected from solicitors, 8 being divorce cases (4 
alleging unreasonable behaviour, 2 alleging cruelty, 1 on mixed 
allegations and 1 alleging adultery), 2 magistrates' cases represented 
by a solicitor (one for separation the other for maintenance), 4 
injunctions (2 under the Domestic Violence & Matrimonial Proceedings 
Act 1976,1 matrimonial injunction' and 1 injunction connected with a 
damages action). No criminal case records could be included as 
these are the property of the state and the women did not have 
rights of access to them as witnesses. The textual information 
contained a combination of petitions, draft petitions, affidavits, 
draft affidavits, witness statements, briefs for counsel, solicitors' 
letters, records of interviews between solicitors, their clients and 
any others and notes of telephone conversations. 
There were significant variations in the length of case records. 
Much of the paperwork being yielded by older cases, those involving 
disputed or unsubstantiated allegations and those where complications 
arose (such as inadequate legal advice or pressure to effect 
reconciliations). Four of the cases lacked notes or other evidence 
of the women's initial discussion with the solicitor. In three of 
these cases the women said they believed their original complaints 
and the allegations in the text had been well matched, allowing for 
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the formality of legal language. For one of the injunction cases, 
the woman noted that the particulars in her affidavit made her 
partner's behaviour appear mild compared to her experience of his 
abuse. As her's was an urgent case however, there was no time to 
build up the trust to allow her to tell the solicitor the full extent 
of the violence. 
In 5 of the cases the 'balance' was out i. e. the affidavits placed 
emphasis upon some aspects of the behaviour in preference to others. 
three cases were described as 'underplaying' the reality of the 
violent relationship. In one of these cases the solicitor had 
transcribed word for word the woman's written complaints so it seems 
most likely that under-estimating the gravity of the behaviour had 
something to do with women's feelings of guilt associated with their 
victimisation. One case was described as a poor match, another 
embroidered events and another was said to be almost 'fabricated'. 
As noted in Chapter 5, legal language is used primarily to create 
meanings for lawyers. Evidence of behaviour is not generally 
collected for the accurate representation of women's experiences but 
for translation into the language required for a workable legal 
document. Solicitors may differ in their presentation of the 
evidence according to their professional beliefs, their experience and 
personal idiosyncracies. For example, a lawyer who proscribed to 
the views of the Plain English group might draft her/his legal 
documents in a radically different manner to one with more orthodox 
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views. Some of the variations found in the texts could quite 
feasibly be explained in terms of varied stylistic features. 
Descriptions of events can be bald statements of 'facts' or elaborate, 
narrative accounts. The following extracts from two documents 
drafted by different solicitors illustrate the point. The first is 
taken from a statement to magistrates, the second from an affidavit 
for divorce. Both give the same 'fact' about the husband's 
unemployment but the first is in a concise style, the second a more 
elaborate narrative: 
My husband was out of work, of course, at this time but he got 
a job eventually. 
He was out of work for two weeks during which time I kept him. 
We were very unhappy because of this situation. In November 
of 1978 he got a job as an assistant office manager with a firm 
of market researchers. 
In its brevity, the first statement also omits any mention of the 
effects of the unemployment upon the couple. 
Events could be described in an exceptionally wordy or elaborate 
manner because of the solicitor's belief that legal precision is 
required as in the following extract: 
The defendant being aware of the precarious situation I was 
living in grace and favour accomodation as a result of my 
parents' goodwill applied constant threats to me namely that he 
would cause trouble at the premises; alternatively that he would 
cause damage to the premises; alternatively he would assault me 
and alternatively he would ensure that he created so much 
trouble that my parents would give me notice to leave the 
premises. 
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In a less legalistic language the same point could be made using 23 
words instead of the above 73: 
When I was living with my parents the defendant constantly 
threatened to assault me or cause so much trouble that I would 
get evicted. 
Like the above extreme of legalese, the language used may be over- 
precise, heavily using formal words to describe events or 
scrupulously mentioning the tiniest details: 
he punched me with his right fist on my right cheek just below 
my eye. This resulted in me having a "black eye" for over a 
week. 
For the woman experiencing the assault whether the husband used his 
right or his left fist on her right or left eye was largely 
irrelevant. The details were given more concisely in the divorce 
petition: 
Respondent struck the Petitioner in the face with his fist 
causing her a black eye. 
Some solicitors who drafted the documents adopted a much less wordy 
style for describing the relevant events as though consciously guided 
by the desire to say only what is necessary. The more modern 
affidavits were far less elaborate than those created prior to the 
Divorce Reform Act 1969. Affidavits still however are traditionally 
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drafted in a narrative style whilst other documents relevant to the 
case will give the essential details in the much briefer sufficing 
style. The difference between narrative and sufficing styles is 
illustrated in the following extracts from a woman's affidavit and 
her particulars for divorce: 
On June 15th my husband came. to the caravan site at West 
Zealand where we were staying, my mother, cousin, myself and 
the three children. It was 10.40. p. m. He barged on the door. 
We were frightened and did not let him in because we were 
scared he would waken the children and perhaps take them away. 
My mother was paying the rent and she told him to go away and 
stop bothering us. I said I did not want to see him because he 
had had plenty of time to communicate with me whilst still in 
London and then was not a suitable time. He knew my father 
was not with us and he had been drinking. He persisted in 
barging on the door and intermittently kept kicking the sides of 
the caravan violently. We ignored these noises and did not 
provoke him to further violence. We let him take the 
initiative and hoped he would go away. At midnight he 
threatened to break in through the door, and smashed a circular 
glass panel in the door with his fist. 
On or about 15th June 1973, the Respondent repeatedly and 
violently banged on the door, and kicked the sides, of a caravan, 
in which the Petitioner was staying so that she was put in 
fear, particularly so when the Respondent broke a glass panel on 
the said door. 
Some of the files included solicitors' notes, drafts of affidavits and 
the women's own handwritten accounts of events. If available, 
solicitors often used previous cases as a basis for drafting the 
evidence in later cases. Many of these documents contained 
crossings out, additions and rewrites. Some of these crossings out 
and rewrites appeared to be purely grammatical, for example adding 
capitals betwen draft and final text, changing 'law school' to 'Law 
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School'. There were the inevitable typing errors. In one case 
theft of a clock worth £55 is mentioned. The second draft affidavit 
completed a few weeks later values the clock at £25. Words could 
be amended to wipe out dialectical or coloquial elements. For 
example, the statement 'He barged on the door' was altered to say, 'He 
banged on the door. 
The disappearance of some material between documentary drafts could 
also have been the result of this being irrelevant or immaterial to 
later cases. For example, deleting a statement that the woman was 
in a situation of financial hardship because no maintenance had been 
paid, if maintenance was no longer an issue. Some of these points 
may well have been corrected as the solicitor checked details with 
the woman concerned. 
Inserting a word or two could have been the result of a solicitor's 
attempt to reduce ambiguity in statements as in the following 
examples: 
my husband came in at about 3 a. m. He had been drinking. 
the Respondent returned home in the early hours of the 
morning in an intoxicated condition. 
He came into the back bedroom and said I was going to sleep 
with him. 
He came into the back bedroom and told me I had got to 
sleep with him. 
he had obviously been drinking heavily. 
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after a heavy drinking session 
in an intoxicated condition. 
Some of the amendments and crossings out led to the disappearance of 
aspects of the men's behaviour from the record. One solicitor had 
crossed through several sentences in the first affidavit, erradicating 
the following details from the evidence: the man's efforts to get the 
woman to cover up for his violence by telling lies about how the 
injuries were caused; threatening phone calls to the wife's friend; 
threats to hit the wife's friends; phoning the woman at work. 
A bit more information would also be added on to statements in 
between drafts. For example: 
He struck me across the head several times with his hand. 
He struck me across the head several times with his hand 
causing me head pains and distress. 
He struck me across the head several times with his 
hand causing me to have head pains and to sorely 
distress me. 
I was screaming and crying. 
I was screaming and crying and was terribly upset. 
Rather than adding on details, the inserts could embroider upon the 
original statement: 
On occasions my salary has paid wages and housekeeping. 
On occasions my salary had to pay wages and housekeeping. 
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On occasions my salary had to pay wages to my 
husband's employees and the remainder went on 
housekeeping. 
On occasions he utilised her salary for the 
payment of wages to his employees, the 
remainder having to be used for housekeeping 
purposes. 
By using appropriate emphases, inserts could introduce an element of 
judgement. The bald statement, 'He did not come with me' becomes 
the more derisive, 'my husband did not even come with me'. The 
extracts below show how one woman's admittance of defiance in her 
affidavit is made acceptable by the element of judgement introduced 
in the particulars of the petition: 
In March of 1975 I left him. My sister in London had asked me 
to go for the weekend and he refused to let me go. I insisted 
on going and he told me not to come back. I took him at his 
word. 
the Respondent unreasonably refused to allow the Petitioner to 
visit her sister and told her that if she insisted on visiting 
her sister, she should not return to the matrimonial home. 
Some of the amendments had the effect of removing altogether the 
women's responsibility for events as in the following example: 
As we were arguing he struck me. 
As my husband was arguing he struck me. 
Put together in their final context, crossings out, amendments and 
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rewrites could result in a description of an event which differed 
radically from the original act documented. 
Apart from typing errors, most of the alterations were likely to be 
the result of solicitors' conscious efforts. The motives however 
need not have been sinister. Professionals would be able to justify 
amendments on technical grounds - to create a 'good' case, minimalise 
contest by narrating events as precisely as possible. Points made 
by the woman which were based on hearsay, unsubstantiated or hard to 
prove might not be included if it was believed they may be 
questioned. In the following example the 'hearsay' element was lost 
between affidavits: 
I have recently been informed by a colleague of my husband that 
he is carrying on an association with another woman. 
I had reason to believe that my husband was carrying on 
an association with another woman. 
In another case, a woman's letter had stated that her husband had 
been out all night at a party and she had heard he was with another 
woman. The reference to the other woman was omitted from the 
affidavit. 
Stanko's work on prosecutors' screening decisions in a New York 
district attorney's office provides further evidence of the' importance 
of the relationship between women's abilities to proceed with cases 
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and lawyers' assessments of viability on technical and psuedo- 
technical grounds: 
Convictions are maximised where only sound cases are brought to 
trial. A 'solid' case must not only be legally sufficient, but 
also based upon a credible complainant or victim. A victim 
must be credible not only in the eyes of the prosecutor but 
also the judge and jury (.... ) Credibility of the victim also 
pertains to the situation, and to the congruence between 
situation and individual. 
(Stanko, 1982, pp. 237-8). 
Stanko emphasises the importance of the stereotypical quality of 
decisions about credibility and how prosecutors assume that judges 
and juries will find certain kinds of victim's claims more credible 
and acceptable than others. The women's 'complaints that the 
solicitors emphasised one aspect of their partners' behaviour in 
preference to others lends support to Stanko's conclusion that 
women's quests for justice may often be determined more by 
stereotypes than by the actual harm rendered against them by 
assailants. 
Although solicitors may stress the value of putting together 'good' 
cases, the transformations in the language used to describe behaviour 
and the events in the documents showed considerable subjective 
variations could exist for the assessment of 'good' cases. A 
solicitor's desire for a 'good' case might override the client's 
interests. An extreme example of this was seen when vagueness and 
ambiguity were deliberately pointed out by the solicitors in the 
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drafting of documents as though their intentions had been to maintain 
professional standards rather than stretch points of law to scrape 
through 'borderline' matters. In one case where the woman's evidence 
of cruelty had 'disappeared' because she had returned to her husband 
and thus condoned the behaviour, the brief for the magistrates' 
hearing was solely concerned with the defence of her allegations 
against the presumed charges of her husband. 'Weak' points in the 
woman's evidence were pointed out as follows: 
the Complainant has suspected the Respondent of committing 
adultery and although the evidence is not very conclusive the 
Enquiry Agent will attend to give evidence. 
When a solicitor begins with the presumption that a court hearing 
will concern the defence of a woman's allegations, the terms of the 
debate are'shifted such that the victim and offender change position 
- she is defending herself 'against his allegations rather than vice 
versa. The outcome was the woman's behaviour, rather than the 
hardship caused by the man's actions, became the main topic of 
discussion. 
After the failure of her case, the woman involved in the above case 
wrote a letter complaining about her solicitor's inadequate 
representation of her case asking him: 
Why was my husband's persistent womanising not mentioned? 
You will reply no doubt that you couldn't pursue the matter 
because it wasn't proven. Where is the proof regarding my 
supposed 'string of lovers' and the 'drawer full of 
contraceptives'? These were spoken of in court as if they 
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were proven facts. 
Expressing his sympathy to the woman over the lost case, the 
solicitor replied in terms which drew upon the 'just' and 'reasonable' 
principles of the new law on divorce: 
after hearing the facts, the Magistrates were not satisfied and 
however deeply about the case you feel you may consider that on 
reflection the blame can be apportioned to both you and your 
husband. 
Although like shopkeepers, lawyers' livelihoods depend upon their 
service to customers, a point exists where professional self-interest 
overrides all others such that the customer is wrong. 
The affidavits, statements and particulars of cases showed the 
frequent use of explanatory or scene setting phrases next to 
descriptions of violent or unreasonable acts. For example: 
The Respondent is a very jealous and possessive man and 
whenever I go out without him he virtually always accuses me of 
messing around with other men. He would often beat me and 
try to make me admit that I had been seeing somebody else. 
During the birth of our first child the Respondent has been 
very uncaring and unfeeling towards me. 
She told me her husband had hit her and beaten her after 
drinking heavily. 
He had been drinking heavily and was very argumentative. 
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The explanatory qualification could be added between affidavits as in 
the following example: 
Throughout the marriage he has used abusive language to me in 
front of the children. 
Throughout the marriage when in drink he has used abusive 
language to me in front of the children 
This type of scene setting material which commonly surrounded 
particular acts was found in some examples to vary for the same 
events between cases, different drafts of the documents and different 
affidavits. 
Where qualifying statements were absent, the text often contained a 
number of references to the fact that the behaviour was 'unjustified' 
or 'without any provocation'. For example: 
he was extremely jealous because I appeared to be enjoying 
myself. He called me over to him and I sat next to him. 
Without any provocation whatever he pushed me over. 
I was very depressed and one evening in our bedroom without 
any justification the Respondent pushed me on to the wall and 
he then kicked me several times. 
The facts or particulars of behaviour included in the texts as 'signs' 
of relationship difficulties obviously varied from case to case. The 
behaviour from the solicitors' cases could be loosely grouped into 
the following categories - drink, violence, foul language, meanness 
with money, unemployment, no committment to the family, woman's 
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infidelity, jealousy, over zealous control, threats, verbal violence, 
sexual perversion, expropriation of property, effects on victims. 
(Behaviour grouped under the heading 'committment to family' was only 
relevant to cases where the man's own children were involved. ) 
With the help of scene setters and shifting context and other 
linguistic transformations, one specific fact of behaviour could fall 
into a number of the groups. For example, the fact 'husband stays 
out nights' could shift its meaning according to its contextual 
position with other evidence about drinking, adultery, lack of 
committment to the family or hard work. An examination of shifting 
context provided further interesting examples of the extent of 
variation in the use of symptoms and the implicit stereotypical 
explanations offered of the behaviour. 
A good example is provided in the extracts below which describe one 
violent event, a woman's eviction from the matrimonial home. The 
woman's affidavit described the event as follows: 
Wednesday, October 15th 1972, my husband came home at 11.00. p. m. 
bringing with him some supper, and said that this was his last 
contribution to married life and if I did not like it I could 
leave. I asked him if he was threatening me and said that our 
life together was finished because of the rotten things he had 
done to me. He promptly came over and grabbed me violently by 
the upper arm, pushed me to the back door, opened it and threw 
me out, kicking me with his boot on the way. I fell against the 
wall and badly grazed and bruised my right elbow. I was 
screaming and crying. A neighbour opposite heard me and she 
and her husband came out and took me into their house. After 
a few minutes the neighbour went across to our house and 
banged on the door, my husband would not answer at first, but 
when he did her told her that the door was locked to me. (.... ) 
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Both our children were in bed at the time and Mr Riley later 
took me up to my mother's house where I stayed the night. 
Because of the children's age and the fact that my husband went 
out to work I did not think he could look after them properly 
and I collected them from his mother's on the 17th October and 
they have lived with me since. 
In the woman's affidavit the salient facts are the husband's 
announcement; her reply; the throwing and kicking out the door; the 
fall; the injury; distress; the neighbour's intervention; husband's 
refusal to allow her entry; staying the night at her mother's and the 
collection of the children. The woman's affidavit situates the 
relevant facts in the context of another late night domestic dispute 
where the husband issues ultimatons. The description of the attack 
suggests the husband's active initiation of the violence. In the 
sentences used to describe the events the husband is depicted as the 
aggressive agent executing an attack upon the woman as victim - 'He 
promptly, came over and grabbed me violently by the upper arm, pushed 
me to the back door etc. ' Due to the information included in the 
evidence, the act is more than violence to a woman. The document 
points out that the children were in the house and the woman was 
concerned for their welfare. The attack was therefore on the mother 
of small children committed in their presence. The event is 
furthermore narrated, with a degree of drama - the woman was 
'screaming and crying', the neighbour 'banged on the door', the 
husband 'promptly came over' etc. 
The neighbour who witnessed part of the event described it as 
follows: 
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On the evening of 15th October 1972, at about 11.00. p. m. I went 
though the lounge in front of the house to the kitchen to make 
some tea. Whilst in the kitchen I heard a loud scream from 
the back and immediately called my husband. My husband and I 
went out to the back and saw Mrs Smith in the street crying. 
We asked her what was wrong. She said, 'He's thrown me out'. 
She was obviously upset and confused. We took her into our 
house. Mrs Smith wasso upset that I went over to her house 
with the intention of speaking to her husband. He came to the 
door and asked me in. I said to him that he could not be 
right in his head behaving like that with such a nice wife and 
children. He said, 'I am going to have bath now'. He then 
said, 'You can tell Ida that as far as she is concerned the door 
is locked. I told him that he could not lock his wife out and 
he said that he could. I then left and returned to my house. 
When I got back I noticed that Mrs Smith was holding her right 
arm and I saw that the skin had been taken off the lower part 
of her right arm. I asked her how she had hurt her arm and she 
said that she had caught her arm when her husband had thrown 
her out. 
After a short time the phone rang and my husband gave 
the receiver to Mrs Smith who spoke to Mr Browne. Mrs Smith 
was only in a dress and it was raining and so my husband took 
her to her parents' in the car. 
For the witness the salient features of the case were different, 
taking into account matters such as making the tea which were 
irrelevant to the woman but to which the event was linked. The only 
facts in common with those in the woman's affidavit were the screams, 
the intervention, the husband's refusal to allow the woman entry, the 
injury and staying the night at her mother's home. The neighbour's 
description uses less dramatic language. For the neighbour, the 
event is a one-off occurence, something which is rarely witnessed. 
She makes no mention of banging on the door and merely states 'He 
came to the door and asked me in'. There is no mention of the 
woman's great concern about the children's welfare, nor of the 
children being in the house although it is noted she is a 'nice wife' 
and mother. The account of the event highlights the bizarre and 
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stupid features of the husband's behaviour rather than his outright 
brutality. When told he 'could not be right in his head behaving 
like that' the husband is said to have replied 'I am going to have a 
bath now'. Even the injury changes. The injury to the elbow 
described by the woman as being a bad graze and bruise is refered, to 
as follows: 
the skin had been taken off the lower part of her right arm. 
The different report of the injury could imply either a more serious 
injury or a lessening of the damage. 
The sister, who was not within earshot of the events, was involved by 
the husband's telephone call and the wife's visit to her mother's 
house to stay the night. She recounted her knowledge of the event 
as follows: 
On 15th October 1972 I received a telephone call from Jasper at 
about 11.00. p. m he said he was phoning "just to let me know" he 
had either "chucked" or "kicked" my sister out and that she 
would be wending her way up to our house. I received a second 
phone, call at about 11.30. p. m. He said, "This is a further 
bulletin" and said that Mrs Smith had gone over and asked him 
to take the wife back but he had refused. I phoned my sister 
at Mrs Smith's and said that she could come to our house. My 
sister arrived at 12.00. midnight. She was very distressed and 
said that her husband had turned her out. She had a bad graze 
on her left arm which was obviously giving her pain. She has 
lived with her parents and I since. 
The sister therefore mentions the husband evicting the wife from the 
home, the neighbours' intervention, staying the night at the mother's 
home and the injury to the left (rather than the right) arm. The 
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sister's report of the events are set within the context of the 
husband's admission and boasting about his violence in a phone call. 
The husband's behaviour here is again described as an active, 
unprovoked act aimed at the woman as a passive victim. The injury 
and the act of locking out are however only loosely linked. The 
affidavit states 'she-had a bad graze' but the explanation for this is 
ambiguous as it is infered by the context rather than explicitly 
stated. 
The above three statements, although different, offer broad agreement 
when taken together that the eviction was violent and unjustified. 
The affidavits together concern not just an act of personal violence 
against a woman and the consequent harm to her well being but an 
unlawful and violent act of eviction which deprived her of her legal 
right to remain in the matrimonial home with the children. Thus, 
even the evidences supporting, the woman's case prioritised property 
rights over personal protection. 
On visiting the wife's solicitor's office, the husband explained. the 
event by suggesting that the wife had fallen out of the door, hurt 
herself and refused to return home. Unlike the wife, he offers no 
corroboration and speaks with the authority awarded to a man's 'bare 
denial': 
She went out of the door, fell and hit herself. On this 
occas (... three illegible words... ) She screams. I had done 
nothing -I had just come home from work and had taken my 
boots off. 
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The fall, the screams and the coming in from work are common facts 
but their meaning in the husband's statement are very different from 
that of the wife's. For the husband, the event is self-explanatory - 
the wife's behaviour caused the injury. His statement offers 
implicit evidence of his hard working and respectable character. He 
plays upon and adds to the ambiguity of the wife's statement 'my 
husband came home at 11.00. p. m.. ' by saying 'I had just come home from 
work'. He contests her statement 'kicking me with his boot on the 
way' by saying 'I had just come home from work and taken my boots 
off'. The image he paints of a hardworking man, coming home, taking 
off his boots to be met by a woman who screams for apparently no 
reason and falls out of the door thereby inflicting injury on herself 
seems incredible, in fact incredulous. The statement invites the 
conclusion that he is either a liar or the woman is neurotic. By 
next offering to take the woman back into the home, the offence has 
the potential to totally disappear. 
The ambiguity and shifting contexts of the specific statements of 
'facts' concerning behaviour within and between the texts meant that 
whether or not an act was unnacceptable was essentially an arbitrary 
matter. A man's drinking for instance could be used as a 'sign' of 
his beastliness, his lack of committment to the family, his alchoholic 
sickness or be used to add further information on the woman's 
suffering and degradation. Alternatively, it could be used by the 
man as evidence of his misfortune - being 'driven to drink' - or his 
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membership as 'one of the lads' and being a 'moderate drinker'. The 
accurate representation of women's needs was found thus not to be 
necessarily the primary concern of solicitors. A 'good' or 
'successful' case need not accurately report the problems experienced 
by the woman concerned. The earlier discussion of the forgeting, 
minimalising and remembering process (see also Chapter 5) 
demonstrates further that a solicitor's approach to the 
representation of a woman's needs can be a vital factor in her 
immediate and subsequent feelings of guilt and powerlessness. 
'Good' cases are still ambiguous because contest is the crux of a 
lawyer's role. Even if contest is theoretically absent, as in the 
special procedure cases of divorce researched, it still plays an 
important part in the lawyer's work of anticipation, as seen in the 
attempts to irradicate linguistic ambiguities. The energies which 
lawyers expend when scrutinising these ambiguities give the 
impression that law jobs are something to do with hearing both sides 
of the argument, listening carefully to what both men and women say 
in order to produce an adjudicated and 'just' outcome. The latest 
trends towards more 'negotiated justice' (see Chapter 4) are an 
extension of this approach. The liberalistic emphasis upon 
individual justice prioritises an equality of opportunity between 
clients whose conditions are fundamentally unequal. The women's 
experiences discussed in this chapter have shown that the legal 
process can enhance the vulnerability of victims. This chapter has 
outlined four factors which give cause for concern: 
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1. The scope for oppression: 
Women who experience domestic violence are vulnerable to a whole 
range of abuses and further oppressions from their partners when 
they enter the legal arena. On the basis of the survey insufficient 
attention was paid to the safety of women for the duration of 
proceedings. Insensitive treatment by the police, solicitors, 
magistrates and judges can add to this oppression. By refusing to 
become involved individuals in the legal system in effect give 
domestic violence against women their own tacit support. Those who 
deal with women victims need an understanding, tactful and skillfull 
approach. A domineering manner, e. g. reducing women to tears 
because they will not 'speak up', is a rather suspect 'strategic' 
necessity. 
2. The presumption of disbelief: 
In the creation of 'watertight' cases lawyers strive to minimalise 
ambiguity. The case material has demonstrated that the law may 
enhance women victims' inequality of condition as clients by 
weighting their claims as victims. The tendencies of magistrates, 
judges and solicitors to give more weight to men's counter 
allegations than to women's corroborated, claims could not be 
explained as the result of only a minority of aberrent cases. The 
discussion of injunction and divorce reforms in Part I demonstrated 
that a man's 'bare denial' of allegations was sufficient in law to 
offer a viable case of defence whilst a woman's allegations had to be 
rigorously substantiated. One of the examples discussed in this 
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chapter has shown how a man's assertions can masquerade as 'facts, in 
debates which, at best, are only secondarily concerned with preventing 
violence against women. The presumption of disbelief can have the 
effect of shifting the emphasis from a woman's needs for protection 
on to her behaviour as precipitator of the attacks. 
3. The use of 'acceptable' legal language: 
This chapter has shown how part of solicitor's job involves 
translating women's experiences into acceptable- legal language - 
whether this means clarifying her complaints for an oral hearing or 
codifying them into an affidavit or petition. The survey and case 
records revealed a great deal of variation was possible in the way 
this part of the legal process was approached. At one extreme the 
woman could have her description of events, taken down verbatim and 
used word for word in any documentation required for the case. At 
another the behaviour could be distorted or made to appear more or 
less grave in nature. There was little need in the cases studied 
for solicitors to portray the behaviour as more severe than that 
which had actually occured in real life. Women's feelings that a 
solicitor's 'putting it all down in words' somehow made the-situation 
appear more severe could have been linked to their own perceptions 
of victimisation in the forgeting, minimalising and remembering 
process. The listing of the complaints and events may have put the 
pattern of behaviour into its inevitably bleak context. The failure 
to include some details of behaviour might similarly be due to 
concern for the feelings of the women involved. Citing just the 
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minimum of behaviour for the success of a petition is a common 
technique, especially in relation to divorce petitions on the basis of 
unreasonable behaviour. In other cases however, the women involved 
felt the exclusions had detrimental effects on the success of their 
cases. Minimalising the the severity of the violence reported to 
the court resulted in failed injunction applications, inadequate 
compensation or maintenance. 
4. The behaviour involved: 
The women surveyed made the frequent complaint that the descriptions 
of behaviour and what the law considered relevant for consideration 
were influenced by social beliefs, prejudices and gender biased 
assumptions. Some feared that legal intervention was guided more 
by racism, paternalistic concerns for wives and mothers 'forced' out 
to work, the wish to persecute sexual 'deviants' or 'rough' men than 
by the desire to protect women as victims. Even at their lowest 
ebb, the women percieved the racist, sexist and class divisive 
features of the law. 
The final chapter in Part II will take up some of these issues and 
tentatively examine how to empower women as victims in the legal 
process. It is worth noting at this stage however that the problems 
faced go beyond the current vogue for the removal of adverserial and 
overly legalistic involvement in favour of a conciliatory approach or 
system of negotiated justice. Whilst there are some obvious 
benefits in this trend, the scope for the oppression of women victims 
would not be affected nor would the influence of social beliefs, 
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prejudices and gendered assumptions upon decisions made on the basis 
of behaviour. The trend towards greater conciliatory imput may in 
fact enhance rather than reduce these problems (see Chapter 9). 
The process of legal definition holds the potential to shift the 
terms of the debate such that women's needs as victims can -become 
totally irrelevant. This chapter has shown that, at the extreme, the 
legal process can shift the ground of the debate so as to lose sight 
of the main reason for a woman going to the law in the first place. 
Chapter 7 will explore this matter further by looking at the 
decisions reported from the higher courts. 
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Over a very large area the law is indifferent to sex. It is 
irrelevant to most of the relationships which give rise to 
contractual or tortious rights and obligations, and to the 
greater part of the criminal law. In some contractual 
relationships e. g. life insurance and pension schemes, sex is a 
relavent factor in determining the rate of premium or 
contributions. It is relevant also to some aspects of the law 
regulating conditions of employment, and to various State-run 
schemes such as national insurance (.... ) It is not an essential 
determinant of the relationship in these cases because there is 
nothing to prevent the parties to a contract to insurance or 
pension schemes from agreeing that the person concerned should 
be treated as a man or a woman, as the case may be. (.... ) On 
the other hand, sex is clearly an essential determinant of the 
relationship called marriage, because it is and always has been 
recognised as the union of man and woman. It is the 
institution on which the family is built, and in which the 
capacity for natural heterosexual intercourse is an essential 
element. It has, of course, many other characteristics, of 
which companionship and mutual support is an important one, but 
the characteristics which distinguish it from all other 
relationships can only be met by two persons of opposite sex. 
There are some other relationships such as adultery, rape and 
gross indecency in which, by definition, the sex of the 
participants is an essential determinant. (.... ) (to assess the) 
heterosexual character of the relationship which is called 
marriage, the criteria must, in my judgement, be biological, for 
even the most extreme degree of transexualism in a male or the 
most severe hormonal imbalance which can exist in a person with 
male chromosones, male gonads and male genitalia cannot 
reproduce a person who is naturally capable of performing the 
essential role of a* woman in marriage. In other words, the law 
should adopt, in the first place, the first three of the doctors' 
criteria, i. e. the chromosonal, gonadal and genital tests, and if 
all three are congruent, determine the sex for the purpose of 
marriage accordingly and ignore any operative 'intervention. (.... ) 
if a 50 year old male transexual, married and the father of 
children, underwent the (sex change) operation, he would then 
have to be regarded in law as a female, and capable of 
"marrying" a man ! The results would be nothing if not 
bizarre. I have dealt by implication, with the submission 
that, because the respondent is treated by society for many 
purposes as a woman, it is illogical to refuse to treat her as a 
woman for the purpose of marriage. The illogicality would only 
arise if marriage were substantially similar to national 
insurance and other social situations, but the differences are 
obviously fundamental. These submissions, in effect confuse 
sex with gender.. Marriage is a relationship which depends on 
sex and not on gender. 
(Ormrod, LJ in Corbett v Corbett (1970)). 
CHAPTER SEVEN. 
Law Reports And Domestic Violence Against Women 
Introduction. 
This chapter is founded on the analysis of over 300 cases traced 
from the published law reports between 1969 to 1987 where a 
spouse's/cohabitee's/lover's behaviour was said to have been the 
intitial reason for the court's involvement. The cases and 
materials which formed the basis for the discussion in this chapter 
are marked in the bibliography by way of an asterisk. The project's 
emphasis upon women victim's needs, rather than on specifically legal 
concerns required cases from different specialities of the law be 
included. The cases covered divorce, nullity, maintenance, 
injunction, custody, housing, homicide, criminal, compensation and 
property matters. Because of the extra amount of work they would 
have involved, cases which refered to the sole complaint of adultery 
were deliberately excluded from the survey. It was hoped that this 
exclusion would not have a marked impact on the discussion because 
some of the issues arising from adultery would be included in other 
cases, especially family cases making multiple allegations and 
homicide cases. 
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The case materials will be used to show how stylistic and discursive 
variations in the texts contributed to the outcome and final 
decisions. Specific examples will be given to illustrate how the 
relationship between the behaviour and legal intervention into cases 
of domestic violence against women was negotiated within the texts. 
Reported Decisions As Good Policy Cases. 
It is a fundamental feature of any system of law that similar cases 
brought before a court should be treated in the same manner. Legal 
systems based upon the traditions of the common law, such as the 
English system, allow a significant proportion of the laws to be 
'judge made'. To prevent anarchic chaos resulting from variations in 
judicial interpretation, most common law nations have developed a 
doctrine of precedent, i. e. 'rules' which dictate how earlier case law 
should be applied. The concept of stare decisis (deriving from the 
common law maxim stare rationibus decidendus - keep to the decisions 
of past cases) is particularly powerful in orthodox English legal 
theory. The theory of precedent in England depends upon a chain of 
command (a heirarchy of courts) and precise 'rules' for analysing 
past cases. A court faced with cases analogous to previous disputes 
must follow its own and superior courts' decisions unless these have 
been overruled by a higher court or statute. Law reports therefore 
form the lawyer's tools of the trade. Case law contains the 'good' 
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policy cases, the precedents and principles which guide lawyers and 
judges in their everyday practice of legal definition. 
Like the legal documents discussed in the last chapter, reported 
decisions are primarily lawyers writing for themselves. Whilst as 
texts they form part of the cultural representation and adjudication 
of standards of behaviour between men and women, they are not 
directly encountered in most people's daily lives. Although these 
cases are usually available in the Law Reports held in public 
libraries, few individuals without a legal interest will have read one 
single reported decision. Media accounts or personal involvement in 
legal cases have much more influence on most people's experiences of 
the law. Reported decisions do however influence the behaviour of 
lawyers and judges thereby affecting the outcome of cases for those 
involved. Reported decisions also influence definitions and 
decisions in 'other' social spheres. Case law is therefore relevant 
to both the practice of the legal adjudication of behaviour and to 
the social definition of 'appropriate' standards. 
As the political scientist Edelman noted in his book the Symbolic 
Uses Of Politics in 1964: 
It is precisely (the law's) ambiguity that gives' lawyers, judges 
and administrators a political and social function, for 
unambiguous -rules would, by definition, call neither for 
interpretation nor for argument as to their meaning. 
(quoted in O'Barr, 1982, p. 23. ) 
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Legal principles operate in a situation of ambiguity, on cases which 
are at the same time similar but different. Stare decisis is 
essentially vague in the English model because there is no official 
test in existence for finding what part of a case is binding. If 
the circumstances in an earlier case do not match the present one, it 
can be distinguished and the need for precedent avoided. 
Alternatively, it can be overruled if the decision is deemed to be per 
incureaum (basically wrong). Although legal theorists condemn the 
practice of distinguishing the 'undistinguishable', there is no true 
measure of how often this occurs, nor any guidance in the process of 
distinguishing as to the level of generality for interpretation. 
Every case coming before the courts is unique - it has its own facts, 
its own special set of circumstances, its own actors in the legal 
drama. To extract a precedent from this detailed and specific 
situation, interpretation of the law must identify its general 
properties. 
Not all parts of a 'case' constitute a principle of law. Traditional 
legal theory regards the binding part of the decision to be the legal 
principle formulated by the court in relation to the matter decided. 
At times however, judges may give their reasons for reaching a 
certain decision in a longwinded and elaborate manner. A lot of 
what is said in a judge's summing up will have very little value in 
later imitative cases. A great proportion of some decisions will be 
'padding', the incantation and paraphrase of other decisions. Thus 
it is pointless to look for the complete formulation in the summing 
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up. The text book method of overcoming this problem involves 
drawing a distinction between the ratio decidendi and the "obiter 
dicta, the binding principle and things said in passing. Dr Goodhart, 
a textbook firm favourite, argued that the ratio decidendi of a case 
would be best found by examining the facts themselves rather than 
the court's reasoning (Zander, 1980). In Learning The Law, Glanville 
Williams uses the following example to show how this is done. 
Assume that in a case there are facts A, B and C. The court finds 
facts B and C to be material and A to be immaterial and concludes X. 
Thus, in future cases in which facts B and C exist, or A, B and C, the 
conclusion must be X. If however in a future case facts A, B, C and 
D exist and fact D is held to be material the first case will not be 
a direct authority, but may be of value as an analogy (Williams, 
1978). 
The lawyers' search for 'buried treasure' (Twining & Miers, 1975) is a 
gross oversimplification of how precedent works in practice. The 
discussion of past cases does not occur in a vacuum. A 
preoccupation with facts rather than with reasoning by analogy and 
contrast assumes: 
i. that every case has one predetermined ratio decidendi for each 
question of law; 
ii. that the ratio decidendi can be found only by reading the case 
rather than looking a. t it in relation to a whole series; 
iii. that the ratio decidendi does not change with the passing of 
time. 
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It is most unlikely that every case has one predetermined ratio 
decidendi. There are a range of ratios which could compete to guide 
future decisions. What in reality constitutes a 'precedent' is a 
ratio decidendi which is picked up and later expanded upon by the 
courts (see the resurrection of Elmsworth v Elmsworth (1975) 
discussed in Chapter 3). As more and more cases are reported and 
decisions made on the basis of cases not reported at all 'precedents' 
are constantly being manufactured. Computer listings are in fact 
now available to assist lawyers in this task. Facts in the last 
analysis have little to do with the matter. In contested cases 
before the courts, lawyers each produce one or more precedents which 
their opponents will distinguish. In 1960, the legal realist Karl 
Llewelyn listed a total of 64 techniques for following or avoiding 
precedents (Llewelyn, 1960). Precedents are thus somewhat arbitrary 
'rules' but they do nonetheless satisfy the demand for administrative 
convenience,, allowing lawyers to do things the way things should be 
or always have been done. Even in 'family cases', where adherence 
to precedent is very arbitrary, the facts being infinitely variable, 
higher court decisions are defered to and followed - hence the 
reported chaos following the Richards case (see Rae and Levin, 1983). 
In the 'family' law, where varying facts are emphasised at every 
opportunity, standard forms, themselves called 'precedents' are used 
for administrative convenience. 
Research by Murphy and Rawlings (1981 & 1982) into decisions of the 
House of Lords found that these often autocratically abandoned the 
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requirement to follow legal rules. Legal rules and 'precedents' 
could be recounted at length only to be swept aside in one sentence 
based on little more than the autocratic assertion that a Law Lord 
did not consider former interpretations 'right' or did not value the 
consequences should they be applied to the instant case, etc. 
Liberal references to justice, impartiality and 'hearing both sides of 
a story' offer no guarantee that judgements will not be made on the 
basis of personal politics. In common with this approach, the 
discussion in this chapter will ignore the matters central to the 
lawyers' 'tools of the trade' reading of cases by emphasising instead 
their sociological features. 
Reported cases are only incidentally concerned with justice for women 
or their protection from abuse. The cases in the law reports also 
include those where the victim's needs are irrelevant either because 
she no longer exists (as in homicide cases) or because the case 
revolves around another issue. Reported decisions relate to legal 
personalities which are abstracted from their experience as human 
beings. In criticism of what he sees to be 'feminist theory' Mark 
Cousins wrote: 
elements of legal personality do not exactly attach themselves 
to persons in the conventional sense at all, but rather to 
certain statuses which are supported by persons. Such might 
be 'husband' or 'wife', 'father' and 'mother'. And before it is 
objected that these titles are merely specialised functions of 
men and women, it is important to recognise that the categories 
can include 'spouse' or 'parent'. 
(Cousins, 1980, p. 119). 
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Legal references to apparently asexual categories such as 'spouse' or 
'parent' are often not as egalitarian as they seem. Part I showed 
how the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 was 
drafted to cover 'spousal' violence, not because men were deemed to 
be equally victims of this type of offence but in order to pre-empt 
the criticisms of the men's equality lobby in Parliament. Whilst 
'spouse' or 'parent' are often euphenisms for 'man' or 'woman' in the 
law, Cousins' essential point that the law works with abstracts rather 
than people is relevant. In the reported decisions traced the act 
or acts of behaviour which provided the original impetus for legal 
involvement ranged in importance from being irrelevant to holding a 
central, position in the text such that specific facts relating to the 
act(s) were discussed at length. All the reported decisions were, of 
course, appeal cases heard in the higher courts. The cases where 
the original behaviour became irrelevant represented the highest 
level of abstraction, where parties contested 'issues' to the fullest 
extent. For cases where the behaviour was relevant, much of the 
discussion concerned whether legal intervention was justified. The 
remainder of the chapter describes how references to behaviour 
between men and women in marriage type relationships in the texts 
was designated a matter of concern for the law and how it was judged 
to be unacceptable enough to warrant legal intervention. The 
discussion which follows compliments and builds upon the findings of 
the previous chapter. Each text is seen as a site of struggle where 
actors in the legal drama play on ambiguities and contest the 
meanings of events. What is 'said' and 'unsaid' about the behaviour, 
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the use of language to designate it 'eccentric', 'brutal', 
'uncontrolled', and so on, the selection of 'signs' of marital distress, 
the repetition and sequencing of evidences, play important roles in 
the presentation of the case for legal intervention. 
Some Features Of Legal Cases. 
Law reports are very complicated texts. Reported decisions contain, 
in varying combinations, the following categories of information : 
1. The background to the case. 
Individualism is crucial to " English law, especially the 'family' 
speciality. There are different facts, different parties to a 
dispute and different experts involved in most cases (doctors, social 
workers, probation officers, forensic scientists, and so on). - All the 
reported decisions studied reinforced the uniqueness of a case by 
including at some point a history of variable length or at least 
reference to the specific details which were recorded elsewhere. As 
in the case records researched stylistic variations were found in the 
reported decisions' references to the backgrounds of the cases. The 
'bare bones' or 'skeleton' background where a 'sufficing' style was 
adopted to describe the history was commonly encountered. This 
would include information on things like the ages of the parties to 
the dispute, the number, ages or sexes of the children, the length of 
the marriage, cohabitation or relationship, a brief statement as to 
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its happiness and a reference to the problems or events leading up 
to the present case. In, some of the reports, the background details 
were precised as the 'facts' and situated in the text before the 
presentation of counsels' evidences or the judgement(s). The 
following are typical examples of the briefer introductions: 
The defendant and Christine Jane O'Brien were married on 5th 
October 1964; and on 10th January 1974, by a decree made in the 
Bristol County Court in an undefended suit, the marriage was 
dissolved on the ground that the defendant had behaved in such 
a way- to his wife that she could not reasonably be expected to 
live with him. On these facts counsel submits that the 
offence of rape cannot be committed by the defendant on Mrs 
O'Brien until a decree absolute has been pronounced. 
(Park J in Rv O'Brien (1974) at 664). 
The parties were married on 1st, April 1972 and, in the 
circumstances which are described in the wife's affidavit, she 
intended at the time of the application to take out an 
originating summons under S2 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1965 for, 
_ 
leave to present a petition for divorce, 
notwithstanding that three years had not expired from the date 
of the marriage on the ground that the case is one of 
exceptional hardship suffered by the wife, or exceptional 
depravity on the part of the husband. 
The affidavit in support of the application for the 
injunction sets out a history of extreme physical violence by 
the husband towards the wife. It is not necessary for me to 
repeat what is in the affidavit. The violence alleged is gross 
and continuing, and apart from the particular legal problem to 
which the case gives rise, I would without hesitation grant ex 
parte, on the evidence as it stands, an injunction to restrain 
such behaviour. However, as counsel for the wife pointed out 
when making the application, there are authorities which cast 
doubt on the power of the court to grant injunctions ancilliary 
to proceedings under S2 of the 1965 Act. 
(Finer, J in McGibbon v McGibbon (1973) at 837). 
The case histories tended to be truncated when an especial need for 
brevity had been asserted by the particular judge. The details were 
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also rapidly dispensed with on the grounds of a need to protect 
individual privacy although, apart from where children were concerned, 
why some people had a right to privacy or anonymity which others 
lacked was never clear. In some of the decisions details could be 
omitted on the grounds of a stated need to safeguard the course of 
justice, if for example, other issues were likely to arise or were yet 
to be tried or decided. Other decisions merely refered to the 
history of the case as having been 'dealt with elsewhere', in a lower 
court or in chambers. 
Like the affidavits studied in the solicitors' cases, the introduction 
to reported decisions could take the form of a pseudo-narrative, 
devoting two or three pages to a couple's matrimonial history, the 
'facts' of an event or criminal assault and the history of legal 
involvement giving rise to the present dispute (e. g. Rv Gittens 
(1984); Livingstone-Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard (1974); Rv 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte Staten (1972); France v 
France (1969)). 
The background details often contained what appeared to be 
extraneous 'facts'. Details such as the race, age, education, social 
status or appearance of an individual were included in cases where 
they seemed to hold little relevance to any of the legal issues 
subsequently defined.. The following are just a few examples: 
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the wife is an attractive woman who dresses well. 
(Foley v Foley (1981)). 
Both parties have strong temperaments. The husband originates 
from Southern Ireland, the wife from Northern Ireland. 
(Bateman v Bateman (1979)). 
Both the man (the respondent) and the woman (the applicant) are 
of West Indian origin. The woman is Jennifer Davis. She is 
now only 21. The man is Nehemiah Johnson. He is twice her 
age. 
(Davis v Johnson - (1978)). 
The victim of the conduct (.... ) was Leak's wife, a slightly built 
young woman in her early twenties. 
(R v Leak (1975)). 
The husband, who is obviously a man of considerable energy and 
ability 
ý. (Griffiths v Griffiths (1974)). 
Some of the introductory statements contained on the other hand a 
statement of sympathy by the judge for one, the other or both 
parties or some other 'scene setting' type of expression: 
This is a particularly unfortunate and unhappy case. It has 
special features which, I would stress at the outset, in my 
view, distinguish it from many of the cases which have in the 
past come before this court. 
(Phillips v Phillips (1973)). 
This is a very sad case for which I think nobody is to be 
blamed. 
(Bennett v Bennett (1969)). 
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The scene setters and apparently irrelevant extraneous facts could 
share a common function in some of the decisions by allowing the 
discussion to shift context or exploit defined ambiguities. A later 
example in this chapter will show how race, a primary matter of 
dispute in a High Court case, became a mere extraneous fact in the 
Court of Appeal. The inclusion of these extraneous facts and scene 
setters may have been the result of a judge/report writer's 
anticipated desire to reduce conflict. As the previous discussion of 
the legal documents revealed however ambiguity cannot be irradicated. 
2. Presentation of the 'issues': 
All appeal cases operate at a certain level of abstraction. The 
cases studied therefore contained various attempts to define the 
degree of abstraction between the instant and primary case. This 
could involve baldly stating the point(s) to be examined by the court 
and/or how the case was different to the original matter brought 
before the court. The following extracts provide concise examples: 
This is an appeal by Miss or Mrs Adeoso against a judgement by 
his Honour Judge Willis in the Shoreditch County Court on 16th 
May 1980 by which he dismissed an application by her against Mr 
Adeoso for an injunction turning him out of a council flat which 
they hold as joint tenants. The case raises again the question 
of construction of S1(2) of the Domestic Violence and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976. 
(Adeoso v Adeoso (1981)). 
In this case the wife claimed a lump sum and agreed that her 
claim for periodic payments should be dismissed (discussion of 
previous case, matrimonial history and wife's grounds for 
appeal). The gravaman of the criticism of the learned judge 
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was that he failed to take into account or give sufficient 
weight to the period of cohabitation. 
(Foley v Foley (1981)). 
This appeal raises a surprisingly large number of points. One 
is of general importance to those who work in the Family 
Division, and indeed to any court dealing with Family Division 
matters. The others are peculiar to the facts of the case. I 
shall endeavour to deal with all the points which arise in turn. 
(Dipper v Dipper (1980)). 
In some cases the 'issue' was almost obscured by the lengthy case 
history. Or it could be presented obtusely by placing it in the 
context of adverserial claims such as, the Crown's position versus 
that of the defence, or the plaintiff's versus the defendant: 
The plaintiffs in this action (.... ) claim damages from the 
defendant arising out of the death of James Ian Gray. They 
claim that the death was caused by the negligence of the 
defendant. The defendant, in his turn, by third party 
proceedings, claims (.... ) an indemnity in respect of any damages. 
(Gray v Barr (1970)). 
The issue could be introduced through a series of negative 
definitions or by shifting emphases from one issue on to another as 
in the following example: 
-By a petition dated 25th November 1970, the wife sought 
dissolution of the marriage on the grounds of her husband's 
cruelty (.... ) She alleged ý that in April- 1970 the husband 
purported to obtain a final decree of divorce (.... ) by talaq 
(talaq is an Islamic ceremony which basically involves the man 
saying 'I divorce you' three times) By his answer the husband 
(.... ) denied cruelty and sought dissolution under S2 (1) (b) of the 
Divorce Reform Act 1969. I heard and determined as a 
preliminary issue the question whether English law would 
recognise the talaq divorce (.... )I decided that the divorce 
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could not be recognised (.... ) Counsel then informed me that on 
the information available to them there was a grave problem 
whether the parties had ever been legally married, 
(Radwan v Radwan (1972) No. 2). 
Some of the texts constructed a dispute over issues by, for example, 
putting forward different judges' conflicting claims about the correct 
matters for consideration. Lord Hailsham pointed out some 
disagreement between Law Lords in Richards v Richards in 1983: 
I believe that all your Lordships are agreed that this appeal 
must be allowed. But there is a difference of opinion as to 
the ground. My noble and learned friend Lord Scarman is 
content to decide the issue on the ground that the 
discretionary decision of the judge can be demonstrated to be 
plainly wrong (.... ) The view of my noble and learned friend Lord 
Brandon is based on a proposition of law, namely that (... ) the 
court (... ) is bound to follow the principles enunciated in Si of 
the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 
(Richards v Richards (1983)). 
The combination of issues, issue shifts and power struggles in the 
texts as to the appropriate matters for consideration further 
hieghtened the ambiguity of the cases. 
3. Presentation of evidences, counter evidences, allegations or 
counter allegations: 
Again the way in which these were presented varied in style. The 
'evidences' could be interwoven with the background or introductory 
details, emeshed with opposing evidences and allegations or a totally 
one sided account could be offered after a statement that this 
account was preferable or more reliable. The personal 
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characteristics of the men and women involved in a case could 
significantly influence the assessment of the value of evidence. 
Here is how Bagnall J rated the evidences of a man and woman 
involved in a case in 1973: 
the wife alleged cruelty including a number of incidents of 
physical violence as well as the incident (admitted by the 
husband) of June 27 1969. She relied on those allegations and 
the husband's neglect of her as conduct conducing to her 
adultery and in support of her cross-prayer for divorce. She 
gave evidence. in support of those allegations before me and was 
cross-examined upon them. Before adjudicating on this I must 
say a few words about the character of the parties and the 
impression they made on me. 
The husband has a dominant and dominating personality; 
yet in contrast I think that he had periods of depression and 
moodiness which his illness and operation intensified and which 
he inflicted on others. He is a perfectionist and expected 
high standards; but he undoubtedly lacked the gentle touch. He 
saw situations in clear terms of black and white with no grey. 
Clearly he was capable of violence, at any rate under 
provocation. My impression was that, quite apart from the 
incident of June 1969, he would be easily provoked. With some 
reservation I thought him a witness of truth. 
The wife is a softer personality but not lacking in 
determination. She knew what she wanted and how to adopt 
effective means of getting it. She is master of the quietly 
biting retort and I have no doubt that in argument, or even in 
discussion, she would be exasperating. Though I have some 
sympathy with her, having regard to the character that I have 
painted of the husband, I am satisfied that her allegations 
against him are substantially exaggerated. I am confirmed in 
this because I thought that as a witness she was generally less 
than frank, prone to prevarication and, as the saying goes, to 
swear by the book. I have great hesitation in accepting her 
evidence, except, where it is admitted or corroborated. 
(Harnett v Harnett (1973)). 
In Qureshi v Qureshi, Sir Jocelyn Simon baldly stated that some 
evidence was 'preferable': 
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The wife and the husband, and their present solicitors, 
respectively Mr Boyle and Mr Thorne, gave evidence on which I 
rely in setting out the facts. I prefered the evidence of the 
husband to that of the wife where they differed. There was 
little variance between the evidence of Mr Boyle and that of Mr 
Thorne; but I thought the latter's recollection was more vivid; 
and I accept his evidence as the touchstone to test the validity 
of all the other evidence. 
(Qureshi v Qureshi (1971)). 
This statement was used as a justification for basing the rest of the 
discussion in the text on the husband's account of the events. 
In Ash v Ash, Bagnall J (again) argued that the woman's evidence was 
less believeable than her husband's because she showed signs of lack 
of restraint: 
The respondent's drinking habits were undoubtedly coupled with 
abuse of and violence towards the petitioner. I must therefore 
first consider the petitioner as a witness in support of the 
allegations that she has made. I say at once that she did not 
impress me. She had a penchant for self-dramatisation to an 
extraordinary degree. She was vague and confused, not only 
about the dates but about the years and sequence of the 
various incidents, and she lost no opportunity of exhibiting 
extreme malevolence towards the respondent, not only dircted 
towards the later years of their marriage, the years of 
complaint, but also going back to the early days of the marriage 
and to the even earlier days before the marriage when they were 
living together as lovers. 
The respondent who has conducted his own case with an 
engaging manner and considerable restraint also gave evidence. 
He exhibited similar restraint in the witness box, and was 
perhaps forshadowed in his answer, he was reluctant to criticise 
his wife. 
(Ash v Ash (1972)). 
In this case the reference to the wife's credibility was followed by 
a lengthy discussion of the husband's justifications for the assaults. 
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Emphasis on the manner of presentation of evidence was found to be 
only rarely used to support the truthfulness of a woman's 
allegations. One example is Dunn J's description of the evidence 
given by husband and wife in the case of Livingstone-Stallard v 
Livingstone-Stallard (1974), Matters of presentation are mentioned 
to add weight to the woman's 'trivial' allegations: 
An indication of his attitude towards his wife was, that in the 
witness box, he refered to her variously as 'the girl', 'the lady' 
and 'Brenda Foster' which was her maiden name but not as 'my 
wife' or 'Brenda'. I accept her complaint that right from the 
very start he did criticise her over these petty things in the 
way she described them (... ) In the witness box he spoke in a 
quiet carefully modulated voice; I do not believe that it was 
his real voice, particularly when he was angry. This was a man 
who was capable of controlled anger. 
(Livings tone-Stallard v Livingstone-Stallard (1974)). 
The same effect of favouritising evidence(s) could be achieved in a 
less direct way by interweaving evidences. This could give at the 
same time an impression that all the issues had been covered by a 
judge who was impartial and fair. In Katz v Katz (1972), for 
instance, the wife's, the husband's and doctor's evidences are all 
interwoven and interspersed with the rather opinionated comments of 
the judge. Presenting the 'evidence' by way of allegation and 
counter-allegation is a familiar technique employed when summarising 
cases of an adversarial nature. The following is a common example: 
The husband, a company director, filed a petition in October 
1964 alleging cruelty. He said that the wife was cold and 
indifferent and that from 1959 she sulked or nagged him, that 
his health suffered and that he left her for six weeks in March 
and April 1964 ( .... ) Her answer denied cruelty. She said 
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overwork caused his ill health, that she tried to persuade him 
to work less hard and to take more care of himself and that was 
the so called nagging. She pleaded that there had been 
condonation (.... ) This he denies. 
(Wilkins v Wilkins (1969)). 
From the decisions analysed, especially those which went through 
several stages of appeal, it was noted that evidences and their 
manner of presentation could be radically different with the changed 
context of a later analysis of the case. This can be demonstrated 
by the use of an example from one of the cases which went through 
several stages of appeal. 
The case of Ogden v Ogden (1969), concerned the contested allegations 
in a divorce cruelty case where two different conclusions as to the 
nature and cause of the conduct involved were arrived at by the 
divorce division of the High Court and by the Court of Appeal. 
Table 27 lists the symptoms of marital distress mentioned in the 
decisions from the divorce division and the Court of Appeal. 
The divorce division had held that Mrs Ogden's allegations about her 
husband's behaviour were enough to establish a case of cruelty for 
divorce. The Court of Appeal overturned this decision and found 
that the true cause of the marital distress was the wife's adulterous 
association with her employer. In the Court of Appeal text, the 
husband's actions were explained in terms of a response to the wife's 
behaviour. 
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Not only did- the Court of Appeal text use some different 'signs' of 
marital distress to those mentioned in the divorce division text but 
the importance attached to behaviour which was common to both texts 
differed. 
TABLE 27: Symptoms Of Marital Distress In Ogden v Ogden. 
Factor/event mentioned as possible symptom 
Race 
Obscene & blasphemous language 
Conduct in front of the children 
Accusation to daughter 1 
Illtreatment of daughter 2 
Accusation of madness 
One act of physical violence 
Painful, racist aspersions 
Cruelty to the children 
Rows 
Wife's illhealth 
Associations with other men 
Accusation of adultery 
Contraceptives 
Wife's leaving 
Husband's leaving 
Husband's offer of reconciliation 
Wife's refusal of sex 
Wife's refusal to give up work 
Husband's non-payment of maintenance 
Wife's employer visits house twice 
without husband being informed 
Divorce Court of 
Division Appeal 
4 
# 
# 
# 
# 
# 
# 
Reported decisions interweave ritual with technical discussions. 
The repetition of points in cases is one example of the more 
ritualistic features. 
. 
In some cases surveyed this bordered on an 
incantation. Table 28 shows the sequential positions and 
repetitions of the symptoms of marital distress in the two cases. 
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Statements refering to Mr Ogden's cruel behaviour and its effect on 
Mrs Ogden (her state of depression) were scattered throughout the 
text in the divorce division case. The husband's offer of 
reconciliation was tartly dispensed with at the conclusion to the 
text by referring to it just twice. 
TABLE 28: Sequential Positions and Repetitions Of Significant Acts 
Attributed To Husband And Wife In Ogden v Ogden. 
Divorce Division. 
Husband's jealousy cited 9 times throughout text. 
Other bad behaviour of 
husband cited 7 times throughout text. 
Wife's depression cited 4- times throughout text. 
Husband's offer of 
reconciliation cited 2 times towards end of judgement. - 
Court of Appeal. 
Husband's bad behaviour cited 1 time at start of text. 
Wife's depression cited 2 times at start of text. 
Wife's refusal to give 
up work cited 
Wife's refusal of 
reconciliation cited 
Wife in company of other men 
cited 
Other bad behaviours of wife 
cited 
Wife's refusal of sex cited 
4 times throughout text. 
4 times throughout text. 
4' times throughout, text. 
4 times throughout text. 
3 times throughout text. 
In the Court of Appeal, by contrast, the allegations of Mr Ogden's 
cruel conduct were refered to just once in the first few sentences of 
the text. The effect of the conduct upon the wife, Mrs Ogden's 
depression, was mentioned twice, also at the very start of the text. 
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In the remainder of the Court of Appeal case there was a liberal 
scattering of references to Mrs Ogden's conduct. In the Divorce 
Division the wife's race and the husband's behaviour are linked in the 
discussion of the evidence relating to his cruelty. His remarks 
about Italian 'peasants', attacks on the sexual fidelity of a Roman 
Catholic, unwillingness to allow his wife to associate with others of 
her race, etc. play a key role in the debate. In the Court of 
Appeal however, race is dispensed with as a mere extraneous fact. 
Between the two cases, the language used to describe the relevant 
acts and events underwent subtle alterations. The 'rows', 'furious 
rows', 'arguments' and 'quarrels' mentioned in the divorce division 
text were refered to with the generic term 'scenes' in the Court of 
Appeal text. 'Obscene and blasphemous language' in the divorce 
division text was refered to in the Court of Appeal case as the 
husband's 'rude or offensive remarks' or his 'nagging'. What the 
divorce division called his 'fits of temper', 'jealousy' and 'unjustly 
impugning chastity' the Court of Appeal text called the 'anxieties of 
a suspicious husband'. Even Mrs Ogden's illness was minimalised 
from 'an acute and dangerous depression' to a 'highly nervous state'. 
The Court of Appeal text devalued as well the importance of the 
evidences of the, wife's key witnesses, thereby excluding them from 
consideration in the final decision. Without these back ups Mrs 
Ogden's allegations were more plausibly dispensed with as 'gross 
exaggerations'. 
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4. Reference to other cases: 
Even if they are dispensed with as being of no use, some reference 
to previous cases decided is an important aspect of legal definition. 
Other cases can help to establish the court's legitimacy in reaching 
decisions by giving the precedents' - 'fathers' law' - seal of 
approval. For lawyers previous decisions help to create the cases' 
meanings through their contextually assigned positions. 
5. The decision(s): 
This was occasionally the decision not to make a decision, to do 
nothing but refer the case back to another court for trial. 
The Relevance Of Behaviour To The Case. 
Whether or not the allegations of behaviour giving rise to a case 
were mentioned at all depended upon their relationship with the 
facts and any defined present issue(s). As noted earlier, technical 
'issues' could take such a prime position that the behaviour giving 
rise to a case could be held to be irrelevant. The level of 
abstraction could be so great that the behaviour could be just 
background, as when an issue arises on a particular point of law 'yet 
to be decided'. Or. the behaviour, although relevant, might not be 
discussed at all beyond reference to it having occured as in for 
example, the cases of Rv O'Brien 1974 and Rv Reid 1971 where the 
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acts of violence - rapes - undoubtedly happened but the discussions 
in both texts centred upon whether these were crimes. The amount 
of space devoted to the description of the behaviour involved in the 
case did not necessarily bear a direct relation to its relevance to 
the decision. The importance attached to the behaviour varied 
primarily in accordance with its defined relationship with the issues 
constructed in the case. It could thus be held to be possibly 
relevant, contributing to the present case (as in maintenance and 
conduct cases, access cases etc. ) or a central feature in the case. 
In divorce law there has been a trend of the removal of facts of 
behaviour from discussion of the primary case especially since the 
introduction of special procedure. Recent proposals by the Law 
Commission to remove the need to prove irretrieveable breakdown 
could complete the trend if implemented. Although this may be a 
welcome move it should be noted that its effects will be limited 
because in cases of marriage dissolution issues of behaviour have 
really only been removed partially. For many cases they have 
shifted on to the matters of child care and financial provisions, 
where behaviour is increasingly adjudicated by welfare officers and 
conciliators. The increased emphasis on welfare officers' 
assessments of behaviour in the later cases studied reflect this 
trend. 
Behaviour defined as, largely 'irrelevant' in a current case could 
nonetheless still be discussed or described at length. This was 
particularly so in homicide cases where a full and often grizzly 
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description of the killing would be reproduced followed by a judge's 
statement that 'the facts are not in dispute' and the real issue 
concerned something else, for example whether the judge at the 
original trial directed the jury adequately. In the recent case of 
Harmsworth v Harmsworth (1987), another case where acts of behaviour 
were described at length, it was not the behaviour which was in 
dispute but how adequately it was described in a committal 
application for breach of an injunction. 
In the remainder of the chapter some of the different approaches' 
concerning the relevance of the behaviour to the problem of 
intervention will be discussed. The examples will be used to 
demonstrate the relevance of women's needs as victims in the legal 
discourse on domestic violence and unreasonable' behaviour. Three 
examples will be used to show how stylistic features, legal issues, 
personal stereotypes and theories about domestic violence against 
women and the 'appropriate' gendered behaviour of men and women all 
interplay to affect the outcome of a case. 
Private Squabbles And Domestic Wars. 
Feminists have often noted how the social creation of public vs 
private spheres of production contribute to women's oppression (see 
Delphy, 1984; Gamarnikow et al, 1983; Stang Dahl & Snare, 1978). 
Although " the division of social responsibilities into so-called 
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'public' and 'private' spheres is an important factor in women's 
oppression it is essentially an arbitrary matter, in that there is no 
realm or domain which could properly be called 'private'. In 
liberalistic political thinking the 'private' sphere has traditionally 
been that area of life not included in the conventional analysis of 
the 'state'. In the liberal tradition, 'private' life is an 
unregulated haven of 'complimentary equality' between the sexes based 
upon a division of labour and responsibilities. Thus, if violence 
takes place at all it has nothing to do with material : inequalities 
(see discussion of liberal traditions in domestic violence research in 
Chapter 9). By contrast, in feminist work, 'private' 
coercion/government is a key component of the state (see e. g. 
MacKinnon, 1982; 1983. ). In the cases studied, legal intervention 
into cases of domestic violence against women was frequently posed 
in the context of the problem of overlapping, opposing or 
irreconcileable rights and interests. Children's rights vs parental 
rights, property vs personal protection, individual freedom (i. e. 
privacy) vs state intervention were commonly encountered oppositions 
constructed in the debates over the problem of intervention. The 
point at which a 'private' dispute becomes a threat. to the 'public' 
interest is of central concern to the police, legal profession and the 
social services. The case of RvD reported in 1984 offers a 
convenient illustration of the issues of behaviour which concern the 
courts in public-private boundary dispute. RvD shows how by 
creating a false dichotomy between 'public' and 'private' spheres of 
life, the law differentiates domestic violence (not only that against 
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women, but also that against children) from other kinds of anti- 
social acts. As a predominantly 'private' matter domestic violence 
is largely unregulated by the law. 
RvD contained another example of conflicting rights and interests 
i. e. the opposition between parental rights and children's interests. 
It also offers an example of a case where children's needs and 
interests were asserted with virtually no discussion as to what' these 
were. ' The text contained minimal references to the matter of how 
to respond to the child's needs, debate concerning the child's rights 
served more to amplify the images of the conflict and 
irresponsibility amongst the parents, and to thereby legitimate legal 
intervention. The criminal prosecution concerned the father's 
kidnapping of his child, D, but much of the discussion in the text 
centered on the behaviour of D towards his wife. D had already been 
convicted for falsely imprisoning his wife Audrey. The violence 
towards Audrey was rather incidental in this case to the assault on 
the child but references to it, its causes and consequences form a 
major part of the debate. The need for legal intervention is 
established right at the start of the case by using incidents of 
behaviour to construct the scenario of the family at war. The 
discussion of the marriage begins: 
The history of this stormy and unhappy family affair begins 
with the marriage of the appellant to Audrey 
(R vD (1984)). 
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A lengthy description of the matrimonial problems, D's violent acts 
and the use of legal proceedings by his wife then follows. The 
family at war or 'locked in battle' is a familar metaphor employed in 
criminal cases and custody disputes. RvD is an extreme example 
but many cases exist which revolve around the same issues. The 
behaviour involved may range from public brawling (as in Rv Bird 
(1985)) to 'scenes' in the living room as in the Ogden case (1969) 
discussed previously. The common factor is that both-the parties 
involved fuel the dispute. The offender and victim are not opposed 
as active vs passive. The judgements of these type of cases are 
packed full of references to couples 'locked in conflict', fathers 
'obsessed with love' who act badly because they are trapped in a 
spiralling battle of matrimonial acrimony. 
One noticeable feature of this scenario was the detailed reproduction 
of past events using militaristic analogies and terminology. 
Husbands were described as 'storming, in' as though invading a foreign 
country rather than the front room, 'enlisting' accomplices or making 
preparations for an 'attack'. The wives hid behind a 'smokescreen' 
of excuses or acted like 'time bombs' thereby precipitating their 
husbands' 'explosive' conduct. The children were refered to as 
'objects' in the 'struggle', who were 'seized' and used as 'pawns' or 
'armoury' in the battle between parents. The following description 
of how D kidnapped his daughter, E, is an extreme example: 
By the late autumn of 1978 the appellant had made, on his 
return at about that time to England, careful and devious 
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preparations to take the law into his own hands and to take E, 
if necessary by force, away from her mother. To assist him in 
this reprehensible endeavour, he enlisted the assistance of two 
violent men named Hunter and Aherne. 
On 13 December these three men, at about 11.15. p. m. when 
Audrey was watching television, pushed their way into the flat 
where she had been living with all three children for some time. 
The appellant had a rope in his hand, Hunter wore a stocking 
mask and plastic gloves and carried a knife. He unscrewed the 
doorbell. Aherne had a pair of scissors and a knife. 
The appellant told Audrey that he had come to take E 
away. She told the other two men that E was a ward of court. 
They were as indifferent to that as was the appellant himself. 
Frightened out of her wits, Audrey took E and dressed her in 
the presence of an even more frightened S. The appellant took 
her away, she showing no signs of distress as she went. Before 
leaving the flat in the company of Aherne, the appellant showed 
Audrey an article which he said was a gas bomb. It was, he 
said to be left with Hunter who knew how to activate it and who 
would, as he did for several hours, remain behind so that the 
appellant could have a good start on his journey before the 
police were informed about what was going on. Thus it was 
that E was taken away from her mother and afterwards by air to 
New Zealand. 
(R vD (1984)). 
The militaristic features of the assault, wearing masks, using 
explosives, guarding Audrey, are highlighted by the judge's 
description of the events and characters involved. 
Presenting the evidence in a judgement in a particular way can make 
it easier for a judge to assert that both parties- were equally 
implicated in the family war. The reported decisions differed 
considerably in the order of presentation of various evidences 
whether from the parties involved in the case or from witnesses or 
any experts. One text might for instance, present the woman's 
evidence first and then move on to the man's or vice versa. In 
cases where the couple were portrayed as locked in a domestic war a 
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common feature was the weaving together the descriptions of the 
couple's actions, thereby furthering the image of each aggravating 
the other's behaviour. Although the description of events in the 
extract portrays D as the active agent of aggression and Audrey and 
E the passive victims, interwoven with the descriptions of the 
husband's bad acts is the history of the wife's fight back and 
resistance - her repeated applications to courts in England and 
abroad, her flights to Eire and New Zealand to find the child he had 
violently removed, her removals to secret addresses, calls to the 
police and screams for help in the streets are recounted as part of 
the history of bitter matrimonial dispute. By presenting the history 
in this manner, it was much more plausible when cases later asserted 
that the conflict was 'mutual' even if evidence only of the man's 
violence was offered as in this case. The manner of presentation of 
the evidences and issues in the text in RvD had the effect of 
raising the authority of D's claims in relation to those corroborated 
and proven by his wife. 
Interweaving the evidences by for example, presenting the man's and 
the woman's allegations as opposing claims was also one way in which 
the 'true issues' of the case could be broached, expert testimony or 
lower court findings introduced. In RvD expert testimony 
concludes the discussion of the man and woman's history of competing 
claims. The lawyers in the case were able to leave it for the 
probation officer to make the charge that the problems arose as a 
result of D and Audrey's 'mutual bitterness': 
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In the social enquiry report prepared for the criminal 
proceedings, the probation officer observed, with much 
justification we think: 
I realise that this case is one of great complexity. 
moreover it is fraught with the kind of mutual bitterness 
and emotional conflict more often found in a matrimonial 
court than in one of criminal jurisdiction. 
Later on the probation officer went on: 
Situations like this are sadly familiar to Probation 
Officers writing reports for Divorce Courts. Only the 
very extremes of (the appellants') behaviour resulting in 
criminal charges and national publicity make it diferent 
from countless other similar cases, whereby the two 
parties concerned become so locked in battle that 
eventually neither can or will move sideways.... In that kind 
of situation, children become weapons or armoury, as they 
have so unhappily become in this case. 
(R vD (1984)). 
Where 'neither party can or will move sideways' the bitterness of 
the conflict allowed courts to assert it was impossible to get at the 
real facts of the case. The 'real facts' existed somewhere in the 
obscurity of 'private' life. Instead of attempting to decide just 
who did what, the issue was sidestepped and the question became 
instead 'should the court intervene and how should it do so ?' The 
disputed behaviour in this case served as a foundation upon which to 
erect issues of public importance and to negotiate the relationship 
between the law and the family. For judges, the invocation of 
matters of public importance offered scope to be as 'political' or 
'apolitical' as they wished. Pondering over whether or not a case 
was of 'public' importance could provide both a justification for 
legal intervention and a safety valve against overzealous intrusion 
by the courts - into' 'private' lives/ individual freedoms, areas best 
covered by statutory control, etc. 
Page 380 
Law Reports And Domestic Violence Against Women/7. 
As noted, none of the decisions actually spelt out what was meant by 
the term the 'public'. It could have meant the world outside a 
couple's home, the neighbours, the legal profession, the nation. The 
ways in which a domestic war could offend the 'public' also varied in 
the cases.. They could be seen to offend the 'public interest' by 
hitting the 'public purse' - wasting resources, squandering legal aid, 
causing high legal costs, wasting court time. The behaviour could 
offend public 'morality' via the manipulation of children in a 'tug of 
love' for adult gain. The behaviour could have exposed the local 
population to danger by the use of shotguns, explosives and so on. 
In RvD the original trial judge seemed to have public morals and 
the neighbours' safety in mind when refering to the 'public': 
(kidnap) charges may well be reserved for the more serious 
cases which go well beyond mere matrimonial conflict and 
impinge on the public peace and on the public conscience 
(R vD (1984)). 
To Watkins LJ in the Court of Appeal, the 'public' seemed to be the 
legal profession: 
It is beyond doubt that these convictions are of outstanding 
importance. This is the first time in legal history, so we are 
told, that a father has been convicted of kidnapping his own 
child. If the conviction is upheld it will, so counsel for the 
appellant contends, create an undesireable precedent which if 
followed, will be an impediment to the proper administration of 
justice as affects family matters and an unnecessary burden on 
juries. Moreover, to resurrect trial on indictment for contempt 
is likely to have similar and unnecessary effects. Contempts 
for their orders, he says, should be left in the hands of judges 
to adjudicate on and where appropriate to punish for. Public 
policy and interest is affected by these convictions. Both 
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demand that there should not be unwelcome and unnecessary 
extensions of the classes of indictable crime. 
(R vD (1984)). 
Not only was domestic violence made 'different' to other violent 
crimes, whether or not prosecution was in the interests of the man, 
woman or child became largely incidental to the main issues of the 
case. 
Justifications. 
By contrast, in some of the cases studied the court's role was 
established in the texts on the basis of the defined or assumed need 
to intervene between parties by hearing the 'other side of the story' 
attached to a dispute. Here the differences between men and women 
could play a key role in the debates, giving full rein to social 
prejudices and beliefs about the 'appropriate' behaviour of either 
gender, especially in relation to sexuality and fidelity. Where the 
case included discussions of the behaviour as evidence of a 
fundamentally unhappy relationship - leading to an assault, 
relationship breakdown or diminished responsibilty, etc. - the 
symptoms of marital distress quoted could include a whole variety of 
gender specific complaints concerning for example a woman's 
housekeeping standards, her mothercraft skills, the sexual fidelity 
and gratification of partners, a man's adequacy as 'breadwinner', and 
so on. Men's complaints about inappropriate wifely behaviour were a 
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common theme for allegations in their own petitions and in defence of 
those made by their wives. The following two extracts give concise 
examples : 
The marriage was reasonably happy until 1957. The husband's 
general complaint from then onward was of neglect of himself 
and of the house, the house being dirty and not looked after 
and refusal to allow Polish guests to come to the house, and 
(.... ) he complained that from 1957 she became increasingly 
disinclined for sexual intercourse. 
(Slon v Slon (1969)). 
The husband also criticised the wife for getting drunk and 
making herself look cheap at a New Year's party in 1968 and as 
an afterthought, made some unspecified criticism of her 
housekeeping. 
(Harnett v Harnett (1973)). 
The case of Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) will be used to demonstrate 
how in some reported decisions, the court legitimated its role (to do 
nothing or to intervene) by way of the discussion of the the 
justifications for behaviour. Part I showed the distressing 
frequency of legal decisions which condoned men's violence against 
women on the grounds that some women 'asked for it'. Mitchell v 
Mitchell (1983) provides an example of. how in the texts a shift could 
be executed between the relative positions of the victim and offender 
such that the victim, rather than the aggressor could be put on 
trial. In the Mitchell case the woman's performance as wife, mother 
and sexual servicer was made the most important matter of the 
debate. 
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Briefly Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) concerned a woman's petition for 
divorce on the basis of her husband's unreasonable behaviour. An 
exclusion and non-molestation order had been attached to the 
petition. Mr Mitchell had breached the injunction and then applied 
to contest the divorce 'out of time'. In Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) 
the court's legitimation for its intervention into the case was 
created on the basis of doing 'justice' to the counter-allegations and 
explaining the man's acts. The allegations made by the woman were 
as a result scrutinised and treated with the utmost scepticism or 
merely ignored. The main issue was defined as concerning whether 
or not the husband should be given the right to have his case heard. 
He successfully persuaded the Court of Appeal that he had reasonable 
grounds to believe his marriage had not irretrievably broken down and 
he could not contest the divorce earlier due to lack of understanding 
of the legal process. 
At the start of the case the whole of Mrs Mitchell's particulars 
concerning her husband's behaviour were reproduced. The husband's 
behaviour was said to have included domineering his wife, timing how 
long she was out shopping, excessive jealousy, objections to her 
going out to see friends or relatives, physical assaults, screaming or 
swearing, threats to kill, threats of violence, 'insistence' on sexual 
intercourse, locking his wife out of the house, ignoring her for long 
periods and belittling her in front of her sister. Mrs Mitchell's 
allegations of violence by her husband were not discussed at all 
after this introduction to the case. In the rest of the text 
Page 384 
Law Reports And Domestic Violence Against Women/7. 
reference was made solely to the domineering aspects of the 
husband's behaviour. 
Domination, even violent domination, was legitimated in some of the 
texts if it could be argued that this had been motivated by 'love' 
or concern for others. In some of the cases lawyers reasoned that 
the domination or violent control of one member of the family was a 
justifiable way of saving the family as a whole! This type of 
argument could 'form part of the defence or mitigation in homicide 
cases. In Rv Ives (1969) for example the man argued he had killed 
his wife by battering' her over the head with an axe handle in 
defence" of their newly born 'child. Mrs Ives was said to have 
suffered a sudden attack of peuperal insanity which caused her to 
say that she was going to 'get rid of' i. e. kill the kids. In 
Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) the woman's allegations of violence at the 
start of the decision ' were counterbalanced if not overwhelmed by 
liberal references to the husband's qualities as a 'good' father 
struggling to preserve family stability. His claims that he merely 
attempted to bring her into line with a modicum of force were by 
the end of the case treated as being quite understandable. 
The first reference in the text to the behaviour played down Mrs 
Mitchell's fears by trivialising them - the original trial judge is 
quoted as having found that: 'To say the least they got on each 
other's nerves'. The next reference to behaviour refers to the 
husband's attempts at explanation: 
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He complained that he had not been represented and that the 
true facts of the relationship between himself and the 
petitioner had been distorted. He alleged that the petitioner 
did not look after the children properly and neglected them 
when she went out in the evening to enjoy herself. He alleged 
that he could look after the children in spite of his high blood 
pressure. He alleged that the petitioner was suffering from 
cancer, had had two serious operations in December 1980 and 
December 1981, and if there were recurence, he could look after 
the children provided he was allowed to live in the matrimonial 
home. The whole trouble was, in his belief, simply that he had 
ordered his sister-in-law Christine out of the matrimonial home. 
(Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) at 625). 
It will be apparent that the quote stating Mr Mitchell's allegations 
does not include any reference to him having denied the use of 
violent or dominating behaviour. The context is instead shifted as 
the emphasis lies with Mr Mitchell's reasons for the behaviour and 
Mrs Mitchell's qualities as a wife and mother. On the next page, 
further references were made to Mr Mitchell's complaints, and how his 
attempts to maintain family stability were undermined by Mrs 
Mitchell's relationship with her sister: 
In this affidavit (a) he described his formidable accomodation 
problems, (b) he described the satisfactory relationship between 
Leslie (the eldest son) and himself, the petitioner's inability 
to control him, and the fact that Leslie was missing his 
brothers, (c) he described friendly relations between the 
petitioner and himself, and continuing frequent sexual 
intercourse between the petitioner and himself, and continuing 
frequent sexual intercourse between them at his flat, (d) he 
described and complained of the fact that the petitioner's 
sister, Christine and her boyfriend, a man aged 30 were living 
in the matrimonial home, and that at weekends the petitioner's 
sister, Elaine, and her boyfriend, Paul, also slept there while 
the boys were in the house, (e) he described how he had seen 
his sister-in-law Christine as threatening his marriage and 
family stability, how he consulted the citizens' advice bureau 
and the court welfare office because of his concern before any 
proceedings were commenced, and as a result he evicted his 
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sister-in-law and the next day his wife applied for an 
injunction. 
(Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) at 627) 
Again the evidence quoted from Mr Mitchell did not provide a denial 
of the allegations but kept the focus of debate upon Mrs Mitchell's 
behaviour, her unwifely and unmotherly conduct being contrasted with 
his fatherly concern for family stability. The text continued with 
the course of explanation by next making Mr Mitchell into a victim, 
noting that he had not understood the legal documents given to him - 
i. e. the injunction and divorce papers - and he had been unable, due 
to hypertension, to visit the solicitor for legal advice prior to the 
first court appearance. Mr Mitchell was portrayed as a working 
class 'victim' of the legal bureaucracy, either too stupid to 
understand the due process (his solicitors argument), inevitably 
mystified by the complicated legal system (the judge's opinion) or too 
blinded by love or illness to comprehend that his wife was about to 
divorce him (conclusion offered by the welfare officer). Further 
reference was then made to his desire to 'save' his family: 
I have never intended that the Divorce should go through 
undefended because I love the Petitioner and feel that our 
relationship has been prejudiced only by the presence of the 
Petitioner's sister in the Matrimonial Home and that when she 
lives with her new boyfriend the Petitioner will lose the 
influence which has driven her to bring the matter this far 
( .... )I strenuously wish to keep my marriage together, not least 
for the sake of the children. The Petitioner has terminal 
cancer further details of which are' set out in paragraph 11 of 
my draft answer and I fear that the children may be split up in 
later years if I'cannot keep the family together now. 
(Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) at 628). 
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Mr Mitchell's allegations were backed up by quotes from his solicitor 
that he had: 
a strong answer to the allegations pleaded against him but 
believed on reasonable grounds that his marriage has not 
irretrievably broken down, so that it would be contrary to the 
interests of justice to deny him an opportunity of defending the 
suit. 
(Mitchell v Mitchell (1983)) 
Like many of the cases read, the Mitchells' case contained a great 
deal of repetition of the same points as though repetition was a 
technique for making some evidence 'important' or one particular 
conclusion 'obvious'. Mr Mitchell's allegations about his wife's 
behaviour were so frequently repeated that when there was some brief 
further discussion of Mrs Mitchell's allegations, her evidence came 
from the perspective of a defence of her own actions: 
She swore that the marriage was definitely at an end and that 
there was no prospect of reconciliation. In her view the 
respondent had had ample opportunity to deal with the papers 
served on him and to attend his solicitors. He did not want 
the marriage to end and was using every possible ploy to delay 
its end. She denied nearly all his allegations and gave 
explanations which put a quite different construction on many 
of the matters he relied on, including the circumstances of 
their continued sexual intercourse (.... ) She had often told (Mr 
Solicitor) that she had been frightened or confused and had 
frequently let (husband) into the house if he called there, 
though she did not wish him to call even for access. She told 
him that, if the ouster injunction was lifted, she did not see 
how she could live with him in any circumstances (.... ) he had 
admitted some acts of physical violence both at the hearing on 
22 July and in his proposed answer (.... ) the Respondent had 
tried to wear the petitioner down to a position where she is 
deemed to want to continue her relationship with him (.... ) the 
waste of two sets of substantial legal aid costs (.... ) would be 
involved if the application was granted. 
(Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) 629). 
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Mrs Mitchell's complaints about the sexual intercourse were left 
vague. They were not linked in the text to the allegations in her 
divorce petition that her husband had often 'insisted on intercourse' 
nor to the fact of her pelvic cancer. Mrs Mitchell in fact changed 
places with her husband such that she had to defend the allegations 
made in her original petition, rather than him having to prove he had 
a viable answer to the statement. The next (and last) mention of 
her evidence put her again on the defensive: 
She contradicted the evidence given in his affidavit in support 
of discharge of the ouster injunction and dealt in detail with 
his allegation that the whole trouble had been that her sister 
Christine had been living in the matrimonial home. She swore 
that she could never live with him again and that she would 
have to leave the children if the injunction was discharged. 
She explained the problems that she and the younger children 
had with Leslie. 
(Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) at 629). 
As in the case of RvD discussed in the last section, professional 
testimony had been quoted to execute a'shift in the topics on the 
agenda for discussion. In the Mitchell case the welfare officer's 
evidence was quoted to further devalue Mrs Mitchell's allegations and 
the dangers posed to her precarious health. Instead of refering to 
'violence' (as in Mrs Mitchell's particulars) or even to 'unreasonable 
behaviour' (the judge), the welfare officer renamed the acts of 
behaviour 'accusations': 
Mr and Mrs Mitchell have on occasions (... ) seen a good deal of 
each other, but in the long term these visits appear to have 
upset rather than heal Mr and Mrs Mitchell's feelings towards 
each other. (.... ) I have the impression that Mr Mitchell deep 
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down does still love his wife therefore is finding it very 
difficult to let her go and is very bitter about the whole 
divorce experience. Mrs Mitchell is clear that she would like 
the marriage ended but on occasions - she would claim - "out of 
the kindness of her heart" - she does collude with Mr Mitchell's 
approach. (.... ) There is a great deal of accusation regarding 
each party's ability to care for the children - particularly by 
Mr Mitchell against Mrs Mitchell. In this welter of accusation 
it is difficult to establish where the truth lies. 
(Mitchell v Mitchell (1983) at 630). 
By the time the Appeal Court judge got round to discussing the 
injunction, the behaviour leading up to it had disappeared. The 
acts of physical violence, such as the threat to kill, were not 
brought in to the context of the discussion: 
the ground of the ouster was not the respondents' behaviour to 
the petitioner but the broad ground, now known to be wrong in 
law, that the children's interests were paramount ( .... ) it must 
also be material that sexual intercourse has continued after the 
separation (.... ) More formidable is the history of the 
matrimonial proceedings. It does look as if the petition for 
dissolution after 25 years of marriage was instigated by the 
decision of the petitioner to apply for an ouster injunction. 
(Mitchell v Mitchell (1983)) 
Mrs Mitchell's vulnerable health, was also trivialised by putting it in 
the context of her husband's allegations about her going out, she was 
well enough to 'enjoy herself': 
The petitioner relies on her health, but she protests that she 
is quite well and has evidently been strong enough to persist 
in late nights at her disco club. She has a history of serious 
chronic disease, and the doctor's letter cannot give a prognosis 
(.... ) It is contended that it is not humane to prolong her 
anxiety and that it would be better to allow her to reach early 
finality in her proceedings for dissolution. There is not 
sufficient force in these considerations to make it just to 
allow the certificate to stand if the respondent has a case 
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which he has always wanted to present and which may well 
succeed. 
(Mitchell v Mitchell (1983)). 
Through the process of justification, the law can lend support to 
men's capacities to use violence to enforce sexual infidelity or 
avenge its loss. This has historically been a well known feature of 
the criminal law (see Chapter 3). A wife's adultery has historically 
been a special case for the category of provocation in the criminal 
law. Provocation and diminished responsibility may both mitigate 
findings of guilt and be built upon assumptions about the behaviour 
of a man and woman. There are of course many cases, especially in 
the criminal law where an offender's justifications for acts of 
violence will be subject to the scrutiny of prosecuting counsels. 
Prosecutors are prone to offer arguments that suggest that an 
accused's justifications for crimes are mere 'excuses'. In Rv 
Turner (1975) for example, the accused killed his pregnant girlfriend 
by battering her over the head with a hammer after her supposed 
confessions that Turner was not the father of the child she was 
carrying and that she had recently been involved in prostitution. 
The description of the behaviour in the case ambiguously interweaved 
the accused's active responsibility for the offence with a more 
passive construction of events. Active and passive states were 
juxtaposed in the introduction to the judgement: 
the appellant killed her by battering her about the head and 
face with a hammer. Fifteen blows were struck. 
(R v Turner (1975 )). 
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And again in the description of Turner's evidence of the event the 
interweaving of active and passive states made the event look more 
like the act of a man possessed than that of a calculating killer: 
he had been very upset by what she had said. His hand came 
across the hammer which was down by the side of the seat and 
he hit her with it. "It was never on my mind", he said, "to do 
her any harm. I did not realise what I had in my hand. I knew 
it was heavy. When I realised it was a hammer I stopped. 
(R v Turner (1975)). 
The medical evidence in the case was quoted in support of the image 
of a man possessed by a 'temporary madness'. The psychiatrist 
described the killing as follow: 
From all accounts his personality has always been that of a 
placid, rather quiet and passive person who is quite sensitive 
to the feelings of other people. He was always regarded by his 
family and friends as an even tempered person who is not in any 
way aggressive ... In general until the night of the crime he 
seems to have displayed remarkably good impulse control (.... ) At 
no time has this man appeared to show any evidence of mental 
illness as defined by the Mental Health Act 1959. His 
homicidal behaviour would appear to be understandable in terms 
of his relationship with (the dead girlfriend) which, as I have 
endeavoured to outline above, was such as to make him 
particularly vulnerable to be overwhelmed by' anger if she 
confirmed the accusation that had been made about her. If his 
statements are true that he was taken completely by surprise by 
her confession he would have appeared to have killed her in an 
explosive release of blind rage. His personality structure is 
consistent with someone who could behave in this way. There 
is no demonstrable clinical evidence to suggest that brain 
damage or organic disease of the brain diminished his sense of 
responsibility at the time he killed her, and since her death 
his behaviour would appear to have been consistent with someone 
suffering from profound grief. 
(R v Turner (1975)). 
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In this case the Crown and the Appeal Court judge supported the-view 
that 'outbursts of blind 'rage' often resulted when individuals 
discovered 'unexpected wantoness on the part of their loved -one'. 
This for the court was 'common sense' and nothing to do with 
psychiatry. Thus, even when the claims about understandable rage 
were challenged, this was done in a way which did not affect the 
gendered assumptions upon which it was founded. What is an 
'understandable' act is bound to be -socially, rather than legally 
determined. 
Expert Or Legal Definition. 
In some of the reported decisions traced, especially the homicide 
cases, the lawyers seemed to virtually defer their judgement to 
experts. The case of Rv Lomas (1969) for example debated the 
offender's responsibility for the strangulation of his wife on the 
basis of the pathologists' evidence on the likely period of- time for 
which the hold on the neck was maintained. The pathologists called 
the strangulation a 'neck compression'. The discussion in the case 
was largely devoted to whether or not the pathologists' evidence 
could show that Lomas had maintained his hold for 30 seconds. If it 
could be accepted that Lomas strangled his wife by holding her by 
the throat for less than 30 seconds the defence argued he could not 
be found guilty of murder. 
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Boundary disputes between law and medicine will be all too familiar 
to anyone who reads the homicide cases which make the news. The 
concepts of medical science can be called upon to allow courts to 
reach decisions as to the mens'rea of an offence, issues concerning 
an accused's state of mind or degree of control (see Rv Ives (1969); 
Rv Gittens (1984); Rv Turner (1975)). Law and medical disputes 
periodically hit the headlines because of conflict over the 
designation of offenders as 'mad' or 'bad'. Law and medicine were in 
the forefront of the dispute during the trial of Peter Sutcliffe. 
There must be many situations of violent or aggressive behaviour 
where one party to a dispute will be found to be suffering from some 
sort of illness. The law formally recognises the difficulties poor 
health can pose for a relationship's stability. The passive 
behaviour of the chronically sick can be grounds for a petition for 
divorce if the other spouse argues some adverse effects on his/her 
health resulted (see Thurlow v Thurlow (1975)). In non-homicide 
cases of active behaviour ill-health was often discussed as the sole 
cause of violent and aggressive behaviour rather than being possibly 
an effect or aggravation. In the case of White -v White in 1993 for 
example, the woman's affidavit was quoted in the judgement as saying 
that the husband's refusal to take his medication led to an increase 
in the intensity of his abuse and violent behaviour. By promptly 
dropping the qualifying word 'increase' however the remainder of the 
Judgement presented the argument that the sole cause of the man's 
behaviour was his refusal to take medication. By emphasising 
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sickness in situations of domestic violence against women the 
decisions shifted judicial attention away from the family or couple 
on to the aberrant individual. Judgement moved away from assessing 
the danger or justification of violent behaviour on to an assessment 
of the responsibility of the aggressor. In the text the behaviour 
was presented as a personal affliction instead of an interactional 
condition. 
Apart from the- 'passive' type, the descriptions of behaviour in 
reported decisions where sickness was turned into an issue typically 
emphasised its unpredictable and irrational nature. An example is 
provided by the description of violent events in the case of Re K 
(1985): 
In the course of a friendly conversation she said something 
that upset him. He struck her without warning across her face 
with such violence that she was thrown to the floor. (.... ) Not 
long afterwards, he approached her from behind, grabbed her by 
the hair, pulled her to the ground and proceeded to kick her. 
(.... ) He began to abuse her in public. He punished her for 
some trivial offences, on one occasion by refusing to allow her 
to have friends to stay, on another by refusing to allow her to 
drive his car for a period of a year. In 1979 there was a 
particularly severe incident when he struck her with such 
violence that blood spirted from her nose on to a rug in the 
sitting room. (.... ) He refused to allow her to use the telephone 
and stood by it in a'menacing way. 
(Re K (1985) at 407 & 408). 
The reported decisions varied in the manner in which the behaviour 
became 'odd' rather than violent over the course of the discussions. 
A selective presentation of witnesses' statements could lend more 
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emphasis to the introduction to the oddness of behaviour rather than 
to the dangers posed. Medical testimony, inevitably concerned with 
individual treatment rather than the protection of others from 
patients, Might help execute a shift from discussions concerning the 
effects of 'odd' behaviour on a woman on to the man's need for 
medical care. Paradoxically, in some of the texts even the victim's 
statements about her needs for legal intervention due to the 
behaviour caused by a partner's illhealth could be presented as 
grounds for refusing intervention on her behalf. 
The behaviour could be described as 'odd' without any explanation as 
to its cause being offered, as in the following extract: 
He asked her to get his tea ready, she did not answer. After 
a long interval the tea appeared. (.... ) When he spoke to her she 
tended to turn her back on him and go to another room, talking 
and mumbling to herself (.... ) He finds her gazing into her 
looking glass making noises and laughing. Frequently there is 
an odd blankness 
(Priday v Priday (1970) at 55). 
Whilst many a woman might might mumble if asked to make tea for a 
husband or perhaps gaze into a mirror and laugh, recited thus as 
events without contexts makes them appear decidely odd. In some of 
the decisions the behaviour was described as being 'embarassing' as 
well as 'odd': 
(the wife) described a distressing history in which, in spite of 
the injunction, the respondent, in a quite irrational way was 
still coming into the house, persuading the children in the 
absence of their mother to let him"in, and when he got in, 
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making a formidable nuisance of himself by abuse and eccentric 
behaviour. On one occasion he became very exciteable. He 
actually hit his former wife and had to be restrained from 
hitting her again. Later the same day he turned up at 
midnight, shouted through the letterbox making an awful noise. 
(White v White (1983) at 54). 
The violence was euphemistically refered to in the above extract as 
the husband getting 'exciteable', the shouting through the letterbox 
is an 'awful noise'. No mention was made in the case of the woman's 
feelings about the behaviour, whether she was in fear or merely 
'embarrassed' was left undetermined. 
Physiological symptoms were frequently quoted as offering 
explanations for 'eccentric' behaviour: 
the husband soon began-to show signs of mental illness. He had 
blackouts or collapsed, was in hospital on two or three 
occasions (.... ) the wife visited him every night but was told by 
the husband and his mother to keep away. He then returned to 
the matrimonial home (...: ) in the company of his mother and 
brother but refused to let his wife make a meal for him, he 
would not go to bed, and he left early next morning without 
telling his wife, who eventually discovered that he had gone to 
his sister. He never returned (.... ) Dr Powell a consultant 
psychiatrist said of him, 'He appears to have a fixed, apparently 
irrational (.... ) unreasonable belief that his wife is going to 
kill or injure him. 
(Brannan v Brannan (1973) at 125-6) 
In some of the texts the judges' own conclusions regards the cause 
of an individual's behaviour were included, in preference to or in the 
absence of expert and medical evidence. In Re K (1985) for 
instance, the judge, after describing the doctor's opinion on the 
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cause of the husband's violence as attributable to 'paranoid 
schizophrenia', moved on to offer his own diagnosis: 
(the wife and doctor) attributed his violence to illness, a brain 
tumour or paranoid schizophrenia. I should add also that he 
was a persistent and heavy drinker and may well have suffered 
in his intellectual capacities and power of self control as a 
result. 
(Re K (1985)). 
Although the violent behaviour which stemmed from illhealth might 
have a physically discernible cause it was primarily distinguished in 
the texts by its effect on the offender's inability to control 
him/herself or function in society at large. Passive as well as 
active/irrational behaviour included the inability to take part in 
domestic or social life. Assessment of these factors showed gender 
variations as to what was applicable for husbands and wives. 
Women's inability to take part in sexual relations was frequently 
mentioned as evidence that they were unable to fulfill their marital 
and social obligations. Mrs Priday in the case quoted previously 
was said to be unable to do her housework or the cooking. The 
family ate 'poorly' because of the doctor's advice that the husband 
should not do the cooking himself (Friday v Friday (1970)). Mrs 
Thurlow was an incontinent and bedridden invalid (Thurlow v Thurlow 
(1975)). Both of these women were said to have ceased having 
sexual relations with their husbands. 
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In some of the decisions even the choice of victim was offered as a 
symptom of the disease. ' Discussion of the partner's illness or 
bizarre behaviour was not put in the context of a consideration of 
the possible pre-illness relations between the parties -involved. 
Here is how the husband's decision to kill his wife in the case of 
White v White (1983) was described: 
On 30 September ( .... ) he was intending to kill himself by 
jumping from a balcony when he heard a message from God 
telling him not to kill himself but to kill his wife instead. 
(White v White (1983)). 
In Rv Miller (1986) the accused's decision to kill Vicky was again a 
'chance' result, the fault of delusions: 
I have been going out with Vicky for three and a half years and 
have lived with her as man and wife, although we haven't 
actually got married. I have been having these voices in my 
head for the last year from a million people whom have told me 
to kill Vicky. 
(R v Miller (1986)). 
For the cases where the medical assessment of behaviour was made 
into an issue the solutions to the unhappy situation offered seldom 
lay with the law alone. Medical intervention was usually advised, 
or the court might decline to intervene on the basis of medical 
solutions. In cases where legal intervention was 'defered' in favour 
of a medical solution the victim's level of tolerance was crucial. 
In 'the decisions researched there was a preference for non- 
intervention as violence and abuse from an intimate was described as 
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being more tolerable and less frightening than an attack by a 
stranger. When the peculiarity, oddness or deviance of the. partner's 
behaviour was prioritised, assuming the victim's ability to-tolerate 
it became a more feasible option. In some of the decisions the 
effects on the women-were either assumed - she 'put up with' the 
eccentricities - or minimalised such that the behaviour was made to 
appear merely irritating. 
The level of tolerance was based upon assumptions about what men and 
women should do in marital relationships and, at the extreme of 
subjectivity, on what the individual couple were capable of doing. 
The cases of unnacceptable behaviour defined on the basis of an 
incurable sickness offered examples of how intervention could be 
deemed to be a possibility if the demands on the victim went beyond 
the requirements of duty and obligation. Men's and women's 
relative capacities as 'carers' are a clear example. In Thurlow v 
Thurlow (1975) for instance intervention to help the man divorce his 
incurably epileptic wife was argued to be necessary because: 
This husband has consistently and courageously suffered the 
behaviour of the wife for substantial periods of time between 
1969 to July 1972 until his powers of endurance were exhausted 
and his health endangered. 
(Thurlow v Thurlow (1975)). 
The evidence in the case offered of Mr Thurlow's going beyond the 
call of duty involved caring for his wife and home as well as keeping 
a full time job for a number of years. Whilst this would 
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undoubtedly be very stressful, similar standards are not applied to 
women (e. g. the historical standards for the provision of invalid care 
allowance to married women). In one case surveyed the woman was 
similarly given court approval for forsaking her caring task. This 
arose however as a result of a defined conflict between, her caring 
'obligations. In the case of WvL (1973) the woman's wish to 
continue to care for her mentally ill husband at home was interpreted 
as going beyond the requirements of duty and obligation. Here the 
woman's loyalty to the husband was judged a risk to her child. As 
the medical testimonies presented in the case suggested an inability 
of the doctors to agree on the nature of the husband's ill-health, 
the final, question in the case concerned: 
what would a reasonable woman in her place do when faced with 
this wife's problem ? It seems to me that a reasonable woman 
would say, ' my husband ought to go in for treatment and he 
ought to be detained until he is cured. It is too great a risk 
to have him home whilst the baby is so small. 
(W vL (1973)). 
In principle it might be argued that, due to the absence of 'fault', 
cases of domestic violence 'resulting' from a partner's affliction 
would present the least contentious grounds for legal intervention. 
Decisions which emphasised expert vs legal 'boundary' disputes 
however gave further potential for lawyers to shift the topic of 
debate from individual women's needs on to the 'broader issues' such 
that the end result, a reluctance to intervene, could be the same. 
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Welfare And Justice. 
In some of the decisions concerns about welfare and justice, rather 
than specifically defined 'legal issues', were said to form the crux 
of the case. -'Legitimation for court intervention was thus 
paradoxically 'established' on the basis of non-legal issues. Some 
of the texts contained long tracts of discussion about previous cases 
which made the present case of behaviour almost subsidiary. In 
others legal principles, although invoked, would be swept aside as not 
providing adequate solutions. Lord Denning's rather arbitrary 
application of legal reasoning will be an obvious case in point 
although many more judges adopted similar approach whilst making 
some reference to the 'rules'. 
Cases such as Davis v Johnson (1978) and Richards v Richards (1983) 
offer well known examples of reported decisions which revolved around 
the court's capacity to intervene on the basis of just principles or 
welfare needs. Part I showed how there were a series of decisions 
following the implementation of the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1976 which concerned the 'correct' procedure for the 
granting and enforcement of injunctions. In some of the cases an 
opposition was constructed between the needs of the women for 
personal protection and men's rights to justice, being fully informed 
about what the court order meant and what would happen if he 
breached it (in certain cases this meant having the injunction or 
penal notice signed correctly or stapled on). Examples will be used 
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here of cases where legitimation for intervention was established on 
the basis of welfare needs. 
During the 1970s the term 'battered women' began to appear in the 
decisions as a shorthand for cases involving violence of a repetitive 
and unprovoked nature. The descriptions of a wife hatterer's 
actions stressed unexplained and brutal conduct : 
whilst they were there the man beat her frequently. The judge 
said there were two instances of extreme violence of a 
horrifying nature. On one occasion the man threatened her 
with a screw driver. He said he would kill her and dump her 
in the river. He kept a chopper under the bed and threatened 
to chop her body up and put it in the deep freeze. 
(Davis v Johnson (1978)). 
the wife left with the children and was walking down an alley 
when he attacked her either with a knife or an open cut-throat 
razor, inflicting on her a number of wounds one of which 
severed the tendons of her right hand. 
(Jones v Jones (1976)). 
If women had not entered refuges or already been refered to as 
'battered' there might be problems in explaining why, after several 
years of marriage, there should be a decision to leave. One much 
criticised decision in the more recent texts, at times leading to a 
reversal of decisions, was that women could become 'used' to abuse. 
In Mrs Bergin's case for instance (Bergin v Bergin (1983)) the 
magistrates had argued that she accepted the abuse as part of her 
married life. In Rennick v Rennick (1978) Lord Ormrod argued that: 
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families of this kind do tolerate an extraordinary amount of ill 
behaviour remarkably well. 
(Rennick v Rennick (1978)). 
Decisions which began from the perspective of the court's protective 
guise of women emphasised the effects of the behaviour rather than- 
its cause, justification or explanation, or the effects on the public 
at large. Whilst an examination of the impact of behaviour upon the 
victim holds the potential to allow courts to better assess and. 
respond to her needs, emphasis upon her vulnerability has a double 
edge. The previous chapter has already demonstrated adequately that 
descriptions of the effects of behaviour and-of the vulnerability of 
victims gives - scope for the introduction of stereotypical views 
regards socially 'correct' standards of behaviour for men and women. 
In the cases surveyed the effects and vulnerability were discussed 
primarily in order to establish a 'right' to the 'benefit' of legal 
solutions. The texts contained frequent references to the women's 
statuses as wives or mothers. For example : 
There seems to have been a good deal of violence between the 
appellant and the respondent and more recently, in February, the 
respondent (.... ) made a series of assaults on her as a result of 
which she sustained scratching, bruising and other injuries. He 
also behaved in such a way as to drive her out of the flat of 
which she was a tenant and to deprive her temporarily of the 
care of the boy (.... ) The situation as it existed before 6th 
March was of such a grave character that this court ought to do 
all it can by way of interlocutory relief to protect the 
appellant and her child. 
(Re W (1981)). 
Paradoxically, the effects of the behaviour upon the victims could be 
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either described in similar terms to the grave and weighty standard 
or on terms which made, them appear merely consequential. The 
individualistic focus further tended to result in discursive 
diversions towards the analysis of victims' powers of endurance. 
The amount of harm resulting from abuse or behaviour would thus 
vary with the couple's relative ages, abilities or disabilities, 
muscular strength, size and so forth. Sexual inequality, with a 
basis in 'natural' differences and vulnerabilities was often refered 
to as a relevant factor in assessing the damage done by an event. 
The emphasis on the woman's status as wife, mother dependent or 
weaker being suggested that protection from the courts had to be 
'earned'. Some of the discussions drew upon physical, biological or 
'sex role' differences between the 'parties. Motherhood and 
pregnancy were particularly popular cases: 
the family doctor dealt with the situation in which the parties 
were living. He said (the son) had become very difficult to 
deal with and was spending a great deal of time in his bedroom, 
and the situation was causing the wife mental illness. 
(Phillips v Phillips (1973)). 
this unruly incident by the husband (.... ) caused her (.... ) at 
1.30 in the morning, when she was in the precarious condition of 
2 months 'pregnancy, to leave the matrimonial home 
(Bergin v Bergin (1983)). 
the appellant has the right, through and for the infant Cordelia, 
to go back to the flat and have the father excluded. 
(Davis v Johnson (1978)). 
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Some of the decisions were rife with sympathy for wives who had 
tried to preserve their marriages by 'covering up' for the husband. 
Legal relief as a welfare benefit was handed out rather like a means 
tested benefit because the emphasis on women's vulnerability (on the 
basis of their just deserts) gave potential for other women to be 
undeserving. Legal intervention on the basis of 'welfare provision' 
was founded upon a belief that one party would 'gain' , housing, 
income support, protection, etc. Thus, not only would the women be 
required to 'earn' protection but the court would have to take care 
to protect against abuse of the law. Some decisions took on a 
policing guise by seeking out and condemning claims said to be made 
on the basis of 'trivia' (see e. g. Richards v Richards (1983)). At 
the extreme end of the 'protective' approach thus the effects of the 
behaviour upon the victim were not discussed at length at all. The 
victim instead took on the role of 'social security scrounger' by 
asserting 'trivial' complaints in order to profit from protective 
legislation. 
The assessment of whether or not complaints were trivial in the 
cases surveyed was found only-to have applied to situations arising 
from women's allegations. This may have been because men's 
allegations of their partner's behaviour were much less common than 
are women's, or men's complaints may be more commonly interpreted as 
'true' or 'untrue' rather than made unimportant. Previous discussion 
has shown that it is not too difficult to trivialise allegations by 
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presenting the evidences in 'a certain fashion and using suitably 
ambiguous or moderate language. In Phillips v Phillips (1973) for 
example, only at the start of the case is it mentioned that the woman 
had complained about 'physical assaults'. The rest of the discussion 
in the text emphasises the less severe acts of behaviour. In 
Williams v Fawcett (1985) the discussion founded the scope for legal 
intervention on the basis of a conflict between the protection of 
women and their manipulation/abuse of this legal option in order to 
gain some benefit. This case had arisen from a committal for 
contempt of court following the man's breach of an undertaking not to 
molest his 'common law' wife. At the start of the text the issues 
are defined, none of which refers to the effects of the behaviour on 
the woman involved. The behaviour was primarily discussed in 
reference to the woman's potential to manipulate the law. 
Where 'protection' was constructed as the main topic in decisions, 
discussion of the woman's potential for gain could override any 
discussion whatever on the effects of the behaviour on the women 
concerned. This tendency was very noticeable in the case of 
Richards v Richards (1983) where only Lord Scarman's judgement 
attempted to place the discussion of behaviour in the context of its 
effects on the woman concerned. 
Summary. 
The analysis in this chapter has not examined the legal texts for 
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evidence of 'objective', statistical or even majority patterns of 
intervention. No objective standard for legal intervention into 
cases of domestic violence against women could be defined as even 
killing is a socially negotiable power. The chapter has sought 
instead to look at how the distinctions between acceptable, 
unnacceptable and even irrelevant, behaviour in marriage type 
relationships are made into issues of concern in legal discourse, 
adding legitimacy to and expanding or limiting the law's powers of 
intervention. 
The analysis of the reported decisions found that, as in the 
solicitors' cases, ambiguity and conflict were central features of the 
texts. The descriptions of the behaviour and its relevance in 
relation to the defined issues of the case varied considerably. The 
examples have shown some ofr the possible variations.. The 
descriptions offered of the behaviour in a couple's relationship could 
for example enter the text in the context of a series of contested 
claims over events and their explanations/justifications, or in the 
context of its social, subjective or welfare implications, or on the 
basis of a conflict between the others (experts, doctors, etc. ) 
involved in the legal case. An interplay between stereotypes and 
assumptions about domestic violence against women were often 
involved in the movement towards conclusions presented in the cases 
but evidence of blatant misogyny in legal texts was seldom found. 
In contrast to the material discussed in the next chapter, the legal 
texts only rarely discussed domestic violence against women in terms 
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of women inviting or 'deserving' the attack. Discussion in most of 
the cases surveyed which had outcomes detrimental to the women 
concerned centred primarily on whether or not the law could/should 
intervene. The women's actual experiences of abuse, the effects 
upon her and her present needs tended to be removed from most of 
the discussions. As good policy cases the decisions offered ways in 
which issues could be asserted and debates framed. Some of the 
texts contained various references to very plausible issues of 
justice without ever discussing the victim's needs. The cases 
established the need for legal mediation on the basis of textually 
constructed oppositions. In the case examples discussed the 
interventionist problem constructed in the texts sidestepped (in the 
majority) an examination of needs by prioritising a welter of 
reasonable (but arbitrary) oppositions between children's welfare and 
parental rights, individual freedom and state intervention, punishment 
and treatment, welfare for the needy and abuse by the greedy. A 
later discussion will take up the analysis in relation to the part 
played by the legal process of definition in the the secondary 
assault of women as victims. In the next chapter a similar 
sidestepping movement away from issues concerning women's needs will 
be discussed. 
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From Bad Clews To Good Stories - The Representation Of 
Offenders And Victims In The Press. 
This chapter is based on the analysis of 105 press reports of cases 
of domestic violence against women traced between the dates 24th 
October 1983 to the 7th October 1986. The reports discussed a 
total of 73 cases of violent assault, 57 of which were homicide 
cases. Seven out of the total 72 cases described women's violence 
towards their husbands or cohabiting manfriends. Three of these 
involved the women's killing of men who had battered them, where the 
homicides were said to have been the only way the women could save 
their own or their children's lives. Two cases concerned women who 
were said to have killed due to sexual jealousy arising from their 
partners associations with other women. The sixth and seventh 
cases described women who were said to have used dominating 
behaviour and violence against their partners. 
The cases were collected primarily from The Guardian and The Times 
newspapers, these being part of the non-tabloid press where 'good' 
stories are supposedly sold on the basis of a balance between the 
accuracy of reporting and the sensationalism of the news. Although 
the sales of newspapers from the non-tabloid press are small when 
compared to the distribution figures for papers such as the Sun or 
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Daily Express, it was assumed that amongst the legal profession the 
non-tabloid news would have a wider readership. 
Newpaper reports of cases of domestic violence against women are 
written in much less complicated and arid language than that used in 
the law reports studied. The style is typically a narrative, 
distinguished from the legal narrative of affidavit evidences by the 
heavy reliance upon metaphorical and descriptive language. 
Newspaper reports break the lawyers' rules by stressing hearsay 
evidence and noting at any opportunity details such as the accused's 
past criminality which could prejudice the trials. Press reports in 
the non-tabloid press however strive for the legitmacy of truth by 
offering reports which quote at length the various evidences offered 
in court and covering the disputes between defence and prosecution. 
Name dropping of the accused's counsel or any other experts involved 
is a common occurence. For example, in the following description of 
Ronald Frost's suicide following his attempted murder of his wife and 
two children almost the whole report is in quotes pertaining to the 
statement made by a Chief Inspector. Name dropping occurs three 
times in this short piece: 
"Mr Frost started to rain blows on his wife's head and at this 
point, Karoll, his eldest daughter entered the kitchen and Mr 
Frost turned his attention to her", said Chief Inspector Brian 
Richardson. (description of killing, police seilte and suicide) 
Home Office pathologist Dr Keith Mant said Frost died from a 
gunshot wound which had entered the roof of his mouth and 
almost emerged through the top of his head. Mr Michael 
Burgess, Surrey deputy coroner, recorded a verdict of suicide. 
(Guardian, 1983, October 24). 
Page 411 
From Bad News To Good Stories/8. 
Like the reported decisions of the courts, press reports of cases of 
domestic violence against women are about judgement. Newspaper 
reports however are capable of being judgemental prior to any legal 
decision. They tend to pre-judge innocence or guilt and publish any 
evidence they are able to publish. Further, unlike law reports, the 
press reports allow open political statement. In the following 
Guardian extract, the frequent use of words like 'alleged' act as 
support for this liberal newspaper's regular contention that the 
police cannot always be believed: 
In his alleged statement Backhouse told police that during the 
last nine years he had had sexual relations with Mrs Gillian 
Lippiatt, a shepherdess from a nearby farm (.... ) He also 
allegedly admitted having sexual relations with Mrs Caroline 
Hodkinson (.... ) Backhouse allegedly said, "This was not a serious 
relationship" (.... ) In the statement which debated his early 
family history, Backhouse is said to have described how he met 
and married his wife over 10 years earlier. 
(Guardian, 1985, February 9). 
Noticeably more political are the editorial condemnations of 
government policy as in the following extract where the Guardian 
blames the Tories for causing the distress and rage expressed by 
readers of the press reports on the killing of Margaret Hogg: 
Captain Hogg seems to have received an almost textbook term for 
manslaughter by reason of provocation. Three years is at the 
lower end of the usual tariff but it is not a freak. What the 
sentence does illustrate is that homicide law which decrees that 
murder shall carry a mandatory life term will inevitably 
encourage a rather rough and ready set of sentencing principles 
for manslaughter. Some of these difficulties would be avoided 
if murder did not carry a mandatory penalty. But no Tory 
conference would wear such a reform, so no Tory Home Secretary 
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is going to propose it. 
(Guardian, 1985, March 11). 
Press accounts of violent crimes differ radically from law reports as 
they are basically 'entertainment'. In this respect cases of domestic 
violence against women covered by the press are no different to 
other violent crimes. A large number of the wife killing cases 
traced from the press were reported merely as 'murders' or 
indistinguishable from the homicides said to have been committed in 
other social contexts. The cases were typically headlined succinctly 
as 'Murder' or 'Murder charge', the description of the arrest and 
other events consisting of a bald precis of the 'facts' as in the 
following examples : 
Murder charge. 
An antiques dealer, Wilfdred Bull, aged 50, of Coggershall, 
Essex, was remanded in custody for a week by Witham magistrates 
yesterday charged with the murder of his wife Patricia, 48. 
(Guardian, 1985, May 9). 
Murder remand. 
Stanley Abel, a 76 year old retired Pentecostal minister, was 
remanded in custody at Glasgow sheriff court yesterday accused 
of murdering his wife at their home in Balcarres Avenue. 
(Guardian, 1985, May 11). 
The brief, bald description of a murder in the cases traced always 
included status related biographical details such as the age and 
occupation of the accused. It could be that the accounts were only 
brief due to a lack of information at that point in the case because 
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this bald 'factual' style was hardly ever used for longer reports. 
The case already mentioned concerning Mr Frost's attempts at murder 
followed by suicide was one rare example traced. Another was the 
Sunday Times report on the killing of three women by violent men set 
in the context of a report on the inadequate protection offered 
women by the police and family law: 
Mary Khelifati (.... ) was hacked to death with a long-bladed 
knife on May 8 this year. Her husband, an Algerian named 
Mohammed, stabbed his wife in full view of their six year old 
daughter Louisa and has since been jailed for life 
(Sunday Times, 1984, December 30). 
This sort of description of an unexplained, unprovoked and far from 
understandable killing where the man is described as an active agent 
in the offence committed appeared very rarely in the press reports 
studied. Homicides, whether of wives or strangers, are first and 
foremost 'stories' in the press. These stories sell news primarily 
because they are titilatory or moral tales about 'ordinary folk' who 
committed crimes, of 'spoilt rich boys' who murdered for cash, wicked 
men who commmitted ghoulish slaughters. The following headlines 
illustrate the point: 
wife killed after sex taunt 
(George Close's killing of his wife, Guardian, 1983, October 24). 
Man killed girlfriend in TV row. 
(Stanley Dingley's killing of his common law wife, Guardian, 1983, 
November 5). 
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Headless body killer gets life. 
(Michael Telling's killing of his wife, Guardian, 1984, June 22). 
Body of man was dumped in tomb. 
(Kenneth Marchant's killing of his lover's husband, The Times, 1986, 
October 25). 
Son 'slaughtered family to inherit £436,000 estate'. 
(Jeremy Bamber's killing of his mother, father, sister and two 
nephews, The Times, 1986, October 3). 
Lecturer hid girl's bones in coffee jar. 
(Samson Perera's killing of his daughter, The Times, 1986, March 6). 
Nagging sister was killed. 
(Daniel O'Sullivan's killing of his sister, The Times, 1986, March 1). 
Murder girls sexually assaulted. 
(Killing of Brighton schoolgirls Nicola Fellows and Karen Hadaway, 
Sunday Times, 1986, October 12). 
News man died from riot blows. 
(Killing of David Hodge in Brixton riots, The Times, 1986, October 21). 
List of errors that ended in child's death. 
(Colin Evans' babysitting killing of Marie Payne, Guardian 1984, 
December18). 
The extraordinary event, a homicide, happening to 'ordinary' people is 
news in itself. The pictures printed of the offenders and victims 
are typically the family snapshot variety. Plate 1 shows a picture 
the Daily Telegraph newspaper printed on 21st August 1986 of Colin 
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Stockport. 
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Gill and the family he killed before he committed suicide. The shot 
portrays the Gills as having the neatly dressed, middle class 
appearance of the ideal (large) nuclear family. The posed 
photograph was most likely part of an event in the family's history, 
possibly a celebration of the last child's birth. It must have been 
taken some time prior to the killings as the youngest child Dorian, is 
shown as a small baby and he had been aged 2 when he died. Anyone 
who has experienced similar family occasions where everybody poses 
for a memorable photograph can easily identify with the individuals 
in the snapshot. It is only the headline -5 shot dead after wife 
met lover - which makes the image incongruous. 
Plate 2 shows a similar use of the family snapshot to reinforce the 
paradox of the domestic murder of a 'happy' family. The two 
photographs were published by The Times newspaper on August 18 
1985. They show Robert Healey with the wife and step-daughter 
whom he murdered. Healey left their bodies in a shallow grave in a 
Welsh woodland and then tried to fake his own suicide. His crimes 
were labelled 'the Reggie Perrin case' as a result of analogies the 
press found with the story of the character of that name played by 
Leonard Rossiter in a TV series. In this example, the snapshot of 
the happy smiling family was published alongside a typical 'criminal' 
image. The headline read Man is questioned in murdered family 
case. In the second picture Healey is shown with his head covered 
by his coat being rushed away from public (i. e. press) view. Instead 
of being smartly dressed, Healey now appears more casual, he wears no 
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tie and his jeans and shirt look crumpled. The two photos tend to 
reinforce the image of his fall from grace. 
Press reports of homicide cases and violent crimes make frequent 
reference to status indicators when describing the offences. All the 
papers surveyed had a special interest in violent crimes perpetrated 
by white collar workers or by those employed in occupations which 
involved a great deal of exposure to the 'public'. This can be seen 
from the headlines attached to many of the press reports: 
Jilted Footballer Fined After Fracas in Farncombe Pub. 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, June 14). 
Pilot 'provoked into killing wife' 
(Guardian, 1985, March 7). 
Fallen Champ 
(Guardian, 1984, October 18). 
Rugby Player In Twins Death Case 
(Guardian, 1985, February 18). 
In the following three cases the status becomes part of the offence 
because the crime is an anathema to the individual's professional 
vocation: 
Fear of Poverty Drove Preacher To Kill His Wife 
(The Times, 1985, August 24). 
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PC's bride killed her husband 
(Guardian, 1984, November 30). 
Surgeon Poisoned His Wife 
(Guardian, 1984, November 30). 
In their discussion of press reports of rape cases, -Walby, Hay & 
Soothill (1983) found loss of control and victim provocation were 
important elements in the discussion. Beasts, fiends, unbalanced, 
wicked men and victims who crossed the boundaries of 'appropriate' 
behaviour by being familiar with the offender, dressing 
'provocatively', hitching lifts and so on, were found to be common 
themes. All press reports of violent crimes have the common 
functions of titilating whilst morally congratulating the readers, 
shocking and stimulating readers whilst reassuring them that they are 
morally better. Colin Evans, for example, the killer of 4 year old 
Marie Payne, was at the extreme end of the shock and morality range 
and was mostly described as 'evil': 
Mr Little (Superin tenden t with the Metropolitan Police) 
described Evans as evil and sadistic. "He lies to suit himself. 
He showed no emotion throughout the time I interviewed him, " he 
said. 
"I would not be happy to see that man ever again on the 
streets. He has an overwhelming desire for sex with young 
children, and who is to say that his desire will have gone away 
when he is 70 ?" 
(Guardian, 1984, December 18). 
A disturbing feature of the accounts of violent crimes was the 
unnecessarily lengthy and detailed descriptions of the killing and 
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dismemberment of women and children. The killing and dismemberment 
of the 13 year old Nilanthe by her adoptive father Samson Perera 
frequently reported in February and March 1986 (see The Times 1986, 
February 25, February 26, Febraury 27, March 1, March 3) provides an 
example. The reports of this case were almostly entirely composed 
of descriptions, in forensic quotes, of Perera's dismemberment of 
Nilanthe's body and the patholigists' 'work' on her remains. 
Judgement/justification for these sordid, detailed descriptions hung 
precariously on the reports' condemnations of Perera as 'evil'. 
Graphic descriptions of the slow death from starvation of three year 
old Heidi Koseda took up a large amount of column space in the non- 
tabloid press in 1985 (see e. g. The Times, 1985 September 25). Here 
the descriptions were interwoven with the account which Nicholas 
Price, the killer, gave of the events reinforcing the image of him as 
cruel and beastly, but the crime alone could have made this point. 
The objectives of press reports departed from legal considerations in 
that the evidences and descriptions of the trials reproduced had 
little to do with the outcome of the case, i. e. the sentence. The 
case reports seldom placed emphasis upon the use of the law to deter 
future crimes of violence against women. Although the link between 
the law and the deterrence of crimes is rather tenuous the emphasis 
upon these more legalistic issues and the outright condemnation of 
violent crimes in reports of other 'stranger' or 'terrorist' killings 
suggests that domestic killings are either seldom a danger to the 
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public or motivated by factors other than pure 
criminality/beastliness. 'The 'justice' of the stated rationales 
behind the sentences given, even though they may be rigorously 
debated in editorials, played a minor role in the reports . Many of 
the latter day press reports on violence against women appeared to 
be both pornographic celebrations of male power and public 
condemnations of its extremes. For women readers there is a third 
function, they stand as warnings about the dangers faced by a whole 
gender whether young, infant or old. 
The reports of wife/cohabitee/lover killings differed from other 
accounts of homicides in the way that the crime was denied, explained 
or celebrated. In some of the accounts the homicide was portrayed 
as a mere event, something that just happened. The offence 
virtually disappeared because the offender's absence was manufactured 
by the discursive techniques employed in the report. Here is how 
the text covering Robert Healey's murders of Greeba, his wife, and 
Marie, his step-daughter described the killing of Greeba 
Mrs Healey, 40, died from skull fractures during a frenzied 
attack. 
(Sunday Times, 1986, August 17). 
In The Times' report of Frans Quirin's murder of his wife and 
subsequent suicide, the distancing of the offender from the crime was 
achieved by setting the discussion in terms of the daughter's 
discovery of the bodies. The headline Girl of 8 finds her parents 
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dead supports the representation of the deaths as mere events. The 
report of the case admited Frans Quirin's responsibility for the 
deaths obtusely: 
A girl aged eight was being comforted by relatives yesterday 
after finding her mother stabbed to death and her father 
hanging in the hallway of their home. 
Francois Quirin discovered her parents when she came 
downstairs for breakfast at their home (.... ) 
In the living room, Mrs Monica, aged 36, had a stab wound 
in the chest and Mr Frans Quirin, her estranged husband, a 
postman in his 40s, was dead nearby. 
The police said Mrs Quirin's death was being treated as 
murder, but no one else was being sought in connection with the 
incident. 
(The Times, 1986, June 9). 
The following extract also divorces the offender from the victims by 
centering the discussion elsewhere: 
3 dead in shooting at house 
A man aged 72 was critically ill in a Birmingham hospital 
yesterday after his wife and two sons were found shot dead at 
their home. 
Mrs Lilian Hadley, who was in her sixties, and her sons, 
Ronald, a disabled polio victim, aged about 40, and Keith aged 
22, were found dead at their house (.... ) early yesterday. 
Her husband, Mr Ronald Hadley, was found lying on the 
floor by the police who broke into the house after neighbours 
heard shots. He had a severe gunshot wound to the head. 
The police said that a shotgun was found in the house. 
They were not looking for anybody else in connection with the 
shooting. It was clearly a domestic incident. 
(The Times, 1986, April 17). 
A report based upon information received from the police prior to 
charges being made would of course necessarily take care not to 
refer to the suspect as the 'killer' or 'offender'. The above 
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descriptions of crimes however are entirely lacking offenders. The 
report is introduced by reference to the husband's critical condition. 
The deaths of Mrs Hadley and the two sons described as events. 
Rather than somebody having killed them, they were 'found dead' or 
'found shot dead'. Although the police are quoted as saying 'It was 
clearly a domestic incident', any one of the Hadley family could have 
been the killer. 
Discussing the killer's acts in passive terms was another way in 
which responsibility could be obscured in the texts. A case 
headlined Wife killed by hammer blows described Brian Harris's 
killing of his wife Edna as follows: 
Brian Harris, aged 49, of Blackpool, pleaded guilty to killing his 
wife Edna, aged 47, because of diminished responsibility. She 
was killed by repeated blows to the head with a hammer after 
which Harris attempted to committ suicide. 
(The Times, 1986, July 6). 
Although less dramatic and more ambiguous than the preceding 
examples the text nonetheless puts similar emphasis upon the event 
as offenderless. The readers are told that Harris pleaded guilty to 
killing his wife not that he actually confessed. Edna Harris was 
'killed by repeated blows to the head with a hammer'. There is no 
mention as to who was the person who yeilded the blows. Further 
examples are provided in the following headlines and extracts: 
Man accused of murder is found hanged in prison cell. 
TRIANGLE OF DEATH 
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Radio DJ and doctor's 
son who fell for the 
same girl.... and died. 
(Daily Mail, 1985, June 7). 
Husband held on shooting charge 
A property developer whose wife was shot outside a North 
London bank on Friday appeared in court at Clerkenwell with 
another man yesterday accused of her attempted murder. 
(The Times, 1985, July 9). 
In the following report (which accompanied the pictures shown in 
Plate 2) published in The Times August 19 1986, the same effect is 
achieved by shifting the focus from the killings on to the 
accusations against the killer: 
Husband accused of family murder 
Mr Robert Healey was remanded in custody until August 26 <.... ) 
charged with the murder of his wife and stepdaughter ( .... ) he 
was accused of the murders of his wife, Greba, aged 40, and 
Marie Walker, aged 13, whose bodies were found in a shallow 
grave in North Wales on Friday. Reporting restrictions were 
not lifted. 
(The Times, 1986, August 19). 
In cases where the offender was directly linked to the offences, his 
explanation for the crime was virtually always included in the 
discussion. This could be based on a 'loss of control' as in the 
following example: 
Man killed girlfriend in TV row 
A football fan who stabbed his girlfriend to death because she 
turned off the television during the FA Cup Final Replay told 
the jury yesterday, "I was still in love with her when I killed 
her" (.... ) Stanley Dingley, aged 43, (.... ) told the jury (.... ) "she 
came in from the kitchen and turned off the TV, saying she 
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could not stand football. " 
Mrs Worley went into the bedroom and he followed her 
there. "I put my hand on her neck and asked her what was the 
matter but she just turned round and dug her teeth into my 
thumb". 
Mr Dingley said he went to get a towel for his thumb and 
saw a knife in the kitchen. "I went back into the bedroom. I 
pulled her backwards and stabbed her three times. I lost my 
temper and lost control. " 
(Guardian, 1983, November 5). 
The following two cases describe men who were said to have resorted 
to violence because the victims did not gratify their sexual demands: 
Five life terms for murder. 
A Pakistani labourer who burnt his wife and four of her family 
to death last June because he was not allowed to sleep with her 
received five life sentences at the Old Bailey yesterday. 
(Guardian, 1984, March 30). 
'Obsessive love' led Esher man to kidnap nurse 
The passionate and obsessive love of an Esher man for a nurse 
led him to kidnap her when she refused to continue their affair, 
a court heard (.... ) Bolton snatched her from her flat in a 
nurse's home and for four days kept her imprisoned in his car 
driving around the South of England (.... ) Mr Bolton's counsel, Mr 
Patrick Black, told Mr Justice Bristow that Mr Bolton (.... ) had 
been pasionately in love with Miss Macklin. 
On one of the nights they spent together, intercourse took 
place several times and he said it was the 'best form of 
conduct of that kind he had ever experienced' (.... ) Miss Macklin 
did not want the relationship to become serious but Bolton 
became obsessed with her and wanted them to marry. 
When the nurse refused to go out with him any more 
because she wanted the relationship to cool, Mr Bolton kidnapped 
her (.... ) Mr Black told the court that Mr Bolton was the type of 
man who became demanding in love 'sexual gratification inflamed 
his emotions instead of relaxing him'. 
Mr Bolton had said Miss Macklin was not to blame for 
anything that happened. 'She is a thoroughly decent young 
woman' said Mr Black. 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, May 3). 
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The murder followed by suicide in the next reports are classic 
examples of the British press's preoccupation with the 'love triangle': 
Possessive man shot wife and children 
(Description of killing of woman and 2 children followed by 
man's suicide) Jealousy over what he thought was an affair 
between his brother Carl, aged 22, and his wife Sharon, aged 31, 
was one of the causes of the tragedy ( .... ) "The suspicions might 
well have been denied in evidence but there is no doubt they 
affected Mr Allen who was of a jealous and possessive nature" 
the coroner said. 
(The Times, 1985, August 29). 
5 shot dead after wife met lover 
A former detective, Colin Gill, shot dead his wife and four sons 
and then killed himself after Mrs Linda Gill, 33, had returned 
home following a moonlight meeting with her 21-year-old lover, 
an inquest heard yesterday. (See Plate 1). 
(Daily Telegraph, 1986, August 21). 
Husband cut car's brake pipe 
A rejected husband who cut the brake pipe of his rival's car 
after scratching the words "You're dead" across the paintwork 
has been given a suspended jail sentence. Colin Gill, aged 30, 
a British Airways engineer, was devestated by the loss of his 
wife, Shirley, to Mr David Thomas, a taxi driver, in late 1984, 
Mr John Perry, for the defence, told Oxford Crown Court 
yesterday. 
He became extremely depressed and one night in February 
last year called at the house in Pitts Road (.... ) where Mr 
Thomas lived with Mrs Gill, and damaged the car. 
Next morning Mrs Gill tried to drive the car to her 
parents' home and found the brakes were not working. 
(The Times, 1986, April 8). 
As in the law reports discussed in the previous chapter, drink was 
another reason why a man might be driven to murder : 
Children killed in arson attack by drunken father 
Four children died when their father set fire to their home in a 
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drunken rage after drinking 18 pints of Guinness and 10 
brandies, Winchester Crown Court heard yesterday ( .... ) 
Mr William Denny QC, prosecuting said, 'He habitually 
drank heavily and when he could not hold his liquor he 
assaulted and threatened his wife. 
(Guardian, 1985, May 15). 
Drugs raised similar, although more ambiguous issues, as these could 
be administered without the offender's knowledge or due to his belief 
they would be beneficial to health: 
Drug led husband to hate wife 
A businessman's love for his wife turned to hate and his 
gentleness turned to violence after a hypnotist injected him 
with a drug called 'Jaffe Juice', a medical disciplinary hearing 
was told yesterday. 
(The Times, 1986, July 30). 
Killer Tried To Revive Body 
After beating his common law wife to death in a row over drugs, 
Joseph Carlton-Armstrong, a heroin addict, made 'futile and 
irrational attempts' to revive the body, Judge Richard Lowry QC, 
said at the Old Bailey yesterday ( .... ) Judge Lowry said years of drug abuse had eroded Carlton-Armstrong's brain and personality. 
(Daily Telegraph, 1986, February 19). 
There were a number of other explanations suggested in the reports. 
Unexplained instability - going berserk - was one theme: 
Gunman hiding in caverns 
Armed police hunting a man who opened fire five times with a 
revolver in Dudley, West Midlands, said last night he could be 
hiding in underground caverns. 
The man from Dudley is believed to be armed with a. 25 
revolver. 
In the latest incident, at the Wren's Nest public house 
in Dudley on Sunday, a bullet passed between the heads of two 
women, one his wife. 
Armed officers joined more than "100 policemen carrying 
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out house to house searches. 
Superintendent Martin Burton, of West Midlands police 
said the gunman appeared to have gone berserk and he advised 
people not to approach him. 
(The Times, 1986, May 27). 
Killing for financial gain was another important theme: 
A farmer who needed £100,000 to save his business tried to blow 
up his wife with a car bomb for insurance money and then 
murdered a neighbour as part of an elaborate cover up. 
(Guardian, 1985, January 29). 
Unhappy husband had two tries at killing his wife for insurance. 
(Guardian, 1985, May 1). 
Some of the reports portrayed offenders driven by abject despair as 
in the 'mercy' killing type of homicide: 
Husband in mercy killing goes free 
A pensioner who carried out the mercy killing of his wife after 
55 years of marriage walked free from the court yesterday. 
Mr Neil Butterfield QC, prosecuting, said that a year-and- 
a-half after his wife suffered a severe stroke which left her 
partially paralysed, Masters determined to put here out of her 
pain. 
(Daily Mail, 1985, July 2). 
The following case offered a similar explanation although few would 
rank it as euthanasia. Stanley Abel is said to have killed to 
protect his wife from possible hardship: 
Fear of poverty drove Pentecostal minister Stanley Abel, aged 
76, to kill his disabled wife (.... ) The court was told Abel (.... ) 
smothered his wife with a pillow believing they were destitute. 
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He was also terrified that because of his own health he would 
be unable to care for his wife, who was disabled with arthritis. 
(The Times, 1985, August 24). 
Self defence was discussed in most of the cases arising from 
women's violence towards men. Celia Ripley was quoted in the 
Guardian report of her trial as saying: 
I had been driven out of my mind by my husband's beastly 
behaviour and (.... ) -I intended to shoot. him. 
(Guardian, 1983, November 1). 
A similar explanation was put forward in the report on Luise 
Legeman's killing of her father: 
Luise Legeman, aged 16, ( .... ) hit her father at least 3 times 
after he attacked her mother with scissors and knives in a row 
over the family's pet rabbit. She told police, 'I did it to 
stop him hitting my Mum. Then I just couldn't stop myself from 
hitting him because I knew if I didn't hurt him seriously he 
would probably kill me or my Mum. 
(Guardian, 1984, September 11). 
Intervention by men to prevent a crime on women was described in one 
of the cases traced: 
Can't take the law into your own hands, man's attacker told. 
A man who attacked . his girlfriend's father was given a 
conditional discharge by Farnham magistrates on Wednesday. 
Magistrates heard how David Browne, 40 (.... ) who pleaded 
guilty to causing Arthur Leggett actual bodily harm, became 
enraged when his girlfriend told him her mother had been hit on 
the head with a blunt instrument by her father. 
(Farnham Herald, 1986, February 7). 
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In some of the reports, the gender and status of offenders and 
victims were inextricably tied in with the explanations offered about 
the crimes. The following report concerns a woman's behaviour cited 
as particulars in her husband's divorce in 1986: 
Husband had to sleep in car 
Mr Jack Mouncey, a senior manager, was dominated in his 
£100,000 home by his wife, Maureen, who sometimes made him 
sleep in the car. 
Mrs Mouncey, aged 54, a teacher, took the view that he 
was "really a working class boy who had made good and should 
be kept in his place" a divorce judge said yesterday. 
For Mr Mouncey, aged 56, Northern England district 
manager for Ford, being kept in his place meant being locked out 
on occasions; sleeping on the living room couch; never being 
allowed to use an upstairs bathroom or lavatory and not being 
cooked for. 
(The Times, 1986, February 14). 
The report is about a very common occurence, a divorce alleging 
unreasonable behaviour but had the 'facts' been alleged by a woman 
against a man, it is unlikely that The Times would have printed it as 
a good story. Injunction and divorce hearings resulting from life 
threatening acts of 
, 
behaviour take place every day, some concerning 
£100,000 houses, yet they are not reported in the national press. 
Although her behaviour could well have been very distressing to Mr 
Mouncey, Mrs Mouncey used no physical violence in her 'domination'. 
'Not being cooked for' is a complaint only men are able to make about 
wives. The report interweaves Mrs Mouncey's references to her 
husband's working class origins with statements about his present 
status -a senior manager, his £100,000 home, Northern England 
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district manager for Ford. The readers are merely told that Mrs 
Mouncey was a 'teacher' and it is noticeably not her or even jointly 
her, £100,000 home. The extract creates and assumes gender 
stereotypes about appropriate behaviour for men and women of a 
certain status that will be shared with the readers. 
The Times report of Gloria Hewitt's killing of her husband stretches 
the gender valued motivations for the crime to the limit by making 
an incident over a 'carpet' the impetus for battering her husband to 
death: 
Woman killed in fear at move. 
A woman killed her husband and then tried to kill herself 
because she was terrified of moving home, a judge at the 
Central Criminal Court was told yesterday. The court heard that 
Mrs Gloria Hewitt, aged 65, and her husband, Jim could not face 
the prospect of leaving their council flat although it was in a 
terrible state (.... )A minor problem over a carpet proved the 
"last straw" for Mrs Hewitt.. She battered her husband to 
death with a hammer and killed their blind pet dog before 
taking a drugs overdose which proved to be not fatal. 
(The Times, 1986, September 27). 
The heroic type of murder , was one of 
the extreme cases where 
gendered behaviour was crucial to the reports. Representations of 
wife killings as 'heroic' events are undoubtedly the 'best' newspaper 
stories because so much column space is devoted to the details of 
these crimes. 'Heroic' murderers of women attract cult type 
followings which perpetuate the glorification of the violent crimes, 
sometimes for centuries (see Cameron & Frazer, 1987; Cameron, 1988). 
The creation of a woman killing as a heroic event offers some, if not 
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all, men the chance to be heroes. These crimes are turned into 
celebrations of the expression of men's power through the strategic 
use of violence against women, celebrations of the law and legal 
actors, forensic experts or prosecutors who hunted for and 'trapped' a 
cunning man by exploiting his oversight of one 'fatal' clue. The 
'heroic' killings celebrated therefore not only men's sexual power but 
also their brain power. 
Press accounts of two cases with common features, the killings of 
Margaret Hogg and Monika Telling, will be discussed and contrasted to 
show how the 'heroic' murders offered male readers the chance to both 
congratulate themselves and put women in their place. 
The Killing Of Margaret Hogg. 
Mrs Margaret Hogg was probably killed as a result of her husband, 
Peter's, strangulation of her in 1976. Peter Hogg then drove to the 
Lake District and threw her body into Wast Water. Mrs Hogg's body 
had been spotted by a local sub-aqua club's divers who pointed it out 
in 1984 as a 'strange parcel' to the police, at the time searching the 
lake for the body of a French student. Hogg was charged with the 
murder of his wife eight years after the offence. 
The national and local press coverage of the trial revolved around 
three issues: Hogg's status, the disposal of the body and Margaret 
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Hogg's behaviour. By the end of the trial Peter Hogg had become a 
national hero and Margaret Hogg an 'erring piece of humanity' 
deserving to die. 
The first report of the case was an ITV newsflash released on March 
5 1984: 
The husband of a woman whose body was found in a Cumbrian lake 
8 years after she disappeared has been charged with her murder. 
Peter Hogg, 56, will appear before Guildford magistrates 
tomorrow morning, Surrey police said. Mrs Hogg, 44, a mother 
of two, of Cranleigh Surrey, was found in Wast Water 5 days 
ago. Her body trussed in a carpet and weighted down with 
concrete was found by divers searching for a French student who 
is still missing. 
The report is written from the perspective of the offender, Hogg 
being charged with murder. This first statement contains the only 
direct reference to Margaret Hogg as a 'mother of two'. In 
subsequent reports of the case Peter Hogg takes on the role of 
parent, being a 'father to his sons'. Despite the brevity of the 
press release, space is found for a description of Margaret Hogg's 
body being 'trussed in a carpet and weighted down with concrete'. 
Later reports added further details about Margaret Hogg's body. 
The next report of the case appeared exactly a year later. On March 
5 1985 the Guardian published a6 by 6 inch photograph of Peter Hogg 
with his 'girlfriend', ex-housekeeper Rosemary Steel, by his side. In 
the photograph Hogg was 'smartly' dressed in a dark suit with a dark 
tie, covered by an expensive looking sombre overcoat. He looked like 
1 
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any well dressed male city commuter. Mrs Steel was shown smiling 
pleasantly at the photographer/onlooker/reader, her head slightly 
inclined to the left side in the manner of women royalty. She was 
holding on to Hogg's arm. The photo was headlined wedding ring 
'helped trap pilot who dumped dead wife in lake'. The discussion 
below the photograph expanded upon the three matters, introduced by 
the headline, of Hogg's status, the body disposal and the clues. 
Hogg's status and status in relation to his wife is liberally refered 
to throughout the report. As well as the headline's reference to a 
'pilot' the discussion stated: 
An airline pilot, Peter Hogg, overlooked two key factors when he 
dumped his wife's body in Wast Water. 
Hogg strangled his air hostess wife, Margaret. 
Captain Hogg, aged 56, of Cranleigh, Surrey, denies murdering his 
wife. 
Less explicit references to his status were made when describing the 
events after the crimes: 
He arranged an appointment with his son David's headmaster and 
drove the 130 miles to the school at Taunton. 
Hogg belonged to the class of men who send their boys to boarding 
schools miles away from home. Mrs Hogg was lower status, an air 
hostess, not a pilot. Her death was said to have followed a 'row 
about her lover': 
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Mrs Hogg was having an affair with Mr Graham Ryan, whom she 
met ten years after marrying Hogg in 1963. 
The description of the killing of Margaret Hogg was written from 
Hogg's perspective, giving readers the chance to change places with 
him in fantasy if so desired. Rather than just say that Hogg 
strangled Margaret the account read: 
During the row which followed, Hogg lost control, "got his wife 
by the throat, and squeezed hard until she stopped squirming. " 
The phrase 'until she stopped squirming' suggests Hogg killed a 
maggot rather than his wife. The suggestion of Mrs Hogg's sub- 
humanity was added to in the description of the disposal of the body 
when Hogg was said to have 'tipped the macabre bundle into the lake'. 
At least three quarters of this report were devoted to Hogg's 
disposal of the body. The prosecuting QC was reported to have 
argued: 
he organised the disposal of his wife's body with "clinical 
efficiency and skill". 
Evidence of Mr Hogg's 'skill' was added in the following extract: 
The day before his wife died Hogg "began to put an alibi 
together to disguise his real plan for the disposal of her 
body", said Mr Hacking. He arranged an appointment with his 
son David's headmaster and drove the 130 miles to the school at 
Taunton with his wife's body in the boot. Also in the car was 
an inflatable dinghy with a concrete block with a hole in it. 
Assuming everyone would think he was spending the night 
at Taunton, he drove 325 miles north to Wast Water, arriving at 
midnight. 
He inflated the dinghy, put in the body, a parcel of blood 
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stained clothing and a concrete block, and rowed out the the 
middle of the lake. He attached the body and parcel to the 
concrete with rope flex and wire, then tipped "the macabre 
bundle" into the lake. 
He drove the night to Taunton -a round trip of 1,000 
miles - collected David for his half-term holiday, and returned 
to Cranleigh. 
(Guardian, 1985, March 5). 
Hogg's 'disposal' of his wife was described as an ordeal, a carefully 
planned attempt to evade prosecution, rather than a 'cold and 
calculating plot'. The 1,000 mile round trip in one night is 
extraordinary. Hogg's 'control' was apparently so well restored that 
he could turn up at the school the next day and collect his son as 
though he had slept peacefully all night. The case began to look 
more like an Agathie Christie novel than a horrible murder. Like 
Agatha Christie's super-sleuths, the readers of the report were given 
similar information on the details of the crime and the offender's 
oversights: 
Hogg ( .... ) overlooked two things which lead to her identification 
- he wrapped her in plastic sheets containing the name and 
address of a Guildford firm, and forgot to remove her wedding 
ring. 
(Guardian, 1985, March 5). 
Two days later on March 7 the Guardian's report emphasised aspects 
of Mrs Hogg's character and behaviour which influenced the airline 
pilot's ability to maintain control: 
Pilot 'provoked into killing wife' 
An airline pilot, Peter Hogg, said yesterday that he was 
provoked into strangling his unfaithful wife, Margaret (.... ) "I 
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was out of control of the situation" he told Mr Anthony Hacking, 
QC, prosecuting (.... ). 
"The law recognises that within every human being lie the 
fires of emotion, and you can provoke a human being just so 
far" Mr Black (defending counsel) said. 
Hogg had been provoked for years by the "unfaithful and 
bad" behaviour of his wife -a "piece of erring humanity". 
(Guardian, 1985, March 7). 
The second description of the events at the time of the crime 
contained in this report put forward Hogg's claim that he had 
initially resorted to violence in self-defence: 
On the day Mrs Hogg died, she returned home after seeing her 
lover, Mr Graham Ryan, Hogg said on oath. 
He told her it was "quite ridiculous" to run two cars, one 
of which was only used to meet Mr Ryan, and he was cancelling 
the insurance. Her furious reaction was to come at him "very 
violently" Hogg said. 
"She was shouting and, when she got to me, she scratched 
my face and kicked me in the crutch, the testicles. It was 
extraordinarily painful. I hit her on the forehead because she 
ducked. 
She started at me again, punching, kicking and shouting 
and screaming", said Hogg. During the tussle that followed, he 
grabbed her round the neck and lost control, he said. 
(Guardian, 1985, March 7). 
The description of the events here made the crime 'understandable'. 
Hogg had been physically as well as psychologically attacked. 
The Guardian headline on March 8 1985 gave the first reference to 
the case's media tag: 
'Lady in the Lake' jury out today 
The jury in the Old Bailey 'Lady in the Lake' trial will retire 
to consider its verdict this morning. 
Peter Hogg, aged 57, of Cranleigh, Surrey, denies 
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murdering his wife Margaret, whose body was found in Wast 
Water in Cumbria. 
(Guardian, 1985, March 8) 
Case tags such as the 'Yorkshire Ripper', 'Lady in the Lake' killer, 
'Boston strangler' etc. are not created in the reported decisions of 
the courts. In reported decisions these were in fact seldom 
mentioned. It is not known whether the 'Lady in the Lake' tag arose 
in the tabloid or non-tabloid press, on TV or radio news. After 
this date however, the tag was always attached to the reports of the 
case. 
The local press on that same day also picked up the Lady in the Lake 
tag. The Surrey Advertiser report shared the Guardian's 
preoccupation with the three matters of Hogg's status, the disposal 
of the body and Margaret Hogg's character. A huge 12 by 8 inch 
photograph of Hogg was published which portrayed him as 'one of the 
lads'. Plate 3 shows a genial middle aged man, seated in a comfy 
armchair with an open book on his lap. He is casually dressed and 
looks relaxed. He could be at home about to read to his 'children' 
or relaxing in a staff room at work or tucked into the corner of a 
local pub. He certainly does not look like he is in the place 
where he actually was at the time i. e. prison. He is surrounded by 
the sort of paraphenalia found in pubs or men's workplace rest rooms. 
On the shelf beside him is a bottle of alchoholic drink. His casual 
dress could be classless but the headline above the picture reminds 
the readers of his status - Pilot on trial for murder. The picture 
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shows Hogg as an ordinary man who killed his wife. The two 
reports on either side of the picture Husband recalls taunts and 
Lover tells of waiting in vain put forward Hogg's claims that 
Margaret was a violent and badly behaved woman. Mrs Hogg is refered 
to liberally as 'emotional', 'impulsive' and 'theatrical': 
Mr Graham Ryan of Banstead told of his torrid affair with the 
woman who had "chased" him since they met. He described their 
passionate and tempestuous affair during which he said she was 
the driver and he the passenger (.... ) In a soft tone Peter Hogg 
gave evidence watched by his son David, his daughter-in-law who 
often wept, and his girlfriend Mrs Rosemary Steel (.... ) He spoke 
of the years of "humiliation and embarassment" when his wife 
flaunted her lover by talking about him in front of their 
friends. He said there were numerous quarrels. During one 
she had thrown shoes, a mustard pot and scratched him all over 
his face and then broken his finger, said Mr Hogg. 
He spoke of her taunts, when she told him her affair with 
Mr Ryan was on and then off "I never knew what to believe". 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, March 8). 
The report of Mr Ryan's evidence confirms Hogg's case that his wife 
was prone to tantrums and had a dominating manner: 
(Ryan) described Margaret Hogg as having "an amazing magnetic 
personality" and said they were in love with each other but 
admitted she liked her own way and was dominant. 
She would fly into an emotional tantrum become hysterical 
and sometimes even violent said Mr Ryan. He said she was 
theatrical and dramatic and it was never easy to know if she 
was telling the truth (.... ) Mr Ryan said he tried to be discreet 
during their three and a half year affair but he said he would 
not be surprised if Mrs Hogg had told her friends all about it. 
He described in court how he would take his wife on 
holiday and Mrs Hogg would turn up too, booking in to a hotel 
or a holiday camp just a few miles down the road. 
"There was nothing I could do to prevent this" said Mr 
Ryan. "I didn't particularly like it as I wanted to be with my 
family. " 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, March 8). 
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Margaret Hogg was criticised by her husband for not acting like a 
wife ought and criticised by her lover for not conforming to the 
usual standards of a mistress's discretion. Her part in the quarrels 
was described as one sided aggression, as unprovoked and violent 
attacks on her husband. Margaret Hogg's 'theatrical' and 'impulsive' 
behaviour was opposed in the reports to her husband's calmness, 
control and 'soft tone'. Even when the prosecuting counsel described 
the killing, Peter Hogg was said to have 'sat impassively in the Old 
Bailey dock'. 
The description of the killing here also cast it in the context of a 
defence against Mrs Hogg's violence (she came at him 'like a tiger'): 
she came at him from across the room. "She was shouting, 
scratching my face and kicked me in the crutch, the testicles, 
it was extraordinarily painful .... He said he had punched her and 
his signet ring had cut her forehead. 
This was the second time in their marriage he had hit 
her. After a tussle on the bed when she was kicking and 
screaming "I got hold of her around the neck and then I lost 
control. I just wanted to stop the noise and shouting. " 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, March 8). 
None of the press reports on the crime refer to the possibility that 
the attack on Mrs Hogg prior to the strangulation was in itself so 
severe her continued punching and kicking may have been in defence 
of her life. Scattered references in the reports to her 'lying in a 
pool of blood', her 'profusely bleeding head' having to be wrapped in 
plastic and Hogg's scrubbing the bedroom floorboards, bathing and 
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disposal of clothes to get rid of blood stains could suggest that the 
wound he inflicted on her forehead with his signet ring was severe. 
Hogg argued that he-quickly regained'his control and' was thus able 
to cope with the situation after the killing: 
He said he had released his hold when she stopped moving. 
"One eye didn't look normal, she slumped to the floor. I was 
appalled at what had occured. I thought I had killed her. I 
did nothing for a minute or two, but it was a surprisingly quick 
interval before I was able to think clearly and realise the 
predicament. " 
He said his first thoughts were "What is going to happen 
to the children. " 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, March 8). 
Following another lengthy description of the disposal of Mrs Hogg's 
body (described as a 'grizzly parcel on midnight lake trip' and a 
'strange package') the prosecuting counsel's question that the jury 
should consider whether Hogg was 'cold and calculating' was raised 
for the first time. On hearing Hogg express regret the prosecuting 
counsel: 
alleged Mr Hogg's only regret was, "That you didn't get away 
with it. " 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, March 8). 
This comment by the counsel is not elaborated in the report and is 
never raised by the Guardian at all. On March 11th the Guardian 
report linked Hogg's story with that of the experts who 'trapped' him. 
In this report Hogg was ascribed a' number of the features of a 
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modern day hero - professional skills and status=airline pilot; quick 
and calm wit=disposal of the body; good father=he covered up his 
offence to protect his sons; romantic qualities=Lady in the Lake 
killer; decent hardworking character=he cleaned windows rather than 
claim dole and built up a 'thriving business'. Beneath two pictures 
of Hogg - before and after Margaret's death (see Plate 4) - the 
report included life history evidence that Hogg was a real life hero: 
Hogg was in the news 11 years ago when he was a pilot for 
Court Line, the holiday firm, and made a 'moonlit flight' from 
Canada with 400 passengers and crew after the airline went 
bust. 
When he heard of the failure, he decided that as the 
Canadian authorities might try to impound the aircraft, he 
should get out quickly. 
(Guardian, 1985, March 11) 
The report also refered to the 'two mistakes (which) helped trap him': 
The plastic sheeting had the name Guildford printed on it, 
directing police attention to the South East, and he left his 
wife's wedding ring on her finger. Inside the band was the 
inscription "Margaret 15-11-63 Peter" - their names and the 
wedding date - which finally clinched identification. 
(Guardian, 1985, March 11). 
The description of the discovery of Hogg's crime contrasted his 
careful planning with the forensic power of the law. His discovery 
looked like it was due to his oversight or just 'bad luck'. 
In the last few paragraphs of the report the idea of his 'bad luck' 
was expanded on so that he became a man with his life ruined: 
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The decision to dispose of the body was based on his love for 
his two sons, who were his life. Hogg "an extremely able pilot" 
had lost his job and £90,000, his salary over the last three 
years of his service. 
There was only old age ahead of him, with very little 
chance of earning more money, said Mr Black. 
(Guardian, 1985, March 11). 
Hogg had changed places with his wife as victim. 
The local press that weekend also published Hogg's account of his 
victimisation and financial loss. Hogg was reported to have said to 
a local reporter: 
"I have lost a well paid job and my career in flying is probably 
finished. I have paid a 'fine' of more than £100,000" 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, March 15). 
His bad luck was here made into a headline: 
I felt no relief only regret that it had been found after all 
these years. 
"I had the most awful shock when the police arrived. I hadn't 
seen any reports of a body being found or the articles in the 
Press asking for information about the wedding ring. « Peter 
Hogg denied he had any feelings of relief that his secret which 
had lain at. the bottom of Wast Water had at last been 
discovered. "No I felt no relief, only regret that it had been 
found after all these years. Some people say it was bad luck. 
I believe it was bloody awful luck. " But he admits even if he 
had known the police suspected him he would not have made a 
run for it. "How could I, there is still my son Geoffrey. " 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, March 15. ) 
Hogg's 'children' were then aged 19 and 16 years. A photograph of 
Hogg was again printed (Plate 5). Once more this shows the genial, 
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smiling middle aged man. This time he appears to be standing at the 
bar of the local pub. It could be anyone's local and he could be 
any man's drinking chum. Underneath the text refers to his heroism 
and hints at his victimisation by the press. 
Reports- from the trial judge, the Cranleigh vicar and Hogg's 
housekeeper/lover all offer the same conclusion that Hogg was an 
'ordinary' middle class man who should never have been punished: 
'What you did was out of character' - Judge 
Sentencing him to three years imprisonment Judge Thomas Pigot 
said this was the least he could properly give for this type of 
offence (.... ) I am satisfied what you did was entirely out of 
character. 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985. March 15). 
We are all sinners says Rector 
One of Cranleigh's clergymen spoke out this week about the Lady 
in the Lake case which rocked the village. 'We ought to get 
things into context and realise we are all sinners. ' 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, March 15). 
I'll stand by him 
Rosemary Steel, the woman who has been Peter Hogg's companion 
for the past two years says she will stand by him. As she 
busied herself with the chores at (Hogg's house) on Monday she 
spoke of her shock and amazement at some of the publicity which 
had followed the trial "The man I know is a gentle, loving, shy 
man", she said, adding her only concern now was to look after 
the home and Peter Hogg's youngest son, Geoffrey (16). 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1985, March 15). 
A spate of letters to the local and national press, mostly from 
women, complained of the heroic representation of Hogg and the 
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'lenient' sentence he received. The criticisms gave men and the 
press another chance to put women in their place. The local press 
later refered to letters of protest from women readers as 'a torrent 
of abuse' but all were extremely polite rather than abusive. 
Letters from men complained that women were also leniently sentenced, 
as in the homicide cases involving pre-menstrual tension, as though 
this had escaped the notice of other readers. One woman effected 
a role swap and took on the job of 'putting women in their place' 
for herself, asserting that women who criticised the case were 
hypocrites or sexual prudes who complained of 'headaches' to avoid 
going to bed with men (Surrey Advertiser, 1985, March 29). The 
Guardian rounded off its report of the case with the editorial 
mentioned at the start of the chapter, where the fault for lenient 
sentencing was laid at the feet of the Tories (Guardian, 1985, March 
11). Headlining the piece Death and The Airline Pilot the editorial 
also noted the: 
male bias in the ground rules and assumptions pervading 
criminal cases where sex and domestic violence are central 
issues. Captain Hogg's defence (.... ) was that his wife had 
been unfaithful to him. Her sexual behaviour was put forward 
as the provocation for killing her. (.... ) The judge, who like all 
Old Bailey judges, is also a man, accepted that Captain Hogg was 
a good father, even though large parts of Hogg's behaviour 
exceeded what is commonly regarded as good fatherhood. And 
much of the coverage of the case has similarly lacked a sense 
of outrage. 
(Guardian, 1985, March 11). 
For the 'quality' press the case was sealed with a judgement - it was 
more than entertaining: 
Page 444 
From Bad News To Good Stories/8. 
the case is more than entertainment. It touches on some dark 
aspect of contemporary Britain. 
(Guardian, 1985, March 11). 
In the local press the story had a 'happy ending': 
Lady in the Lake killer Free 
Lady in the lake killer Peter Hogg was released from prison this 
week into the arms of a woman he met through the Surrey 
Advertiser. 
The 58 year old former airline pilot was met by 36 year 
old Marie-Christine Pinoul, the French born woman who defended 
him through this paper's letter columns. 
Mrs Pinoul, who ousted formner girlfriend Mrs Rosemary 
Steele from Mr Hogg's home (.... ) last year was outside North Eye 
Open Prison near Bexhill, Sussex, when he left 15 months after 
being sentenced to four years for the manslaughter of his 
unfaithful wife Margaret. 
Her trussed up body was found in West Water, in the Lake 
District, weighed down by a concrete block. 
'Hypocrites' 
Mrs Pinoul, of Godalming, defended the man she had never met 
against a torrent of abuse from women after the trial. She 
called those who criticised -the leniency of his sentence 
'hypocrites'. 
After corresponding with him for several months, the 
couple met and Mrs Pinoul moved into the family home. 
(Surrey Advertiser, 1986, June 27). 
The Killing Of Monika Telling. 
Mrs Monika Telling was shot and killed by her husband Michael in 
1983. Five months after the killing, Telling dumped Monika's body in 
bracken near the Exe valley, hacked off her head which he took away 
and locked in the boot of his car. Monika's body was found two days 
later and Telling was charged with her murder, 
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The press reports of Michael Telling's killing of his wife Monika 
stressed features which were common to the reports of Peter Hogg's 
crime, Like Hogg, Telling's status was an important topic of 
discussion. Gruesome details of the disposal of the body alongside 
references to clever forensic scientists were similarly matters of 
importance. The case was awarded the tag the 'headless body killing'. 
As in the Hogg case, much of the discussion in the reports on the 
killing of Monika Telling concerned her behaviour and qualities as a 
wife. Like Peter Hogg, Michael Telling, according to press reports, 
had killed a woman who almost deserved to die. Michael Telling 
however was sentenced to life imprisonment for his crime. Telling 
differed from Hogg in that he, rather-than his crime, offended men. 
Various signposts in the reports point to how and where Telling 
'failed' as a man. 
The first reference traced concerning the killing started from the 
evidence presented at the trial itself. Whether this late entry to 
the case was the result of a sudden lifting of reporting restrictions 
or the non-tabloid press's oversight of a 'good' story is not clear. 
However, the first report opened the discussion with a judgement of 
Monika Telling's behaviour. The headline read Girl Student Tells of 
Sex With Monika Telling. The discussion opened with reference to 
Monika Telling's sexual activities before her death: 
Monika Telling made love to a girl student only days before she 
was killed by her husband, the 'headless corpse' murder trial 
was told yesterday. 
Julie Chamberlain, aged 21, said the sex session took 
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place in the Telling's marriage bed at the couple's 
Buckinghamshire home in March 1983. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 22). 
Most of the report concerned Monika's sexual practices, cannabis 
smoking and drug taking. The discussion of Monika's sex life refers 
frequently to her lesbianism and to specific acts of intercourse as 
'sex sessions', where a girl student 'ended up in bed after getting 
high on cannabis'. The report left judgement as to whether Monika 
was a lesbian or bisexual undecided. She was refered to as lesbian 
but another part of the report mentioned that: 
(Monika) taunted him about her affairs with men and women. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 22). 
Quotes from Chamberlain's woman lover, Miss Mayers, put Michael 
Telling in the victim role: 
Mrs Telling had an addiction to cocaine and cruelly embarassed 
her husband, calling him a "little rich kid" and criticising his 
lack of sexual prowess. "I saw this happen more than once (.... ) 
she liked to wind him up and humiliate him. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 22). 
The following day the emphasis in the report shifted dramatically on 
to the expert evidence of a Broadmoor psychiatrist. The report was a 
complete contrast to, that of the previous day because here Telling's 
criminal intent, rather than Monika's behaviour was discussed. The 
piece was headlined Telling 'calculating killer' jury told. The 
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language used to describe Telling's crime stressed his pre-planned 
and calculating approach - he 'dealt with the killing of his wife' 
rather than 'killed his wife'; he 'calculated' a 'cover up', 'arranged 
small matters like cleaning the carpets in the house, installing a 
fresh air unit in the cellar, and engaging a private detective to look 
for his wife'. The discussion of the psychiatrist's evidence split 
the decision to murder from the method thereby enhancing the element 
of calculation in the plan: 
he decided to murder her. Later he decided on the method. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 22). 
Monika's sexual 'taunts' (no longer her lesbianism) were refered to 
but they were included with other taunts and set in the context of 
what Telling had said: 
Dr Hamilton said that Telling told him in an interview that he 
finally decided to shoot his wife on the evening before her 
death. He said that he killed her because she taunted him 
over his sexual prowess and his mental problems. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 23). 
The mention of Telling's status made in the report treated it as an 
incidental matter, something hardly worth mentioning: 
The prosecution alleges that Telling, the 34 year old second 
cousin of Lord Vestey, murdered his wife, 
(Guardian, 1984, June 23). 
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On June 30 the case was given extensive coverage. Pictures of the 
accused and the murdered woman were published for the first time 
(Plate 6). In the Hogg case the victim was 'faceless' whilst images 
of the 'genial' offender were frequently published. In the Telling 
case the images of the beautiful victim are contrasted with 
uninviting images of the offender. The pictures published showed 
two of Monika Telling and one of Michael Telling. The images of 
Monika showed a young, good looking woman with some of the 'exotic' 
features attributed to women in TV commercials. In one picture 
Monika was shown wearing a neck choker which held large flowers, 
possibly orchids. She wore heavy make up. In the second photo she 
was shown wearing what looked like embroidered gypsy style clothing 
with an open necked blouse. Her hair was slightly tussled and she 
again wore heavy make up, emphasising her eyes and giving them an 
'oriental' appearance. The picture of Michael Telling was a complete 
contrast to the images of Peter Hogg. He was shown through the 
window of a car, wearing 'smart' casual clothes. He looked as 
though he was about to be driven away from public view, an 
uninviting image opposed to the fatherly/chummy images connected to 
the reports on the crime committed by Peter Hogg. 
Four articles that day described the case at length. In the first, 
Telling's status formed the main topic of discussion. His status as 
relative to Lord Vestey was here put forward as both explanation for 
his bizarre behaviour and justification for the need to use the law 
to punish him. 
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The jury of five women and seven men had earlier heard of 
Telling's loveless childhood as the son of a violent, aggressive 
and alchoholic father. 
As a grown man Telling of Cambourne House, West Wycombe, 
Bucks, had been able to indulge his sometimes bizarre wishes. 
As a second cousin to the multi-millionairre Lord Vestey he was 
a beneficiary of the Vestey Trust from which he received a 
monthly allowance. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
Being 'able to indulge himself' explained why he ' had married the now 
'bisexual' Monika: 
Telling'met his second wife, Monika, when he went to America to 
buy a motorcycle. The marriage lasted 17 months. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
Monika's criticisms of Telling's sexual adequacy in this report were 
used both to back up the discussion of his inadequacy as a man, as 
well as add to the assassination of her character. What had been 
refered to as criticism of his sexual 'prowess' was then 
interchanged with abuse over his sexual 'inadequacies'. 
Even descriptions of the disposal of Monika's body were quoted to 
reinforce the portrayal of his behaviour as 'bizarre' rather than 
ghoulish or clever: 
After he killed her Telling moved her body around the house for 
a week before placing it in a half built sauna in the grounds. 
In mid-summer last year, five months after her death, he dumped 
the corpse on the edge of Exeter Forest in Devon. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
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The readers were also told 'he kept her head when he dumped the 
corpse'. 
A further three articles published that day added more 'signs' of 
Telling's eccentricity. One recounted Telling's family history and 
was headlined Deprived boy was pampered with cash. The second 
described the murder and was headlined husband gaoled for killing. 
The third discussed Monika's Telling's activities as evidence of 
Michael Telling's bad choice of a wife. Monika's 'orbituary' was 
headlined a brief bizarre life in fast lane. All three articles were 
under a generic headline which read Judge gives 'disturbed child' 
Michael Telling a life sentence for wife's manslaughter in 'headless 
body' trial. 
The Guardian offered symptoms of Telling's bizarre behaviour on the 
basis of information about his wealthy family background. The 
family history was set in the context of both a critique of the 
class system and of Michael' Telling's failure to conform to it. 
Telling's unhappy childhood was written in the form of a curriculum 
vitae: 
As a child, Michael Telling was more susceptible to colds and 
flu than other boys, and generally less robust. 
However, he was still packed off to boarding school at 
an early age, and badly bullied by fellow pupils. When he 
reacted by stealing, starting fires and playing truant he was 
beaten by staff. 
He was expelled twice and eventually went to a special 
school for maladjusted children, as well as becoming an inmate 
at a mental hospital. 
When at home he was confined to parts of the house away 
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from the rest of the family, and raised by nannies and 
governesses. 
The jury was told that Telling's father was violent, 
aggressive and an alchoholic. 
He took to running naked into the road and lying down in 
front of oncoming traffic. He also threatened his mother with 
knives, wrecked rooms, stole, bit a relative on the arm, and 
smashed a milk bottle over the head of a local vicar's daughter. 
By the age of nine he was drinking sherry and smoking heavily. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
Having recounted his history as an abused and disturbed child, the 
report then moved on to quote various acts committed in his adult 
life as symptoms of his inability to 'face his responsibilities' and 
the continued indulgence of 'his childish whims'. Some of his 
'whims', removed from their context in the report were not very 
different from those of any rich man: 
He spent a fortune on expensive cars, motorcycles, guns and 
stereo equipment, and took holidays in Monte Carlo, America and 
Australia. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
Two other quotations supported the claim that he had a tendency to 
step out of his class position. He worked: 
Although he did not need to work, Telling took a series of 
mundane jobs in a restuarant, a delicatessen and factories and 
washed cars for a rental company. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
He could not spell correctly: 
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The court was forced to adjourn for 10 minutes after a 
distraught Telling had scribbled a strangely worded and misspelt 
note to his counsel. It read, "You get Mum away from this 
awful trial or I will get up and let the bloddy prosoquter (sic) 
hear what I think off. ' 
Other 'signs' of his immaturity as an adult quoted included his 
jealousy of his child: 
Their son Matthew was born the following year. Telling could 
not stand the competition for his wife's affections, and 18 
months later he went to America to buy a Harley Davidson 
motorcycle. There he met Monika. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
His marriage to Monika was also linked in the report to his 'failure' 
in adult life: 
Monika Telling was a Californian beauty who had set her heart 
on becoming a model. Her habits included carrying a gun and a 
vibrator in her handbag, drinking benedictine and orange at 
breakfast and using cocaine, heroin and marijuana. 
She often joined naked party guests plunging into a 
whirlpool bath on her lawn at home, while her husband sat on 
the sidelines, drinking. She also boasted to him of her male 
and female lovers and publicly decried his sexual prowess. 
Telling also claimed that Monika refused to have sex with 
him on their honeymoon night, banned sex with him for the last 
seven months of her life, tried to run him down in a car, and 
attacked him with a whip. 
Telling sought love, but Monika, who drove a Pontiac Firebird, 
only wanted his money. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
His appearance and behaviour at the trial were emphasised in terms. 
of the eccentric features: 
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Inside Exeter's No. 2 -court, the chubby faced, balding defendant, 
dressed in a Savile Row pinstripe suit, sipped water from a 
green mug or plastic cup and sifted through reams of documents 
in a Marks and Spencers' carrier bag. 
He paid rapt attention, sending streams of notes to his 
lawyers, and only rarely showed signs of emotion. 
Once was early in the trial, when his mother (.... ) was 
giving evidence about her son's disturbed childhood (.... ) On 
another occasion Telling was clearly moved by the unexpected 
appearance of an old schoolfellow from 25 years ago (.... ) In a 
further show of affection Michael Telling wrote a note sending 
his love to Mrs Susan Bright, a divorcee. She was called to 
give evidence about their affair, which took place while his 
wife's body was in the sauna outside. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
Telling's behaviour in court was described very differently to that of 
Peter Hogg. Both men had shown little emotion during their trials 
yet the image of Hogg suggested a calm and controlled approach (his 
'soft tone' etc). The descriptions of Telling's lack of emotion in 
the report do not suggest that he was controlled (He sent 'streams 
of notes', 'sifted through reams of documents' ) but rather that he 
was incapable of 'normal' emotions. 
The trial judge described Telling as having: 
matured very little from a profoundly disturbed boy with little 
or no real ability to control his emotions or impulses. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
In this comment fault for the immature personality rests partly with 
Telling himself. It is expected that he should, in adult life, be able 
to mature emotionally. 
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Like Peter Hogg, Telling made preparations for the disposal of his 
wife's body in order to cover up the crime. Unlike Hogg, Telling's 
preparations were discussed as further evidence of his inadequacy. 
Instead of being treated as 'clever' or even 'devious' preparations 
they were recounted as signs of Telling's almost bumbling inability 
to make up his mind: 
Telling shot (.... ) his American wife after she had taunted him 
about her sexual exploits with men and women. He moved her 
body around the house for a week or so, calling in occasionally 
to kiss and talk to the corpse as it lay on a camp bed, then 
put it in a half built sauna in the grounds of their home (.... ) 
In his search for somewhere to dispose of the body, he paid 
several visits to local graveyards but dismissed them all as 
unsuitable. Then after five months he decided to take the body 
to Devon (.... ) In late Summer 1983 he hired a van, disguising 
the purpose of his visit by pretending he was going on a 
camping weekend (.... ) He again tried a few graveyards, but a hot 
spell had made the ground too hard to dig. In desperation he 
took the body to a disused public viewing area overlooking the 
Exe valley and dumped it among the bracken. 
Before leaving Telling chopped off Monika's head with an 
axe and took it away, leaving behind a chunk of hair and a few 
teeth. He said later that it was because he could not bear to 
be completely parted from her (.... ) A team of Devon detectives 
(.... ) found the dead woman's skull locked in the boot of a Mini 
in Telling's garage. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
The description of events made a stark contrast to that applied to 
Hogg's crime. Telling's rejection of cemeteries was not recounted in 
a manner which suggested his control of the situation. His keeping 
the body in the house was discussed more in terms of his desire to 
be near Monika, and only secondarily as evidence of his wish to avoid 
prosecution. 
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Like Hogg, Telling left 'clues', which were potentially more elusive. 
Monika wore a 'distinctive Moroccan T-shirt' and: 
'dental tests revealed that the victim had suffered a gum 
disorder. Monika had recently undergone an operation for a gum 
infection. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
Unlike Hogg who had been 'trapped' by the forensic experts, the 
discovery of Telling's crime was a more mundane affair: 
Monika was just one of dozens of missing young women who 
vaguely fitted the description gleaned from the remains. As a 
result of the widespread enquiries, police managed to clear up 
nearly 70 other missing persons cases. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
Telling's crime was not made into an heroic event so he was small fry 
in the hunt between the law and offenders. Although much of the 
reports discussed Monika's behaviour as a wife and gave Telling the 
'justification' for his crime, the heroic crime depends upon a man 
being a 'proper' man. Telling never reached the manhood demanded of 
his position. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 
manslaughter of his wife Monika. His first wife and his mother were 
reported to have been 'delighted' with the verdict. His counsel 
George Carman QC said: 
This verdict is important for Michael Telling, to his son 
Matthew and to his family. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
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Justice Sheldon claimed the life sentence would: 
leave it to those responsible for your custody to decide if and 
when it would be safe and proper to release you. 
(Guardian, 1984, June 30). 
The reports on the two cases were first and foremost about men who 
had killed with 'justification'. The entertainment value of the 
reports emphasised the mistakes of one man and the stupidity of 
another, not the horror of the crimes they committed on the two 
women. 
Summary. 
The cases described in this chapter raise a number of issues for 
consideration in this study of the secondary assault of women as 
victims, particularly : 
1. the range of meanings about crimes of violence against women 
offered by press representations 
2. the possible effects of the above on readers. 
As a conclusion to the chapter, these social implications of the press 
reports will be discussed. 
A number of different meanings could be attributed to the reports 
researched. For example, they might be interpreted as 
fascinating/gory/titilating news items, in the same category as the 
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tales of personal tragedy which flow prolific from the press. They 
could be seen to be 'moral' tales advising readers about the 
boundaries of correct behaviour for men and women, the limits of 
endurance, human suffering or the powers to discipline. They might 
offer a sort of Robin Hood assessment (especially for Guardian 
readers ?) of the faults and failures of the British class system. 
The sparring between offenders and scientific experts or those in 
authority, is another possibility. The copious forensic quotes and 
details of cat-and-mouse hunts between offender and the law were 
very dominant features of the cases researched. The description of 
the events and details of dismemberments in the texts might offer 
readers the opportunity to change places with the perpetrators, to 
fantasise their own involvement in the crimes. On the other hand 
they may be seen as tales of the intense suffering of ordinary 
people, exposure of which repulses or angers readers. The texts 
thus gave scope for a range of possible meanings, many of which were 
contradictory. 
The press reports, like legal discourse, separated 'domestics' from 
other violent crimes by way of the denial, explanation or 
justification of the events. Some of the-violent crimes and wife 
killing cases were explained on the basis of inadequate gendered 
behaviour, e. g. Mrs Hogg's domineering behaviour. The construction 
of sexual stereotypes however is a feature of press reports of 
violent crimes committed in other contexts. In the following report 
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for example the traditional charge that women 'nag' was cited as 
'justification' for a man's killing of his sister: 
Nagging sister was killed 
A shy, gentle man killed his sister, a religious fanatic, after 
enduring 20 years of nagging, Sir James Miskin, QC, Recorder of 
London, was told at the Central Criminal Court yesterday. 
Daniel O'Sullivan never answered back until his self- 
control finally snapped one August morning, Mrs Barbara Mills 
for the prosecution said. He pushed his sister, Bridget, aged 
63, to the ground and put his foot on her throat, killing her. 
(The Times, 1986, March 1). 
The murder is described as an active aggression against Bridget the 
victim but, in this case, there is no attempt to construct. a link with 
his sexuality. 
In the style of pornography, the reports of the crimes by Telling and 
Hogg by contrast were drafted as men's fantasies about violence 
against women. They stressed the parts played by powerful, rich, 
clever men who gave women 'what they deserved'. The pornographic 
undercurrent in the lengthy descriptions of the killings and 
mutilations of the two women was thinly disguised by the 
pathologists and forensic experts quotes. Whilst dismemberment 
seems to be an expanding preoccupation in the press, the reports set 
these firmly in the context of the construction of mythical images 
of the women victims - the bisexual Monika Telling, the lesbian 
Monika Telling, Monika Telling the sadistic sexual experimenter, the 
sexually 'aggressive' and 'dominating' Margaret Hogg. The same 
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stereotypical images have been found in pornographic portrayals of 
women's sexuality (see Dworkin, 1981). 
The sexualisation of violent crimes is not limited to cases of wife 
or even woman killing. In their study of 'cultural' representations 
of homicides from the 19th century onwards, Cameron and Frazer note 
how homosexual and child murders (e. g. as by Brady and Hindley) have 
similarly become sexualised (Cameron and Frazer, 1987). They argue 
that the impact of these sexual murders goes beyond misogyny, into 
the area of the creation and maintenance of the institution of 
heterosexuality. Some interesting points are made about the 
relationship between sexuality, science and its pseudo-scientific 
derivatives. The existence of forensic and pathological science 
would obviously make the double dismemberment of women victims (ie. 
in crime and text) that much easier by providing newspaper editors 
with gruesome descriptions in parentheses. The suggestion that the 
science of 'sexology' had an active part to play in the creation of a 
specific category of sexual murders is less convincing however. 
Cameron and Frazer suggest that there exists a specific category of 
sexual killings (hence the book title The Lust To Kill) which are 
distinct from wife killings. Sexual killings are defined as: 
compulsive and depersonalised ( .... ) the motifs of desire and 
irrationality are expressed in a form both mysterious and 
grotesque. 
(Cameron & Frazer, 1987, p. 17. ) 
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Wife killings are said to arise instead: 
from the couples' individual circumstances; the strains and 
problems of cohabitation, the stress and frustration of sexual 
passion. 
(Cameron & Frazer, 1987, p. 16). 
Wife killings thus involve victim precipitated relationship problems 
whilst lust killings are more like sexual frenzies. 
The discussions in this chapter and the preceding one would suggest 
that the distinction betwen sexual and wife killings is not very 
helpful. The division seems to be founded on an attempt to 
separate sex/lust from sexuality/power. The Telling case 
demonstrated that representations of wife killings as irrational and 
grotesque do occur. Victim precipitation (inviting, deserving 
attacks, etc. ) is also a feature of 'lust' crimes, e. g. as in the 
reports of the killings by Peter Sutcliffe where 'good' victims were 
separated from prostitutes. There may have been very little 
difference in Telling's pattern of returning to his wife's body and 
Sutcliffe's occasional repeat visits to victims. 
Hogg's heroism was clearly different to Telling and Sutcliffe's. 
Whilst some readers of the press reports may have been fascinated by 
Sutcliffe's crimes, some seem to have admired them (see Ward Jouve, 
1986), no serious suggestion was made that he was wrongfully in 
court. 
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The reports of crimes of violence against women reveal a confusing 
interplay between gender based sexual stereotypes and the norms of 
heterosexuality. Rather than being less sexual than 'lust' killings, 
it is possible that wife killings have potential to be more 'heroic', 
having the highest degree of correspondence between gender based 
sexual stereotypes and the norms of heterosexuality. 
Alongside personal experience, textual representations of crimes of 
violence against women will have some influence on how the problem 
is perceived, the words we possess to describe its effects or with 
which to assess viable preventive strategies. Newspaper coverage of 
homicides and violent crimes may be the only information many people 
have about the workings of the law. There are however big 
differences between the law reports and newspaper reports of 
homicide cases. The last chapter showed that the heroic killer 
barely exists in law reports. This does not mean of course that 
'heroic' killers never appear in the courts. Hogg's crime was 
described as an almost classic case of provocation. For the legal 
profession it was a mundane event, unexceptional and uninteresting. 
The relationship between representation, stereotype and practice is 
not a neat correspondence. 
Recent debates on pornography as violence against women have raised 
questions about the relationship between cultural representations of 
women as sex objects and the practice of violent crimes (see Cameron 
& Frazer, 1987; Coward, 1982; Dworkin, 1981; Kappeler, 1986. ). The 
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idea that media 'myths' can come into being to be tried out in the 
real lives of consumers may have some foundation in women's 
experiences (see e. g. Russell's discussion of the practice of 
pornography in women's relationships, 1982) but it is not a total 
explanation of the relationship between pornographic images and 
crimes of sexual violence. The' processes of stereotyping and 
elevating abstract 'types' into orthodoxies of practice are much more 
complicated than straightforward copy-catting. Representations, 
stereotypes and orthodoxies of practice are furthermore open to 
challenge and resistance. The final chapter in the study aims to 
move away from description and criticism of the secondary assault of 
women in socio-legal discourse to look at possibilities for 
empowering women as victims. 
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Academic Discourse And The Abuse Of Women. 
Academic interest in domestic violence against women has seen an 
expansion following the campaigns arising from the battered women's 
movement and the establishment of refuges since the 1970s. This 
chapter represents a summary, rather than an overview by reviewing 
three themes in academic discussion - justification, explanation and 
challenge. The final part of the chapter will conclude with a 
presentation of some possibilities for the empowerment of women 
victims who become involved in the law. 
Justification 
Academic discourse on domestic violence against women shows some 
features which are common to legal and media, discussions on the 
subject of domestic violence against women. Emphasis is not 
primarily with women victim's needs but often instead with justifying 
or explaining the acts of the aggressor. As in press and law 
reports, academic discussions have sometimes placed both 
responsibility, and cure for the crime solely on a belief in a 
physiological cause. Psychiatric discussions are particularly prone 
to the assertion of biological proofs. Some have stressed 
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biologically derived sexual differences which leave little hope for 
women's empowerment beyond intervention by medical science to make 
them more like men. Anthony Storr, for example, published a book 
entitled Human Aggression in 1968 where he drew upon the Freudian 
concept of Thanatos, the death instinct, to argue that aggression, 
like sexuality, was an 'innate drive' (Storr, 1968, p. 33). Storr 
sought to make the point that aggression had its good qualities. By 
stressing the good qualities of the aggressive instinct, his book 
consisted largely of a celebration of the 'heroic' and violent 
sexuality attributed to men. Examples of how aggression could have 
'positive' effects were given in women's defence of their children, 
the child's. 'mastering' his environment and man's defence of territory 
as in warmaking. Storr constructed a link between sexuality and 
aggression by asserting that the physiological states of the human 
body were the same in sexual and aggressive arousal, hence the 
reason quarrelling couples often ended, up in bed (Storr, 1968, p. 34). 
As a 'drive', aggression was said to be connected with the male sex 
hormones, and, because women 'lacked' on Storr's analysis, this made 
them less aggressive, less competitive, less intelligent and more 
likely victims than me - Storr asserted that most women fantasised 
about being raped by King Kong, (Storr, 1968, p. 62). On the basis of 
this conceptualisation of a predominantly biological aggression, Storr 
made domestic violence against women women's fault. The causes of 
the problem were: 
- sado-masochism (the over-masculine and over-feminine 
biological types who got sexual pleasure from violent abuse 
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as either victim or offender. ) 
- women's masochism (the 'nagging' wife was cited as an 
example of this by inviting attacks with her verbal 
provocations, Storr, 1968, p. 95. ) 
- women's over-aggression (such that men and women became 
rivals for active-passive roles, Storr, 1968, p. 92). 
- women's rejections. of men's advances (Storr, 1968, p. 99). 
Storr's general theme will echo the press headlines and legal debates. 
Whilst psychiatrists such as Storr argued a case for men's aggression 
as a biological inevitability few psychiatrists would argue that 
criminal assaults and homicides are 'healthy' features of a society. 
Research on the basis of clinical practice with male offenders formed 
an important part of psychiatric debate. In 1974, Faulk published 
findings from his clinical appraisal of 23 men imprisoned for violent 
assaults on their wives. Faulk claimed that nine of his sample had 
been involved with women who, due to their, own behaviour, had a 
major impact on their victimisation (Faulk, 1974). The victim 
blaming theme based upon clinical findings has been consistently 
asserted in discussions of domestic violence against women. For 
example, David Riley and Harry Cohen, psychologists employed by the 
New Zealand Justice Department, published a paper in the academic 
journals which discussed the 'psychodynamics' of one patient's wife 
murder and attributed its cause to the offender's rejection by both 
his wife and his mother. The offender's relief from the rejection 
by the wife could only be attained through her destruction: 
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He was humiliated and degraded by her extra-marital liasons - 
his last recollection prior to the offence was her saying. "I've 
fucked every one of your friends" - and he attacked in defence 
against his own feelings of worthlessness and shame and also 
attempted to wrest by force that which he had felt deprived of 
for so long. The extremely clumsy uncoordinated nature of the 
killing (he had trained and served in the army as a commando), 
coupled with the emotions giving rise to his actions were not 
adult ones, but rather repressed feelings from an infantile 
level (.... ) a year prior to the offence (the offender) had 
become impotent, a symptom which was associated with the 
deterioration of his marital relationship. Relief from this was 
only achieved after retrieval of the feelings he experienced at 
the time of the killing. The significance of this feature of 
his pathology and his subsequent attainment of , 
full sexual 
functioning is explained by reference to the therapeutic 
material concerned with the offence. 
(Riley & Cohen, 1977, pp. 27-30). 
Toch's writings, also based on a sample of violent prisoners, 
similarly linked the victim's role in the creation of the violent 
event in a pattern of reciprocal threat and attack, such that violence 
could be habit forming (Toch, 1969). Toch put forward a catharsis 
theory of violent behaviour as well where the violent event was 
viewed as a form of explosion following an accumulation of tensions, 
although he argued this was less common. Toch introduced social 
factors into his model. Violence was a resource used mainly by 
individuals who were 'prone to violence' due to their lack of verbal 
and social skills. It could thus be open to remedial attempts on 
the individual level by identifying the 'violence prone', and on a 
collective level by making non-violent resources available. Many 
latter day myths about domestic violence against women have been 
constructed on the basis of clinical assertion. 
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Most of the research from clinical practice was so dogged by the 
individualistic vision of the therapeutic philosophy that 
understanding of the women's needs rarely advanced beyond a 
questioning of why they did not merely walk out of abusive 
relationships, hence the inordinate importance attached to female 
masochism. The clinical studies show no interest in women's 
oppressed position in society. The clinical studies seek the 
solution to the problem in the identification and treatment of the 
aggressor. The emphases on women's own qualities as victim and 
precipitator of the attacks (see Faulk, 1974, Gayford, 1976) poses 
particular problems. Research by Flitcraft, Stark and Frazier shows 
that victim provocation theories have an impact beyond academic 
debate influencing medicine's treatment of women victim's as 
'neurotic' rather than abused (Flitcraft, Stark & Frazier, 1979). 
This affected markedly the treatment they received. 
Explanation. 
Erin Pizzey and Jeff Shapiro expanded their own theory about the 
violence prone. Pizzey and Shapiro became staunch defenders of a 
pseudo-Freudian masochistic-sadistic theory of domestic violence yet 
they did not give it the support of tacit condonation and aimed 
instead to remedy the problem with the aid of medical intervention 
(Pizzey & Shapiro, 1981). Their argument drew upon assertions 
about female masochism made in psychiatric debates (e. g. Menninger, 
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1942; Storr, 1974; Toch, 1969). Pizzey and. Shapiro's methods 
however give little evidence of any, attempt at scientific validation 
much of their impressionistic discussion being based on Pizzey's 
coercive 'therapy sessions' with the most abused and psychologically 
harmed women victims who visited the Chiswick hostel (these women 
were said to be 5% of the refuge population and were described by 
Pizzey as the 'dregs'). The book contained the most distressing 
extracts from Pizzey's 'therapy' sessions with the women's small 
children where she appears to have effectively bullied them into 
'confessions' about having watched their parents in the act of sexual 
intercourse. 
, 
Aside from publishing lewd and sensational , extracts 
from- the lives of grossly abused women and children, Pizzey & 
Shapiro's interest appeared to have been with explaining why women 
'stay' with or return to violent men. The explanation they offered 
was founded upon biological difference. The reasons why some men 
grow into batterers and some women into victims were said to be 
primarily due to a physical addiction to adrenalin or cortisone (this 
addiction could even be created in the womb). Without any 
substantiation from medical trials, it was argued that these 'flight' 
and 'fright' hormones could addict men to violent aggression and 
women to masochistic victimisation. For a battered woman the 
addiction to pain was supposed to activate the pleasure centres of 
the brain so that only in conditions of extreme violence would she be 
able to orgasm. I As in the clinical studies, violent, aggressive 
sexuality is an important factor in this analysis. But like the 
Victorian surgeons who urged women undergo mutilating operations to 
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curb their sexually derived 'hysteria', Pizzey and Shapiro recommend 
women be given remedial hormone therapy. 
The explanations of domestic violence against women in psychological 
discourse are essentially of two varieties - drive models and social 
learning theories. A. Mitchell of the University of London founded 
his discussion of family violence between the two, basing much of the 
argument upon biological differences between the sexes (drives, body 
size, etc. ), the experiments conducted upon seagulls, rats and rhesus 
monkeys to discover their territorial habits, and the argument that 
'men' are a product of nature and nurture. For Mitchell, 'men' have 
a genetic propensity to be violent but have to learn how to be so. 
He offered an algebraic equation to illustrate the main features of 
violent events: 
The Analysis Of A Violent Incident. 
Each violent incident in a family can be thought of as a violent 
episode in the human drama of that family. (.... ) Various 
individuals with differing propensities to violent behaviour 
interact with each other in a potentially provocative situation, 
and the outcome depends on the nature of the confrontation. 
This can be expressed in a simple algebraic formula: 
I+S=R 
where I= the individuals concerned, 
S= the confronting stimulus, 
R= the response or outcome. 
This basic algebraic formula can now be further expanded to 
allow for the complexities of the human drama being looked at: 
[I (Pv) +S (p. t. f. )tl Lv =R 
where I (Pv) = the individuals concerned with their varying 
propensity to be violent, 
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S (p. t. f. )T = the stimulus of provocation, threat and 
frustration, occuring at a particular time (T), 
I ]Lv = recognition that the human interaction takes 
place in a given locality (L) which either potentiates 
or dampens down a violent response. 
(Mitchell, 1978). 
Domestic violence against women was explained by Mitchell therefore 
on the basis of a mixture of theory, assertion and experimental 
finding, as being the result of: 
lack of territorial space in modern society causing inward 
turning aggression; 
a bad mix of personality types, 'obsessive husbands' and 
'hysterical wives' , aggressive women; 
personal tension. 
Mitchell's discussion of territoriality is based upon the direct 
analogy between twentieth century human society and the social 
structures of primates, birds and rats. The only explanation 
offered for crimes of domestic violence against women in rural 
villages or, as in Michael Telling's case, in country mansions rests 
on the assertion that some individuals require more territorial space. 
Like most academic theorists concerned predominantly with the 
individual aberrations of clinical practice, Mitchell glosses over the 
relationship between individual act of violence by men and the group 
violence executed on women. Despite the emphasis upon learned 
aggression, what is judged to be 'provocation' or 'frustration' are 
largely social, gendered, issues. Mitchell himself classified a 
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husband hitting a 'nagging' wife as legitimate violence. Some of his 
'theory' was little more than old 'fashioned sexism: 
Women may be just as violent but in less physical ways, by 
spite, by nagging, by neglect and by what is loosely called 
"mental cruelty". 
(Mitchell, 1978, p. 36). 
Social learning theorists tend to place more stress upon the 
possibility of changing things. If a problem is socially learned it 
can, after all be unlearned, primarily by attacking its creation in 
nurture. P. D. Scott argued that domestic violence against women 
was no different in many respects than other types of 'social 
deviance' (Scott, 1974). Battering men according to Scott were part 
of a violent subculture which perpetuated the problem of 'failed 
adaptation'. 
In her work based upon interviews with 100 women drawn from clinical 
practice, Leonore Walker also emphasised an explanation on the basis 
of the mixture of sociological and psychological variables (Walker, 
1977). Walker criticised the assertions made by her colleagues in 
the field regards abused women's masochistic tendencies and the 
biologically reductionist arguments based upon drives and innate 
aggression. Walker argued that as men learn violence, battered 
women learn to be 'helpless'. Drawing upon Seligman's experiments in 
the late 1960s, where dogs and new born rats were tortured with 
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electric shocks in order to test their reactions to repetitive 
violence, Walker argued that, like the animals in the 'experiments', 
men, or more commonly women, could learn to be 'helpless'. Walker 
argued that battered women could be 'over-socialised' into pa! SLvity 
before even starting their relationships, they were unable to leave 
violent men because they truly believed it is impossible to escape: 
The sex role socialisation process may be responsible for the 
learned helplessness behaviour seen in adult women, specifically 
battered women. They learn that their voluntary responses 
really don't make that much difference in what happens to them 
(.... ) Like Seligman's dogs, they need to be shown the way out 
repeatedly before change is possible. 
(Walker, 1977, pp. 528-529). 
It may be impossible to argue women have to be shown out repeatedly 
if their attempts to obtain relief are so often frustrated. Whilst 
25% of the women Walker interviewed were abused as children, 75% had 
what she called a 'dresden doll' upbringing in which they learned to 
be passive. Walker described three stages in violent events - 
tension, violence and loving forgiveness - as contributing to women's 
beliefs that they must try to preserve their marriages due to the 
belief that their husbands might change. 
Walker's arguments kept the focus upon women's role in violent 
relationships at the same time as rejecting the orthodox claims that 
stressed female masochism etc. She differs from her colleagues in 
that her main aim. is to emphasise the effects of violent behaviour 
upon the women concerned, not primarily 'explain' men's role as 
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offenders. Walker has acted as expert witness in battered women's 
legal cases in the USA. 
Sociological Discussions. 
In the discussions from clinical practice, domestic violence against 
women was described as either personally gratifying for the offender, 
or deviant. Sociological discussions have attempted to address the 
possibility that domestic violence against women is not deviant but 
socially acceptable. Researchers such as Steinmetz, Straus and 
Gelles (1980) take the view that violence against women can only be 
explained on the basis of social factors. They take issue with the 
emphasis upon sado-masochistic or drive oriented interpretations. 
Steinmetz, Straus and Gelles tend in fact to drop the 
sexuality/violence hot potato altogether. They have consistently 
argued that, by themselves, sexual relations and violence against 
women offer an indequate explanation (Steinmetz, Straus & Gelles, 
1980; Gelles, 1980). The American sociologist Goode put forward the 
idea that force and violence could be seen to be resources (Goode, 
1971). Goode argued that all social systems rest upon some degree 
of force or its threat. Children were socialised into its use and 
this would vary from culture to culture. Goode in fact argued that 
not only 'mothers' but also Catholics and Jews would be'more tolerant 
of aggression aimed at them due to their cultural differences. For 
Goode, the more resources a person has, the more force s/he can use 
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although s/he will not need in fact to use. them so much. Violence 
was used mainly by the powerless as a last resort. On this analysis 
violent men would tend again to be those with low job prestige and 
low incomes. 
Murray Straus's 'General Systems' theory attempted to account for 
violence in the home on the basis of a purposive, goal, seeking, 
adaptive system. Violence was'argued to be system 'output' rather 
than individual pathology. The system could have positive feedback 
creating an upward spiral of violence and 'negative feedback' reducing 
it (Gelles, 1980). As part of 'a research team, Steinmetz, Straus 
and Gelles similarly argued a social function for domestic violence 
against women. They rejected interpretations of domestic violence as 
predominantly working class phenomena, the result of mental illness 
and catharsis. Explanation was sought in terms of a multivariate 
resource model where resource lack (money, etc. ) lead to frustration 
and violence. Straus, Steinmetz and Gelles drew upon their survey of 
'interspousal' violence amongst 2,143 couples and link the 
multivariate resource model to factors such as the intergenerational 
'transmission' of violence, socio-economic status (affecting women's 
ability to leave etc. ), stress (job loss, poverty etc. ). They used a 
scale called the Conflict Tactics Scale to measure 'interspousal' 
violence amongst 2,143 couples. - The magnitude of the sample and 
the rigorously scientific modes of analysis has resulted, as Pagelow 
points out, in a situation where 
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general recognition is given to Straus, Gelles or Steinmetz as 
the leading experts on this form of violence. 
(Pagelow, 1981, p. 25. ) 
Gelles', Straus' and Steinmetz's results showed the widespread nature 
of the problem of domestic violence but had a number of inconsistent 
results which arose from problems with the scale. The research 
totally excluded sexual violence and its threat and furthermore 
classified the acts on wholly, 'objective' lines which neglected to 
record the actual damage done to the victims. A light push by a 
small person may be less damaging than a strong push by a heavy one. 
The scale furthermore did not distinguish violence used in defense 
from that used in attack. The results showed that 28% of the 
sample reported violence having occured at some time during the 
course of their man ages. Men and women were said to have obtained 
'equal' scores in their use of violence but controvemy over this point 
continued amongst the researchers for several years (see Gelles 
1980). Women's use of 'verbal aggression' was ranked as equal to 
men's scores of physical violence. Steinmetz, Straus and Gelles' 
framework assumes domestic violence is a 'complicated' problem 
requiring further research. 
Challenge. 
Feminist discussions of domestic violence against women begin from 
the perspective of a challenge. The starting point for many 
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feminists discussions of violence against women has been with an 
attack upon the 'myths' surrounding the problem. Like other 
researchers, feminists have taken issue with and challenged 
stereotypical assumptions about domestic violence against women - 
that it is a 'private' matter, a problem which-only occurs when 
individuals are mentally ill, drunk, working class or stressed. The 
question 'why don't women leave' , which preoccupied the clinical 
discussions, was turned on its head by the research based upon 
interviews with women in refuges to read 'what prevents them from 
leaving' (see Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981; Dobash & Dobash, 1980; 
Evason, 19882; Homer, Leonard & Taylor, 1984; ), These surveys, which 
aimed to allow the women to 'speak', showed that most women do try 
to leave time and time again but are prevented from doing so by lack 
of advice, resources, housing or financial support. For many women 
dependence upon-individual men or upon the state is the only choice 
available. In the absence of state support there may- be no escape. 
Marriage saving and non-interventionist ideologies are emphasised in 
these studies as explaining why it is so'difficult for women to leave 
violent relationships. In the study by Binney, Harkell and Nixon 
(1981) 70% of the sample of 636 women had approached between 4 and 
13 different sources -to obtain help or advice on leaving. A total 
of 3,090, agency consultations had been made but half of these were 
rated by the women as being of no use. 
In 1980 Russell and Rebecca Dobash published the findings of their 
research into domestic violence against women based upon historical 
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discussion, statistical research upon court and police records and 
interviews with women victims drawn from the refuge population in 
Scotland. On the basis of this work, Dobash and Dobash found 25% of 
violent crime reported to theI police and courts was wife assault. 
They urged for a broadening of theoretical debate claiming it was 
impossible to understand domestic violence against women unless 
discussions were set in the context of men's patriarchal domination 
of women. In this and their subsequent work they challenged 
institutional support for the abuse of women given by the caring 
profeEaons and the law (Dobash & Dobash, 1977; 1980; 1982). 
Writers such as Brownmiller (1975) and Medea & Thompson (1974) 
identified the contribution of male sexual violence to the 
maintenance of patriarchy throughout history and under capitalism. 
As in the psychiatric discussions, sexuality, agggression and violence 
are argued to be linked as the primary component of masculinity in a 
number of societies. 'Normal' heterosexual intercourse and rape are 
joined on a continuum which differs rather in degree than quality. 
Brownmiller employed some of the principles of biological determinism, 
comparing men and women to apes but arguing that men prey on women 
as well as protect them. Femininity, socially constructed as the 
complement of masculinity, not only undermines women's capacity for 
sexual and social self-determination but also increases their physical 
and psychological vulnerability to attack. Expanding the discussion 
to the law the failure of men and the law to give women legal 
redress could be argued to be part of 'male terrorism', a secondary 
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assault. As fear and threat are seen to be as important as the 
actual use of violent assault, these writers execute a shift in the 
debate from 'drive bursting' sexual violence. The concern is with 
power and the domination of women, not violence as an aberrent act. 
In the 1980s feminist descriptions explored ideological and cultural 
practices and the part these played in maintaining the abuse of 
women. Heterosexuality, monogamy, motherhood, the public/private 
dichotomy were held to contribute to male supremacy and capitalist 
patriarchy. Judicial and professional responses to wife battering 
said to deny, excuse or justify male violence and attribute blame 
instead to the victims and sometimes even to the feminist movement. 
Recent work links all forms of male violence against women with 
other abuses and exploitations and the underlying struggle by men to 
retain and reinforce their dominant position as a group over women. 
On this analysis patriarchal social relations rely on different modes 
of exerting power and control over women under different socio- 
historical conditions. (see Young & Harris, 1978). The sexualisation 
of the relationship between men and women became a major form of 
social control over them. Rich (1981) and Barry (1979) argued 
that heterosexuality should be studied as a political institution. 
Although feminist discussions link sexuality and violence, violence is 
argued to be socially produced and socially legitimated rather than 
biologically driven by innate male factors. Catherine MacKinnon 
claimed that sexuality was the primary social sphere of male power 
(MacKinnon, 1982 & 1983). She argue. 1 that sexual violence and 
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heterosexaulity were an 'eroticisation of dominance'. Sexuality 
cannot be separated from power but the power is fundamental. 
MacKinnon's state is an institutionalised agency of male control over 
women and women's sexuality. The law holds up male rights and 
interests at the same time as claiming to be objective, abstract and 
neutral in the adjudication of its cases. Feminist struggles with 
the law need therefore. to involve not only the pragmatic 
implementation of amendments but a critique of the manner in which 
the law 'objectively' supports violence against women. 
Empowerment. 
How is it possible to empower women in a legal system which 
'objectively', 'reasonably' and 'fairly' justifies, explains and 
mystifies violence against women whilst the press celebrates the 
deed ? The struggle for women's empowerment will not be easy. As 
struggles against socially constructed relations between men and 
women, women's struggles against domestic violence will necessarily 
continue on a number of levels - providing alternative strategies of 
intervention (rape crisis centres, refuges, etc), campaigning for 
better legal and economnic provisions, education, etc. It is perhaps 
trite to point out that the law alone will not bring women equality, 
especially if legal energies are expended on creating the very 
relations of sexual 'dominance feminism seeks to 'eradicate (see Tong, 
1984). Only a combination of theoretical work, political action and 
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attempts at social change can women's oppression be understood and 
eventually overcome. Ultimately one aim of the battered women's 
movement must be to remove the need for women's contact with the 
law. The requirement that women negotiate a personal freedom from 
domestic violence is an anathema to a just society. The experiences 
of the women surveyed, along with the results of other peoples' 
research (Binney, Harkell & Nixon, 1981: Dobash & Dobash, 1980; Homer, 
Leonard & Taylor, 1984) showed that in their attempts to obtain 
legal satisfaction women victims of domestic violence are frequently 
frustrated, delayed and diverted. Others went to court merely to 
placate the whims of public bodies such as housing authorities. 
With more adequate enforcement, welfare and housing provision the 
numbers of women having to contact the law could be cut. One 
practical remedy would be to attach powers of arrest to all 
injunctions. There is no viable reason for not attaching powers of 
arrest to all injunctions. The provision of emergency protection for 
women is inadequate. 
I think the police should be more helpful. The police should 
be more on the woman's side than on the man's. And I think 
there should be more refuges open. 
(Nell). 
More refuges and a committment of the police to enforcement and 
intervention would improve provision for emergency protection. 
Refuges offer protection, information, support and the opportunity for 
women to make decisions for themselves. Government committment to 
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the funding of a larger independent network of Womens Aid refuges is 
needed.. More readily available information on remedies, automatic 
legal aid for injunction cases and training for solicitors could 
remove some of women's frustration in the law. 
Although there are contradictions and problems in the use of legal 
remedies few but the most ardent believers in a 'withering away' of 
state control would argue that the need for legal intervention will 
totally disappear. The empowerment of women in the law is dependent 
upon the redistribution of control over the legal process. 
Struggles with the law which attempt to challenge the institution of 
heterosexuality, by e. g. removing the rape in marriage bar, are 
important concerns. Bringing more women into the law could have 
beneficial effects. A number of the women surveyed claimed women 
solicitors were more understanding and better able to represent their 
needs. Although some argued that women solicitors and police 
officers could be just as bad as the men. Women in male dominated 
professions may have to become better men than men to survive. 
There would undoubtedly be dramatic changes if the legal profession 
were more representative of sex, race and class differences. On the 
interpersonal level many women found talking to men about their 
experiences of violence very difficult. Solicitors' use of women 
legal executives in busy practices could help women overcome their 
feelings of guilt and fear. 
Having more female solicitors and judges may be better but the 
whole thing about putting the victim on trial should be 
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abolished. If you didn't have to go to court it would be 
better. I'm sure no one believes you. You have to prove 
everything to solicitors as well. It is too complicated and 
they do not explain things - you have to ask. 
(Laura). 
The women expressed opinions on how the legal procedures could 
better represent their needs. The representation of women's needs in 
legal discourse is neither a straightforward nor an impartial matter. 
They should change the way they handle it. Solicitors should be 
less forceful. They try and push you into doing the case their 
way. 
(Karen). 
Verbatim drafting, rereading and explanation would allow women more 
control. Some of the women expressed the opinion that a less 
adverserial approach, allowing women to put their own cases, a family 
court in an informal and special building would improve matters: 
It would be better if it was possible to have things settled in 
a special building rather than a court. Somewhere more relaxed 
where they could talk to you before you go in and prepare you 
for it. So you could have more time and not feel you're on a 
conveyor belt. They either whip you in and out or its long and 
drawn out. 
(Janine). 
The women's emphasis upon informality however did not necessarily 
mean they would opt for a conciliatory settlement. The conci]Htory 
trend was agreed to in principle by most of the women, mainly due to 
its informality and emphasis upon individuals talking things through 
Page 483 
Academic Discourse And The Abuse Of Women/9. 
with an arbitrator. Some women had experiences of conciliatory 
intervention which led then to conclude that it was as bad as, if not 
worse than adverserial neglect. 
Conciliation may have helped but I am doubtful that he would 
have bothered to go to such a scheme. He would not cooperate. 
It depends on how reasonable the man concerned is. 
(Eliza). 
Conciliation should not go on. , It is really bad. More 
informality in court would help but it is only cosmetic. It 
would not stop them putting the victim on trial. Middle class 
judges are so out of touch. How can they understand what a 
working class woman feels ? 
(Laura) 
I can't think of anything worse than, sitting with a conciliator. 
It would have put pressure on me. I would feel I am wrong, I 
should try harder. 
(Karen). 
The conciliation service in this area is run by old fuddies. 
(My husband) misused this system and his lawyers cited things 
the-service had said about the marriage which were false. 
(Harriet). 
Unless the way in which domestic violence against women is explained, 
justified and made a secondary concern is challenged, whether 
administered by conciliators or judges, the law will have little 
impact upon the empowerment of women. An emphasis upon the 
effects of the decision upon the woman should be a primary concern. 
At present references' to the effects are nearly always second place. 
The successes of the refuge movement show that the empowerment of 
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women victims is more likely to result when their needs are 
prioritised rather than through the reforms of what is already 
available (see Schecter, 1982). There are other areas where 
challenges can be made. 
We need financial reform for women before divorce. If women 
had rights to property and income before the breakdown there 
would be no problems on divorce. Women have no rights at all 
at present during the marriage. The only other solution would 
be for women not to have children and that is not a very nice 
prognosis. 
(Harriet). 
In redis yib*uting control it is necessary to ensure that the state 
does not merely take over control as the influence of legal men or 
husband's declines. State intervention should be used to 
resdistribute power back to women not regulate or replace male 
control. 
A. 
Women's feelings need to be respected. The law sees women as 
of no value, as property. It needs to value people for 
themselves - focus on people's feelings. Not like a legal 
machine dealing with spoils and property. 
(Eliza). 
Change may not be rapid but one woman surveyed who had taken 12 
years to find a legal remedy in protection of her life pointed out, 
things are better than they were. 
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Women and law question ný. 4re. 
NOTES. 
PLEASE READ BEFORE STARTING UESTICNNn_? ZF. 
I Zim . 
The questionnaire aims to obtvtn infornati:, n of woven"s experiences 
of the law in cases of Behaviour in'.: narriage and conabitatIon. it 
is part of a study of the recent history of legal change and reforn 
in fanily and criminal law. The questionnaire its for women who have 
experienced one or more of the following legal cases at any time 
between 1969 and the present day : 
a divorce petition where cruelty grounds or cruelty plus other 
grounds) was alleged! " 
-a DIVORCE where unreasonable behaviour was alleged. 
-a DIVORCE within 3 years-due to a partner's exceptional depravity. 
-a JUDICIAL SEPERATION where cruelty grounds (or cruelty plus other 
grounds)Iras alleged ,? k 
-a JUDICIAL SEPERATION where unreasonable behaviour (cr behaviour 
plus other grounds) was alleged f-' 
- an INJUNCTION (ouster, exclusion, non-molestation, re-entry) as part 
of a divorce OR under the Domestic Violence Act OR under the 
Domestic Proceedings (Magistrates Court) Act. 
- an order for occupation under the MATRIMONIAL H014ES AC+S. 
-a claim for DAMAGES FOR ASSAULT (as a civil case or to the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Board) as a result of an assault upon 
you by a husband, ex-husband, 'cohabiting or ex-cohabitant manfriend. 
- an ASSAULT upon you tinder the Offences Against the Person Act by a 
husband, ex-husband, cohabiting or ax-cohabitant manfriend. 
- any other CRIMINAL or SEXUAL ASSAULT upom you- by a husband, ex- 
husband, cohabiting or ex-cohabitant manfriend. 
41 LEASE NOTE THAT 'ALLEGED' MEANS ALL. CASES WHERE THIS WAS CITED EE1 
'rr YOU CHANGED THE PLEA TO OTHER GROUNDS OR LOST OR DROPPED THE Cý. ý.. 
2. Anonvrni" 
Many of the questions here are personal so it is important that you 
do not include your name, address or any other information which 
could identify you or anyone else. When you have finished the 
questionnaire please check that you have not included any nae3c, 
addresses or other information which would reveal your identity. 
(P; -cýteS c--? td. j 
The questionnaire is part of a serious (cne wcn. _n) p j: C. :, ý 
at the university of Bradford. Any reformation rrhtch you proc"_Lº.: ý . -will be treated with sympathy and will remain confidential. RýhF: 
information front questionnaires will be used for the benefit of 
women who become involved in legal cases. 
if you would rather give a personal interview than fill out form_', j time and place can be arranged by phoning- Bradford (027.4 733466 ;:;. 
354. 
3. Filling in the questionnaire : 
Please print (or type) your answers clearly. 
the questionnaire will take on average 30 minutes to compute, but this varies. it could take longer if you have been involved in a 
number of legal cases. if you have been involved in more than or. e 
case (e. g. a number of injunctions, an injunction and a divorce, e ". ý 
please could you provide information on EACH case on SEPER: A! L'E 
q.. uestionnaire forms, marking them "IMMER 1", "2", "3", etc., 
according to the order in which you experienced them. 
Please return your completed questionnaire(s) to 
Lorraine Radford, 
Dept. of Applied Social : studies, 
University of Bradford, 
Pic i and road, 
Bradford 7, 
West Yorks. 
An sae is attached to the questionnaire for your use. 
If you are presently experiencing violence or need help/advice wit-16. 
your relationship with a man, the follow. ng groups can put you in 
contact with people *Y: ho can help : 
Bradford Wonnen°s Oenl re - : `hone Lradford 
Women's Aid Federation-- P;. c O1 - 251 6429zß SRr; oýý'r 
Rights of Women -- Phone 01 ?ßz- 
Woman, aild 2A :E Lci I 
1" What is your age ? "c oy, _ ."., " "yý : ýss 
2. Do you have any children ? yes 
cif 
No 
0 b`öv 
How many and how old ? ................... .......... 
3. In what year did you begin the legal proceeding ? 39.... 0 
4. Where you at the time of the case :. 
Married to the aw-? n D 
Divorced from him 0 
His ' co-mrnon law wife' 0 
His girlfriend 0 
His ex-girlfriend 0 
Living apart from the man. 0 
5. Was the case 
lw 
't rek brýýýe) relev' 
a divorce 0 go to or 
a judicial seperation ] go to p' 
an injunction go CG , 1. -. 
an order under the Matrirýonial Hc: r; es Act i go to gn 
a claim for damages in assault } go `ID 
an assault under the Offences Against the Person Ej go to il 
another case of criminal or sexual assault go to g. ^. 
5i. Was it on the grc azids of 
Ei' 
Cruelty 0 
Crv. elty Plus 
Unreasonable 
Jnreasona. h- - 
depravity 
ot;: ýr gr: =u. ds 0 
behaviour 
bahc, vä. our plus other grounds Q 
It 
T 
Defended ? +=. c 
Undefended GO TO QN. 12. 
Special procedure 0 
7.1. Was the injunction : 
trTisk 
Ancilliary to divorce 0 
Under the Domestic Violence Act 0 
Under the Domestic Proceedings [ 
(Magistrates Court) act 
ii. Did the order cover : 
You a 1nne 
You and the children [ý 
iii. Was it any of the following : 
An emergency or expedited application 
D 
Heard exparte (without the an) Q 
To include powers of arrest 0 
iv. Was it an order for : 
a 
Non-molestation Cj.. go to qn 12 
Exclusion/ouster (from house) 0..,. 
Non-molestation plus exclusion/ouster ýj ..., 
> 
GO TO QN 
i 
Re-entry 
B. i. Was your home 
Owner occupied - C3 
Local authority (council) 0 
Private rented D 
Shared parents/friends/relatives . 
'. a 
Mobile hcme/houseboat 0 
: i. i. Was it registered in 
Your hasband/i anfri end 's name 
Your name Q 
Joint names 
Don't know Q CC TO ; N. 12 
9, Was it a: 
Civil case El 
Claim to the Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Board 
GO TO Q11.3 
A i. Under which section of the Act was the case brought ? 
Section .......... 
ii. Was it brought by 
You 0 VT; c, k 
The police 
GO TO N. 12 
11. i. What sort of case was it you were involved In ?. 
"""". "w""""". """"""". """"... """""""""""". """. """" 
ii. Was it going to be heard in 
Magistrates court 0 
Crown court 0 
Either 
GO TO QN. 12 
I 
12. i. Do you have in your possession any copies of tli- rt ný*i. r 
legal documents relating to your case : 
The petition/s ax*. ýý*ýoýis/appZi Cationj co nJ a'i: ": t 
Your affidavit 
. our husband/manfriend's affidavit 0 
?: ffidävit(s) by witness(es) [] 
Doctor's report for hearing 
Welfare report 0 
Letters written by your husband/manfriend/others 
which were used as evidence in court 
None of these 0 (If none, go to gn. 13) 
ii., Please would you copy word for word on the attached sheets 
of paper all of these documents or the parts of them which 
relate to the behaviour complained of. 
MAKE SURE YOU LEAVE OUT NAMES AND ADDRESSES OR OTHER 
IDENTIFICATIONS. 
If you have copies of any affidavits, these are particularly 
important to the research. it may be quicker, if you are 
able-,, to photocopy the documents providing you black out 
beforehand names, adresses and other identification. The costs 
of photocopying. will be reimbursed to you or donated to a 
charity of your choice. Please send the bill in a seperate 
envelope or telephone me directly. 
When you have finished this section, go to gn. i4. 
If you possess some of these documents but do not want to 
provide this information, please continue with the 
questionnaire at qn. 13. 
13. Could you please give details below of the exact nature of the 
legal proceedings, the grounds on which they were brought, how 
the solicitors and legal workers described the behaviour complained 
cf, how they described the result of the behaviour and any adverse 
effects on your health, well-being or sate of mind. 
""""". """i"i! """f"""""""""""""""""""". Y" 
"" 
"""""""""""i"""""1. """""""""\' 
"f"w"""a""""w"""s"""""". u "". """"a"""". ""f""" .t""""""""""""""""""".. ".. 
.......................... 
', 'e SA ect 
) 
14, Do you feel the solicitor/law officer's of 
behaviour matched your complaints and feelings abtut the 
relationship with your husband/ianfriend 
Perfectly 0 
Only partly U 
Adequately 0 Fairly well 0 
Badly Q Not at all 0 
_15. 
What were your main, grievances about the relationship with your 
husband/manfriend ? 
"................................................................ 0.0 
Va""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" S" S"" """""""""""""""""""" 
"""....... """""""". """"""""". ". ". """",. "". "".. ""...... """". ". *. ". """ 
"""""""""""""""""""".. 5.. e... " """""""""""""""""""""+"""". """"""""""" 
16. What caused you to becoine involved in the legal case in the 
first instance ? 
""""f""""""""""""""""0"""00""0""0""""""0"9"0.00""0"0s0"90"""f. 0+"r" 
.. 0.0................ 0.0.0000.0000.. 0.0.. 00.00.0... 6.. 0.. 0.000.... 0. 
................................................................... 
17. How long did the legal proceedings take from start- (going to see 
a solicitor or offence öccuring) to finish ? 
.0 
""""". """""""""". """""""""i"""""""""""". """""""""""""""""""""""""""" 
0""s00"4""""""""0000"""0""0""""9""""9o"0""w0 "000""""""0"""0"""""00 
ý8. How would you rate the way. the following dealt with your case ? 
On my Excellent Fairly Not well Bad Biased No 
. 
T%ck side. contact L+nx°5 /can't 
a1, F 
Po i8 
Solicitor 
: tagistrate 
. lud e 
LCICE staff 
'r 
18. ii. if you have any complaints about the service pl. cvided by one 
or more of the above, please specify them i: elcw : 
....... 00....................................... 0.................... 
.... 0........... 0....... 0.. 0...... 0.0....... 0.000... 0.0.4... 0.0.. 000. 
.. 0......................... 0..... 0.0.. 0.. 00... 0.. 00.... 000.. 0...... 0 
""""""0""""""0""0""""""""""""""""""""""0"""""i"""""""""""""""""""0""" 
iii. If you are satisfied/pleased with the service provided by one 
or more of the above, please specify the reasons below : 
."""". """"""""""". """""""""""""r"""""""""""r"""""""""""""""""""""".. " 
". """"""""""""""""""""""a"""""""""""""""". """""". """. """""""r"""""""" 
(. 
.". """"". ""......... """"""""""""""s""""". """"""""". """""""""""""""""t 
""""""""""""""""""""""""".. """""""""""""""""""""f"""r"""""""""r""""""" 
i 
19. i. Was a doctor involved in your legal case as provider of 
evidence ? 
"Ti 
Yes No 0 (if No to to qn. 20) 
if . Was s/he a 
GP Hospital doctor/consultant 0 
Psychiatrist Q Attached to the police 0 
iii. Please describe below what part s/he/they played in the case 
and the nature of evidence offered, how. they ddscribed the 
behaviour concerned in the case : 
... .0............. 00............. 0......... 0...................... 0 
.. 9......... 0.............. 0........................... 0........... 
00 
""""""""""0"""""""""". +""0"", " .0"""0""0"""""". """""""0"""""+""0"""0"" 
...........................,........................................ 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""". """. """. """"", """"""" 
w". """"""""""". """""""""". """. """""""""r""". """"""""""f""""f",. """""""" 
". """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""r""1"""""""""""""""""r"" 
.... ............. .... 
I 
19. iv. How would you rate the way Lese doctor dealt z; th your case ? 
Not my side ! 0. Excellent 0 Fairly 0 ot well 0 
r; ýx Bad II Biased Q - Can't rate Q 
v. If you have any complaints about the doctor's behaviour, please 
specify them below : 
.......... 0......... 00.. 00000.0.... 0.. 0......... 9000.00.. 00000.... 0 
..................................................................... 
..................................................................... 
............................................................ 
vi. If you are satisfied/pleased with the doctor's behaviour, please 
specify the reasons below : 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""f"""""""""""""""""""""f"""""""""f""""""" 
""""""""""f"""""""""""""""""". r"""""""""""""""". """""""""""""". """"" 
...... 00...... "00...... 000... 00.............. 6... 0............... 00.. 
........ .... ......................................................... 
20. i. Was a welfare officer 'and/or social -worker involved in your case 
as provider of evidence ? 
Yes [} No D .ý (if No go togn. 21) 
ii. Were you able to see a copy of her/his report 7 
Yes 0 No Q. None made 
iii. Please describe. below what part s/he/they played in the case 
and the nature of evidence offered 
...... ......... "......... .1... . ..... J......... a. " ...... Se S" .. SC .... 
........... 0........ 00.... 0...... 1. "........ 0.4... 4.... 0..... 0..... 
0.1000... 0... a.. *... 0.. v0--&0a 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""Y""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 
"""10"""""""". """"000""""00"s""0"0"""0""""""". "0". """""""0"0""""w"" 
20. iv. If a welfare report and/or social work report was made, do you feel it described your complaints and feelings about the 
relationship with your husband/manfriend 
ýTrýk Welfare report Social work report 
Perfectly 
Adequately 
Fairly well 
Only partly 
Badly 
Not at all 
( v. Do you feel it helped your case ? 
No Q Yes Q In what way ? .................. 
............................ 
..................................... 
vi. How'would'"you: rate -the social worker-and/or welfare officer 
dealt with your case-? ' 
'I 
7-ýLk Welfare officer Social worker 
On my' side " :.. __ 
. Excellent 
- Fairly . 
Not well 
Badly .. 
'Biased 
Can't rate 
vii. if you have any complaints about the social worker and/or 
welfaro officer's behaviour, please specify them below : 
""... "". """". "". """". """"L""Y"""""""""""""Y"". 
1""""f. 
""""""""""""""" 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""".. """". "". """""""""""" 
-------------- 
1 
yam : 
; w=: lý"ý 
20. viii. If you are satisfied/pleased with thw social worker and/or 
welfare officer's behaviour, please specify tr= reasons 
below : 
....... 0... 0...................... 0................................ 
......................................................... 0 ........ 
............................ 0....... 0........... 0... 0.... 0......... 
... 0.... 0.0.4......... 0..................... 0....................... 
....... """0. """"". ".. """""0""""""""""""". 0. "00. """""""""0""""""" 
21. i. Was a probation officer involved on your legal case ? 
'r i-; c A 
Yes ( No 0 (if no go to qn. 22) 
ii. Was s/he involved by nature of : 
Your-being on probation Cl 
His/her matrimonial interests 0 
iii. Did s/he take part in the case on : 
a professional basis 0 
an advisory/support basis Q 
c 
Other reason CI 
iv. Please describe below what part s/he played in the case and 
the nature of the evidence offerea (if any). 
................................... .................... 
........................ 0........................................... 
.0.0.0.... 0....................................................... 
". """"""..... ". """"". """""". """"4""""""0"". "0"0""". """"""... """"""0 
v. If the probat-ion officer made a report for the court, do you 
feel it described your complaints and feelings about the 
relationship with your husband/manfriend : 
Perfectly t0 Adequately 0 Fairly well 
0 
Only partly Badly 0 Not at all 0 
Your husband/manfriend 0 
being on probation. 
21., vi. Do yoü feel his/her advice helped your case ? 
Yes 110 0 
vii. How would you rate the way the probation officer dealt with 
your case ? 
'fT; c 
On my side JD Excellent Q Fairly 0 
Not' well Q Bad 0 Biased 13 Can't rate 0 
viii. If you have any complaints about the way the probation 
officer behaved, please specify them below : 
................. 0.............. ............. 0.............. 
.................................................................... 
... ................................................................. 
0.. 0a........... 0.. 0.............. *................ *..... a0.. 
If you are pleased/satisfied with the way the probation 
officer acted, please write your reasons below : 
....... 0................... 00.0.. 0................ 0........... 0..... 
...................................... *... 4*0............... 0 
..................... 0.0................ 6..... ............... 0... 9 .... 
0........................... 0.. 4........ 0.. 0.0...................... 0 
22` i. Were there any witnesses involved in your case ? 
Yes 0- 1 No 
0 (ice no go to qn. 23) 
ii. Who were they 7 (DO NOT GIVE PERSONAL NAMES. IT IS O. K. TO 
WRITE 'neighbour', 'bystander', friend', etc. ). 
""""""""". ". "".. ". ""1"""". "0"""00. "0. """""0"""".. """"... "" 
iii. Please say below how they becäms involved : 
.......................... 0........................... 0........... 0. 
.. 4. *. 0...... 0.. 0...... 00.... 0.00....................... 0....... 0.0. 
."""0""""". ". """""""". ".. 0"0""0"00"0""""""w""4"""1"""""""00"""". ", " "" 
22. 'Iv. Was it necessary to subpoen . rý-- 
.: z1 n""= " . rýrs.. 
Yes 0 NO 0 
v. Please describe below what part s/he/they rayed in the case 
and the nature of evidence offered : 
..................................... 0........ 0.... 0........... 00.. 0 
... 0.0.0... 9.................................................... 0... 
................................................................... 
............... -................................................... 
. .... ...... .. "......... ... ... .". ".... " ...... .. ".... ".... ".. """. e", s" 
vi. Do you feel her/his/their evidence helped your case ? 
No Q Yes Q in what way ?........... 
....... 0....... 4.0.......... 0.. 
................................ 
..... .0................ 0... 0.0.0 
vii. if you have any complaints about the witness(es), please 
specify them below : 
.. 90.......... 0................ 0.0... 0.. 0.0................ 0.0..... 0 
..................................................................... 
..................................................................... 
viii. if you are pleased/satisfied with the witness(es) please 
state the reasons below : 
I ................................................................... 
.............. 000..... 0... 9... 00... 0... 0............. 0.6... 0.... 0.. 0 
I""""""10.100"0... ". """"".. "".. """". 0"""9"... ".... ". """. """""""""""" 
......... ........................................................... 0 
1 
23. i. Did you attend the cot ?ý/ 
ry''" 
r'{ 
Yes 0 No 0 (if no go to qn. 2'41 
f 
23. ii. Was the case heard in Týcý 
Open court Q Chambers 0 
iii. Did you have anybody with you when you attended court, apart 
from your solicitor ? 
No Cl Yes' [7 Who ? .......... 
iv. Please describe below how you felt about the court experience : 
..... *....................................... 0....................... 
........................... ............ 0.............................. 
............,...... ..................................................... 
..................................................................... 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""f"""""" 
V., Please describe below how you remember the atmosphere, 
comfort and general. environment of the courtroom chambers 
and court area : 
..... 
-............................................................. 
................... 
`. 
........ I. ........................ ...... 
...................... 0........................ 0...... 4............. 0 
.................................................................... 
(..................................................... 
............. 
............................ . 
'. 
............................. 
........ 0.......... 00... 0....... 0........... 0....................... 0 
."III/"""""". ". """"""". "...... ... """"""... """". "". """". ".. ". """""". "" 
24. What was the outcome of the legal proceeding ? 
Case won 0 (go to gn. 27) Case lost 0 (go to qn. 25) 
Case dropp3d [Q (go to gn. 25) Case alterred [] (go to qn. 26) 
0 
25.1. Why was the case lost/dropped ? 
.......................... 0............. 
': 
...... 00......... 0.0....... 0 
"... "". ""..... ". """0"""0"90"""". 0""0""""""""""""""""". """""". 9"0"""""" 
".. """... """""". "".. """"""""""""""". """"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" 
ii. How do you feel about the case being lost/dropped and were 
there any consequences ? 
...... ............................................... 0........... 0.. 0.. 4 
..................... 0.... 00........... 9... 0..... 0............... 
0.. 00.. 
........................... 0.0........ 0.... ................ 6... 0.. 
1 ..................................................................... 
Please go to gn. 28 
26. Why was the case altered ? 
..................... 0........... 0........... 0......... 0... 
0"....... 
.................................................................... 
If you switched to proceedings which are also relevant to the 
research, please fill in a second questionnaire after finishing 
this one. - 
Please go to gn. 28 
c 
27. Please describe what you feel were the main factors in the 
success of your case ; 
............. 0.... 0.0....... .................... 
0.................... 
.... 0.................................... 0.0.... 
0................ ..... 
................ 0.............. 0.. 0.............. 
0...... 0.4.0....... 
..................................................................... 
.". "".. ".. """. ""t". "0""". e""""...... .. "......... "8"""""""""""""". 
". "" 
8 
28. Flow would you assess the value of the legal procýýýý: ýs in helping 
you to overcome your grievances at the time ? 
Main remedy 
0 
Partial remedy 0 
Waste of tine Q Other 
Q 
please specify ............... 
29. Do you feel reforms are needed for cases like your's ? 
No Q 
Yes [3 
(if No go to gn. 30) 
What needs to be done,?........ ................... 
....... 0.. 0....................................... 
..... 00........... 0.. 0.. -.... 0....... 
0............... 0..... 0.. 00.......... 0 
30. It has been suggested that : 
4. 
the CRIMINAL LAW could be made more sensitive towards victims if 
the police were specially trained, there were seperate complaints 
and prosecution procedures from the police, there were special 
local schemes to help victims of crime and new schemes which show 
the lawb3akers the damage they have done by introducing them to 
victims or making them do tasks to help victims and repay some of 
the damage they have done. 
the FAMILY LAW could be made more sensitive by replacing the 
present courts (magistrates, county and high court) with just one 
special court for family cases where the staff would be specially 
trained; making conciliation schemes compulsory (where the man and 
woman talk about the main money and legal problems and make 
agreements with the help of a Counsellor before actually getting 
the law involved); and introducing safeguards to prevent conflict 
by e. g. referring everyone wo wants an injunction to the 
conciliation service first. 
What do you think about these suggestions 7 
" "'" ""... """.. """. "". ". "w"... ".... "... ""+"".. "". ". """""""".. ". """"" 
... """"""""". 0.... """""". ".. "0.. 0...... "..... ". """. """""""". ". "0"""" 
.... 0....... 0...... 0..... 0............ 0..... 0..................... 0. 
.. 00................... 0.......................................... 0. 
""""0""... ". """9". """"""""". "0""""4""""""""""" "" """". """0"""""""""00" 
31. Please use this space (and overleaf if needed) to add anything 
f) 
31. you would like to say about how the la,,. - ha: tr`a, te' ycua which 
the questionnaire has not covered. 
0 
CHECKLIST. 
HAVE YOU . removed all names, addresses and other identification ? 
answered all the relevant questions ? 
included any extra answer sheets in the envelope 
for posting ? 
included any photocopies in the envelope for 
posting 2 
numbered any additional questionnaires ? 
THANKYOU for completing the questionnaire. 
Lorraine Radford, Dept. of Applied Social Studies, University of 
Bradford, Richmond Road, Bradford 7, West Yorks. 
